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Chapter	  1	  
The	  Struggle	  for	  International	  Recognition—An	  Essential	  Task	  for	  China	  
	  
世事洞明皆学问	  
人情练达即文章	  -­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑	  曹雪芹	  	  
A	  grasp	  of	  mundane	  affairs	  is	  genuine	  knowledge.	  	  
Understanding	  of	  worldly	  wisdom	  is	  true	  learning.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  —Cao	  Xueqin	  
	  
Anyone	   with	   even	   a	   basic	   understanding	   of	   Chinese	   diplomacy	   will	   agree	   that	   China	   has	   a	  strong	  desire	  for,	  and	  makes	  constant	  endeavours	  to	  gain,	  international	  recognition.	  Compared	  with	  other	  international	  actors,	  for	  China	  and	  its	  people,	  this	  intangible	  objective	  is	  extremely	  important.	  	  
It	  is	  no	  exaggeration	  to	  say	  that	  the	  struggle	  for	  international	  recognition	  is	  a	  key	  goal	  for	  the	  country,	   having	   already	   taken	   up	  much	   of	   its	   time	   and	   resources.	  Whether	   it	   is	   the	   Olympic	  Games	   in	  2008,	   the	  APEC	  Summit	   in	  2014,	   the	  G20	  Hangzhou	  Summit	   in	  2016	  or	   the	   recent	  Belt	   and	   Road	   Forum	   for	   International	   Cooperation,	   the	   Chinese	   government	   is	   commonly	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believed	   to	   be	   the	  most	   generous	   and	   devoted	   organiser	   of	   large-­‐‑scale	   international	   events,	  seizing	  every	  opportunity	  to	  ‘position	  itself	  as	  a	  state	  worthy	  of	  acceptance	  and	  respect	  among	  the	  major	  global	  players’	  (Bolewski	  &	  Rietig,	  2008,	  p.	  83).	  Since	  the	  time	  of	   former	  President	  Hu	  Jintao,	  China	  has	  made	  large	  investments	  in	  improving	  its	  public	  diplomacy	  and	  on	  building	  a	  positive	  image	  internationally	  (e.g.	  the	  global	  presence	  of	  the	  Confucius	  Institute	  and	  national	  advertising	   campaigns	   aimed	   at	   enhancing	   China’s	   image).	   Beijing’s	   ambition	   is	   clear	   and	  explicit:	  to	  make	  more	  foreigners	  believe	  in	  a	  rising	  and	  benign	  China.	  	  
Simultaneously,	  both	  Chinese	  officials	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Chinese	  public	  are	  extremely	  sensitive	  to	  comments	   made	   about	   China	   internationally	   and	   are	   very	   easily	   angered	   by	   international	  misrecognition	   or	   non-­‐‑recognition.	   The	   Chinese	   Foreign	   Ministry’s	   spokespeople	   regularly	  warn	  Western	  governments	  not	  to	  make	  ‘irresponsible	  remarks’	  about	  China’s	  internal	  affairs.	  In	   the	   process	   of	   conducting	   public	   diplomacy,	   officials	   are	   usually	   fearful	   of	   alternative	   or	  different	   voices	   that	  might	   harm	   their	   national	   image	   or	   disrupt	   their	   strategy	   of	   promoting	  only	   self-­‐‑glorifying	   themes	   (e.g.	   peaceful	   development,	   never	   seeking	  hegemony,	   the	  Chinese	  dream)	  (Lee,	  2016,	  p.	  112).	  Regarding	  foreign	  politicians	  or	  international	  organisations,	  there	  is	  constantly	  a	  clear-­‐‑cut	  stand	  on	  whom	  to	   favour	  and	  whom	  to	  dislike.	  Many	   ‘Old	  Friends	  of	  Chinese	   People’1	  like	   Henry	   Kissinger	   and	   Gerhard	   Schroeder	   are	   beloved	   for	   confirming	  China’s	   high	   status	   as	   well	   as	   its	   claims	   to	   international	   recognition—the	   Nobel	   Prize	  Committee	  and	  Amnesty	  International	  are	  both	  often	  criticised	  for	  withholding	  such	  validation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	   China’s	   diplomatic	   vocabulary,	   ‘Old	   Friend	   of	   Chinese	   People’	   [Chinese:	  中国人民的老朋友]	   is	   a	   very	   special	   title	   in	   the	  official	   parlance,	   used	   to	   describe	   foreign	   leaders	   who	   have	   shown	   their	   strong	   support	   and	   positive	   recognition	   of	   China	  (China	  Digital	  Times,	  2016).	  This	  term	  often	  appears	  in	  Chinese	  leaders’	  speeches	  and	  reports	  in	  China’s	  official	  media.	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(Gries,	  2005,	  p.	  244).	  
This	   tendency	   to	   seek	   international	   validation	   leads	   to	   some	  questions:	  Why	  do	   the	  Chinese	  seek	  foreign	  praise	  and	  seek	  to	  avoid	  criticism	  at	  any	  cost?	  What	  is	  the	  real	  purpose	  behind	  this	  endeavour?	  Sometimes,	  China	  tenaciously	  persists	   in	   its	  own	  way	  no	  matter	  what	  others	  say,	  and	  sometimes	  it	  indulges	  in	  self-­‐‑trivialisation,	  akin	  to	  slavishly	  following	  in	  others’	  footsteps.	  What	  then	  is	  China’s	  true	  character?	  Among	  the	  many	  bewildering	  or	  conflicting	  images,	  which	  one	   does	   China	   really	   want	   others	   to	   focus	   on?	   Is	   there	   any	   coherent	   behavioural	   rulebook	  behind	   China’s	   seemingly	   arbitrary	   struggle?	   Do	   the	   Chinese	   support	   or	   oppose	   their	  government’s	   endeavours?	   After	   so	   many	   efforts,	   do	   they	   feel	   their	   country	   has	   been	  recognised	  by	  the	  international	  community?	  	  
‘Broadly	  stated,	  recognition	  matters	  to	  international	  politics	  because	  it	  represents	  the	  process	  through	  which	   actors	   come	   to	   exist	   as	   actors	  within	   the	   international	   system	   and	   take	   on	   a	  particular	  identity	  within	  that	  system’	  (Greenhill,	  2008,	  p.	  344).	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  deep-­‐‑seated	  problem	  of	  international	  recognition	  is	  how	  a	  state	  regards	  itself	  and	  engages	  with	  others.	  This	  book	   does	   not	   intend	   to	   cover	   the	   entire	   breadth	   of	   this	   issue	   but	   aims	   instead	   to	   examine	  China’s	   strenuous	   struggle	   for	   international	   recognition	   based	   on	   native	   Chinese	   culture,	   to	  present	  a	  vivid	  description	  of	   the	   true	  Chinese	   temperament	  and	  the	  sophisticated	  hypocrisy	  involved	   in	   China’s	   diplomatic	   behaviours	   and,	   finally,	   to	   present	   the	   various	   opinions	   of	  Chinese	   citizens	   about	   their	   contentious	   country	   and	   its	   place	   in	   an	   uncertain	   global	  environment.	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You	  will	  see	  an	  expected	  China,	  and	  also	  an	  unexpected	  China.	  Written	  by	  a	  Chinese	  researcher,	  this	   book	   is	   aimed	   at	   both	   foreign	   and	   Chinese	   readers	   who	   may	   be	   interested	   in	   China’s	  contemporary	   diplomacy.	   For	   foreign	   readers,	   the	   author	   wants	   you	   to	   know	   that	   China’s	  diplomacy	   is	   not	   as	   ambitious,	   irrational	   or	   inflexible	   as	   you	  may	   observe	   or	   regard	   on	   the	  surface;	  for	  Chinese	  readers,	  the	  author	  hopes	  you	  realise	  that	  our	  country	  is	  not	  as	  virtuous,	  considerate	  or	  popular	  as	  our	  government	  propagandises.	  
Before	  presenting	  the	  research	  questions,	  below	  are	  explanations	  of	  some	  key	  terms	  that	  will	  be	  used	  in	  this	  book.	  	  
	  
1.1	  International	  Recognition	  
1.1.1	  Thin	  recognition	  and	  thick	  recognition	  
In	   this	   book,	   ‘international	   recognition’	   refers	   to	   the	   acknowledgement	   of	   the	   sovereign	  equality	   and	   particular	   qualities	   that	   characterise	   an	   actor	   in	   the	   context	   of	   international	  relations.	   Indeed,	   politicians	   seldom	   refer	   to	   this	   concept	   directly	   but	  more	   often	   use	   other	  terms	  interchangeably	  like	  ‘honour’,	  ‘prestige’,	  ‘reputation’,	  ‘praise’,	  etc.	  
Social	   psychology	   shows	   that	   recognition	   is	   a	   fundamental	   human	   need,	   ‘a	   deep-­‐‑seated	  anthropological	   fact	   of	   the	   matter	   about	   the	   intersubjective	   nature	   of	   human	   beings’	  (Kompridis,	   2007,	   p.	   278;	   see	   also,	   Fraser	  &	  Honneth,	   2003,	   p.	   145).	   As	   social	   creatures,	  we	  need	   to	   be	   both	   equal	   to	   and	   different	   from	   others;	   we	   want	   to	   be	   acknowledged	   as	   equal	  individuals	   and	   also	   ‘as	   a	   clearly	   identifiable	   someone	  with	   a	   life	   that	   is	   uniquely	   our	   own’	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(Ringmar,	  2010,	  p.	  7).	  Because	  recognition	  cannot	  be	  achieved	  automatically,	  each	  person	  has	  no	  alternative	  but	  to	  ‘fight	  for	  what	  he/she	  takes	  him/herself	  to	  be’	  (Ringmar,	  2002,	  p.	  120).	  
In	  line	  with	  these	  psychological	  appeals,	  international	  recognition	  can	  be	  categorised	  into	  ‘thin’	  and	  ‘thick’	  recognition.	  
	  
Thin	  recognition	  
‘International	   recognition	   takes	   place	  most	   visibly	   when	   an	   existing	   government	   announces	  that	  another	  political	  entity	  has	  become	  a	  sovereign	  state’	  (Agne,	  2013,	  p.	  94).	  Such	  recognition	  can	   be	   described	   as	   ‘thin	   recognition’	   i.e.	   ‘being	   acknowledged	   as	   an	   independent	   subject	  within	   a	   community	   of	   law’	   (Strombom,	   2014,	   p.	   171;	   see	   also,	   Moller,	   2007,	   p.	   60;	  Wendt,	  2003,	   p.	   511).2	  The	   essence	   of	   this	   recognition	   is	   to	   grant	   an	   actor	   sovereign	   equality,	   only	  through	  which	  one	  can	  attain	   ‘the	   juridical	  status	  of	  an	   independent,	   sovereign	  entity’	   (Ibid.)	  and	  become	  a	  legitimate	  member	  in	  the	  context	  of	  international	  relations.	  Certainly,	  sovereign	  equality	   is	   not	   equality	   of	   power	   ‘but	   only	   equality	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   belonging	   to	   the	   same	  fundamental	  category,	  of	  being	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  subject’	  (Gustafsson,	  2015,	  p.	  4).	  
For	  most	  of	   the	  period	   following	  World	  War	   II,	   the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	   (PRC)	  and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Some	  scholars	  believe	  that	  international	  recognition	  is	  still	  an	  essentially	  political	  issue	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  legal	  one.	  Agne	  (2013,	  p.	  103)	  argues	  that	   ‘any	  procedures	  of	   international	   law	  are	  all	  premised	  on	  particular	  views	  on	  who	  the	   legitimate	  subjects	  are’.	   Yongjing	   Zhang	   (2015,	   p.	   308)	   claims	   that	   legitimation	   i.e.	   the	   process	   of	   achieving	   recognition,	   is	   ‘a	   realm	   of	   political	  action	  and	  a	  contending	  site	  of	  politics,	  involving	  negotiated	  accommodations	  and	  compromises	  contingent	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  power’.	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Republic	  of	  China	  (ROC)	  on	  Taiwan	  both	  claimed	  to	  be	  the	  sole	  legitimate	  government	  of	  China	  (Rich,	  2009,	  p.	  160).	  Even	  today,	  both	  sides	  are	  engaged	  in	  an	  enduring	  battle	  over	  diplomatic	  recognition.	   On	   14	   June	   2017,	   Panama	   abruptly	   switched	   its	   diplomatic	   ties	   from	   Taipei	   to	  Beijing,	  which	  left	  the	  ROC	  only	  20	  formal	  diplomatic	  partners,	  compared	  to	  175	  that	  recognise	  the	  PRC.	  This	  is	  a	  typical	  contest	  for	  thin	  recognition.	  In	  order	  to	  win	  this	  competition,	  Beijing	  attempts	   making	   the	   One	  China	   principle	   become	   a	   globally	   accepted	   consensus3	  and,	   thus,	  effectively	  hampers	  Taiwan’s	  official	  participation	  in	  international	  activities.	  	  
	  
Thick	  recognition	  
Thick	  recognition	  points	  to	  an	  actor’s	  alterity	  and	  calls	  for	  the	  acknowledgement	  of	  a	  ‘difference	  or	  uniqueness,	  or	  a	  particular	  identity’	  (Gustafsson,	  2015,	  p.	  2;	  see	  also,	  Wendt,	  2003,	  p.	  521).	  Through	   this	   recognition,	   a	   state	   can	  attain	   a	  distinctive	   and/or	   respectful	   social	   standing	   in	  relation	  to	  others.	  For	  Strombon	  (2014,	  p.	  171),	  only	  when	  one	  acquires	  the	  thick	  recognition	  of	   the	   other,	   ‘empathy	   towards	   the	   feelings	   and	   experience	   of	   the	   other	   group	   might	   be	  achieved’.	  
There	   are	  mainly	   two	   kinds	   of	   thick	   recognition	   that	  most	   countries	   focus	   on:	   one	   is	   aimed	  towards	  power	  status,	  more	  often	  just	  equivalent	  to	  obedience	  to	  material	  strength;	  the	  other	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  When	  establishing	   formal	  diplomatic	   relations	  with	   the	  PRC,	  almost	  every	  country	  should	  express	   its	  clear	  support	   for	   the	  ‘One	  China’	  principle.	  The	  official	  statement	  of	  this	  principle	  is	  that	  ‘only	  one	  China	  exists	  in	  the	  world,	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  is	  the	  only	  legitimate	  government	  that	  represents	  all	  of	  China,	  and	  Taiwan	  forms	  an	  inalienable	  part	  of	  Chinese	  territory’.	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about	  the	  actor’s	  ideological	  or	  normative	  particularness.	  On	  31	  December	  2013,	  when	  talking	  about	   how	   to	   promote	   China’s	   soft	   power,	   President	   Xi	   Jinping	   advocated	   enhancing	   China’s	  international	   image	   as	   ‘a	  more	   approachable,	   hopeful	   and	   energetic	   socialism	   great	   country’	  (Xinhua	   News	   Agency,	   2013).	   Needless	   to	   say,	   the	   typical	   aim	   of	   such	   an	   image	   is	   thick	  recognition—that	  foreigners	  should	  understand	  and	  accept	  China’s	  particularity	  with	  regard	  to	  its	  political	  and	  social	  systems.	  	  
	  
1.1.2	  Why	  does	  international	  recognition	  matter?	  
The	  most	  important	  function	  of	  international	  recognition	  is	  to	  accord	  the	  actor	  (as	  well	  as	  its	  behaviour	   or	   value	   or	   relationship	   with	   others)	   legitimacy	   i.e.	   to	   enable	   it	   to	   seem	  internationally	  or	  domestically	  acceptable	  and	  right.	  Very	  often,	   international	  recognition	  has	  the	  potential	  of	   fungibility.	  For	  example,	   the	  mere	  confirmation	  of	  one’s	  specific	  qualities	  can	  naturally	  expand	  to	  an	  admiration	  for	  that	  actor’s	  entire	  entity.	  Moreover,	  recognition	  gained	  in	  one	  context	  can	  be	  transplanted	  to	  another	  context	  (Tang,	  2005,	  p.	  41).	  According	  to	  Finnemore	  (2008,	  p.	  62)	  and	  Zhang	  (2015,	  p.	  309),	  recognising	  a	  hegemon’s	  legitimacy	  always	  implies	  at	  least	  the	  tacit	  acceptance	  of	  the	  social	  structures	  in	  which	  its	  power	  is	  exercised.	  	  
Based	  on	  this,	  recognition	  is	  often	  sought	  by	  international	  actors	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  social	  currency,	  which	  helps	  nurture	  mutual	  trust,	  consolidate	  solidarity,	  reduce	  careless	  unilateral	  moves	  and	  expand	   cooperation	   among	   actors	   (Snidal,	   1991;	   Wendt,	   1994;	   Kelman,	   2005,	   p.	   649).	   It	   is	  tempting	  to	  conclude	  that	   if	   the	  desire	  of	  all	   the	  actors	   in	  this	  world	   is	   fully	  satisfied,	  we	  can	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expect	  that	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  would	  become	  more	  stable	  (Wendt,	  2003,	  pp.	  32-­‐‑33).	  	  
In	   addition,	   international	   recognition	   can	   also	   contribute	   a	   state’s	   domestic	   solidarity	   and	  regime	   legitimacy.	   The	   simple	   truth	   is,	   ‘if	   a	   group’s	   subjectivity	   is	   not	   recognized	   by	   other	  groups,	   then	   its	   members	   will	   not	   recognize	   either’	   (Ibid.,	   p.	   37).	   As	   commonly	   observed,	  China’s	   struggle	   for	   international	   recognition	   first	   serves	   as	   a	   source	   of	   domestic	   legitimacy,	  and	  the	  main	  target	  audience	  is	  not	  outside	  China	  but	  inside	  the	  PRC.	  
From	  a	  psychological	   perspective,	   ‘recognition	   is	   fundamental	   to	   securing	   a	   healthy	   sense	   of	  subjectivity,	  since	  without	  it	  actors	  may	  feel	  shame	  and	  humiliation’	  (Browning,	  2015,	  p.	  199).	  In	   the	   same	   way,	   being	   denied	   the	   recognition	   one	   expects	   easily	   leads	   to	   uncontrollable	  international	   antagonism	   or	   conflict.	   Punitive	   and	   discriminating	   peace	   treaties,	   verbal	  depreciation	   of	   the	   other’s	   status	   and	   harsh	   injunctions,	   such	   as	   ultimatums,	   can	   all	   trigger	  national	  grievance	  and	  violent	  reactions	  (Lindemann,	  2011,	  p.	  216).	  Tang	  (2005,	  p.	  46)	  argues	  that	  too	  many	  wars	  have	  been	  waged	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  international	  recognition.	  During	  the	  Cold	  War	  alone,	   the	   two	   superpowers	   fought	   at	   least	   three	   large-­‐‑scale	  wars	   (Korea,	  Vietnam	  and	  Afghanistan)	  and	  were	  involved	  in	  countless	  proxy	  conflicts	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  their	  reputation	  (or	  their	  prestige,	  honour	  and	  credibility)’	  (Ibid.).	  Forsberg	  (2014,	  p.	  262)	  believes	  that	  the	  lack	  of	   genuine	   recognition	  of	  Russia’s	   immense	  power	   is	  often	  viewed	  as	   ‘a	  primary	   reason	  why	  Russia	  has	  turned	  away	  from	  cooperating	  with	  the	  West	  on	  a	  number	  of	  issues’.	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1.2	  China:	  Still	  a	  Marginalised	  ‘Other’	  
Gaining	  international	  recognition,	  especially	  from	  the	  Western	  powers,	  has	  never	  been	  easy	  for	  the	  PRC.	  Even	  though	  China	  stands	  at	  the	  threshold	  of	  the	  club	  of	  international	  superpowers,	  it	  is	   still	   frequently	   and	   widely	   considered	   as	   a	   marginalised	   ‘other’	   in	   the	   international	  community	  (Suzuki,	  2007,	  p.	  24).	  
The	  current	  China	  desires	  thick	  global	  recognition,	  but	  in	  this	  it	  faces	  two	  dilemmas	  :	  
1)	  Since	  the	  modern	  age,	  China	  has	  never	  fully	  been	  accorded	  the	  status	  of	  being	  a	  great	  power	  by	  most	   countries	   as	  well	   as	  many	   other	   international	   actors.	   As	   ‘the	  most	   status-­‐‑conscious	  country	  in	  the	  world’	  (Deng,	  2008,	  p.	  8),	  China	  definitely	  wants	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  great	  power,	  at	   least	  in	  the	  material	  sense.	  However,	   in	  many	  people’s	  eyes,	  even	  though	  China’s	  economic	  growth	  over	   the	  past	  decades	  has	   led	   to	   the	  possibility	   that	   it	  will	   take	  on	  a	   leadership	   role,	  China	  today	  is	  still	  only	  a	  partial	  power,	  lacking	  sufficient	  strength	  (both	  material	  and	  spiritual)	  to	   provide	  public	   goods	   for	   the	   international	  market,	   to	   influence	  major	   international	   issues	  and	   to	  actively	  solve	  problems	  (Liang,	  2016;	  Shambaugh,	  2013,	  p.	  309).	  Volgy	  et	  al.	   (2014,	  p.	  63)	   view	   China	   as	   ‘a	   perennial	   status	   underachiever—a	   country	   that	   lacks	   full	   status	  proportional	  to	  its	  capabilities	  and	  behavior’.	  
2)	   In	   the	   words	   of	   Western	   academia,	   the	   PRC	   never	   enjoys	   full	   membership	   of	   the	   global	  international	  society	  mainly	  because	  it	  obdurately	  maintains	  its	  stance	  as	  a	  country	  that	  does	  not	   abide	   by	  human	   rights	   norms	   and	   is	   not	   a	   standard	  democratic	   country	   (Clark,	   2014,	   p.	  334;	  Friedmann,	  2011,	  p.	  10;	  Lindemann,	  2010,	  p.	  151).	  In	  international	  society,	  recognition	  is	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always	  awarded	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  dominant	  normative	  structure	  of	  that	  society	  (Reus-­‐‑Smit,	  2007,	  p.	  165).	  In	  the	  world	  today,	  ‘liberal	  democracy	  is	  widely	  regarded	  as	  the	  only	  legitimate	  form	   of	   domestic	   governance	   in	   international	   politics’	   (Zhang,	   2015,	   p.	   306).	   China,	   which	  denies	  the	  universality	  of	  Western	  liberal	  democracy	  and	  devotes	  itself	  to	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  
Political	  System	  of	  Chinese	  Characteristic,	   is	  doomed	  to	  be	  labelled	  as	  ‘a	  perceived	  threat	  to	  the	  liberal	  world’	   (Breslin,	   2013,	   p.	   322),	   ‘a	   potential	   challenge	   to	   the	   normative	   changes	   in	   the	  international	  society’	  (Zhang,	  2011,	  p.	  242)	  or	  as	   ‘one	  of	  the	  outsiders	  from	  the	  liberal	  global	  order’	  (Larson	  &	  Shevchenko,	  2010,	  p.	  64).	  	  
Chinese	  people	  always	  feel	  that	  the	  world	  treats	  China	  unfairly	  and	  believe	  that	  their	  efforts	  to	  seek	   international	   recognition	   do	   not	   receive	   the	   appropriate	   response	   or	   respect	   from	   the	  international	   community.	   They	   complain	   that	   Westerners	   habitually	   wear	   ‘coloured	   glass’	  [Chinese:	  有色眼镜]	   when	   observing	   and	   commenting	   on	   China.	   One	   of	   my	   Chinese	   friends	  once	  complained,	  ‘India	  has	  much	  more	  domestic	  problems	  and	  social	  unfairness,	  but	  as	  the	  so-­‐‑called	  largest	  democratic	  country,	   it	  can	  gain	  “democratic	  peace”	  with	  the	  West.	  Contrarily,	   in	  the	  eyes	  of	  Westerners,	  the	  wrong	  thing	  China	  did	  must	  be	  wrong,	  and	  the	  right	  thing	  China	  did	  is	  still	  possibly	  wrong’.	  	  
Beijing	   chronically	   holds	   the	  Western	  media	   responsible	   for	   creating	   a	   negative	   or	   distorted	  image	  of	  China	  (Hooghe,	  2005,	  p.	  91;	  Brady,	  2015,	  p.	  51).	  The	  author	  who	  has	  been	  used	  to	  the	  style	   of	   the	  Western	  media	   sometimes	   still	   feels	   aggrieved	   about	   its	   discriminatory	   reports	  about	  China.	  One	  typical	  case	  is	  a	  news	  piece	  from	  the	  Associated	  Foreign	  Press	  (AFP)	  entitled	  ‘Light	   Rail	   Fails	   to	   Fix	   Ethiopia’s	   Traffic	   Troubles’.	   This	   report	   extensively	   covered	   Addis	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Ababa’s	   residents’	   ‘complaints’	   about	   their	   first	   electric	   light	   railway	   track,	   which	   was	  financially	  supported	  and	  built	  by	  Chinese	  state-­‐‑owned	  companies.	  Some	  excerpts	  are	  below:	  
‘“It’s	   better	   than	   nothing”,	   said	   retiree	   Zerayakob	   Assefa,	   dismissing	   the	   half	   a	  billion	  dollar	  investment	  with	  a	  shrug	  as	  he	  waited	  for	  a	  train	  to	  the	  city’s	  eastern	  suburbs.	   When	   one	   did	   arrive,	   15	   minutes	   later,	   it	   was	   so	   packed	   he	   could	   not	  board.’	  
‘With	  ticket	  prices	  from	  $0.10	  to	  $0.30,	  the	  train	  is	  comparable	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  bus	  ride	   but	   the	   light	   rail	   is	   overcrowded	   and	   the	   network	   reaches	   only	   certain	  neighbourhoods,	  commuters	  said.’	  
‘Some	   even	   blamed	   the	   light	   railway	   for	   increasing	   traffic.	   While	   the	   tracks	   are	  elevated	  in	  parts	  of	  town,	  in	  others	  they	  cut	  between	  and	  through	  lanes	  of	  traffic,	  leaving	  thoroughfares	  snarled	  with	  cars,	  complained	  minibus	  driver	  Amin	  Ansar.’	  
The	  entire	  report	  had	  an	  acrid	  tone	  and	  kept	  implying	  that	  this	  project	  was	  counterproductive	  and	  that	  Africa’s	  reliance	  on	  China	  is	  risky.	  I	  truly	  understand	  and	  respect	  the	  critical	  attitude	  of	  the	   reporter,	  but	   I	  would	  still	   like	   to	  ask	  him/her	   two	  questions：1.	   If	   this	   light	   railway	   is	   so	  useless,	  where	   is	   the	  crowd	  coming	   from?	  2.	  For	  any	  big	   city	   in	   the	  world,	  would	  simply	  one	  light	  railway	  be	  able	  to	  solve	  all	  its	  traffic	  problems?	  	  
Beijing’s	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐‑makers	  clearly	  know	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  change	  China’s	  fate	  as	  a	  marginalised	  other	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  but	  they	  still	  regard	  international	  recognition	  as	  a	  key	  diplomatic	   goal,	   worthy	   of	   tenacious	   struggles.	   For	   them,	   the	   struggle	   for	   recognition	   is	   an	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essential	  task,	  which	  can	  at	  least	  reduce	  ‘the	  suspicion	  or	  misconception	  that	  will	  undercut	  the	  cultivation	   of	   a	   positive	   environment	   for	   its	   socioeconomic	   system’	   (Liao,	   2013,	   p.	   553).	   The	  Chinese	  government’s	  own	  argument	  is	  as	  follows:	  
We	   sincerely	   hope	   that	   the	   international	   community	   will	   have	   a	   deeper	  appreciation	   of	   China’s	   time-­‐‑honored	   cultural	   traditions,	   and	   respect	   its	  sovereignty,	   security,	   territorial	   integrity	   and	   social	   stability,	   which	   the	   Chinese	  people	   hold	   dear… We	   also	   hope	   that	   the	   international	   community	   will	   have	  confidence	  in	  the	  Chinese	  people’s	  sincerity	  and	  determination	  to	  achieve	  peaceful	  development,	   and	   support	   rather	   than	   obstruct	   China’s	   pursuit	   of	   peaceful	  development.	  (Information	  Office	  of	  the	  State	  Council,	  PRC,	  2011)	  
Meanwhile,	   as	   mentioned	   earlier,	   any	   foreigner’s	   recognition	   is	   believed	   to	   be	   beneficial	   for	  domestically	  legitimising	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party’s	  (CCP)	  rule.	  	  
	  
1.3	  Face	  Culture:	  A	  Muse	  for	  the	  Chinese	  	  
As	  an	  idea,	  ‘face’	  [Chinese:	  面子;	  Pinyin:	  mianzi]	  constitutes	  ‘the	  most	  curious	  point	  of	  Chinese	  social	   psychology’	   (Lin,	   1936,	   p.	   190)	   and	   the	  most	   delicate	   standard	   epitomising	   the	   ethical	  and	  relational	  rules	  of	  Chinese	  society.	  Anyone	  who	  wishes	  to	  truly	  understand	  China’s	  focus	  on	  and	   behaviours	   towards	   gaining	   social	   recognition	   would	   have	   to	   necessarily	   understand	  Chinese	  face	  culture.	  	  
Face	   culture	   originated	   in	   the	   cross-­‐‑cultural	   communication	   between	   Chinese	   people	   and	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Westerners	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  centuries	  (Di,	  2011,	  p.	  13-­‐‑14).	  By	  then,	  many	  of	  the	  books	  about	  China	  written	  by	  Westerners	  included	  records	  of	  this	  remarkable	  Chinese	  national	  characteristic.4	  The	   book	   Chinese	   Characteristics,	   written	   by	   American	   missionary	   Arthur	   H.	  Smith	  and	  published	   in	  1894,	   is	  widely	  recognised	  as	   the	   first	  work	  of	   literature	  to	   introduce	  Chinese	  face	  culture.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  following	  quotations	  from	  these	  pioneering	  works,	  we	  can	  see	   what	   position	   face	   culture	   has	   in	   Chinese	   social	   communication	   from	   the	   foreigners’	  perspective:	  
‘At	  first	  sight,	  nothing	  can	  be	  more	  irrational	  than	  to	  call	  that	  which	  is	  shared	  with	  the	  whole	  human	  race	  a	  ‘characteristic’	  of	  the	  Chinese.	  But	  the	  word	  face	  does	  not	   in	  China	   signify	   simply	   the	   front	  part	  of	   the	  head	  but	   is	   literally	   a	  compound	  noun	  of	  multitude,	  with	  more	  meanings	   than	  we	  shall	  be	  able	   to	  describe	  or,	  perhaps,	  to	  comprehend.’	  (Smith,	  1894,	  p.	  16)	  
‘Face	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  potent	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  amusing	  words	   in	   the	   Chinese	   language...	   It	   represents	   an	   idea	   that	   permeates	   the	  whole	  of	   society.	   It	  may	  be	  said	   to	  be	   the	  one	  dramatic	  element	   that	  makes	  every	  Chinese	   a	   play-­‐‑actor,	   and	  his	   own	   life	   the	   stage	   on	  which	  he	   acts	   the	  farces	   and	   comedies	   that	   are	   constantly	   being	   played	   in	   everyday	   life.’	  (Macgowan,	  1912,	  p.	  301)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See,	   for	   example,	   Smith,	  A.	  H.	   (1894).	  Chinese	  Characteristics.	  Revell;	  Holcombe,	  C.	   (1895).	  The	  Real	  Chinaman.	  Dodd,	  Mead;	  Macgowan,	   J.	   (1909).	  Lights	  and	  Shadows	  of	  Chinese	  Life.	   North	   China	   Daily	   News	   &	   Herald	   Limited;	   Russell,	   B.	   (1922).	  The	  
Problem	  of	  China.	  Century;	  Wilhelm,	  R.	  (1928).	  The	  Soul	  of	  China.	  Lethe	  Press.	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‘The	   business	   of	   saving	   face,	   which	   often	   strikes	   foreigners	   in	   China	   as	  ludicrous,	   is	   only	   the	   carrying	   out	   of	   respect	   for	   personal	   dignity	   in	   the	  sphere	   of	   social	  manners.	   Everybody	   has	   “face”,	   even	   the	   humblest	   beggar.’	  (Rusell,	  1922,	  p.	  463)	  	  
Also,	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century,	  ‘the	  figurative	  use	  of	  face	  in	  English	  was	  borrowed	  into	  the	  English	  lexicon	  from	  Chinese	  by	  the	  missionaries	  and	  diplomats’	  (Haugh	  &	  Hinze,	  2003,	  p.	  1587).	  More	  precisely,	  ‘face’	  is	  a	  literal	  translation	  of	  two	  Chinese	  words—‘lian’	  [脸]	  and	  ‘mianzi’.	  Even	  today,	  some	  scholars	  still	  seek	  to	  clarify	  the	  nuances	  of	  these	  two	  words.5	  However,	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  endless	   and	   impossible	   task,	   as	   the	   meanings	   of	   lian	   and	  mianzi	   ‘vary	   according	   to	   verbal	  context	  and	  in	  addition	  are	  not	  completely	  differentiated	  from	  each	  other	  in	  that	  the	  terms	  are	  interchangeable	  in	  some	  contexts’	  (Ho,	  1976,	  p.	  868).	  In	  this	  research,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘face’	  only	  to	  mean	  mianzi,	   first	  because	  face	  culture	  in	  Chinese	  is	  invariably	  referred	  to	  as	  mianzi	  culture	  instead	   of	   lian	  culture.	  Moreover,	   compared	  with	   the	  word	   lian,	   the	  word	  mianzi	   bears	  more	  cultural	  implications	  regarding	  a	  person’s	  social	  relationships	  and	  interactions	  (Cheng,	  2006,	  p.	  34).	  	  
Inspired	  by	  the	  observations	  of	  Westerners,	  Chinese	  intellectuals	  in	  the	  late	  Qing	  Dynasty	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  most	  cited	  argument	  about	  the	  semantic	  differences	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Hu	  Hsien-­‐‑chin’s	  paper	  The	  Chinese	  Concepts	  of	  ‘Face’	  (1944).	   She	  defines	   ‘lian’	   as	   ‘the	   respect	  of	   the	  group	   for	   a	  man	  with	  a	   good	  moral	   reputation’	   and	   ‘mianzi’	   as	   ‘a	   reputation	  achieved	  through	  getting	  on	  in	  life,	  through	  success	  and	  ostentation’	  (1944,	  p.	  45).	  There	  is	  still	  today	  an	  on-­‐‑going	  theoretical	  debate	   about	   the	   meaning	   of	   lia	   and	  mianz	   especially	   from	   the	   perspectives	   of	   social	   psychology	   and	   linguistics.	   See,	   for	  example,	  Hwang,	  K.	  K.	  (2012).	  Face	  and	  Morality	  in	  Confucian	  Society.	  In	  Foundations	  of	  Chinese	  Psychology	  (pp.	  265-­‐‑295).	  New	  York:	  Springer.	  Haugh,	  M.,	  &	  Hinze,	  C.	  (2003).	  A	  metalinguistic	  approach	  to	  deconstructing	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘face’	  and	  ‘politeness’	  in	  Chinese,	  English	  and	  Japanese.	  Journal	  of	  Pragmatics,	  35(10),	  1581-­‐‑1611.	  
	   21	  
the	   early	   Republic	   period	   (1890s–1930s)	   also	   attempted	   to	   give	   their	   own	   indigenous	  interpretations	  of	  face	  culture.	  Most	  of	  them	  adopted	  a	  poignantly	  critical	  attitude	  and	  regarded	  face	   culture	   as	   a	  poor	   characteristic	   of	   the	  Chinese	  nation.	   Lu	  Xun	   (1934,	  p.	   129),	   one	  of	   the	  most	  renowned	  writers	  in	  China’s	  modern	  history,	  once	  wrote,	  ‘Face	  is	  the	  key	  moral	  to	  all	  the	  Chinese.	  It	  is	  like	  the	  pigtail	  everyone	  wore	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty.	  Once	  seized	  by	  his	  or	  her	  pigtail,	   one	   could	  not	  move	   a	   single	   step,	   but	  was	   completely	  under	   another’s	   control’.	   In	  his	  view,	  face	  ‘becomes	  one	  of	  several	  makers	  of	  traditional	  China,	  which	  must	  be	  rejected	  in	  order	  for	  Modern	  China	  to	  become	  a	  modern	  nation’	  (Andre,	  2013,	  p.	  71).	  Lu	  Xun	  (1934,	  p.	  129)	  also	  points	  out	  the	  difficulty	  of	  defining	  or	  theorising	  the	  Chinese	  concept	  of	  face,	   ‘But	  what	  is	  this	  thing	  called	  face?	  It	   is	  very	  well	   if	  you	  do	  not	  think	  about	  it,	  but	  the	  more	  you	  think	  the	  more	  confused	   you	   will	   grow’.	   In	   his	   book	  My	  Country	  and	  My	  People,	   famous	   modern	   writer	   Lin	  Yutang	  (1936,	  p.	  186)	  claims,	  ‘Face,	  Fate	  (obey	  hierarchical	  status),	  and	  Favor	  are	  three	  muses’	  that	   have	   always	   ruled	   China.	   Among	   these	   three	   muses,	   the	   influence	   of	   face	   is	   the	   most	  remarkable,	   and	   it	   is	   certainly	   impossible	   to	   know	   the	   Chinese	   spiritual	   world	   without	  understanding	  the	  Chinese	  face	  system’	  (Ibid.).	  	  
In	   1944,	   sociologist	   Hu	   Hien-­‐‑chin	   published	   the	   paper	   The	   Chinese	   Concepts	   of	   Face	   in	   the	  academic	   journal	  American	  Anthropologist.	  This	   constitutes	   the	  earliest	  academic	   resource	  on	  face	  culture	  research,	  as	  it	  was	  the	  first	  time	  the	  anthropological	  method	  was	  adopted	  to	  shed	  light	   on	   the	  history,	  meaning	   and	  usage	   context	   of	   Chinese	   face	   culture.	   In	  1955,	   inspired	  by	  previous	   discussions	   on	   the	   Chinese	   concept	   of	   face,6	  American	   sociologist	   Evring	   Goffman	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  See,	   Goffman,	   E.	   (1955).	   On	   face-­‐‑work:	   An	   analysis	   of	   ritual	   elements	   in	   social	   interaction.	  Psychiatry,	  18(3),	   213-­‐‑231.	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(1955,	  pp.	  213-­‐‑231)	  posited	  his	  face	  theory	  to	  explain	  the	  common	  ritual	  elements	  in	  humans’	  struggle	   for	   social	   recognition.	   Following	   this,	   face	   rapidly	   became	   a	   significant	   concept	   in	  sociological	   research	   and	   was	   also	   extensively	   borrowed	   by	   communications,	   psychology,	  political	  science,	  business	  management	  and	  many	  other	  fields	  of	  social	  science.	  	  
To	  date,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  academic	  studies	  have	  been	  devoted	  to	  face	  culture,	  and,	  of	  course,	  there	  are	  widely	  varying	  interpretations	  and	  conflicting	  disputes	  associated	  with	  it.	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  there	  is	  a	  basic	  consensus	  that	  face	  culture	  remains	  the	  most	  important	  feature	  of	  Chinese	  people	   and	   their	   culture.	   Despite	   its	   dramatic	   and	   rapid	   transformations	   across	   almost	   all	  aspects,	  China	  seems	  to	  have	  never	  given	  up	  its	  most	  important	  cultural	  characteristics	  (Faure	  and	  Fang,	  2008,	  p.	  194).	  Manifestly,	   the	  cult	  of	   face	  continues	   its	  status	  of	  a	  muse	  dominating	  Chinese	   behaviour	   and	   psychology	   while	   continuing	   to	   play	   its	   role	   as	   a	   key	   concept	   in	  unfolding	  China’s	  past,	  present	  and	  future.	  	  
	  
1.4	  Face	  Culture	  and	  Chinese	  Diplomacy	  
Face	   culture	   appears	   very	   frequently	   in	   academic	   papers	   and	   media	   reports	   as	   the	   cause	  explaining	   China’s	   diplomacy,	   and	   some	  Western	   writers	   even	   use	   the	   Chinese	   word	  mianzi	  directly	   to	  highlight	   this	  national	   characteristic.	  The	  general	   logic	   is	   that	  because	   the	  Chinese	  have	   a	   deep-­‐‑seated	   dependence	   on	   face	   culture,	   China	   is	   bound	   to	   constantly	   crave	   for	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  According	  to	  the	  references	  cited	  in	  this	  paper,	  it	  can	  be	  easily	  noted	  that	  Goffman	  assimilated	  many	  ideas	  from	  Hu	  Hien-­‐‑chin’s	  research	   and	   some	   Westerners’	   observations	   about	   Chinese	   face	   culture	   (for	   example,	   Smith’s	   Chinese	   Characteristics,	  Macgowan’s	  Lights	  and	  Shadows	  of	  Chinese	  Life	  etc.).	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international	  recognition	  of	   its	  projected	   images	  and,	  moreover,	  be	   impulsively	  and	  extremely	  sensitive	  to	  any	  less-­‐‑than-­‐‑honourable	  depictions	  of	  Chinese	  (Ding,	  2011;	  Gries,	  2004;	  Ho,	  2015;	  Scott,	  2015).	  However,	  there	  are	  very	  few	  academic	  works	  specifically	  examining	  the	  role	  of	  face	  culture	   in	   influencing	   China’s	   foreign	   relations.	   Chinese	   people	   as	   well	   as	   foreigners	   have	  stereotyped	   this	   seemingly	   shallow	   cultural	   trait,	   commonly	   simplifying	   it	   as	   an	   overriding	  emphasis	  on	  vanity	  or	  an	  emotional	  aspect	  of	  nationalism.	  	  
A	  limited	  search	  of	  existing	  studies	  yields	  the	  following	  commonly	  held	  opinions:	  
1.	  Concern	  for	  face	  exists	  as	  a	  human	  need	  in	  worldwide	  diplomatic	  practices,	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  
face	  is	  a	  valuable	  analytical	  element	  for	  research	  on	  diplomacy.	  	  	  	  
According	  to	  Goffman,	  diplomacy	  itself	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  face	  work.	  ‘The	  ritualization	  of	  diplomacy,	  as	  well	   as	   everyday	   life,	   involves	   “face-­‐‑work”—the	   development	   of	   repertoires	   of	   face-­‐‑saving	  practices,	   including	  defensive	  ones	   to	  save	  one’s	  own	  face	  and	  protective	  ones	   to	  save	  others’	  faces’	  (Goffman	  1967,	  p.	  12).	  He	  further	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  human	  interaction	  to	  be	  conducted	  comfortably	  and	  hence	  human	  beings	  develop	  social	  behaviours	   in	  which	   the	   joint	  responsibility	   for	   this	  comfortable	   interaction	   is	  expressed	  (Goffman,	  1956,	  pp.	  264-­‐‑271).	  For	  Adler-­‐‑Nissen	   (2012,	   p.	   6),	   ‘diplomats	   are	   not	   only	   representatives	   of	   their	   states,	   but	   also	  defenders	   and	   performers	   of	   a	   particular	   social	   order’.	   ‘Within	   diplomatic	   interaction	   orders	  (perhaps	  more	  so	  than	  in	  other	  types),	  a	  central	  issue	  is	  to	  avoid	  losing	  face’	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  7).	  	  
2.	  Face	  culture	  has	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  China’s	  struggle	  for	  international	  recognition	  since	  
the	  ancient	  times,	  and	  this	  continues	  until	  today.	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In	  ancient	  East	  Asia’s	  tribute	  system,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  China	  as	  the	  central	  country	  was	  derived	  from	   the	   Chinese	   rulers’	   self-­‐‑prescribed	   identity	   as	   the	   Sons	   of	  Heaven	   (Feng,	   2011,	   p.	   546).	  What	  was	  at	  stake	  then	  was	  the	  Chinese	  government’s	  constant	  risk	  of	  losing	  face—both	  among	  its	  people	  and	  before	  the	  outside	  world—and	  to	  be	  known	  as	  a	  ‘paper	  tiger’	  if	  it	  was	  unable	  to	  ‘back	  up	  its	  claims	  of	  the	  right	  to	  rule	  with	  the	  provision	  of	  physical	  security’	  (Ibid.).	  In	  order	  to	  highlight	   its	   face,	   China	   also	   designed	   a	   set	   of	   rituals	   that	   secondary	   states	   are	   expected	   to	  perform	  when	  seeking	  a	  relationship	  with	  China	  (Kang,	  2010,	  p.	  56).	  	  
With	   regard	   to	  China’s	   contemporary	  diplomacy7,	  Benjamin	  Tze	  Ern	  Ho	   (2015,	   p.	   3)	   believes	  that	  face	  is	  still	   ‘one	  crucial	  element	  influencing	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  China	  relates	  with	  other	  nations’.	   Nathan	   and	   Scobell	   (2012,	   pp.	   25-­‐‑26)	   argue	   that,	   ‘face	   can	   be	   used	   to	   explain	   the	  uniqueness	   of	   Chinese	   diplomacy’.	   Huang	   and	   Bedford	   (2009,	   p.	   573)	   claim	   that	   in	   Chinese	  culture,	  ‘face	  is	  an	  especially	  critical	  component	  to	  be	  considered,	  particularly	  in	  a	  circumstance	  that	  becomes	  public	  and	  formal’.	  Below	  are	  some	  academic	  explanations	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  face	  culture:	  
China’s	  diplomatic	  cases	   Explanation	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  face	  culture	  
The	  Sino-­‐‑Soviet	  split	  (1960-­‐‑1989)	  
‘China	  did	  not	  experience	  any	  follower	  status	  in	  its	  dynastic	  history…	  China	  would	  feel	  offended	  because	  of	  the	  rejection	  of	  face,	  i.e.,	  the	  appearance	  of	  being	  a	  worthy	  follower.	  When	  China	  is	  unable	  to	  reform	  this	  situation,	  an	  isolationist	  policy	  would	  be	  adopted’.	  (Shih,	  1988,	  p	  624)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Historically,	  the	  contemporary	  history	  of	  China	  normally	  refers	  to	  the	  period	  following	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  PRC	  (1949).	  ‘China’s	  contemporary	  diplomacy’	  here	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  diplomacy	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  PRC.	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Sino-­‐‑Canada	  relations	  in	  2009	  
‘Harper’s	  visit	  leads	  the	  Chinese	  Premier	  Wen	  Jiabao	  to	  make	  some	  public	  criticisms	  of	  Canada’s	  tardiness	  in	  maintaining	  friendship	  with	  China…	  Wen’s	  comment	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  not	  giving	  face	  to	  Harper,	  just	  as	  Harper,	  whose	  advisers	  were	  apparently	  ignorant	  of	  this	  Chinese	  tradition,	  had	  
failed	  to	  give	  face	  when	  he	  skipped	  the	  Beijing	  Olympics’.	  (Lo,	  2011,	  pp.	  68-­‐‑69)	  
Deng	  Xiaoping’s	  strategy	  of	  ‘keeping	  a	  low	  profile’8	  
‘Deng	  Xiaoping’s	  admonition	  that	  China	  should	  keep	  a	  low	  profile	  in	  international	  affairs	  also	  relates	  well	  with	  the	  value	  of	  face,	  given	  the	  risk-­‐‑averse	  nature	  of	  Chinese	  culture’.	  (Hsee	  &	  Webber,	  1999,	  pp.	  165-­‐‑179)	  
‘By	  keeping	  a	  low	  profile,	  the	  Chinese	  are	  able	  to	  guard	  against	  the	  loss	  of	  face	  should	  events	  or	  matters	  not	  go	  the	  way	  they	  had	  hoped’.	  (Ho,	  2015,	  p.	  13)	  
China’s	  diplomatic	  discourse	  
According	  to	  comparative	  research	  on	  routine	  press	  conferences	  conducted	  by	  China’s	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Ministry	  and	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  State,	  Jiang	  (2006,	  p.	  251)	  finds	  that	  on	  China’s	  side,	  ‘avoidance	  and	  insufficient	  answers	  were	  prevalent	  but	  relatively	  few	  direct	  refusals	  were	  used’.	  The	  main	  reason	  is	  that	  ‘in	  Chinese	  culture,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  
preserve	  the	  interlocutor’s	  face	  and	  to	  leave	  a	  way	  out	  for	  the	  refuser’.	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  252)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  In	   1990,	   in	   response	   both	   to	   the	   global	   backlash	   to	   the	   Tiananmen	   Square	   incident	   of	   1989	   and	   to	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	  communist	  states	  of	  Eastern	  Europe,	  Chinese	  leader	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  proposed	  his	  now	  famous	  strategy	  for	  Chinese	  diplomacy.	  Its	   core	  message	  was,	   ‘keep	  a	   low	  profile	  and	  achieve	  something’	   [韬光养晦，有所作为].	  What	   this	  means	   is	   that	  China	  still	  needs	  to	  concentrate	  on	  its	  own	  development,	  hide	  its	  capabilities	  and	  avoid	  holding	  a	  position	  of	  leadership.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Chen,	   D.,	   &	   Wang,	   J.	   (2011).	   Lying	   low	   no	   more?	   China's	   new	   thinking	   on	   the	   Tao	   Guang	   Yang	   Hui	   strategy.	  China:	   An	  
International	  Journal,	  9(02),	  195-­‐‑216;	  Suisheng,	  Z.	  (2010).	  Chinese	  foreign	  policy	  under	  Hu	  Jintao:	  The	  struggle	  between	  low-­‐‑profile	  policy	  and	  diplomatic	  activism.	  The	  Hague	  Journal	  of	  Diplomacy,	  5(4),	  357-­‐‑378.	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China’s	  public	  diplomacy	  
‘A	  great	  irony	  of	  Chinese	  foreign	  policy	  is	  that	  the	  strong	  desire	  for	  
international	  affirmation	  often	  leads	  China’s	  elite	  to	  present	  a	  very	  bad	  face	  to	  the	  world.	  In	  trying	  to	  hide	  China’s	  blemishes	  and	  maintain	  national	  face,	  Chinese	  bureaucrats	  have	  tirelessly	  harassed	  foreign	  journalists,	  their	  families	  and	  friends’.	  (Gries,	  1999,	  p.	  68)	  
Chinese	  perception	  of	  Africa	  
‘If	  somehow	  the	  Chinese	  are	  seen	  as	  losing	  face	  in	  Africa,	  Internet	  users	  will	  respond	  rigorously	  and	  complain	  that	  Beijing	  has	  not	  done	  enough.	  Any	  negative	  behaviour,	  or	  simply	  negative	  comments,	  coming	  from	  Africa	  about	  China,	  are	  taken	  seriously	  by	  Chinese	  Internet	  users’.	  (Shen,	  2015,	  p.	  123)	  
Figure	  1.1:	  Explanations	  of	  China’s	  diplomacy	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  face	  culture	  
As	  is	  evident	  in	  Figure	  1.1,	  starting	  from	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  through	  till	  the	  Post-­‐‑Cold	  War	  era,	   whether	   in	   the	   case	   of	   macroscopic-­‐‑level	   strategy	   or	   microcosmic-­‐‑level	   discourse	   and	  whether	   in	   the	   official	   attitude	   or	   public	   perception,	   the	   concern	   for	   face	   has	   always	   been	  viewed	  as	  a	  factor	  that	  motivates	  China’s	  struggle	  for	  international	  recognition.	  	  
Peter	  Gries	   is	   an	  American	   scholar	  who	  did	   some	  pioneering	   research	  on	   the	  nexus	  between	  face	  culture	  and	  China’s	  diplomacy,	  although	  more	  often	  he	  regards	  face	  culture	  as	  a	  remarkable	  component	  of	  Chinese	  nationalism.9	  In	  his	  view,	  face	  as	  an	  analytical	  concept	  has	  the	  following	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Gries’	   main	   studies	   on	   this	   issue	   are	   Gries,	   P.	   H.	   (1999).	   A	   ‘China	   Threat’?	   Power	   and	   Passion	   in	   Chinese	   Face	  Nationalism.	  World	  Affairs,	   63-­‐‑75;	   Gries,	   P.	   H.	   (2001).	   Tears	   of	   rage:	   Chinese	   nationalist	   reactions	   to	   the	   Belgrade	   embassy	  bombing.	  The	   China	   Journal,	   25-­‐‑43;	   Gries,	   P.	   H.,	   &	   Peng,	   K.	   (2002).	   Culture	   clash?	   Apologies	   east	   and	   west.	   Journal	   of	  
Contemporary	  China,	  11(30),	   173-­‐‑178;	   Gries,	   P.	   H.	   (2004).	   China's	  New	  Nationalism:	  Pride.	  Politics,	  and	  Diplomacy.	   Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press.	  
	   27	  
values	  (2004,	  pp.	  23-­‐‑25):	  
l   Face	   helps	   capture	   the	   interplay	   of	   reason	   and	   passion	   that	   is	   central	   to	  nationalism.	  
l   Face	  as	  a	  universal	  human	  concern	  can	  help	  us	  overcome	  the	  opposition	  of	  reason	  and	  passion	   common	   in	   the	   social	   sciences,	  providing	  a	  more	  nuanced	  account	  of	  human	  motivation.	  
l   Face	   can	   help	   us	   understand	   how	   national	   identities	   are	   reshaped	   through	  international	   encounters	   and	   what	   are	   the	   complex	   motivations	   that	   drive	  nationalists.	  
3.	  Under	  the	  influence	  of	  face	  culture,	  Chinese	  diplomacy	  is	  perpetually	  manifested	  in	  two	  kinds	  of	  
behavioural	  characteristics.	  	  	  
The	  first	   typical	  behaviour	   is	   that	  China	   is	  always	  eager	  to	  show	  off	   its	  power	  and	   leadership	  through	  its	  diplomacy	  and	  to	  seek	  positive	  recognition	  from	  international	  society	  (Shambaugh,	  2013,	  p.	  23).	   ‘China	  has	   long	  suffered	   from	  the	  poor	   international	   image	  of	  being	  a	  weak	  soft	  power…	   Because	   the	   ruling	   Chinese	   Communist	   Party	   wants	   China	   to	   gain	   face	   in	   the	  international	   arena,	   it	   has	   in	   recent	   years	   invested	   heavily	   in	   boosting	   the	   country’s	  international	  approval	  rating’	   (Brady,	  2015,	  p.	  51).	  According	   to	  Hooghe	  (2005,	  p.	  93-­‐‑94),	   the	  good	  face	  or	  favourable	  international	  recognition	  that	  China	  wishes	  to	  promote	  internationally	  is	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  ‘a	  stable	  trustworthy	  and	  responsible	  economic	  partner’,	  ‘a	  trustworthy	  and	  responsible	  member	  of	   the	   international	   community’	  and	   ‘an	  ancient	   culture	  with	  a	   long	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history’	  (Hooghe,	  2005,	  pp.	  93-­‐‑94).	  	  
Gries	   (2004,	   p.	   55)	   coined	   an	   interesting	   term—‘Kissinger	   complex’—which	  means	   that	   the	  Chinese	  prefer	   ‘to	  praise	  high-­‐‑status	  foreigners	  who,	  like	  Kissinger,	  trumpet	  China’s	  rise	  while	  downplaying	   its	   flaws’	   (Ibid.).	   As	   such,	   Chinese	   scholars	  Tang	   and	  Qi	   (2008,	   p.	   67)	   point	   out	  that,	   ‘we	   [Chinese]	  particularly	   the	  compliments	   from	  American	  politicians	   like	  Kissinger	  and	  Brzezinski.	  Any	  trivial	  praise	  from	  them	  will	  be	  expounded	  inside	  China’.	  
The	  other	  way	   in	  which	   this	  manifests	   is	   that	  China	   is	   ‘vulnerable	   to	   lose	   face	   internationally	  and	  is	  hypersensitive	  to	  being	  shamed	  in	  the	  international	  court	  of	  public	  opinion’	  (Shambaugh,	  2013,	  p.	  23).	  The	  Chinese	   ‘often	  seem	  overly	  emotional	  about	  China’s	  national	  dignity’	   (Gries,	  1999,	   p.	   68).	   In	   order	   to	   cover	   their	   backs	   as	   well	   as	   to	   maintain	   face,	   Chinese	   officials	  constantly	   hold	   the	  Western	  media	   responsible	   for	   creating	   a	   negative	   or	   distorted	   image	   of	  China	  (Hooghe,	  2005,	  p.	  91;	  Brady,	  2015,	  p.	  51).	  	  
Two	   diplomatic	   crises	   are	   frequently	   mentioned	   in	   the	   context	   of	   losing	   face—the	   1999	   US	  bombing	  of	  the	  Chinese	  embassy	  in	  Belgrade	  and	  the	  2001	  China-­‐‑US	  aircraft	  collision.10	  During	  both	   these	   events,	   instead	   of	   first	   seeking	   private,	   personal	   deals	   before	   practical	   diplomacy,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  On	  7	  May	  1999,	   during	  NATO’s	  bombing	  of	  Yugoslavia,	   5	  US	   JDAM	  guided	  bombs	  hit	   China’s	   embassy	   in	  Belgrade,	   killing	  three	   Chinese	   reporters	   and	   outraging	   the	   Chinese	   public.	   On	   1	   April	   2001,	   over	   the	   South	   China	   Sea’s	   airspace,	   a	  mid-­‐‑air	  collision	  occurred	  between	  a	  United	  States	  EP-­‐‑3E	  ARIES	  II	  signals	   intelligence	  aircraft	  and	  a	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  (PLA)	  Navy	  J-­‐‑8II	  interceptor	  fighter	  jet.	  It	  resulted	  in	  the	  death	  of	  a	  PLA	  pilot,	  and	  the	  EP-­‐‑3	  was	  forced	  to	  make	  an	  emergency	  landing	  in	  Hainan,	   China.	   These	   two	   events	   resulted	   in	   immediate	   diplomatic	   crises	   between	   China	   and	   the	  United	   States,	  with	   the	  disputes	  mainly	  being	  over	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  accident,	  whether	  Washington	  should	  apologise	  and	  how	  it	  should	  apologise.	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which	   is	   the	   conventional	  practice	  of	   the	  PRC	   leadership,	  Beijing	   ‘preferred	   to	  work	  with	   the	  Americans	   through	   normal	   diplomatic	   channels’	   and	   tried	   to	   publicise	   the	   status	   of	   these	  negotiations	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  (Kan,	  2001,	  p.	  13).	  Obviously,	  these	  actions	  made	  it	  harder	  to	  solve	  the	  problems	  but	  also	  exemplified	  that	  at	  a	  time	  of	  crisis,	   ‘the	  PRC	  tried	  to	  preserve	  face	  and	  cannot	  be	  seen	  as	  wrong	  by	  its	  people’	  (Ibid.).	  Similarly,	  as	  Gries	  (1999,	  pp.	  70-­‐‑72)	  shows,	  the	  Chinese	  propensity	   to	  view	  international	  offences	  against	   them	  as	   insults	   to	   its	   face,	  have	  rendered	  it	  very	  difficult	  for	  reconciliations	  to	  take	  place,	  even	  if	  formal	  apologies	  were	  made	  by	  the	  offending	  party.	  	  
4.	  Most	  scholars	  or	  reviewers	  hold	  negative	  views	  towards	  China’s	  face	  diplomacy.	  
According	   to	   Chinese	   diplomat	   Yuan	   Nansheng	   (2011,	   p.	   66),	   ’influenced	   by	   face	   culture,	  Chinese	  people	  always	  pursue	  vain	  glory	  instead	  of	  tangible	  national	  interests	  in	  international	  relations…	  We	  should	  keep	  away	  from	  such	  mentality	  caused	  by	  face	  culture	  in	  practice’.	  Cheng	  and	  Ngok	  (2004,	  p.	  83)	  believe	  that	  diplomacy	  in	  Chinese	  terms	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  a	  competition	  for	   international	   recognition,	   due	   to	   the	   zero-­‐‑sum	   nature	   of	   face	   and	   the	   West’s	   historical	  victimisation	  of	  China.	  Ho	  (2015,	  p.	  13)	  predicts	  that	  the	  Chinese	  sensitivity	  to	  losing	  national	  face	  can	  be	  ‘a	  potential	  source	  of	  worry’	  that	  possibly	  leads	  to	  conflicts	  between	  China	  and	  its	  neighbours,	   because	   ‘as	   China	   becomes	   stronger,	   it	   becomes	  more	   susceptible	   to	   losing	   face,	  especially	  among	   its	  own	  citizens’.	  Some	  remind	  the	  West	  of	   the	  trap	  set	  by	  the	  Chinese—the	  exchange	  of	  face	  as	  a	  practical	  tool	  of	  bargaining	  is	  one	  that	  China	  often	  utilises	  in	  its	  dealings	  with	  the	  West,	  which	  is	  usefully	  adapted	  to	  modern	  diplomacy	  (Nathan	  &	  Scobell,	  2012,	  pp.	  25-­‐‑26).	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Gries’	  idea	  (2004,	  p.	  27)	  is	  more	  balanced:	  the	  Chinese	  tend	  to	  sacrifice	  relationships	  to	  protect	  face	  as	  well	  as	  constrain	  behaviour	  out	  of	  the	  fear	  of	  losing	  face,	  that	  is,	  ‘the	  desire	  to	  maintain	  face	  can	  thus	  act	  as	  both	  a	  barrier	  and	  a	   facilitator	  of	  social	   interaction’.	  Gao	  and	  Ting-­‐‑Toomy	  (1998)	   state	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   face	   is	   illustrated	   in	   the	   Chinese	   tendency	   to	   avoid	   conflict,	  especially	  when	  even	  if	  they	  stand	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  conflict.	  
	  
1.5	  Research	  Questions	  
‘China’s	  rise	  may	  not	  have	  changed	  everything,	  but	  its	  dramatic	  re-­‐‑emergence	  at	  the	  center	  of	  world	  politics	   throws	   familiar	   issues	   into	  newly	  sharp	  relief’	   (Beeson	  &	  Bisley,	  2013,	  p.	  290).	  Apparently,	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   international	   recognition	   is	   to	   a	   great	   extent	   culturally	  construed	  and	  constructed,	  thereby	  acquiring	  some	  special	  features.	  	  	  
Plenty	   of	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   face	   culture	   constitutes	   a	   basic	   Chinese	   value	   and	  behavioural	   logic	   for	   social	   recognition	   (see	  more	   in	   Chapter	   3);	   correspondingly,	   this	   study	  assumes	   that	   face	   culture	   serves	   as	   a	   constructive	   force	   in	   Chinese	   diplomacy,	   prominent	   in	  shaping	   China’s	   identity	   and	   behavioural	   models	   for	   seeking	   international	   recognition.	   This	  entire	  study	  is	  guided	  by	  the	  following	  core	  question:	  	  	  
How	  does	  Chinese	  face	  culture	  influence	  its	  struggle	  for	  international	  recognition?	  
This	  question	  can	  be	  further	  sub-­‐‑divided	  into	  two	  questions	  for	  the	  feasibility	  of	  this	  research:	  
Ø   What	   national	   identities	   does	   China	   pursue	   and	   maintain	   in	   order	   to	   gain	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international	  recognition?	  	  
Ø   What	   behavioural	   strategies	   (especially	   discourse	   behaviours)	   does	   China	  
conduct	  to	  highlight	  its	  identity?	  	  
In	  answering	  these	  questions,	  this	  book	  tries	  to	  reveal	  not	  only	  the	  struggle	  for	  recognition	  but	  also	  the	  process	  through	  which	  China	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  a	  particularised	  construct	  made	  up	  of	  multifarious	  or	  even	  seemingly	  paradoxical	  characteristics.	  
This	  study	  will	  use	  role	  theory	  to	  establish	  an	  analytical	  framework	  and	  a	  discourse	  analysis	  as	  the	  main	  methods.	  The	  related	  discussion	  will	  be	  conducted	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	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Chapter	  2	  
Culture	  and	  Diplomacy	  	  
	  
中国文化自古就认为世界应是一个和谐整体	  	  —白皮书《中国的和平发展》	  	  
The	  world	  has	  been	  believed	  to	  be	  a	  harmonious	  whole	  in	  
Chinese	  culture	  ever	  since	  ancient	  times.	  	  
—White	  Paper,	  ‘China’s	  Peaceful	  Development’	  
	  
	  
This	  study	  assumes	  that	  a	  state’s	  struggle	  for	  international	  recognition	  is	  about	  the	  constitution	  of	  group	   identities	  and	  ultimately	  about	  specific	  culture.	   In	  other	  words,	   face	  culture	  dictates	  the	   ‘operational	  code’	   (George,	  1969)	  of	  state	  behaviour.	  Before	  a	  concrete	  case	  study	  can	  be	  considered,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  clarify	  the	  various	  kinds	  of	  impact	  of	  culture	  on	  diplomacy	  from	  a	  theoretical	  perspective.	  Based	  on	  the	  existing	  literature,	  this	  chapter	  will	  propose	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  based	  on	  role	  theory.	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2.1	  Why	  Has	  Cultural	  Analysis	  Become	  Important?	  
In	   the	   field	   of	   international	   relations,	   for	   a	   long	   time,	   culture	   has	   been	   considered	   as	   an	  explanation	   of	   the	   last	   resort’	   (Pye,	   1991,	   p.	   504).	   ‘Everything	   that	   cannot	   be	   explained	   by	  existing	  theories	  in	  foreign	  policy	  analysis	  is	  ascribed	  to	  cultural	  differences’	  (Hudson,	  1997,	  p.	  2).	  In	  recent	  decades,	  the	  perspective	  on	  culture	  has	  been	  re-­‐‑examined	  and	  emphasized	  by	  the	  increasing	  number	  of	  decision	  makers,	  scholars	  and	  analysts.	  Such	  a	  shift	  is	  closely	  linked	  with	  the	  historical	  background	  and	  theoretical	  trends	  of	  international	  relations.	  
	  
2.1.1	  Historical	  background	  
Changing	  circumstances	  
Often,	   people	   think	   that	   the	   rise	   of	   cultural	   analysis	   in	   the	   field	   of	   international	   relations	  followed	   upon	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War.	   ‘The	   failure	   of	   mainstream	   International	   Relations	  theory	  to	  provide	  correct	  predictions	  and	  to	  explain	  outcomes	  caused	  many	  scholars	  and	  policy	  makers	   to	   re-­‐‑engage	   with	   national,	   i.e.,	   with	   the	   domestic	   and	   the	   non-­‐‑material	   sources	   of	  foreign	  policy’	  (Bukh,	  2010,	  p.	  3).	  In	  fact,	  the	  analysis	  of	  cultural	  factors	  had	  begun	  long	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Gaenslen	  (1997,	  p.	  267)	  claims	  that	  its	  present-­‐‑day	  ‘culture	  revival’	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  1970s,	  when	  a	  series	  of	  political	  upheavals	  changed	  the	  world’s	  political	  landscape.	  The	  political	  changes	  he	  refers	  to	  include	  the	  third	  wave	  of	  global	  democratisation,	  the	  continuing	  growth	  of	   the	   Islamist	  movement	  after	   the	   Iranian	  revolution,	   the	  burgeoning	  phenomenon	   of	   ‘collapsed	   states,	   and,	   certainly	   the	   most	   notably,	   the	   demise	   of	   Marxist	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regimes	   in	   Eastern	   Europe	   and	   the	   disintegration	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   Yugoslavia,	   and	  Czechoslovakia’	  (Ibid.).	  	  
If	  we	  broaden	  our	  view	  of	  the	  post-­‐‑Cold	  War	  era,	  at	  least	  three	  more	  events	  can	  be	  added	  to	  the	  above	  list:	  1)	  the	  9/11	  terrorist	  attack	  and	  the	  subsequent	  global	  war	  on	  terror,	  which	  seemed	  to	   confirm	  Huntington’s	   (1993)	  notion	   that	   culture	  would	   serve	  as	   the	  new	  battleground	   for	  future	  political	  conflicts;11	  2)	   the	   faster	   than	  expected	  European	   integration,	  which	  highlights	  the	   role	   of	   culture	   as	   a	   political	   instrument	   for	   transferring	   popular	   loyalty	   and	   sovereignty	  from	  nation-­‐‑states	  to	  supranational	  entities	  (Shore,	  2000,	  p.	  1);	  3)	  the	  remarkable	  rise	  of	  non-­‐‑Western	  powers	  on	  the	  world	  stage,	  which	  prompted	  scholars	  around	  the	  world	  to	  re-­‐‑examine	  the	  value	  and	  potential	  of	  non-­‐‑Western	  cultures	  in	  the	  current	  changes	  of	  world	  order.	  	  
In	   the	   face	   of	   these	   transformations,	   both	   decision-­‐‑makers	   and	   researchers	   felt	   impelled	   to	  consider	  global	   issues	   from	  a	  cultural	  perspective,	  especially	  with	  regard	  to	   ‘the	  way	  regimes	  legitimize	  themselves	  and	  the	  way	  citizens	  identify	  themselves’	  (Street,	  1994,	  p.	  96).	  	  
	  
Culture	  as	  a	  soft	  power.	  
‘Soft	  power’	  is	  a	  concept	  developed	  by	  Joseph	  Nye	  to	  describe	  the	  ability	  to	  get	  what	  you	  want	  through	  attraction	  rather	  than	  coercion	  or	  payment	  (Nye,	  1990;	  Nye,	  2004).	  Since	  the	  1990s,	  this	   term	   has	   been	   extensively	   used	   in	   international	   affairs	   by	   statesmen	   and	   analysts,	   as	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  As	  soon	  as	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Huntington’s	  ‘Civilization	  Conflict	  Theory’	  strongly	  set	  academic	  agendas	  and	  provoked	  research	   in	   new	   directions,	   especially	   from	   the	   cultural	   perspective.	   See	  Huntington,	   S.	   P.	   (1993).	   The	   clash	   of	   civilzations?	  
Foreign	  Affairs,	  72(3),	  22-­‐‑49.	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provides	   them	  with	   ‘a	   tool	   through	  which	  to	  refer	   to	  sources	  of	   influence	  other	   than	  military	  force	   and	   economic	   payoff’	   (Hall,	   2010,	   p.	   189).	   ‘Increasingly	   unable	   to	   curb	   the	   rise	   of	   the	  emerging	  powers	  in	  political	  and	  economic	  fields,	  traditional	  powers	  increasingly	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  use	  of	  soft	  power,	  thereby	  trying	  to	  continue	  their	  monopolization	  of	  international	  rule-­‐‑making	  power’	  (Ye,	  2010,	  p.	  38).	  
Normally,	  soft	  power	  arises	   from	  the	  values	  an	  organisation	  or	  country	  expresses	  through	   its	  culture	  (Nye,	  2009).	  Based	  on	  such	  a	  nexus,	   foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐‑makers	  are	  committed	  to	  transforming	  a	  state’s	  cultural	  resources	  into	  appealing	  soft	  power;	  the	  worldwide	  public	  has	  more	  opportunities	  to	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  the	  culture	  and	  national	  image	  of	  other	  countries	  through	  various	  forms	  of	  public	  or	  cultural	  diplomacy.	  For	  scholars,	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  state’s	  culture	  and	  its	  soft	  power	  is	  a	  topic	  worthy	  of	  extensive	  study.	  	  
	  
The	  rise	  of	  non-­‐‑Western	  powers.	  
After	  the	  Cold	  War,	  it	  became	  increasingly	  clear	  that	  ‘the	  West	  was	  facing	  a	  massive	  challenge	  from	  other	  non-­‐‑Western	  players	  in	  the	  world	  capitalist	  economy’	  (Cox,	  2012,	  p.	  371).	  In	  2001,	  when	  Goldman	  Sachs	  put	  forth	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘BRICS’	  countries	  comprising	  Brazil,	  Russia,	  India	  and	  China,	  only	  a	  few	  economists	  took	  it	  seriously.	  However,	  the	  pace	  of	  change	  is	  much	  greater	  than	  people’s	   imagination,	   and	   today	   the	  BRICS	   countries	   (now	   including	  South	  Africa)	  have	  become	   a	   significant	   political	   and	   economic	   group	   determined	   to	   promote	   a	   more	  representative	  and	  equitable	  world	  order.	  	  
	   36	  
Power	  shifts	  taking	  place	  today	  are	  believed	  to	  have	  far	  more	  complex	  implications	  than	  those	  from	   the	   last	   century,	   especially	   with	   regard	   to	   culture,	   since	   these	   emerging	   powers	  encompass	   their	   continuous	   and	   special	   civilizations	   for	   centuries.	   While	   Japan’s	  modernisation	   began	   with	   the	   Meiji	   restoration	   in	   1868	   and	   included	   a	   total	   adoption	   of	  Western	   models,	   the	   same	   may	   not	   be	   true	   for	   China	   and	   India	   (Pethiyagoda,	   2014).	  Researchers	  are	  already	  keen	  to	  summarise	  the	  non-­‐‑Western	  powers’	  governance	  models	  or	  to	  predict	   their	   future	   trends	   based	   on	   certain	   cultural	   specificities.	   For	   example,	   off	   late,	   the	  concept	   of	   ‘All-­‐‑under-­‐‑Heaven’	   [Chinese:	   天下]12	  originating	   in	   ancient	   China	   has	   become	   a	  popular	   term	   to	   describe	   China’s	   worldview	   and	   diplomatic	   trends,	   although	   the	   Chinese	  government	   itself	   has	   never	   mentioned	   this	   in	   any	   official	   capacity.	   Meanwhile,	   there	   are	  growing	  concerns	  about	  the	  possible	  cultural	  or	  value-­‐‑based	  challenges	  to	  the	  West-­‐‑dominated	  world.	   ‘The	  BRICS	  countries’	  ambition	  to	  change	  the	  world	   in	   their	   image	  raises	  questions	  of	  fundamental	  values	  as	  well	  as	  geopolitical	  influence’	  (Tisdall,	  2012).	  	  
	  
2.1.2	  Theoretical	  trends:	  Towards	  the	  actor-­‐‑specific	  path	  
In	   the	   past,	   a	   cultural	   analysis	   of	   diplomacy	   had	   been	   long	   neglected	   or	   devalued,	   largely	  because	   it	   was	   categorised	   as	   an	   actor-­‐‑specific	   method	   of	   analysis.	   However,	   mainstream	  studies	   on	   international	   relations	   have	   focused	   on	   actor-­‐‑general	   theories,	   regarding	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  According	  to	  Chinese	  philosopher	  Zhao	  Dingyang	  (2006,	  pp.	  29-­‐‑41),	  All-­‐‑under-­‐‑Heaven	  represents	  China’s	  classical	  philosophy	  of	  world	  governance.	   It	  advocates	  a	  political	  goal	   i.e.	   ‘to	  create	   “All-­‐‑under-­‐‑Heaven”	   the	   trinity	  of	   the	  geographical	  world	   (the	  earth),	  the	  psychological	  world	  (the	  hearts	  of	  all	  people)	  and	  the	  political	  world	  (the	  world	  institution)’	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  39).	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international	  actors	  as	  unitary	  and	  rational,	  and	  they	  do	  not	  care	  about	  what	  kind	  of	  decision-­‐‑making	  units	  the	  actors	  employ	  and	  how	  domestic	  units	  interact.	  Neorealism	  is	  a	  classic	  case—according	   to	  Waltz	   (1979,	   p.	   96),	   differences	   between	   states	   ‘are	   of	   capability,	   not	   function’.	  ‘National	  politics	  consists	  of	  differentiated	  units	  performing	  specified	  functions.	   International	  politics	  consists	  of	  like	  units	  duplicating	  one	  another’s	  activities’	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  97).	  As	  an	  extension	  of	  this	  logic,	  the	  actor-­‐‑general	  theories	  almost	  only	  seek	  explanations	  at	  the	  systematic	  level.	  	  
As	   early	   as	   the	   1980s,	   theorists	   had	   realised	   that	   there	   was	   not	   much	   room	   for	   the	  advancement	   of	   actor-­‐‑general	   theories,	   which	   had	   thus	   far	   informed	   only	   a	   little	   amount	   of	  empirical	  research	  .	  Then,	  the	  sudden	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  totally	  exposed	  the	  inability	  of	  actor-­‐‑general	   theories	   to	  predict	   and	  explain	   system-­‐‑level	   and	  actor-­‐‑level	   transformations.	  Hudson	  (2005,	  p.	  5)	  points	  out	  that	  ‘with	  every	  system	  transformation,	  we	  rediscover	  that	  the	  power	  of	  the	  human	  will	  and	  imagination	  was	  greater	  than	  that	  of	  the	  straitjacket	  of	  the	  system	  rules’.	  	  
Also,	   in	   the	   same	   period,	   an	   increasing	   number	   of	   scholars	   began	   to	   recognise	   that	   actor-­‐‑specific	  analysis	  also	  has	  its	  irreducible	  function	  in	  the	  explanation	  of	  international	  behaviours.	  This	   research	   path	   is	   generally	   based	   on	   anti-­‐‑essentialist	   theory	   i.e.	   ‘the	   social	   world	   is	  constructed	  socially	  and	  discursively	  implies	  that	  its	  character	  is	  not	  pre-­‐‑given	  or	  determined	  by	   external	   conditions,	   and	   that	   people	   do	   not	   possess	   a	   set	   of	   fixed	   and	   authentic	  characteristics	  or	  essences’	  (Jørgensen	  &	  Phillips,	  2002,	  p.	  5).	  The	  most	  significant	  challenge	  to	  the	   hegemony	   of	   the	   actor-­‐‑general	   theory	   emerged	   with	   the	   advent	   of	   constructivism.	   As	  opposed	   to	   the	   rationalist	   ontology	   of	   mainstream	   international	   relations	   studies,	  constructivists	  commonly	  deny	  that	  actors,	  be	  they	  individuals	  or	  states,	  deal	  with	  one	  another	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with	   a	   pre-­‐‑existing	   set	   of	   preferences	   (Reus-­‐‑Smit,	   2009,	   p.	   3).	   Instead,	   their	   preferences	   and	  interests	  constantly	  change	  as	  they	  develop	  their	  identities	  in	  various	  ideational	  or	  normative	  environments	  and	  through	  different	  processes	  of	  interaction.	  	  
Most	  theorists	  who	  adopt	  the	  actor-­‐‑specific	  approach	  also	  accept	  the	  role	  of	  systematic	  factors.	  A	   basic	   consensus	   has	   been	   achieved—‘neither	   a	   completely	   structural	   explanation	   nor	   a	  wholly	   agent-­‐‑based	   one	   can	   capture	   the	   interplay	   between	   decision	   makers	   and	   the	  environment	  within	  which	  they	  function’	  (Breuning,	  2012,	  p.	  31).	  For	  example,	  Wendt,	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  his	  theoretical	  constructions,	  has	  emphasised	  that	  both	  agent	  and	  structure	  matter.	   Both	   systematic	   and	   agent-­‐‑based	   analyses	   ‘have	   distinct	   and	   irreducible	   functions	   in	  the	   explanation	   of	   social	   action,	   and	   they	   are	   both	   necessary	   elements	   of	   a	   complete	  explanation	  of	  social	  action’	  (Wendt,	  1987,	  p.	  362).	  	  
The	   above-­‐‑mentioned	   theoretical	   trends	   prompted	   researchers	   to	   probe	   more	   into	   actors’	  autonomy	   and	   cultural	   sediments,	   and	   the	   various	   related	   theoretical	   models	   and	   research	  methods	  progressively	  enrich	  the	  cultural	  analysis	  of	  diplomacy.	  
	  
2.2	  Conceptualising	  Culture	  and	  Diplomacy	  
2.2.1	  Defining	  culture	  
‘Culture’	   is	   a	   notoriously	   difficult	   term	   to	   define.	   Generations	   of	   scholars	   have	   attempted	   to	  provide	  a	  plausible,	  pithy	  explanation,	  but	   the	  definition	  of	   this	   term	  has	  never	  been	  entirely	  clear.	  What	  puzzles	  people	  is	  not	  so	  much	  ‘what	  to	  include	  in	  such	  a	  definition,	  but	  rather	  what	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to	   exclude’	   (Hudson,	   1997,	   p.	   2).	   If	   we	   were	   to	   apply	   a	   sense	   of	   all-­‐‑encompassing	   logic,	   all	  human	   activities	   and	   creations—including	   diplomatic	   behaviours—can	   be	   described	   as	  products	   or	   components	   of	   culture.	   However,	   from	   the	   usual	   narrow	   point	   of	   view,	   religion,	  history,	   art	   and	  morality	   have	   been	   identified	   as	   more	   important	   in	   defining	   a	   culture.	   The	  slippery	  nature	  of	  this	  concept	  often	  makes	  scholars	  hesitant	  about	  stepping	  into	  the	  quagmire	  of	   a	  discussion	   about	   it	   (Liland,	   1993,	   p.	   1).	  One	   satisfactory	  definition	   for	   this	   study	   can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Hofsted	  (1991,	  p.	  5),	  a	  well-­‐‑known	  cultural	  researcher.	  
‘The	   collective	   programming	   of	   the	  mind,	   which	   distinguishes	   the	  members	   of	   one	  
group	  or	  category	  of	  people	  from	  another.’	  	  	  
Although	   presenting	   a	   definitive	   definition	   of	   culture	   may	   be	   impossible,	   some	   of	   its	  characteristics	  have	  been	  recognised	  by	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  people.	  The	  following	  extract	   is	  from	  Helen	  Spencer-­‐‑Oatey	  (2012,	  pp.	  3-­‐‑16):	  
Ø   Culture	  is	  manifested	  as	  different	  layers	  of	  depth.	  
Ø   Culture	  affects	  behaviour	  and	  interpretations	  of	  behaviour.	  	  
Ø   Culture	   is	   associated	   with	   social	   groups,	   always	   both	   socially	   and	   psychologically	  distributed	  in	  a	  group.	  
Ø   Culture	  has	  both	  universal	  (etic)	  and	  distinctive	  (emic)	  elements.	  
Ø   Culture	  is	  subject	  to	  gradual	  change.	  
Ø   The	  various	  parts	  of	  a	  culture	  are	  all,	  to	  some	  degree,	  interrelated.	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Ø   Culture	  is	  a	  descriptive,	  not	  an	  evaluative,	  concept.	  
This	   study	   regards	  Chinese	   face	   culture	   as	   a	   typical	   kind	  of	  national	   culture.	   Since	   culture	   is	  understood	  as	  a	  group-­‐‑level	  construct,	  the	  cluster	  that	  invariably	  is	  most	  influential	  in	  creating	  and	  disseminating	  a	  specific	  culture	  is	  the	  nation.	  In	  the	  age	  of	  globalisation,	  there	  continue	  to	  be	  cultural	  differences	  within	  a	  nation	  (Inglehart	  &	  Wayne,	  2000,	  pp.	  19-­‐‑51;	  Schwartz,	  2008).	  ‘While	   at	   the	   surface	   level	   there	   may	   be	   some	   convergence	   in	   cultural	   habits,	   artifacts	   and	  symbols,	  at	  a	  deeper	  level,	  cultural	  differences	  persist’	  (Ghemawat	  &	  Reiche	  2011,	  p.	  2).	  
In	   the	  sphere	  of	  political	  science,	   the	  analysis	  of	  culture	  used	  to	  be	  associated	  primarily	  with	  political	  culture,	  which	  emerged	  in	  the	  context	  of	  post-­‐‑war	  political	  sociology	  (Wedeen,	  2002,	  p.	   713).	   However,	   the	   problem	   is	   that	   ‘definitions	   of	   political	   culture	   are	   virtually	  indistinguishable	  from	  definitions	  of	  general	  culture’	  (Hudson,	  1997,	  p.	  10).	  Nowadays,	  political	  scholars	   prefer	   to	   adopt	   a	   more	   open	   view	   of	   culture,	   as	   shown	   in	   the	   next	   section.	   When	  culture	   is	   used	   in	   political	   research,	   no	  matter	   what	   form	   it	   takes	   (i.e.	   value,	   belief,	   history,	  myth,	   orientation,	   behavioural	   pattern	   etc.),	   it	   is	   generally	   believed	   to	   directly	   affect	   politics	  and	  political	  choices.	  	  
	  
2.2.2	  Defining	  diplomacy	  
This	  research	  regards	  China’s	  struggle	  for	  international	  recognition	  as	  a	  part	  of	  its	  diplomacy,	  or	  as	  a	  diplomatic	  behaviour,	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  necessary	  to	  define	  the	  term	  diplomacy.	  
A	  relatively	  comprehensive	  definition	  of	  ‘diplomacy’	  is	  as	  follows:	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‘…The	   conduct	   of	   relationships,	   using	   peaceful	  means,	   by	   and	   among	   international	  
actors,	   at	   least	   one	   of	   whom	   is	   usually	   governmental’	   (Cooper,	   Heine,	   &	   Thakur,	  2013,	  p.	  2).	  	  
Peaceful	  activities	  or	  means	  are	  viewed	  as	  the	  primary	  characteristic	  of	  diplomacy,	  although	  ‘it	  may	  occur	  within	  war	  or	   armed	  conflict	   or	  be	  used	   in	   the	  orchestration	  of	  particular	   acts	  of	  violence,	  such	  as	  seeking	  overflight	  clearance	  for	  an	  airstrike’	  (Barson,	  2006,	  p.	  1).	  
In	  the	  past	  few	  decades,	  mainly	  with	  the	  global	  rise	  of	  democratic	  politics,	  multiple	  governance	  and	  information	  technology,	  the	  sphere	  of	  diplomacy	  has	  experienced	  a	  shift	  from	  club	  politics	  to	   network	   coordination.	   ‘Bilateral	   state-­‐‑to-­‐‑state	   diplomacy	   remains	   an	   important	   structural	  feature…	  but	  it	  has	  been	  increasingly	  supplemented	  by	  multilateral	  forms	  of	  diplomacy	  with	  a	  mixture	  of	  state	  and	  non-­‐‑state	  actors	  involved’	  (White,	  2005,	  p.	  400).	  Figure	  2.1	  extracted	  from	  Heine	  (2006,	  p.	  15)	  reflects	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  21st	  century	  diplomacy.	  
Levels	  
Local,	   Domestic,	   National,	   Bilateral,	   Regional,	  Global	  
Scope	   Broad	  array	  of	  public	  policy	  issues	  
Actors	  
Governments,	   Private	   Firms,	   Multi-­‐‑National	  Companies,	  Civil	  Society	  Actors	  
Machinery	  
Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	   Ministry	   of	  International	  Trade,	  Department	  of	  Defence	  	  
Modes	   Summits,	  Shuttle,	  Track	  Two,	  Celebrity	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Figure	  2.1:	  The	  Complex	  Network	  of	  Modern	  Diplomacy	  
	  
2.3	  Does	  Culture	  Influence	  Diplomacy?	  
Does	  culture	  influence	  diplomacy?	  This	  is	  not	  a	  question	  with	  a	  clear	  answer.	  Although	  to	  many	  the	  answer	  is	  a	  resounding	  yes,	  there	  are	  still	  some	  who	  deny	  this	  or	  are	  sceptical	  of	  it.	  	  
Deniers	  always	  claim	  that	  ‘most	  political,	  social	  and	  cultural	  life	  is	  lived	  inside	  polities,	  between	  which	  only	  simple	  relations	  are	  conducted	  in	  a	  thin	  or	  absent	  cultural	  context’	  (Sharp,	  2004,	  p.	  362).	  Such	  an	  argument	  is	  obviously	  contrary	  to	  human	  feelings,	  and	  in	  real	  life	  there	  is	  never	  a	  boundary	  separating	  culture	  and	  polity	  (in	  a	  sense,	  polity	  itself	  is	  a	  form	  of	  culture).	  	  
Admitting	   that	   culture	  does	  play	  a	   role	   in	  diplomacy,	   sceptics	   still	   emphasise	   that	   ‘individual	  human	   beings	   may	   have	   uneven	   and	   limited	   liability	   commitments	   to	   the	   cultures	   of	   the	  societies	  in	  which	  they	  live’	  (Ibid.).	  There	  are	  always	  examples	  of	  leaders	  ‘who	  did	  try	  very	  hard	  to	   view	   the	   world	   from	   different	   perspectives’	   (Breuning,	   2007,	   p.	   54)	   and	   who	   ‘asked	  themselves	  hard	  questions	  about	  the	  accuracy	  and	  wisdom	  of	  their	  own	  beliefs	  and	  judgments’	  (Welch,	  2003,	  p.	  208).	  This	  implies	  that	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  feasibility	  of	  a	  study,	  culture	  is	  not	  a	   reliable	  or	  valuable	  variable	   to	  explore	  political	  behaviours.	  These	  doubts	   in	   fact	  are	  entrenched	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  absolute	  individualism	  and	  obscure	  the	  real	  explanations	  for	  why	  a	  set	  of	  people	  seem	  to	  think,	  act	  and	  believe	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  Many	  cultural	  theories	  have	  revealed	  that	  ‘in	  any	  given	  situation,	  an	  individual	  selects	  a	  dominant	  cultural	  identity	  trait,	  which	  plays	  a	  primary	  role	  in	  influencing	  his	  or	  her	  behaviour’	  (Singer,	  1998,	  p.	  xiii).	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This	   study	   is	   clearly	   based	   on	   the	   premise	   that	   culture	   must	   and	   can	   affect	   diplomacy.	  Arguments	  to	  support	  this	  can	  be	  summarised	  as	  follows：	  
Ø   Culture	  is	  a	  ubiquitous	  factor	  in	  diplomacy.	  
n   Influences	  individual	  and	  group.	  
n   Exists	  in	  social	  interaction.	  
n   Exists	  in	  language.	  
n   Culture	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  diplomatic	  resource.	  	  
n   To	  enhance	  diplomatic	  activities	  
n   To	  gain	  domestic	  support	  
The	  following	  sections	  will	  elaborate	  on	  the	  above	  arguments.	  
	  
2.3.1	  Culture	  as	  a	  ubiquitous	  factor	  
Individual	  and	  group.	  
Why	   can	   culture	   influence	   diplomacy?	   The	   predominant	   cause	  must	   be	   the	   fact	   that	   culture	  influences—or,	  more	  accurately,	  is	  embedded	  in—every	  individual	  and	  group	  in	  human	  society.	  Numerous	  studies	  have	  been	  conducted	  to	  explain	  the	  relationship	  between	  culture	  and	  human	  behaviour.13	  A	  classic	  argument	  often	  cited	  is	  as	  follows:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  See,	   for	   example,	  Harrison,	   L.	   E.,	  &	  Huntington,	   S.	   P.	   (2000).	  Culture	  matters:	  How	  values	  shape	  human	  progress.	  New	  York:	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The	   pattern	   of	   culture	   conditions	   individuals,	   providing	   their	   assumptions	   and	  their	   tools	   of	   observation	   and	   thought,	   and	   setting	   the	   frame	   for	   their	   living.	   It	  determines	   the	   forms	   of	   institutions,	   the	   types	   of	   personality	   which	   will	   be	  developed,	  and	  the	  types	  of	  conduct	  which	  will	  be	  sanctioned.	  (Ware,	  1940,	  p.	  11)	  
At	  the	  individual	  level,	  no	  one	  can	  be	  totally	  culturally	  independent,	  and	  no	  political	  career	  can	  be	  conducted	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  cultural	  context.	  Decision-­‐‑makers	  and	  diplomatic	  participants	  are	   ‘products	  as	  well	  as	   representatives	  of	   their	   society’	   (Breuning,	  2007,	  p.	  117).	  Through	  a	  long-­‐‑lasting	  socialisation	  process,	  it	  is	  highly	  possible	  that	  their	  cultural	  awareness	  is	  related	  to	  their	  understanding	  of	  international	  affairs	  and	  cannot	  be	  abandoned	  or	  erased	  even	  by	  means	  of	   intense	   professional	   training	   (Bolewski,	   2008,	   pp.	   149-­‐‑151).	   Besides,	   in	   many	   cases,	  diplomats	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  conscious	  of	  the	  cultural	  foundation	  of	  their	  conduct	  but	  will	  still	   follow	   cultural	   common	   sense,	   which	   Roland	   Barthes	   described	   as	   ‘what-­‐‑goes-­‐‑without-­‐‑saying’	   (Barthes,	   1972,	   p.	   11).	   Although	   cultural	   differences	   always	   lead	   to	   obstacles	   in	  communication,	  abandoning	  a	  national	  culture	  of	  individuality	  in	  diplomacy	  seems	  to	  do	  more	  harm	   than	   good,	   as	   diplomats	   ‘would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   identify	   with	   their	   own	   cultural	  background,	  making	   it	   almost	   impossible	   to	   fulfil	   their	   job	   as	   servants	   of	   national	   interests’	  (Bolewski,	  2008,	  p.	  151).	  
At	   the	   group	   level,	   culture	   contributes	   to	   the	   institutional	   framework	   that	   comprises	   formal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Basic	   Books;	   Reis,	   H.	   T.,	   Collins,	   W.	   A.,	   &	   Berscheid,	   E.	   (2000).	   The	   relationship	   context	   of	   human	   behavior	   and	  development.	  Psychological	  Bulletin,	  126(6),	  844-­‐‑872;	  Nisbett,	  R.	  E.,	  &	  Miyamoto,	  Y.	   (2005).	  The	   influence	  of	   culture:	  Holistic	  versus	   analytic	   perception.	  Trends	   in	   Cognitive	   Sciences,	  9(10),	   467-­‐‑473;	   Oyserman,	   D.,	   &	   Lee,	   S.	   W.	   (2008).	   Does	   culture	  influence	  what	  and	  how	  we	  think?	  Effects	  of	  priming	  individualism	  and	  collectivism.	  Psychological	  Bulletin,	  134(2),	  311-­‐‑342.	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and	   informal	   rules	   (Breuning,	   1999,	   pp.	   103-­‐‑104).	  When	   rooted	   in	   a	   specific	   culture,	   formal	  rules	  help	  draw	   clear	  parameter	  within	  which	  policy	  makers	   can	   take	  decisions	  more	   easily,	  while	   informal	   rules	   will	   have	   an	   on-­‐‑going	   influence	   on	   behavioural	   styles	   and	   habits.	   If	   a	  country	  has	  been	  accustomed	  to	  one	  set	  of	  established	  cultural	  rules,	   it	  will	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  adapt	   to	   a	   different	   one.	   Consider	   China	   as	   an	   example.	   For	   centuries,	   China	   had	   adopted	   a	  Sino-­‐‑centric	   model	   in	   its	   dealings	   with	   others—a	   model	   that	   was	   highly	   assimilative,	  hierarchical,	   ideological	  and	  personalistic.	  From	  the	  19th	  century,	  when	  China	  had	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  European	  multistage	  system,	  which	  is	  egalitarian,	  non-­‐‑ideological	  and	  contractual,	  it	  faced	  cultural	  confusion	  and	  behavioural	   issues	  and	  was	  also	  revealed	  as	  having	  an	   inherent,	   long-­‐‑standing	  sense	  of	  unwillingness.14	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Social	  interaction.	  
One	   of	   the	   core	   functions	   of	   culture	   is	   to	   ascribe	   meaning	   to	   humans’	   social	   interactions	  (Matsumoto	  2007,	  p.	  1295).	  For	  social	  actors,	  culture	  principally	  explains	  two	  key	  things:	   ‘(1)	  the	   relationship	   between	   the	   individual	   and	   the	   group	   and	   (2)	   the	   establishment	   and	  maintenance	   of	   hierarchies’(Ibid.,	   pp.	   1296-­‐‑8). 15 	  According	   to	   this	   logic	   presented	   by	  Matsumoto,	   culture	   can	   be	   considered	   a	   guideline	   for	   the	   smooth	   operation	   of	   diplomacy,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  See	  also,	  Nathan,	  A.	  J.,	  &	  Scobell,	  A.	  (2015).	  China's	  search	  for	  security.	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  
15	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  first	  point,	  ‘all	  human	  societies	  make	  distinctions	  between	  ingroups	  and	  outgroups’	  (Matsumoto,	  2007,	  p.	  1296),	  and	  ‘self-­‐‑ingroup	  relationships	  are	  inherently	  different	  from	  self-­‐‑outgroup	  relationships’	  (Ibid,	  p.	  1297).	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  second	  point,	  ’all	  groups	  require	  some	  degree	  of	  hierarchy	  in	  order	  to	  function	  effectively’	  (Ibid.).	  See	  also,	  Matsumoto,	  D.	  (2007).	  Culture,	  context,	  and	  behavior.	  Journal	  of	  Personality,	  75(6),	  1285-­‐‑1320.	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providing	   participants	   with	   information	   or	   analytical	   frameworks	   for	   social	   roles,	   the	  structures	  of	  international	  systems,	  diplomatic	  etiquette	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
Countries—especially	  those	  that	  have	  or	  seek	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  international	  arena—tend	   to	   impose	   their	   own	   interactional	   models	   on	   other	   countries	   whose	   cultures	   are	   very	  different	  (Bolewski,	  2008,	  p.	  146).	  This	  study	  shows	  how,	  under	  the	   influence	  of	   face	  culture,	  China	   thinks	   about	   its	   relationships	   with	   other	   actors	   and	   how	   it	   promotes	   its	   preferred	  hierarchical	  models	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  its	  diplomacy.	  	  
	  
Language.	  
Language	  is	  the	  medium	  through	  which	  culture	  penetrates	  the	  diplomatic	  process.	  
The	   relationship	   between	   culture	   and	   language	   can	   be	   summarised	   as	   follows:	   ‘Language	  expresses,	   embodies,	   and	   symbolizes	   cultural	   reality’	   (Kramsch,	   1998,	   pp.	   3-­‐‑4).	  Linguists	  regard	   language	   as	   ‘a	   key	   to	   the	   cultural	   past	   of	   a	   society’	   and	   ‘a	   guide	   to	   social	   reality’	  (Slazmann,	   1998,	   p.	   41).	  Meanwhile,	   according	   to	  Nick	   (2001,	   p.	   39),	   language	   is	   not	   only	   a	  simple	  tool	  but	  ‘often	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  the	  diplomatic	  vocation’.	  ‘The	  process	  of	  diplomacy—communicating,	   negotiating,	   reaching	   and	   formulating	   agreements,	   collecting,	   creating,	  transmitting	  and	  recording	  knowledge—all	  depends	  on	  language’	  (Sharp,	  2001,	  pp.	  93-­‐‑106).	  Its	  function	  can	  be	  described	  as	  ‘political	  technology’	  meant	  to	  help	  achieve	  certain	  interests	  (Laffy	  &	  Weldes,	  1997),	  a	  form	  of	  ‘rhetorical	  coercion’	  (Kreb	  &	  Jackson,	  2007)	  or	  a	  ‘representational	  force’	   (Mattern,	   2001)	   to	   eliminate	   unfavourable	   outcomes,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   means	   of	   ‘selling	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policies’	  to	  the	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  public	  (Jackson,	  2011,	  p.	  391).	  	  
Language	   is	   also	   commonly	   recognised	   as	   an	   obstacle	   to	   a	   successful	   diplomatic	   process	  because	  of	  the	  ‘possible	  cross-­‐‑cultural	  misinterpretations’	  (Bolewski,	  2008,	  p.	  152).	  ‘Even	  if	  the	  negotiating	   partners	   use	   the	   same	   language,	   it	   can	   be	   difficult	   or	   even	   impossible	   to	  communicate	   the	  meaning	   and	   relevance	   of	   a	   certain	   word.	   Some	  words	   have	   a	   completely	  different	  meaning	  depending	  on	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  culture	  in	  which	  they	  are	  used’	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  153).	  Because	  of	  such	  problems,	  some	  have	  even	  suggested	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  cosmopolitan	  language	  specifically	  for	  diplomacy,	  which	  is	  not	  related	  to	  any	  specific	  culture	  and	  can	  therefore	  serve	  as	  a	  quasi-­‐‑neutral	  medium	  of	  exchange	  (Jaber,	  2001,	  p.	  51).	  
	  
2.3.2	  Culture	  as	  a	  diplomatic	  resource	  
It	  is	  common	  for	  leaders	  and	  diplomats	  to	  draw	  upon	  the	  ‘toolbox’	  of	  cultural	  resources	  as	  an	  interpretive	  framework	  for	  problem	  definition	  and	  solution	  (Jackson,	  2011,	  p.	  391).	  
To	  enhance	  diplomatic	  activities.	  
Culture,	   as	   an	   important	   soft	   power	   asset,	   ‘contributes	   to	   a	   more	   effective	   environment	   for	  diplomacy	   and	   foreign	   relations’	   (Reiterer,	   2014,	   p.	   139).	   The	   common	   cultural	   tools	   of	  diplomacy	   include	   the	   arts,	   exhibitions,	   exchanges,	   educational	   programmes,	   literature,	  language	   teaching,	   broadcasting,	   gifts,	   listening	   and	   according	   respect,	   promoting	   ideas	   and	  social	   policy,	   religion,	   communication	   and	   so	   on	   (Lenczowski,	   2008,	   pp.	   13-­‐‑19).	   In	   the	   short	  term,	   culture	   may	   bring	   about	   many	   interests;	   in	   the	   long	   term,	   culture	   can	   significantly	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ameliorate	  international	  relations	  by	  ‘bringing	  to	  light	  and	  strengthening	  cultural	  affinities	  and	  thereby	  inspiring	  relations	  of	  trust’	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  19).	  
As	  early	  as	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  both	  Soviet	  and	  American	  policymakers	   ‘realized	  that	  to	  “win	  the	  minds	  of	  men”	   in	  Europe	  and	  to	  convince	  people	  of	  the	  “right”	   ideology,	  they	  had	  to	  appeal	  more	  to	  their	  cultural	  identity	  than	  to	  their	  political	  identity’	  (Gienow-­‐‑Hecht	  &	  Donfried,	  2010,	   p.	   15).	   Both	   superpowers	   employed	   lasting	   cultural	   infiltration	   and	   psychological	  warfare	   to	   dwarf	   their	   opponents	   and	   improve	   their	   relations	   with	   their	   client	   states.	   The	  recently	  emerging	  cultural	  diplomacy	  and	  public	  diplomacy	  are	  all	  aimed	  at	  making	  good	  use	  of	  a	  country’s	  cultural	  resources	  to	  build	  relationships	  among	  different	  nations.	  For	  example,	  the	  EU	  clearly	  claims	  that	  ‘Europe’s	  cultural	  richness	  and	  diversity	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  its	  role	  and	  influence	  in	  the	  world’	  (European	  Commission,	  2007).	  On	  the	  issue	  of	  EU-­‐‑China	  relations,	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  ‘developing	  through	  culture,	  the	  EU	  soft	  power	  projection	  capacities	  in	  China	  can	  strengthen	  the	  EU’s	   image	  while	  promoting	  the	  diversity	  of	   its	  cultures	  and	   its	  shared	  values	  and	  improve	  mutual	  understanding,	  which	  can	  be	  further	  useful	  in	  political	  dialogue	  and	  trade	  relationships’	  (Reiterer,	  2014,	  p.	  145).	  	  
	  
To	  gain	  domestic	  support.	  
A	  country’s	  diplomats	  ‘must	  not	  only	  respond	  appropriately	  to	  the	  situation,	  they	  must	  also	  be	  acceptable	  at	  home’	  (Breuning,	  2007,	  p.	  116).	  Most	  of	  the	  time,	  culture	  (especially	  the	  national	  and/or	  traditional	  culture	  of	  a	  state)	  is	  a	  framework	  used	  to	  legitimise	  policies	  to	  the	  collective.	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The	  political	   elites	   that	   can	   justify	   itself	   in	   cultural	   terms	   can	  become	   stronger	   and	   gain	   the	  approval	  of	  	  the	  domestic	  public	  	  more	  easily	  	  (Sharp,	  2004,	  p.	  363).	  
For	   example,	  when	  explaining	   the	  War	  on	  Terror,	   the	  Bush	  administration	  always	   infused	   its	  official	  discourse	  with	  terms	  like	  ‘…with	  long-­‐‑standing	  and	  widely	  accepted	  cultural	  notions	  of	  “American	   exceptionalism”,	   “manifest	   destiny”	   and	   the	   “chosen	   nation”’	   (Hughes,	   2003).	  ‘Expressed	   in	  terms	  of	   this	  pre-­‐‑existing	  cultural	  grammar,	   the	  narratives	  of	   the	  war	  on	  terror	  come	   to	   be	   accepted	   as	   self-­‐‑evident	   truths	   and	   common	   sense’	   (Jackson,	   2011,	   pp.	   398-­‐‑9).	  Similarly,	  modern-­‐‑day	  Chinese	  leaders	  like	  to	  quote	  Confucius	  when	  explaining	  foreign	  policies,	  in	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  adherence	  to	  traditional	  Chinese	  ethics.	  	  
	  
2.4	  Different	  Answers:	  How	  Does	  Culture	  Influence	  Diplomacy?	  
How	   culture	   influences	   diplomacy	   is	   the	   core	   question	   behind	   most	   cultural	   analyses	   of	  diplomacy.	  Any	   research	  on	   this	   subject	   should	   fulfil	   the	   following	   two	  basic	   conditions:	   ‘(1)	  Culture	  must	  be	  (re)conceptualized	  so	  as	  to	  facilitate	  rigorous	  empirical	  research,	  and	  (2)	  the	  conceptual	  distance	  between	  the	  independent	  variable	  must	  be	  reduced’	  (Zurovchak,	  1997,	  p.	  125).	  Based	  on	   these,	   different	   theoretical	   approaches,	   one	  must	   try	   to	   seek	   suitable	   and,	   at	  best,	  observable	  symbols	  to	  reveal	  the	  concrete	  influences	  of	  culture.	  
Strategic	   culture	   research,	   which	   can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   the	   1970s,	   attempts	   to	   create	  framework	   to	   examine	   the	   impact	   of	   culture	   on	   a	   state’s	   diplomacy,	   especially	   its	   external	  security	  policies.	  According	  to	  leading	  scholar	  Ian	  Johnston	  (1995,	  p.	  46),	  ‘strategic	  culture	  is	  an	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integrated	  system	  of	  symbols	  (e.g.	  argumentation,	  structures,	  languages,	  analogies,	  metaphors)	  which	   acts	   to	   establish	   pervasive	   and	   long	   lasting	   strategic	   preferences	   by	   formulating	  concepts	  of	  the	  role	  and	  efficacy	  of	  military	  force	  in	  interstate	  political	  affairs,	  and	  by	  clothing	  these	  conceptions	  with	  such	  an	  aura	  of	  factuality	  that	  the	  strategic	  preferences	  seem	  uniquely	  realistic	  and	  efficacious’.	  Klein	  (1988,	  p.	  136)	  emphasises	  that	  this	  research	  model	  establishes	  ‘widely	  available	  orientations	   to	  violence	  and	   to	  ways	   in	  which	   the	  state	  can	   legitimately	  use	  violence	  against	  putative	  enemies’.	  	  
An	  inheritance	  from	  the	  tradition	  of	  liberal	  institutionalism,	  scholars	  of	  this	  school	  of	  thought	  underline	   the	   role	   of	   the	   institution	   in	   cultural	   analysis.	   Sackmann	   (1991)	  defines	   culture	   in	  organisations	  as	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  rules	  that	  guide	  collective	  perception	  and	  thought.	  Also,	  institutional	  structures	  can	  reflect	  the	  conditions	  and	  power	  configurations	  of	  a	  particular	  time,	  become	  vehicles	  of	  value	  transmission	  and	  shape	  the	  decision-­‐‑making	  process	  (Koelble,	  1995;	  March	  &	  Olsen,	  1984).	  Goldstein	  and	  Keohane	  presented	  a	  theoretical	  construct	  in	  their	  book	  Ideas	  and	  Foreign	  Policy:	  Beliefs,	  Institutions	  and	  Political	  Change.	  They	  used	  the	  term	  idea	  instead	  of	  culture,	  but,	  nevertheless,	   the	   following	  cultural	  analysis	   is	  based	  on	   the	  analytical	  structure	  they	  presented.	  Ideas	  are	  divided	  into	  three	  types:	  world	  views,	  principled	  beliefs	  and	  causal	   beliefs.	   Next,	   they	   put	   forward	   three	   causal	   pathways	   through	  which	   ideas	   can	   affect	  foreign	  policy:	   ‘By	  providing	  principled	  or	  causal	  maps,	  affecting	  strategies	  where	  there	   is	  no	  unique	  equilibrium,	  and	  becoming	  embedded	  in	  institutions’	  (Goldstein	  &	  Keohane,	  1993,	  p.	  8).	  Among	  these	  three	  pathways,	   ‘ideas	  embedded	  in	  institutions	  specify	  policy	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  innovation’	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  13).	  They	  can	  ‘affect	  the	  incentives	  of	  political	  entrepreneurs	  long	  after	  the	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interests	  of	  its	  initial	  proponents	  have	  changed’	  (Ibid.).	  	  
Historical	   sociology	   attracts	   scholars	   of	   international	   relations	   who	   are	   motivated	   by	   the	  belief	   that	   ‘the	   distinctive	   and	   possibly	   unique	   features	   of	   the	   modern	   world	   will	   remain	  opaque	  unless	  they	  are	  placed	  in	  the	  broadest	  historical	  context’	  (Linklater,	  2009,	  p.	  136).	  This	  school	   of	   thought	   tends	   to	   view	   culture	   from	   a	   macroscopic	   perspective,	   as	   a	   ‘normative	  structure’	  within	  which	   interactions	  between	  political	   communities	   take	  place	   (Ibid.,	  p.	  149).	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  influential	  study	  on	  this	  subject	  is	  Huntington’s	  ‘clash	  of	  civilisations’	  theory,	  which	  has	  heavily	   influenced	  academic	  agendas	  and	  provoked	  a	   lot	  of	  new	  research	  since	   its	  publication.	   Huntington	   (1993)	   predicted	   that	   violence	   resulting	   from	   international	   anarchy	  and	   the	   absence	   of	   common	   values	   and	   institutions	   would	   erupt	   among	   and	   between	  civilisations	  rather	  than	  among	  and	  between	  states.	  
Constructivism	   according	   to	  Houghton	   (2007,	   p.	   25)	   can	   help	   revive	   the	   field	   of	   diplomacy	  research,	  as	  it	  ‘has	  a	  significant	  bearing	  particularly	  upon	  the	  cognitive	  psychological	  approach	  to	   the	   study	   of	   foreign	   policy’.	   Broadly	   speaking,	   constructivism	   has	   appeared	   in	   two	  major	  schools—North	   American	   and	   European.	   The	   former	   emphasises	   the	   role	   of	   ‘common	  knowledge’,	   ‘social	   norms’	   and	   ‘identity’	   in	   constructing	   international	   relations	   and	  determining	   diplomatic	   outcomes;	   the	   latter	   pays	   attention	   largely	   to	  the	   role	   of	   ‘language’,	  ‘linguistic	   constructions’	   and	   ‘social	   discourses’	   in	   defining	   situations,	   revealing	  motives	   and	  setting	  forth	  strategies	  (Behravesh,	  2011;	  Banerjee,	  1997,	  p.	  29).	  Both	  contribute	  greatly	  to	  the	  development	  of	  cultural	  analysis,	  and	  the	  most	  influential	  variant	  is	  perhaps	  Wendt’s	  theory	  of	  social	  constructivism.	  Wendt	  regards	  culture	  in	  international	  politics	  as	  common	  and	  collective	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knowledge,	  which	   is	   ‘deeply	   embedded	   in	   how	  both	   statesman	   and	   scholars	   understand	   the	  nature	   of	   international	   politics’	   (1999,	   p.	   190).	   According	   to	   him,	   the	   social	   structure	   of	  international	   politics	   known	   as	   ‘culture’	   has	   construction	   effects	   on	   states,	  most	   directly	   on	  their	   identities	   and	   interests	   and	   then	   on	   their	   behaviours	   (1999,	   pp.	   246-­‐‑251).	   Although	  Wendt	  has	   repeatedly	  claimed	   that	  his	   theory	   is	   systemic	   rather	   than	  at	   the	  agent	  or	   foreign	  policy	  level,	  this	  has	  not	  prevented	  many	  scholars	  from	  adopting	  constructivist	  approaches	  and	  frameworks	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  state	  diplomacy.	  	  	  
Political	   psychology	   ‘occupies	   an	   uncertain	   space	   in	   the	   study	   of	   international	   politics	   and	  foreign	  policy’	  (Levy,	  2013,	  p.	  1).	  Many	  theorists	  define	  culture	  in	  cognitive	  terms,	  mainly	  due	  to	   the	   proposition	   that	   culture	   encourages	   and	   sustains	   certain	   kinds	   of	   cognitive	   ideas	   and	  processes,	  which	  then	  shape	  the	  content	  and	  structure	  of	  the	  decision-­‐‑making	  process	  (Nisbett	  &	   Norenzayan,	   2002).	   Although	   for	   a	   state	   there	   are	   very	   real	   differences	   between	   small	  groups,	  organisations	  and	  societies,	  among	  each	  of	  them,	  culture	  is	  always	  present	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ‘shared	  cognitive	  mechanisms’	  (Breuning,	  1997,	  p.	  101).	  It	  is	  claimed	  that	  ‘the	  incorporation	  of	  psychological	  variables	  and	  their	  interaction	  effects	  into	  social	  and	  cultural	  explanations	  of	  identity	   would	   create	   a	   better	   balance	   between	   social	   structures	   and	   individual	   agency	   in	  constructivist	  research’	  (Levy,	  2013,	  p.	  24).	  
Role	  theory,	  which	  this	  research	  will	  mainly	  rely	  on,	  is	  another	  important	  theory	  in	  the	  context	  of	  cultural	  research.	  The	  following	  chapter	  will	  present	  a	  further	  theoretical	  discussion	  on	  this	  subject.	  Obviously,	  the	  scope	  of	  these	  theories	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear,	  and	  individual	  studies	  will	  often	  combine	  elements	  from	  each	  approach.	  	  




Level	  of	  analysis	   Definition	  of	  culture	   Theoretical	  argument	  
Strategic	  culture	  
research	  
State	   An	  integrated	  system	  of	  symbols	   Strategic	  culture	  →Strategic	  preference	  →	  Diplomacy	  
Liberal	  
institutionalism	  
State;	  System	   Institutional	  structure	  constructed	  by	  rules	   Culture	  →Institutional	  structure→	  Diplomacy	  
Historical	  
sociology	  





State;	  System	   Common	  knowledge;	  	  Social	  norms	  
Culture	  (Social	  structure)→	  Identity	  and	  interest	  of	  actor	  →	  Diplomacy	  
Constructivism	  
(Europe	  variant)	  
State;	  System	   Social	  discourses	   Culture	  (Discourse	  structure)→	  Identity	  and	  interest	  of	  actor	  →Diplomacy	  
Political	  
psychology	  
Individual;	  State	   Shared	  cognitive	  mechanism	   Culture	  →	  Cognitive	  content	  and	  progress	  →	  Diplomacy	  
Role	  theory	  
Individual;	  State;	  System	  
Ego	  aspects	  from	  the	  state’s	  history	  that	  do,	  or	  have,	  shaped	  identity	  
Culture→	  National	  role	  conception	  →	  Diplomacy	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Figure	  2.2:	  Various	  interpretations	  of	  cultural	  Influence	  on	  diplomacy.	  
	  
2.5	  Theoretical	  Framework	  Based	  on	  Role	  Theory	  
Role	  theory,	  which	  initially	  developed	  in	  sociology	  and	  psychology	  to	  map	  human	  activity,	  is	  a	  suitable	  theoretical	  tool	  that	  infuses	  culture	  with	  more	  analytical	  power	  and	  avoids	  nebulous,	  catchall	  explanations.	  Specifically	  in	  the	  context	  of	  research	  on	  Chinese	  diplomacy,	  according	  to	  Gottwald	   and	   Duggan	   (2011,	   p.	   238),	   the	   role	   theory	   approach	   ‘opens	   up	   the	   domestic	  dimension	  by	  incorporating	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  domestic	  constituency’	  and,	  finally,	  ‘allows	  for	   ideas,	   notions	   of	   historical	   traditions,	   and	   interests	   to	   be	   integrated	   through	   the	   self-­‐‑perception	  of	  the	  Chinese	  leadership	  regarding	  its	  role	  in	  foreign	  policy’.	  	  
	  
2.5.1	  Basic	  concepts	  
Role	  
Just	  like	  the	  concept	  of	  culture,	  the	  term	  role	  appears	  throughout	  academic	  literature	  on	  social	  science,	   but	   it	   has	   never	   had	   a	   universally	   accepted	   definition.	   American	   sociologist	   Bruce	  Biddle	  (1979,	  p.	  58)	  defines	  role	  as	  ‘those	  behaviors	  characteristic	  of	  one	  or	  more	  persons	  in	  a	  context’	  and	  presents	  a	  relatively	  comprehensive	  summary	  of	  its	  essential	  features	  (Ibid.):	  
1.   Roles	  are	  behavioural	  and	  must	  involve	  overt	  actions	  or	  performances	  that	  can	  be	  observed	  by	  persons.	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2.   Roles	   are	   performed	   by	   persons,	  which	   is	   confined	   to	   the	   behaviours	   of	  human	  beings.	  
3.   Roles	  are	  normally	  limited	  in	  some	  way	  by	  contextual	  specification.	  
4.   Roles	  consist	  of	  those	  behaviours	  that	  are	  characteristic	  of	  a	  set	  of	  persons	  and	  a	  context.	  	  
It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   role	   may	   be	   exhibited	   by	   one	   person	   and	   also	   may	   be	   assumed	   by	  several	  persons	  or	  a	  social	  group	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  60).	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  plausible	  to	  use	  this	  concept	  to	  describe	  the	  regular	  behavioural	  pattern	  of	  a	  state.	  In	  addition,	  theorists	  tend	  to	  believe	  that	  roles	   are	  not	   solely	  pre-­‐‑existing	  but	   are	   contained	   in	   the	  entire	  process	  of	  becoming	   (Butler,	  2011).	  Fazendeiro	  (2016,	  p.	  11)	  noted	  that	   ‘it	   is	  not	  simply	  by	  being	  called	  a	  woman	  that	  one	  becomes	  a	  woman,	  but	  rather	  by	  systematically	  corroborating	  that	  role	  with	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  actions’.	  	  
	  
Role	  conception	  
Role	  conception	  is	  a	  highly	  contested	  concept.	  The	  definition	  presented	  by	  Holisti	  (1970),	  who	  first	  introduced	  role	  theory	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  research	  behaviour	  of	  a	  state,	  is	  still	  the	  most	  classic	  reference:	  
The	  policymakers’	  own	  definition	  of	   the	  general	  kind	  of	  decisions,	   commitments,	  rules,	   and	   actions	   suitable	   to	   their	   state,	   and	   of	   the	   functions,	   if	   any,	   their	   state	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should	  perform	  on	  a	  continuing	  basis	  in	  the	  international	  system	  or	  in	  subordinate	  regional	   systems.	   It	   is	   their	   ‘image’	  of	   the	  appropriate	  orientation	  or	   functions	  of	  their	  state	  toward,	  or	  in,	  the	  external	  environment.	  (Holisti,	  1970,	  pp.	  245-­‐‑6)	  
This	  definition	  dominated	  early	  research	  on	  role	  theory	  (e.g.	  Holsti,	  1970;	  Walker,	  1979,	  1987;	  Wish,	  1980),	  but	  it	   is	  now	  believed	  to	  only	  focus	  on	  the	  ego	  aspect	  of	  roles,	  namely,	  the	   ’‘self-­‐‑conceptualization	  of	  a	  state’s	  purpose	  by	  its	  leadership”	  (Harnisch,	  2011,	  p.	  7).	  Drawing	  on	  the	  work	  of	  social	  constructivists	  and	  discourse	  theorists	  (e.g.	  Mead,	  1970;	  Wendt,	  1987),	  current	  research	  views	  role	  conception	  in	  a	  more	  integrative	  sense.	  A	  typical	  definition	  from	  Sebastian	  Harnisch	  (2011,	  p.	  8)	  is	  as	  follows:	  ‘An	  actor’s	  perception	  of	  his	  or	  her	  position	  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis	  others	  (the	  ego	  part	  of	  a	  role)	  and	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  role	  expectations	  of	  others	  (the	  alter	  part	  of	  a	  role)	  as	  signaled	  through	  language	  and	  actions.’	  	  
This	  definition	  reflects	  the	  general	  truth	  that	   ‘roles	  and	  their	  enactment	  are	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  roles	  of	  other	  actors’	  (Ibid.).	  In	  different	  situations,	  the	  ego	  part	  and	  the	  alter	  part	  both	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  become	  dominant	  factors	  in	  role	  conception.	  For	  example,	  according	  to	  Maull	  (2011,	  pp.	  170-­‐‑1),	  US	  foreign	  policy	  role	  conceptions	  from	  2000	  to	  2010	  reflects	  a	  dominance	  of	   ego	   expectation	   and	  perception,	   namely,	   the	  pursuit	   of	   an	   exclusive	   global	   leadership	   role	  based	  on	  the	  ‘American	  ideology’.	  The	  alter	  parts	  were	  simply	  subordinate	  to	  this,	  if	  considered	  at	   all.	   Another	   example	   is	   that	   China	   substantially	   altered	   its	   role	   from	   being	   a	   stubborn	  obstructionist	   to	   an	   active	   peacekeeping	   force	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   humanitarian	   crisis	   in	  Darfur	  (Gottwald	  &	  Duggan,	  2011,	  p.	  240;	  Huang,	  2008,	  pp.	  1-­‐‑2)	  The	  main	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  that	  Beijing’s	  role	  conception	  is	  heavily	  modified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  expectations	  of	  significant	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others,	  most	  notably	  the	  African	  Union	  and	  then	  the	  United	  States	  (Gottwald	  &	  Duggan,	  2011	  p.	  242;	  Harnisch,	  2012,	  p.	  64).	  From	  this	  case,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  the	  alter	  part	  of	  role	  conception	  appears	  to	  be	  more	  decisive	  than	  the	  ego	  part.	  
This	  research	  also	  accepts	  Holsti’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  crucial	  role	  of	  decision	  makers	  as	  primary	  bearers	  of	  national	  role	  conceptions.16	  In	  most	  cases	  individuals	  who	  serve	  as	  decision-­‐‑makers	  are	  ‘the	  only	  ones	  we	  can	  confidently	  assume	  could	  speak	  with	  authority	  on	  matters	  of	  foreign	  and	  defense	  policy’	  (Chafetz,	  Abramso,	  &	  Grillot,	  1996,	  p.	  741).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  ‘every	  foreign	  policy	  decision	  maker	  is	  as	  much	  a	  member	  of	  the	  social	  cognitive	  structure	  that	  characterizes	  his/her	   society	   as	   the	   average	   citizen’	   (Hopf,	   2002,	   p.	   37).	   A	   nation’s	   leader	   could	   represent	  his/her	  state	   ‘in	  part	  because	   they	  articulate	  a	  vision	  of	   the	  nation’s	   role	   in	   the	  world	  affairs	  that	   corresponds	   to	   deep,	   cultural	   beliefs	   about	   the	   nation’	   (Hudson,	   1999,	   p.	   769).	   On	   the	  other	  hand,	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  decision-­‐‑makers	  have	  the	  predominant	  power	  or	  autonomy	  of	  translating	   their	   preferred	   ideational	   elements	   into	   role	   conceptions	   (cf.	   Breuning,	   1997;	  Hobolt,	   2005;	   Hooghe	   &	   Marks,	   2005),	   and	   eventually	   make	   their	   actions	   look	   like	   a	  homogenous	  response	  to	  their	  domestic	  audiences.17	  	  
Why	  does	  this	  study	  choose	  to	  focus	  on	  role	  theory?	  The	  main	  reason	  is	  that	  role	  conception	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Some	  scholars	  believe	  that	  decision	  makers	  who	  can	  affect	  national	  role	  conceptions	  include	  not	  only	  heads	  of	  government	  and	  foreign	  policy	  ministers	  but	  also	  cabinet	  members	  and	  members	  of	  the	  state	  legislature	  (Brummer	  &	  Thies,	  2015,	  p.	  290;	  Cantir	  &	  Kaarbo,	  2012	  p.	  275).	  
17	  Some	   empirical	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   the	   public	   or	   citizens	   in	   fact	   rely	   more	   on	   ‘cognitive	   shortcuts’	   in	   a	   complex	  decision-­‐‑making	  environment	  (Cram	  &	  Patrikios,	  2015,	  p.	  188)	  and	  are	  not	  adept	  at	  shaping	  and	  adjusting	  national	  identities.	  More	  often,	  they	  just	  follow	  what	  the	  decision-­‐‑makers	  believe	  (Hudson,	  1999).	  Given	  the	  centralised	  structure	  of	  the	  Chinese	  political	  system,	  Chinese	  decision-­‐‑makers	  evidently	  have	  more	  of	  a	  monopoly	  on	  shaping	  China’s	  national	  role	  conceptions.	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assumed	  to	  be	  a	  stable	  determinant,	  which	  can	  provide	  long-­‐‑standing	  guidelines	  or	  standards	  of	  appropriate	  behaviour	  for	  policymakers	  (Biddle,	  1986,	  p.	  148;	  Breuning,	  2011,	  p.	  7).	  Kortz	  and	  Sperling	   (2011,	  pp.	  213-­‐‑251)	  probe	   the	  American	  and	  French	   role	   conceptions	   from	   the	  Cold	  War	  to	  the	  21st	  century18	  and	  conclude	  that	  a	  role	  conception	  can	  ‘both	  exist	  and	  persist	  fairly	   isolated	   from	   even	   dramatic	   external	   political	   changes	   or	   fundamental	   shifts	   in	   the	  international	  system’.	  For	  researchers,	  this	  longevity	  and	  stability	  of	  role	  conception	  are	  assets	  when	  attempting	  to	  explain	  the	  long-­‐‑term	  patterns	  of	  behaviour	  rather	  than	  discrete	  decisions	  (Harnisch,	  2011,	  p.	  7).	  Nevertheless,	  almost	  all	  of	   the	   theorists	  accept	   that	  role	  conception	   is	  ‘not	   something	   an	   agent	  merely	   inherits’	   (Schlag,	   2009,	   p.	   98),	   but	   in	   fact	   it	   regularly	   has	   a	  certain	   degree	   of	   malleability	   and	   more	   often	   undergoes	   a	   gradual	   shift	   or	   modification	  (Aggestam,	  2006,	  p.	  22;	  Muller,	  2011,	  p.	  56).	  
In	   this	   study,	   identity	   and	   role	  conception	  are	   believed	   to	   be	   synonymous	   and	   the	   terms	   are	  used	  interchangeably.	  
	  
Role	  performance	  
Role	   performance,	   basically	   identified	   as	   a	   dependent	   variable	   in	   research,	   refers	   to	   ‘the	  
behavior	  of	  an	  actor	  when	  performing	  a	  role’	  (Harnisch,	  2011,	  p.	  9).	  For	  an	  international	  actor,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  According	   to	   Krotz	   and	   Sperling’s	   research,	   both	   the	   United	   States	   and	   France	   have	   had	   some	   consistent	   or	   unrelenting	  national	   role	   conception	   since	   the	   1950s.	   For	   example,	   the	  United	   States	   always	   views	   itself	   as	   a	   benevolent	   hegemon	   that	  deserves	  the	  obedience	  of	   its	  European	  and	  Asian	  allies,	  and	  France	  views	  itself	  as	  a	  great	  power	  capable	  of	  challenging	  and	  balancing	  the	  American	  hegemon	  and	  leading	  an	  autonomous	  Europe	  (Krotze	  &	  Sperling,	  2011,	  p.	  214).	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common	   performances	   include	   speech,	   various	   diplomatic	   actions	   as	   well	   as	   non-­‐‑action19	  (Harnisch,	  2011,	  p.	  15;	  Holsti,	  1970,	  p.	  247).	  
As	  a	  rule,	  role	  theory	  assumes	  that	  the	  role	  conception	  and	  role	  performance	  it	  engenders	  are	  consistent	   (Folz,	   2011,	   p.	   148;	   Frank,	   2011,	   p.	   132).	   According	   to	   role	   theorists,	   role	  conceptions	   determine	   foreign	   policy	   behaviour	   because	   they	   constitute	   a	   national	  understanding	  of	  the	  external	  environment	  (Krotz	  &	  Sperling,	  2011,	  p.	  214);	  they	  imply	  specific	  expectations	  of	  state	  actions	  (Frank,	  2011,	  p.	  132;	  Hopf,	  1998);	  they	  have	  been	  internalised	  and	  habitualised	   to	   such	   a	   degree	   that	   they	   are	   considered	   appropriate	   behaviour	   in	   the	  international	  arena	  (Benes,	  2011,	  p.	  5;	  Muller,	  2011,	  p.	  57).	  
Also	  noteworthy	  is	  that,	  in	  real	  life,	  there	  is	  indeed	  no	  one-­‐‑to-­‐‑one	  correspondence	  between	  role	  conception	   and	   role	   performance.	   Concretely,	   ‘the	   role	   prescribes	   behaviors,	   values	   and	  objectives	   in	   a	   general	   frame,	   but	   the	   individual	   representative	   is	   given	   some	   leeway—occasionally	  considerable	  leeway—to	  enact	  the	  role	  in	  ways	  fit	  for	  the	  particular	  environment	  in	  which	  she	  has	  to	  operate’	  (Muller,	  2011,	  p.	  56).	  	  
	  
Role	  conflict	  
The	   state	   or	   a	   decision-­‐‑maker	   tends	   to	   simultaneously	   hold	   incompatible	   national	   role	  conceptions.	   It	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   the	   correlation	   of	   role	   conceptions	   and	   role	   enactment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Non-­‐‑action	  refers	  to	  the	  deliberate	  absence	  of	  action.	  In	  international	  relations,	  non-­‐‑interference	  in	  others’	   internal	  affairs,	  wilful	  ignorance	  of	  external	  criticism	  or	  refusal	  to	  shake	  hands	  by	  officials	  of	  allied	  nations	  all	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  examples	  of	  non-­‐‑action.	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behaviours	  usually	   takes	  on	  a	  disaggregated	   form	  (Shih,	  1988,	  p.	  601;	  Walker,	  1979,	  p.	  204).	  According	   to	   Biddle	   (1986,	   p.	   83),	   role	   conflict	   can	   ‘derive	   from	   role	   ambiguity	   (when	   the	  specificity	   of	   a	   norm	   is	   low),	   role	  malintegration	   (when	  multiple	   roles	   do	  not	   interlock),	  role	  
discontinuity	   (when	   different	   sequential	   contexts	   require	   disjointed	   roles),	   and	   role	  overload	  (when	   too	  many	   role	   expectations	   exist)’.	   Generally,	   role	   conflict	   can	   ‘take	   the	   form	  of	   either	  interrole	  or	  intrarole	  conflict’	  (Brummer	  &	  Thies,	  2015,	  p.	  279).	  Inter-­‐‑role	  conflict	  refers	  to	  ‘an	  actor	  occupying	  two	  or	  more	  roles	  simultaneously	  that	  have	  incompatible	  expectations’;	  intra-­‐‑role	  conflict	  involves	  ‘incompatible	  expectations	  held	  either	  by	  the	  actor	  or	  others	  regarding	  a	  single	  role’	  (Ibid.).	  	  
It	   is	  not	  a	  problem	  for	  social	  actors	  to	  occupy	  conflicting	  roles	  in	  a	  social	  system	  at	  any	  given	  time,	  ‘since	  multiple	  roles	  may	  be	  organized	  so	  that	  they	  are	  successfully	  enacted	  successively	  or	   simultaneously’	   (Thies,	   2012,	   p.	   29).	   For	   example,	   although	   some	   scholars	   (Deng,	   2008;	  Geeraerts,	   2013b;	   S.	   Li,	   2012)	   claim	   that	   China’s	   diplomacy	   often	   faces	   difficulties	   due	   to	   its	  double	  role	  conceptions	  i.e.	  a	  ‘weak	  power	  identity’	  and	  a	  ‘great	  power	  identity’,	  this	  study	  will	  try	   to	   prove	   that	   such	   double	   identities	   are	   in	   fact	   intentional	   and	   are	   based	   on	   cultural	  heritage	  as	  well	  as	  realistic	  considerations.	  
One	  purpose	  of	  this	  research	  is	  to	  consider	  some	  of	  China’s	  contradictory	  roles	  in	  the	  context	  of	  international	   relations	   and	   to	   prove	   that	   face	   culture	   is	   a	   significant	   cause	   of	   China’s	   role	  conflicts.	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2.5.2	  Theoretical	  framework:	  Between	  culture	  and	  role	  performance	  
Sources	  of	  role	  conceptions	  
Generally,	  role	  theorists	  in	  social	  science	  focus	  on	  agent-­‐‑level	  variables,	  namely,	  ‘the	  individual	  interpretations	  and	  definitions	  of	  rights,	  duties,	  privileges	  and	  appropriate	  forms	  of	  behavior’	  (Flockhart,	  2011),	  and	  in	  a	  profound	  sense,	  ‘agents’	  desire	  to	  maximize	  their	  own	  self-­‐‑esteem’	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  :99).	  	  
In	   the	   field	  of	   international	   relations,	   there	  have	   long	  been	   two	   strands	  of	   research	  differing	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  sources	  of	  role	  conception.	  One	  tends	  to	  believe	  that	  an	  international	  actor’s	  role	   conceptions	   are	   mainly	   driven	   by	   internal	   ideas	   and	   processes,	   namely,	   domestic-­‐‑level	  elements.	  Benes	  (2011,	  p.	  13)	  argues	  that	  the	  theoretical	  meaning	  of	  role	  theory	  is	  to	  correct	  the	   constructivist	   dismissal	   of	   agency	   in	   favour	   of	   structure.	   For	   Hopf	   (2002,	   p.	   263),	   role	  conceptions	  can	  even	  be	  entirely	  domestically	  driven,	  and	  ‘there	  is	  no	  justification	  for	  assuming	  that	   the	   identity	  of	   a	   state	   can	  be	   constructed	  only	   vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis	   another	   state’.	   The	  other	   theory	  holds	   an	   explicitly	   system-­‐‑dominant	   perspective,	   focusing	   on	   foreign	   decision	   makers’	  perceptions	   of	   their	   state’s	   position	   in	   the	   international	   environment.	   This	   research	   trend	   is	  mainly	   a	   product	   of	   the	   constructivist	   argument	   that	   roles	   are	   institutionalised	   in	   social	  structures	   (Wendt,	   1999,	   p.	   227)	   and	   ‘the	   intersubjective	   structure	   is	   the	   final	   arbiter	   of	  meaning’	   (Hopf,	   1998,	   p.	   175).	   In	   light	   of	   this	   deep	   divergence,	   role	   theorists	   always	   have	  conflicting	   viewpoints	   about	   the	   same	   issue.	   For	   example,	   Holsti	   (1970,	   p.	   243)	   favours	  domestic	  sources	  of	  role	  conceptions,	  believing	  that	  during	  serious	  international	  conflicts,	  self-­‐‑
	   62	  
defined	   national	   role	   conceptions	   always	   take	   precedence	   over	   externally	   derived	   role	  prescriptions.	  However,	  Breuing	  (2011,	  p.	  20)	  notes	  that	  ‘crisis	  situations	  are	  likely	  to	  narrow	  the	   scope	   of	   agency	   and	   may	   lead	   actors	   to	   perceive	   themselves	   as	   merely	   reacting	   to	   a	  structural	  imperative’.	  	  
In	   its	   contemporary	   formulation,	   ‘role	   theory	   occupies	   a	  middle	   position	   on	   the	   ontological	  spectrum	   between	   individualism	   and	   structuralism’	   (Benes,	   2011,	   p.	   8).	   Theorists	   have	  proposed	  multiple	  sources	  of	  national	  role	  conceptions,	  trying	  to	  accommodate	  both	  structural	  and	  agent-­‐‑based	  factors,	  as	  well	  as	  material	  and	  ideational	  factors.	  	  
	  
	   Material	   Ideational	  
Domestic	  level	  
Decision-­‐‑makers’	  perception	  of	  a	  state’s	  ·	  Power	  and	  capability ·	  Tangible	  national	  interests	  	  
Decision-­‐‑makers’	  perception	  of	  a	  state’s	  ·	  Cultural	  heritage	  ·	  Historical	  memory ·	  Public	  opinion ·	  Leader’s	  individual	  preferences	  
International	  level	  
Decision-­‐‑makers’	  perception	  of	  a	  state’s	  ·	  Power	  status	  in	  the	  global	  order	  or	  specific	  area ·	  Opportunity	  to	  act	  (possibilities	  afforded	  by	  
Decision-­‐‑makers’	  perception	  of	  	  ·	  Universal	  values	  or	  commonly	  accepted	  norms	   ·	  Socialization	  from	  some	  actor	  or	  among	  actors	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circumstances)	  
Figure	  2.3:	  Multiple	  sources	  of	  national	  role	  conceptions.	  
(c.f.	  Breuning,	  2011,	  p.	  26;	  Neack,	  1995)	  
	  
‘The	   relative	   significance	   of	   domestic	   and	   international	   sources	   is	   ultimately	   a	   matter	   for	  empirical	   research’	   (Breuning,	   2011,	   p.	   19).	  Most	   researchers	   feel	   no	  necessity	   to	   determine	  one	   final	   answer	   to	   this	   agent-­‐‑structure	   problem,	   and	   which	   source	   provides	   better	  explanations	  for	  state	  behaviour	  depends	  on	  specified	  sets	  of	  circumstances.	  
	  
Culture,	  role	  conception,	  role	  performance	  
According	   to	   role	   theory,	   there	   is	   a	   three-­‐‑part	   relationship	   between	   culture	   and	   a	   state’s	  diplomatic	  behaviour.	  Role	  conception	  is	  regarded	  as	  an	  intermediate	  variable	  between	  these	  two	  factors.	  
	  	  
Figure	  2.4	  Theoretical	  framework	  of	  culture	  and	  diplomatic	  behaviour	  
Culture	   Role	  conception	   Role	  performance	  (Diplomatic	  behaviour)	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First,	   a	   state’s	   cultural	   heritage	   constitutes	   the	   main	   and	   stable	   source	   of	   its	   national	   role	  conception.	   Culture	   is	   regarded	   as	   the	   main	   domestic	   source	   of	   national	   role	   conception	  (Breuning,	  1997;	  Chafetz	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Hudson,	  1999),	  and	  it	  is	  identified	  as	  a	  ‘hard’	  core	  of	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  roles	  that	  can	  give	  the	  actor	  some	  distinctive	  individuality	  (Muller,	  2011,	  p.	  56).	  Hudson	  (1999,	  p.	  770)	  argues	  that	  deep-­‐‑rooted	  cultural	  differences	  reverberate	  through	  many	  national	  role	  conceptions	  and	  behaviours.	  In	  this	  sense,	  roles	  are	  essentially	  ‘social	  positions’,	  ‘comprised	   of	   cultural	   norms	   that	   engender	   certain	   expectations	   of	   appropriate	   behaviour’	  (Nabers,	  2011,	  p.	  75).	  	  
Second,	   role	   conception	   leads	   to	   corresponding	   role	   performances.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	  cognitive	   psychology,	   role	   conceptions	   are	   first	   internalised	   by	   the	   decision-­‐‑maker	   and	   then	  become	  the	  standard	  of	  appropriate	  behaviour	  that	  prescribes	  a	  particular	  behaviour	  in	  certain	  situations	   (Folz,	   2011,	   p.	   148;	   Hudson,	   1999,	   pp.	   767-­‐‑801).	   In	   this	   sense,	   roles	   are	   ‘shared,	  normative	  expectations	  that	  prescribe	  and	  proscribe	  behavior’	  (Nabers,	  2011,	  p.	  75).	  
This	   study	   aims	   to	   further	   explore	   to	  what	   degree	   and	   how	   face	   culture	   as	   a	   source	   of	   role	  conception	   is	   translated	   into	   China’s	   national	   images	   and	   diplomatic	   performances.	   The	  concrete	   application	   of	   this	   framework	   will	   be	   illustrated	   in	   the	   next	   chapter	   following	   a	  discussion	  on	  face	  culture.	  This	  study	  will	  adopt	  inductive	  reasoning,	  using	  concrete	  cases	  and	  detailed	  empirical	  proof	  to	  testify	  to	  the	  salience	  of	  face	  culture.	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Diplomacy	  of	  the	  Communist	  Group;	  	  International	  conflicts	  between	  American	  and	  Soviet	  camps	  
Class	  analysis	  of	  Marxism-­‐‑Leninism;	  Mao’s	  Theory	  of	  Contradiction	  
Descriptive	  analysis	  
Learning-­‐‑Copying	  Period	  	  (1980s-­‐‑1990s)	  
China’s	  integration	  into	  the	  world	  economic	  and	  political	  system;	  Multi-­‐‑polarisation	  and	  major	  power	  relations;	  Introduction	  of	  American	  theories	  
American	  theories	  of	  international	  relations,	  especially	  realism	  and	  liberal	  institutionalism	  
Qualitative	  study;	  Standard	  analysis;	  Literature	  review	  
Reflecting-­‐‑Constructing	  Period	  (2000s-­‐‑Present)	  
China’s	  rise;	  China’s	  diverse	  roles;	  Major	  power	  relations;	  Regional	  integration	  and	  multilateral	  governance;	  Low-­‐‑political	  issues;	  A	  possible	  Chinese	  theory	  of	  international	  relations	  	  
Western	  theories	  of	  international	  relations,	  including	  American	  theories,	  the	  English	  School,	  the	  Copenhagen	  School,	  Japanese	  theories	  etc.	  
Qualitative	  study;	  Quantitative	  study;	  Historical	  methods;	  Discourse	  analysis	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Figure	  2.5:	  Development	  stages	  of	  studies	  on	  China’s	  international	  relations.20	  
	  
As	   a	   researcher	   from	  China,	  my	   research	  motivation	  behind	   this	  paper	   is	   closely	   linked	  with	  current	   studies	   on	   China’s	   international	   relations.	   It	   is	   therefore	   imperative	   to	   provide	   an	  overview	  of	  the	  contemporary	  features	  of	  this	  field	  of	  research.	  	  
Figure	  2.5	  presents	  a	  brief	  history	  of	  Chinese	  studies	  in	  the	  field	  of	  international	  relations.	  After	  the	   foundation	   of	   the	   PRC,	   in	   light	   of	   research	   topics	   and	   preferences,	   these	   studies	   can	   be	  divided	   into	  the	  three	  stages	  outlined	  above.	  Currently,	  although	  Chinese	  scholars	  still	  have	  a	  long	   way	   to	   go	   to	   catch	   up	   with	   their	   Western	   counterparts,	   they	   have	   essentially	   grasped	  Western	   research	   theories	   and	  models	   and	  moved	   on	   from	   the	   pure	   ‘imitation’	   stage	   to	   the	  ‘reflecting-­‐‑constructing’	   stage.	   Moreover,	   the	   entire	   community	   has	   gradually	   developed	   a	  sense	  of	  academic	  self-­‐‑consciousness.	  ‘Nearly	  all	  Chinese	  scholars	  agree	  that	  Western	  IR	  theory	  cannot	   solve	   all	   Chinese	   problems	   and	   puzzles—that	   the	   Chinese	   should	   have	   their	   own	  theories	  to	  explain	  the	  world,	  especially	  to	  theorize	  Chinese	  diplomatic	  practice’	  (Wang,	  2009,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  This	   chart	   has	   been	   compiled	   with	   reference	   to	   the	   following	   studies:	   Wang,	   Y.	   (2009).	   China:	   Between	   copying	   and	  constructing.	  In	  A.	  B.	  Tickner,	  &	  O.	  Waver	  (Eds.)	  International	  Relations	  Scholarship	  Around	  the	  World	  (pp.	  103-­‐‑119).	  Oxon	  and	  New	   York:	   Routledge;	   Qin,	   Y.	   (2005).	   A	   Chinese	   school	   of	   international	   relations	   theory:	   Possibility	   and	   inevitability.	  World	  
Economics	  and	  Politics,	   3,	  7(13);	   Duan,	   X.	   (2008).	   Review	   of	   China’s	   international	   relations	   research	   since	   The	   Reform	   and	  Opening-­‐‑Up	  of	  1978.	  Contemporary	  International	  Relations,	  12,	  50-­‐‑54.	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p.	  107).	  
Many	  Chinese	  scholars	  are	  seeking	  to	  establish	  theoretical	  models	  or	  explain	   issues	   from	  the	  perspective	   of	   indigenous	   Chinese	   culture	   and	   practice.	   Most	   of	   them	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   be	  doubtful	   of	   the	   research	   value	   of	   Chinese	   culture	   to	   international	   studies.	   Some	   studies	  underline	  geo-­‐‑cultural	  uniqueness.	  Qin	  Yaqing	  (2005,	  p.	  9),	  for	  instance,	  believes	  that	  a	  Chinese	  School	  of	  International	  Relations	  theory	  is	  very	  possible,	  first	  because	  social	  theory	  differs	  from	  natural	  theory	  in	  that	  the	  former	  has	  a	  distinct	  geo-­‐‑cultural	  birthmark.	  Also,	  for	  China,	  the	  main	  cultural	   resources	   include	   ‘the	   all-­‐‑under-­‐‑heaven	  worldview	   and	   the	   practice	   of	   the	   tributary	  system,	  the	  revolutionary	  thoughts	  and	  practices	  in	  China,	  and	  the	  ideas	  and	  practice	  of	  Reform	  and	  Opening-­‐‑up	  since	  1978’	  (Ibid.).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  some	  highlight	  cultural	  continuity.	  Shi	  Yinhong	  (2010,	  p.	  23)	  states	  that	  China’s	  huge	  size,	  long	  history	  and	  rich	  culture	  determine	  that	  over	  hundreds	  of	  years,	  the	  Chinese	  have	  never	  liked	  to	  identify	  themselves	  as	  followers	  of	  any	  foreign	  civilisation	  or	  culture.	  ‘People	  are	  easily	  shocked	  or	  occupied	  by	  the	  radical	  changes	  of	  the	  modern	  or	  contemporary	  China,	  but	  meanwhile	  they	  still	  inherit	  some	  profound	  cultural	  or	  behavioral	   characteristics	   owned	   by	   China’	   (Ibid.,	   p.	   15).	   Some	   emphasise	   the	   potential	   of	  influence.	  Yan	  Xuetong	  (2011)	  posits	  that	  Chinese	  traditional	  thought	  has	  a	  greater	  chance	  than	  any	  other	  foreign	  ideology	  (say,	  Marxism	  or	  Liberalism)	  of	  becoming	  the	  dominant	  intellectual	  force	   behind	   Chinese	   diplomacy-­‐‑making.	  Wang	   Jisi	   (2011,	   p.	   504)	   notes	   that	   Chinese	   native	  culture	   can	   serve	   as	   a	   unifying	   and	   energising	   force,	   since	   ‘the	   pursuit	   of	   centralized	   single	  party	   rule	   in	   a	   country	   with	   a	   vast	   diversity	   of	   conflicting	   interests	   reinforces	   the	   need	   for	  exhortatory	   implements	   of	   rule’.	   Certainly,	   there	   are	   also	   sceptical	   voices	   in	   the	   context	   of	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cultural	   study.	   Zhang	   Jianxin	   (2009,	   p.	   13)	   opposes	   the	   overemphasis	   of	   China’s	   ancient	  political	  culture,	  which	  often	  mingles	  with	  ethical	   ideas	  and	   lacks	  a	  realistic	  discussion	  about	  politics.	  Shi	  Yinhong	  (2010,	  p.	  17)	  who	  emphasises	  the	  importance	  of	  culture	  also	  questions	  the	  necessity	  of	  establishing	  native	  Chinese	  international	  theories.	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12	   3	   12	   10	  
World	  Outlook	   4	   8	   10	   13	  
Total	   42	   58	   90	   66	  
Percentage	   16.40%	   22.60%	   35.20%	   25.80%	  
Figure	  2.6:	  Cultural	  research	  on	  international	  relations	  in	  China’s	  top	  academic	  journals:21	  	  
Four	  types	  of	  articles	  (2010-­‐‑2014)	  
	  
The	  numbers	  in	  Figure	  2.6	  show	  that	  cultural	  research	  today	  focuses	  more	  on	  other	  countries’	  diplomacy	  and	  ancient	  China’s	  external	  relations.	  The	  former	  is	  basically	  concentrated	  on	  the	  United	   States	   and	   Japan,	   mainly	   elaborating	   on	   cultural	   factors	   behind	   their	   ‘aggressive’	   or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Data	   Sources:	   www.cnki.net	   (The	   China	   Knowledge	   Resource	   Integrated	   Database	   official	   website).	  World	   Economy	   and	  
Politics	   is	  a	   journal	  published	  by	   the	   Institute	  of	  World	  Economy	  and	  Politics,	  Chinese	  Academy	  of	  Social	  Science.	   In	  China’s	  academic	  circles,	   it	   is	  commonly	  regarded	  as	   the	   leading	  academic	   journal	   in	   the	   field	  of	   international	  relations.	  The	  Chinese	  
Journal	  of	  International	  Politics	   is	  a	   journal	  published	  by	  the	  Institute	  of	  Modern	  International	  Relations,	  Tsinghua	  University.	  
Contemporary	  International	  Relations	   is	   a	   journal	  published	  by	   the	  China	   Institutes	  of	  Contemporary	   International	  Relations	  that	   is	   affiliated	   with	   China’s	   State	   Security	   Ministry.	   Diplomatic	   Review	   is	   a	   journal	   published	   by	   China	   Foreign	   Affairs	  University	   under	   China’s	   Foreign	   Affairs	  Ministry.	   International	  Politics	  Quarterly	   is	   a	   journal	   of	   the	   School	   of	   International	  Studies,	   Peking	  University.	  World	  Outlook	  is	   a	   journal	   published	   by	   the	   Shanghai	   Institute	   of	   International	   Studies,	   affiliated	  with	  Shanghai’s	  government.	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‘unfriendly’	   foreign	  policies	  towards	  China	  or	  the	  world.	  The	  latter	   looks	  more	  like	  a	  study	  of	  ideological	  history,	  whose	  aim	  is	  nothing	  but	  to	  show	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  China’s	  thoughts	  and	  behaviours.	   Very	   often,	   Chinese	   traditional	   culture	   is	   presented	   as	   a	   treasure	   trove	   of	   soft	  power;	  China’s	  worldviews	  are	  illustrated	  as	  ‘the	  idealized	  view	  of	  Chinese	  civilization	  as	  open	  to	  the	  world,	  and	  tolerant	  of	  outsiders’	  (Callahan,	  2012,	  p.	  20).	  	  
The	   analysis	   of	   China’s	   contemporary	  diplomacy	  only	   accounts	   for	   a	   small	   proportion	  of	   the	  research	   and	   gets	   short	   shrift.	  Many	   essays	   are	   just	   limited	   to	   analysing	   China’s	   burgeoning	  cultural	  or	  public	  diplomacy	   in	  which	  culture	   is	  originally	   the	  main	   tool	  or	   content	  of	  policy.	  Chinese	   scholars	   seem	   uninterested	   in	   using	   culture	   to	   explain	   diplomatic	   practices	   in	   the	  political,	  military	  and	  other	  spheres	  of	  high	  politics.	  The	  cultural	  analysis	  is	  not	  well	  integrated	  with	  current	  diplomacy,	  so	  to	  speak.	  	  	  	  
Another	  significant	  problem	  is	  that	  to	  ensure	  ‘political	  correctness’,	  Chinese	  academic	  research,	  especially	  in	  the	  field	  of	  social	  science,	  more	  often	  than	  not	  must	  cater	  to	  the	  government	  or	  the	  ruling	  party’s	  viewpoints	  or	  preferences.	  For	  example,	  ‘in	  Chinese	  academic	  society,	  criticizing	  or	   underestimating	   the	   United	   States	   is	   always	   politically	   right’	   (Niu,	   2014,	   p.	   9).	   This	   is	   a	  common	   practice	   whose	   purpose	   is	   to	   elude	   the	   possible	   risks	   of	   political	   speech	   (Ibid.).	  Similarly,	   in	   cultural	   research,	   Chinese	   researchers	   habitually	   attribute	   the	   characteristics	   of	  China’s	   diplomacy	   to	   concepts	   promoted	   by	   its	   highest	   rung	   of	   leaders	   Consider	   the	   term	  ‘Harmonious	  World’	  as	  an	  example.22	  This	  term	  appeared	  most	  frequently	  in	  Chinese	  studies	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  On	  15	  September	  2005,	  Chinese	  President	  Hu	  Jintao	  called	  for	  a	  ‘harmonious	  world’	  at	  the	  summit	  for	  the	  60th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  (UN).	  At	  the	  end	  of	  this	  year,	  the	  PRC	  State	  Council	  Information	  Office	  issued	  a	  white	  
	   71	  
international	   relations	   during	   the	   period	   of	   the	   former	   President	   Hu	   Jintao.	   There	   was	  considerable	   research	   to	   argue	   its	   ‘guiding’	   or	   ‘positive’	   influence	   on	   China’s	   foreign	   policy,	  although	  most	   of	   it	   lacked	   any	   clear	   logic	   or	   empirical	   evidence.	  When	   President	   Xi	   Jinping	  came	   to	   power,	   the	   concept	   of	  Harmonious	  World	   seemed	   to	   become	   a	   foundling	   overnight,	  and	   the	   new	   idea	   dubbed	   ‘China	  Dream,	  World	  Dream’23	  began	   to	   heavily	   feature	   in	   Chinese	  academic	  discourse	  and	  research.	  
It	   is	  such	  things	  that	   inspired	  my	  research	  interest	   in	  this	  topic.	  First,	   it	   is	  a	  pressing	  need	  to	  analyse	  what	   is	  happening	   in	  China	  today	  and	  to	  explore	   the	   longevity	  of	   the	  rules	  behind	   it,	  instead	   of	   focusing	   on	   China’s	   historical	   glory	   or	   past	   thinkers’	   (or	   politicians’)	   thoughts.	  Professor	  Di	  Xuewei’s	  comment	  on	  social	  science	  in	  China	  today	  captures	  my	  feelings:	  ‘So	  many	  highly	   realistic	   problems	   or	   issues	   do	  not	   gain	   the	   deserved	   attention	   or	   enough	  discussion,	  and	  so	  many	  clarified	  things	  have	  very	  little	  to	  do	  with	  China	  today’	  (Di,	  2013,	  p.	  3).	  
Second,	   my	   research	   has	   been	   driven	   by	   the	   desire	   to	   reveal	   an	   authentic	   China	   from	   the	  cultural	   perspective.	   ‘Romanticizing	   and	   demonizing	   China…	   dangerously	   distorts	   our	  understanding	   of	   Chinese	   foreign	   policies’	   (Gries,	   2005,	   p.	   20).	   In	   recent	   years,	   plenty	   of	  Western	   scholars	   have	   become	   fond	   of	   embellishing	   their	   descriptions	   of	   an	   aggressive	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  paper	   entitled	   China’s	   peaceful	   development	   road,	   which	   referred	   to	   building	   a	   harmonious	   world	   as	   one	   of	   China’s	   ‘lofty	  goal[s]’	   in	   taking	   the	   ‘road	  of	   peaceful	   development’.	   The	   concept	   of	   ‘harmonious	  world’	   since	  became	   the	  most	  mentioned	  term	  in	  Hu	  Jintao’s	  diplomacy.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  Western	  scholars,	  although	  this	  idea	  has	  received	  considerable	  attention	  in	  China,	  the	  concept	  always	  remains	  ill	  defined	  and	  very	  much	  dependent	  on	  the	  interpretations	  of	  its	  advocates.	  	  
23	  ‘China	  Dream’	   [Chinese:	  中国梦]	   is	   a	   political	   term	   that	   gained	   popularity	   in	   China	   after	   President	   Xi	   Jingpng	   took	   office.	  Generally,	  this	  phrase	  refers	  to	  the	  collective	  hope	  of	  Chinese	  people	  to	  restore	  China’s	  lost	  national	  greatness.	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threatening	   China	   and	   believe	   that	   this	   crafty	   country	   is	   enthusiastic	   about	   taking	   off	   its	  disguise	   and	   revealing	   its	   Machiavellian	   side.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   many	   Chinese	   scholars	   have	  strived	  to	  relentlessly	  prove	  that	  China	  is	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  peaceful	  force	  and	  claim	  that	  the	  world	  will	  soon	  witness	  it	  becoming	  a	  world	  leader	  that	  is	  totally	  different	  from	  its	  previous	  hegemonic	   form.	   This	   research	   will	   try	   to	   avoid	   the	   paradigm	   of	   ‘either-­‐‑or’	   thinking	   and	  provide	  more	  plausible	  descriptions	  of	  a	  multifaceted	  China.	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Chapter	  3	  
Face	  Culture	  in	  Chinese	  Society	  
	  
忍丑少羞，无面有头。	  	  —《诗经》	  	  
If	  a	  person	  can	  endure	  the	  sloppy	  appearance	  and	  lack	  of	  
sense	  of	  shame,	  he	  only	  has	  his	  head	  rather	  than	  face.	  
—Classic	  of	  Poetry24	  
	  
	  
Over	  the	  decades,	  social	  scientists	  from	  various	  fields	  have	  explored	  the	  concept	  of	  face,	  which	  is	   believed	   to	   help	   account	   for	   much	   of	   the	   distinctive	   yet	   misunderstood	  individual/organisational	  behaviour	  seen	  in	  Chinese	  social	  life	  (Kim	  &	  Nam,	  1998,	  p.	  523).	  	  
For	  most	  Chinese	  people,	  the	  word	  面子	  [face]	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  natural	  and	  self-­‐‑explanatory	  part	  of	  social	  life.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘although	  everyone	  appears	  to	  have	  some	  notion	  of	  what	   face	   entails,	   a	   precise	  definition	  of	   it	   proves	   to	  be	   the	  most	  difficult	   task’	   (Ho,	   1976,	   p.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Classic	   of	   Poetry	   [Chinese:诗经]	   is	   the	   oldest	   existing	   collection	   of	   Chinese	   poetry,	   containing	   305	   chronologically	  authenticated	  works	  dating	  from	  the	  11th	  to	  7th	  centuries	  BC.	  There	  are	  two	  opinions	  about	  how	  these	  poems	  were	  collected.	  Traditional	  theory	  states	  that	  Classic	  of	  Poetry	  was	  compiled	  by	  Confucius	  around	  600	  BC,	  while	  another	  theory	  states	  that	  the	  book	  has	  been	  in	  existence	  since	  long	  before	  Confucius’	  time	  (Liu,	  1966,	  p.	  11-­‐‑13).	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867).	  This	  book	  defines	  face	  in	  a	  universal	  sense	  i.e.	  the	  public	  image	  that	  a	  person	  claims	  for	  him/herself	   and	   that	   is	   also	   recognised	   by	   others	   (See	   more	   in	   3.2).	   Naturally,	   face	   culture	  refers	   to	   the	   conceptualisation	  of	   face	  as	   a	   cultural	   phenomenon	  and	   the	  behavioural	  modes	  adopted	  to	  deal	  with	  ‘face	  wants.	  
This	   chapter	   is	   rooted	   in	   the	   following	   research:	   1)	   Research	   results	   from	   sociology,	   social	  psychology	   and	   communication	   studies,	   in	   which	   face	   concern	   and	   related	   behaviours	   have	  been	   a	   recurring	   theme	   since	   a	   long	   time.	   The	   works	   of	   Goffman	   (1955;	   1967),	   Ho	   (1976;	  1994),	  Brown	  and	  Levinson	  (1987),	  Hwang	  (1987;	  2011),	  Ting-­‐‑Toomey	  (1988;	  1994),	  Spencer-­‐‑Oatey	  (2007)	  and	  Di	  (2011)	  have	  greatly	  contributed	  to	  the	  study	  of	  face	  culture.	  Chinese	  and	  foreign	  scholars’	  studies	  complement	  each	  other,	  together	  providing	  a	  comprehensive	  view	  of	  the	   universality	   and	   particularity	   of	   the	   Chinese	   case;	   2)	   Chinese	   philosophy,	   especially	  Confucian	  ethics,	  which	  are	  very	  critical	  in	  explaining	  the	  culturally	  unique	  features	  of	  Chinese	  face	  culture;	  3)	  My	  own	  personal	  experience	  and	  viewpoints.	  	  
Since	  face	  culture	  exists	  so	  conspicuously	  in	  Chinese	  society	  and	  daily	  life,	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  any	  Chinese	  person	  or	  even	  any	  foreigner	  who	  has	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  contact	  with	  Chinese	  people	  can	  obtain	  plenty	  of	  first-­‐‑hand	  knowledge	  or	  understanding	  of	  this	  culture	  simply	  through	  daily	  interactions.	   Being	   Chinese	  myself	   serves	   as	   a	   distinct	   advantage	   and	   I	   shall	   be	   able	   to	   cite	  some	  typical	  phenomena	  that	  illustrate	  the	  characteristics	  of	  face	  culture.	  This	  chapter	  is	  not	  a	  summary	  of	  existing	  opinions,	  but	  is	  an	  attempt	  at	  defining	  face	  in	  a	  general	  sense	  and	  depict	  the	   distinctiveness	   of	   Chinese	   face	   culture	   in	   an	   academically	   innovative	   way.	   The	   research	  framework	  for	  this	  chapter	  is	  presented	  in	  Figure	  3.1.	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Figure	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  Outline	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  Chapter	  3.	  
	  
3.1	  Basic	  Problem:	  Is	  Face	  Culture	  a	  Universal	  Phenomenon	  or	  Not?	  	  
The	   following	   paragraph	   provides	   a	   relatively	   comprehensive	   and	   plausible	   answer	   to	   this	  question:	  
Persons	   universally	   have	   face	   and	   the	   desire	   to	   maintain	   or	   even	   gain	   face.	  Facework,	  the	  actions	  which	  are	  taken	  to	  support	  these	  desires	  to	  maintain	  or	  gain	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face,	   can	   also	   be	   found	   universally.	   While	   the	   universality	   of	   face	   and	   facework	  seems	   to	   be	   evident,	   the	   specific	   elements	   of	   face	   and	   the	   specific	   facework	  strategies	  seem	  to	  vary	  across	  different	  societies	  or	  across	  different	  situations	  even	  in	  the	  same	  society.	  (Lim,	  1994,	  pp.	  209-­‐‑210)	  
It	  has	  been	  common	  consensus	  that	  face	  and	  facework	  are	  undoubtedly	  universal	  phenomena	  in	   human	   society	   as	   well	   as	   a	   fundamental	   consideration	   in	   social	   interactions	   and	  relationships.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   one	   cares	   about	   face,	   the	   specific	  motivation	   to	   seek	   or	   save	   face	   and	   how	   one	   manages	   facework	   are	   mainly	   influenced	   by	  cultural	   variability	   as	  well	   as	   by	   gender,	   relations,	   context	   and	   other	   variables	   (Ting-­‐‑Toomy,	  1994,	  p.	  3;	  Kitayama	  &	  Markus,	  1995,	  p.	  366).	  	  
	  
3.1.1	  Cultural-­‐‑universal	  aspects	  
From	  the	  outset,	  researchers	  identified	  the	  universality	  of	  face	  concern.	  Hu	  Hsien	  Chin	  (1944,	  p.	  45),	  the	  first	  scholar	  to	  discuss	  the	  concept	  of	  face	  academically,	  claims	  that	  the	  desire	  for	  face	  exists	  in	  every	  human	  society.	  According	  to	  Goffman	  (1967,	  p.	  1),	  every	  person	  who	  lives	  in	  a	  world	  of	  social	  encounters	  tends	  to	  act	  out	  ‘a	  pattern	  of	  verbal	  and	  nonverbal	  acts	  by	  which	  he	  expresses	  his	  view	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  through	  this	  his	  evaluation	  of	  the	  participants’.	  Brown	  and	  Levinson	  (1987)	  believe	   that	  every	  competent	  adult	   in	  every	  society	  needs	   face	  and	  also	  knows	  that	  others	  need	  it.	  	  
Scholars	   believe	   that	   the	   universality	   of	   face	   concern	   primarily	   originates	   from	   the	   basic	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psychological	  need	  for	  social	  recognition.	  That	  is,	   ‘when	  interacting,	  most	  members	  of	  society	  are	  concerned	  about	  what	  others	  think	  of	  them’	  (Haugh	  &	  Hinze,	  2003,	  p.	  1581).	  ‘Anyone	  who	  does	  not	  wish	  to	  declare	  his	  social	  bankruptcy	  must	  show	  a	  regard	  for	  face:	  he	  must	  claim	  for	  himself,	  and	  must	  extend	  to	  others,	  some	  degree	  of	  compliance,	  respect,	  and	  deference	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  a	  minimum	  level	  of	  effective	  social	  functioning’	  (Ho,	  1976,	  pp.	  881-­‐‑2).	  	  
Facework,	  as	  the	  name	  suggests,	  refers	  to	  ‘the	  actions	  taken	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  face-­‐‑wants	  of	  one	  and/or	   the	   other’	   (Cupach	  &	  Metts,	   1994,	   p.	   4).	  We	   could	   say	   that	   each	   person,	   culture	   and	  society	  appears	  to	  have	  its	  own	  characteristic	  repertoire	  of	  facework	  practice,	  but,	  nonetheless,	  there	  obviously	  exists	  a	  universal	  set	  of	  strategic	  resources	  from	  which	  individuals	  across	  the	  world	  choose	  their	  facework	  (Yu,	  2003,	  p.	  1684).	  Just	  like	  Chinese	  facework	  that	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  prove	  that	  all	  of	  its	  constituent	  factors	  are	  unique	  to	  Chinese	  people	  and	  culture	  alone.	  They	  are	  very	   likely	  to	  be	   found	  and	  observed	   in	  other	  cultures	  to	  varying	  degrees.	  Differences	  in	  facework	  among	  cultures	  are	  in	  fact	  the	  various	  clustered	  preferences	  of	  behaviour.	  
	  
3.1.2	  Cultural-­‐‑special	  aspects	  
Clearly,	   face	   wants	   and	   concrete	   acts	   are	   subject	   to	   cultural	   specifications	   of	   many	   kinds	  (Brown	  &	  Levinson,	  1987,	  p.	  13).	  	  
1.	   The	   degree	   of	   concern	   with	   face.	   Face	   can	   have	   an	   almost	   quantitative	   dimension,	   and	  people	  of	  different	  cultural	  backgrounds	  are	  frequently	  described	  as	  different	  in	  their	  degree	  of
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face-­‐‑love	  (Chang	  &	  Holt,	  1994,	  p.	  100).	  
There	   is	  consensus	  about	   the	  high	  degree	  of	   face	  demand	   in	  Chinese	  culture	  as	  well	  as	  some	  other	  East	  Asian	  cultures.	  Empirical	  studies	  from	  cross-­‐‑cultural	  anthropology,	  psychology	  and	  sociology	  reveal	   that	  Easterners	  are	  more	  concerned	  with	  how	   they	  are	  perceived	  by	  others,	  and	   they	   are	   also	   more	   likely	   than	   Westerners	   to	   feel	   anxiety	   concerning	   their	   social	  recognition	  in	  public	  ([Liao	  &	  Wang,	  2009,	  p.	  990;	  Abe,	  Bagozzi,	  &	  Sadarangani,	  1996;	  Redding,	  1982;	  Bond,	  1991;	  Kim	  &	  Cohen,	  2010;	  Leung	  &	  Cohen,	  2011;	  Di,	  2011).	  For	  the	  Chinese,	  it	  is	  behaviourally	   reasonable	   to	   forego	   tangible	   rewards	   for	   the	   sake	  of	   face,	  which	   is	   valued	   far	  more	   than	  any	  of	   the	  other	  objectives	  of	  social	   interactions	  (Dean,	  1983,	  p.	  49).	   In	  China,	  we	  often	  describe	  many	  phenomena	  in	  daily	  life	  with	  a	  two-­‐‑part	  allegorical	  saying:	  ‘打肿脸充胖子—死要面子活受罪’	   [Literal	   translation:	   To	   slap	   one’s	   face	   until	   it	   is	   swollen	   in	   order	   to	   look	  imposing—(one)	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  suffer	  terribly	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  face].	  	  
2.	   Dynamics	   behind	   gaining	   and	   saving	   face.	   ‘The	   uniqueness	   of	   Chinese	   face	   is	   that	   an	  individual	  would	  take	  actions	  not	  only	  for	  the	  face	  of	  oneself	  but	  also	  for	  the	  face	  of	  the	  greater	  self ’	  (Wu,	  2013,	  p.	  156).	  How	  one	  defines	  ‘the	  greater	  self ’	  is	  completely	  individual,	  but	  what	  is	  clear	   is	  that	  the	  greater	  self	  can	  include	  one’s	   family	  members,	   friends,	  the	  wider	  community	  and	  even	  one’s	  ancestors	  (Ibid.).	  In	  particular,	  an	  individual’s	  face	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  face	  of	  his	   or	  her	   family	  members.	   ‘Such	   sayings	   as,	   “The	   children’s	  misbehaviour	   is	   the	   fault	   of	   the	  father”	  [Chinese:	  子不教，父之过],	  or,	   “The	  ugly	  things	  of	   the	   family	  should	  not	  go	  out	  of	   the	  family’s	  gate”	  [Chinese:	  家丑不可外扬],	  underscore	  the	  sense	  of	  joint	  responsibility	  and	  shared	  fate	   involved	   in	   family	   membership’	   (King	   &	   Bond,	   1985,	   p.	   37).	   Chinese	   parents	   can	   be	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commonly	  heard	  saying	  ‘Do	  not	  make	  us	  lose	  face’	  [Chinese:	  别跟我们丢脸].	  Influenced	  by	  this,	  Chinese	   children	   generally	   tend	   to	   be	   cautious	   and	   avoid	   any	   rash	   behaviour	   that	   may	  adversely	  reflect	  both	  on	  them	  and	  on	  their	  family	  (Ibid.).	  	  
I	  would	  like	  to	  present	  my	  own	  experience	  as	  an	  example.	  I	  completed	  my	  doctoral	  studies	  in	  Belgium	  between	  2014	  and	  2017.	  Whenever	  I	  was	  worried	  about	  failing	  to	  complete	  my	  PhD,	  my	  biggest	  concerns	  were:	  How	  will	  I	  explain	  such	  a	  failure	  to	  my	  parents?	  How	  will	  my	  parents	  
face	  our	  relatives	  and	  friends?	  My	  failure	  will	  inevitably	  become	  my	  parents’	  failure	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  other	  people	  and	  will	  make	  my	  parents	  continuously	  lose	  face	  in	  front	  of	  others.	  If	  someone	  asks	  my	   parents	   how	   their	   son	   is	   doing	   in	   Belgium,	   they	  will	   feel	   embarrassed	   and	  will	   not	  know	  how	  to	  maintain	  the	  face	  of	  the	  whole	  family.	  	  
In	   line	   with	   Confucian	   relationalism,	   Chinese	   people	   have	   far	   more	   spiritual	   dynamics	   (or,	  sometimes,	   obligations)	   to	   pursue	   and	   safeguard	   face	   in	   social	   life,	   which	   will	   be	   explained	  more	  in	  Section	  3.5.2.	  
3.	   Behavioural	   modes	   of	   seeking	   and	   saving	   face.	   Regarding	   the	   cultural	   diversity	   of	  facework,	  Goffman	   (1967,	   p.	   13)	   notes,	   ‘the	   particular	   set	   of	   practices	   stressed	  by	  particular	  persons	  or	  groups	  seems	  to	  be	  drawn	  from	  a	  single	   logically	  coherent	   framework	  of	  possible	  practices…	  It	  is	  as	  if	  face,	  by	  its	  very	  nature,	  can	  be	  saved	  only	  in	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  ways,	  and	  as	   if	  each	  social	  grouping	  must	  make	   its	  selections	   from	  this	  single	  matrix	  of	  possibilities’.	   In	  short,	  different	   social	   groups	  have	  different	   facework	   selections	   that	   can	  be	   characterised	  by	  their	  distinct	  cultural	  features.	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Scholars	   have	   consistently	   pointed	   out	   that	   facework	   is	   conceptualised	   in	   a	  more	   relational	  manner	   in	   Chinese	   culture	   (e.g.	  Mao,	   1994;	   Jia,	   1997,	   p.	   44,	  Di,	   2011,	   p.	   260;	  Hwang	  &	  Han,	  2012,	  p.	  479).	  Chang	  and	  Holt	  (1994,	  p.	  95),	  who	  compare	  the	  concept	  of	  face	  in	  the	  Western	  and	  Chinese	  cultural	  contexts,	  claim	  that	  Chinese	  face	  places	  emphasis	  on	  human	  relationships	  instead	  of	  impression	  management.	  Based	  on	  these	  research	  perspectives,	  I	  will	  summarise	  the	  behaviour	  models	  of	  Chinese	  facework	  in	  Section	  3.6.	  	  	  
	  
3.2	  Defining	  Face:	  Multiple	  Sociological	  Perspectives	  
Since	   face	  is	   a	   universal	   phenomenon,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   give	   it	   a	   clear	   definition	   in	   its	  most	  general	  sense.	  
Currently,	  the	  bulk	  of	  research	  on	  this	  topic	  comes	  from	  the	  field	  of	  sociology.	  Western	  studies	  on	   face	   began	   with	   the	   pioneering	   work	   of	   American	   sociologist	   Goffman	   (1955;	   1967).	  Oriental	  studies	  mainly	  started	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  gradually	  became	  an	  important	  part	  of	  efforts	  to	   promote	   sociological	   localisation.	   In	   this	   section,	   I	  will	   begin	   by	   reviewing	   the	  most	   cited	  definitions	   of	   face	   and	   then	   propose	   a	   definition	   that	   is	   aimed	   to	   best	   reflect	   the	   universal	  features	  of	   this	   concept.	  This	   section	  will	   also	  discuss	   some	  differences	  between	   the	  Chinese	  and	  Western	  ideas	  of	  face.	  
	  
	   82	  
3.2.1	  Goffman:	  Positive	  social	  value.	  
‘The	   positive	   social	   value	   a	   person	   effectively	   claims	   for	   himself	   by	   the	   line	   others	  
assume	  he	  has	  taken	  during	  a	  particular	  contact’	  (Goffman,	  1967,	  p.	  5)	  
The	  most	   commonly	   cited	   definition	   of	   face	   in	   current	   research	   is	   from	  Goffman,25	  who	   first	  tried	   to	   clarify	   the	   universal	   meaning	   of	   face	   across	   cultures.	   For	   him,	   face	   is	   just	   an	  embodiment	   of	   social	   norms	   i.e.	   ‘an	   image	   of	   self	   delineated	   in	   terms	   of	   approved	   social	  attributes’	  (Ibid.).	  More	  precisely,	   ‘one’s	  own	  face	  and	  the	  face	  of	  others	  are	  constructs	  of	   the	  same	  order;	  it	  is	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  group	  and	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  situation	  which	  determine	  how	  much	  feeling	  one	  is	  to	  have	  for	  face	  and	  how	  this	  feeling	  is	  to	  be	  distributed	  among	  the	  faces	  involved’	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  6).	  Consistent	  with	  this	  logic,	  the	  key	  to	  gaining	  face	  is	  to	  follow	  behavioural	  rules	  that	  a	  society	  recognises,	  which	  at	  best	  ‘tends	  to	  be	  of	  a	  legitimate,	  institutionalized	  kind’	  (Ho,	  1976,	  p.	  7).	  Likewise,	  the	  reason	  why	  a	  person	  has	  the	  wrong	  face	  or	  loses	  face	  is	  that	  his	  or	   her	   social	   worth	   cannot	   be	   integrated,	   even	   through	   effort,	   into	   the	   form	   that	   is	   being	  sustained	  for	  him	  (or	  her)	  Ibid.,	  p.	  8).	  	  
Criticism	   of	   Goffman’s	   definition	   focuses	   on	   its	   ignorance	   of	   the	   human’s	   dynamic	   role.	  According	   to	   this	   perspective,	   the	   unmentioned	   society	   or	   community,	   inhabiting	   in	   a	   realm	  beyond	  individuals	  and	  their	  interactions,	  becomes	  the	  sole	  determinant	  factor	  of	  granting	  or	  withdrawing	   face.	  Correspondingly,	   face	  becomes	  a	   thing	   ‘on	   loan	   to	   individuals	   from	  society,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Erving	  Goffman	  was	  a	  Canadian-­‐‑American	  sociologist,	  long	  considered	  the	  most	  influential	  American	  sociologist	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  His	  best	  known	  books	   include	  The	  Presentation	  of	  Self	  in	  Everyday	  Life	   (1959),	  Asylums	  (1961)	  and	   Interaction	  Ritual	  (1967).	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and	   that	   will	   be	   withdrawn	   from	   them	   if	   they	   prove	   unworthy	   of	   it’	   (Goffman,	   1967,	   p.	   7).	  However,	  in	  reality,	  individuals	  are	  never	  only	  passive	  recipients	  of	  social	  norms	  but	  also	  can	  be	  active	  creators	  of	   them.	  When	  social	  actors	  deal	  with	   the	   largely	  ordinary	  affairs	  of	  everyday	  life,	  they	  continually	  produce	  accountable	  social	  actions	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  reflexively	  reproduce	  the	   normative	   framework	   within	   which	   their	   social	   actions	   are	   carried	   out	   (Schutz,	   1962;	  Heritage,	  1984).	  In	  some	  situations,	  an	  individual	  can	  even	  be	  autonomic	  and	  creative	  enough	  to	  act	  independently	  of	  group	  standards,	  through	  which	  it	  is	  still	  likely	  for	  them	  to	  inspire	  social	  others	  and	  gain	  recognition	  (Norton	  &	  Toohey,	  2011;	  Sueda,	  2014,	  p.	  19).	  Face	  can	  be	  created	  and	   manipulated	   both	   endogenously	   and	   exogenously,	   and	   facework	   inevitably	   involves	  people’s	  personalised	  preferences	  and	  initiatives	  to	  a	  large	  extent.	  	  
Another	  controversy	  about	  Goffman’s	  definition	  is	  its	  emphasis	  on	  ‘positive	  social	  value’.	  First	  of	   all,	   judgments	   of	   what	   is	   ‘positive’	   are	   highly	   situational	   and	   subjective.	   ‘Judgments	  concerning	  the	  extent,	  loss,	  or	  gain	  of	  face	  are	  based	  on	  sets	  of	  criteria	  or	  standards	  which	  vary	  both	   cross-­‐‑culturally	   and	   over	   time	   within	   a	   single	   culture.	   These	   standards	   are	   rooted	  ultimately	  in	  the	  value	  within	  a	  single	  culture	  at	  a	  particular	  point	  in	  time’	  (Ho,	  1976,	  p.	  874).	  Even	  in	  a	  small	  community,	  a	  social	  value	  may	  be	  perceived	  as	  positive	  by	  one	  person	  while	  it	  may	  be	  considered	  neutral	  or	  negative	  by	  another.	  	  
Second,	  at	  least	  in	  China,	  face	  very	  often	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  a	  positive	  quality	  or	  any	  merely	  positive	   indication.	   ‘In	   China,	   people	  who	   have	   no	   accomplishment,	   power,	  wealth,	   status	   or	  morality	   still	   care	   about	   their	   face	   and	   seek	   face,	   and	   very	   often	   still	   can	   obtain	   face	   as	  expected.	   In	   contrast,	   sometimes,	   those	  who	   possess	   achievement,	   status,	   or	   even	   sufficient	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morality	  may	  not	   necessarily	   own	   face’	   (Di,	   2011,	   p.	   73).	   Chen	  Zhizhao	   (1988,	   p.	   75)	   argues	  more	  directly	  that,	   ‘it	  is	  generally	  known	  that	  [in	  Chinese	  society]	  gang	  members	  gain	  face	  by	  means	  of	  their	  aggressive	  and	  fierce	  images,	  and	  brothel	  women	  seek	  face	  from	  a	  steady	  flow	  of	  clients.	  You	  cannot	   find	  any	  positive	  value	   in	   these	  people’s	   images	  or	   face’.	  Lu	  Xun	  (2006,	  p.	  398)	  expresses	  a	  similar	  viewpoint:	  ‘[face]	  not	  only	  belongs	  to	  the	  middle	  class	  and	  the	  people	  above	  them.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  face	  issue,	  even	  pedicab	  drivers	  and	  the	  illiterate	  still	  strive	  to	  maintain	  their	  face	  at	  all	  costs	  and	  in	  all	  circumstances’.	  To	  the	  Chinese,	  face	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  natural	  right,26	  namely,	  a	  person	  can	  get	  face	  without	  possessing	  any	  positive	  social	  value.	  	  
Third,	   Goffman’s	   explanation	   of	   face	   does	   not	   consider	   the	   hierarchical	   structure	   of	   every	  society.	  Whether	  East	  or	  West,	  it	  can	  be	  observed	  that	  some	  people’s	  face	  is	  derived	  from	  their	  superior	  status	  and	  involves	  no	  positive	  implication.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  workplace,	  we	  always	  have	  to	  give	  face	  to	  our	  supervisors,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  believed	  to	  be	  incapable	  or	  unwelcome.	  In	  the	  family,	  children	  need	  to	  always	  be	  concerned	  with	  the	  face	  of	  their	  parents,	  in	  many	  cases	  not	  because	  of	  their	  positive	  actions	  but	  just	  simply	  because	  they	  are	  parents.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  There	  may	  be	  a	  conceptual	  confusion	  between	  face	  and	  dignity.	  As	  a	  counterpart	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  face,	  the	  concept	  of	  dignity	  refers	   to	   ‘the	  conviction	  that	  each	   individual	  at	  birth	  possesses	  an	   intrinsic	  value	  at	   least	   theoretically	  equal	   to	   that	  of	  every	  other	  person’	  (Ayers,	  1984,	  p.	  19).	  Dignity	  culture	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  culture	   in	  which	  every	   individual	   is	  considered	  to	  possess	  inherent	  value,	  and	  that	  value	  is	  not	  supposed	  to	  be	  judged	  by	  others	  (Kim	  &	  Cohen,	  2010).	  However,	  the	  concept	  of	  face	  depends	  on	  others’	  judgment	  and	  recognition.	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3.2.2	  Brown	  and	  Levinson:	  Positive	  face	  and	  negative	  face	  
‘The	   public	   self-­‐‑image	   that	   every	   member	   wants	   to	   claim	   for	   himself.	   (Brown	   &	  Levinson,	  1987,	  p.	  61)	  
It	  seems	  clear	  that	  Brown	  and	  Levinson	  centre	  their	  ideas	  on	  the	  individual	  aspect	  of	  face.	  Face	  is	  characterised	  as	  ‘an	  image	  that	  intrinsically	  belongs	  to	  the	  individual,	  to	  the	  “self”’	  (Ho,	  1976,	  p.	  454),	  and	  to	  protect	  and	  enhance	  one’s	  face	  is	  equated	  with	  acting	  in	  full	  compliance	  with	  the	  expectations	   of	   personal	   desires	   (Mao,	   1994;	   Yu,	   1999].	   Compared	   with	   Goffman’s	   over-­‐‑emphasis	   on	   society,	   Brown	   and	   Levinson	   go	   to	   the	   other	   extreme	   of	   only	   highlighting	  individual	  desire	  and	  ignoring	  face’s	  interactive	  nature.	  
Brown	  and	  Levinson	  also	  put	  forward	  two	  kinds	  of	  face	  at	  the	  universal	  level:	  positive	  face	  and	  
negative	  face.	  They	  interpret	  negative	  face	  as	  ‘the	  want	  of	  every	  individual	  to	  be	  unimpeded	  in	  their	  actions’	  and	  positive	  face	  as	  ‘the	  want	  to	  have	  one’s	  wants	  approved	  by	  others’	  (Brown	  &	  Levinson,	   1987,	   p.	   61).	   It	   is	   assumed	   that	   most	   actions	   involving	   speech,	   such	   as	   requests,	  offers	   and	   compliments,	   inherently	   threaten	   either	   the	   hearer’s	   or	   the	   speaker’s	   face-­‐‑wants,	  and	  that	  politeness	  is	  involved	  in	  redressing	  face-­‐‑threatening	  actions	  (Vilkki,	  2006,	  p.	  324).	  	  
Their	   research	   is	   criticised	   for	   failing	   to	   address	   behaviours	   in	   many	   non-­‐‑Western	   cultures	  where	   the	   underlying	   interactional	   focus	   is	   centred	   not	   upon	   individualism	   but	   upon	   group	  identity	  (e.g.	  Kasper,	  1990;	  O’Driscoll,	  1996).	  For	  example,	  ‘the	  speaker’s	  negative	  face	  desires	  are	  usually	  negligible	  or	  even	  irrelevant	  in	  Chinese	  sociocultural	  contexts’	  (Yu,	  2003,	  p.	  1698).	  Further,	   ‘it	   is	  the	  harmony	  of	  individual	  behavior	  with	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  community,	  rather	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than	  the	  accommodation	  of	  individual	  desires,	  that	  Chinese	  face	  emphasizes’	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  1685).	  	  
	  
3.2.3	  Hu’s	  definition:	  Reputation	  
‘A	   reputation	   achieved	   through	   getting	   on	   in	   life,	   through	   success	   and	   ostentation.’	  (Hu,	  1944,	  p.	  45)	  
As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  Hu	  Hsien	  Chin	  was	  the	  first	  scholar	  to	  discuss	  the	  Chinese	  concept	  of	  face	  in	   an	   academic	   way.	   The	   definition	   she	   put	   forth	   is	   solely	   based	   on	   the	   Chinese	   cultural	  background.	   Regarding	   how	   to	   gain	   face,	   she	   says,	   ‘[Face]	   is	   built	   up	   through	   initial	   high	  position,	   wealth,	   power,	   ability,	   through	   cleverly	   establishing	   ties	   to	   a	   number	   of	   prominent	  people,	  as	  well	  as	  through	  avoidance	  of	  acts	  that	  would	  cause	  unfavourable	  comment’	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  61).	  	  
However,	   strictly	   speaking,	   face	   and	   good	   reputation,	   honour	   or	   prestige	   are	   not	   the	   same	  thing.	  The	  relation	  between	  face	  and	  good	  reputation	  can	  be	  summarised	  as	  follows:	  
1.   When	  good	  reputation	  is	  gained,	  face	  may	  not	  be	  gained.	  
In	  most	  situations,	  a	  person’s	  good	  reputation	  is	  a	  primary	  resource	  of	  his	  or	  her	  face,	  but	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  that	  it	  is	  unaccompanied	  by	  face.	  The	  key	  reason	  is	  that	  the	  individual	  alone	  is	  held	  accountable	  for	  his	  or	  her	  conduct	  and,	  hence,	  what	  kind	  of	  reputation	  he	  or	  she	  deserves;	  however,	  a	  person’s	  face	  can	  be	  lost	  or	  gained	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  behaviour	  of	  someone	  else	  (Ho,	  1976,	   p.	   880).	   The	   gain	   of	   face	   is	   not	   a	   pure	   individual	   effort	   and	   always	   needs	   others’	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recognition.	  The	  simplest	  example	  is	  that	  even	  if	  my	  enemy	  receives	  a	  Nobel	  Prize	  and	  earns	  a	  world-­‐‑class	  reputation,	  for	  me,	  he	  or	  she	  is	  still	  my	  enemy	  and	  hatred	  will	  impel	  me	  not	  to	  give	  him	  or	  her	  any	  face	  on	  any	  occasion.	  	  
2.   When	  good	  reputation	  is	  lost	  or	  has	  never	  existed	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  face	  can	  still	  be	  obtained	  or	  secured.	  
As	  mentioned	  in	  Section	  3.2.1,	  in	  Chinese	  culture	  as	  well	  as	  in	  many	  other	  cultures,	  people	  with	  bad	  reputations	  can	  still	  attain	  their	  desired	  face	  if	   it	  were	  granted	  to	  them	  by	  others.	  In	  fact,	  Hu	  Hsien	  Chin	  (1944,	  p.	  57)	  too	  acknowledged	  this	  fact:	  ‘To	  give	  face	  is	  not	  always	  approved	  of	  by	  society.	   Sometimes,	  an	   individual	   is	  elected	  or	  appointed	   to	  an	  honorary	  position	  without	  being	  properly	  qualified.	  [In	  the	  academic	  circle,]	  some	  person	  may	  criticize	  such	  actions,	  but	  his	   friends,	  wise	   in	   the	  affairs	  of	   the	  world,	  will	   tell	  him,	   “He	   is	  an	  eminent	  scholar	   [etc.]”,	   so	  they	   decided	   to	   give	   him	   face’.	   Evidently,	   such	   an	   argument	   is	   totally	   contradictory	   to	   the	  definition	  of	  face	  she	  proposed.	  Lin	  Yutang	  (1936,	  p.	  201)	  in	  his	  book	  My	  Country	  and	  My	  People	  asserts	  that	  ‘to	  confuse	  face	  with	  Western	  honor	  is	  to	  make	  a	  grievous	  error’.	  He	  explains	  this	  by	  means	  of	  a	  specific	  example:	  ‘[In	  ancient	  China,]	  the	  ugly	  son	  of	  a	  high-­‐‑ranking	  official	  who	  goes	  to	  a	  sing-­‐‑song	  girl’s	  house	  is	  insulted	  and	  returns	  in	  the	  company	  of	  the	  police	  to	  order	  the	  arrest	  of	  the	  sing-­‐‑song	  girl	  and	  the	  closing	  of	  the	  house,	  is	  getting	  face,	  but	  we	  would	  hardly	  say	  he	  is	  guarding	  his	  honor’	  (Ibid.).	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3.2.4	  Definition	  of	  this	  thesis	  
‘Face	   is	   the	   public	   image	   which	   a	   person	   claims	   for	   himself/herself	   and	   is	   also	  
recognized	  by	  others.’	  (Brown	  and	  Levinson,	  1987,	  p.	  61;	  Zhou	  and	  Ho,	  1992)	  
This	   definition	   is	   a	   combination	   of	   two	   pieces	   of	   research,	   both	   of	   which	   seek	   to	   give	   an	  explanation	  of	  face	  in	  a	  universal	  sense.	  This	  argument	  involves	  the	  following	  key	  points:	  
1.   The	  fundamental	  aim	  of	  face	  concern	  is	  orientated	  towards	  ‘being	  recognized	  by	  others’,	  i.e.	  social	  recognition.	  
2.   The	   essence	   of	   face	   is	   ‘public	   image’,	   which	   implies	   that	   the	   nature	   of	   face	   need	   not	  necessarily	  be	  positive.	  	  
3.   The	   interactional	   attribute	   of	   face	   has	   been	   highlighted,	   that	   is,	   face	   is	   never	   a	   purely	  individual	   thing	  (Ho,	  1976,	  p.	  882;	  Tracy,	  1990,	  p.	  210;	  Cupach,	  1994,	  p.	  3).	  Whatever	   the	  context	   in	   which	   communication	   occurs,	   and	   whatever	   the	   relationship	   shared	   by	  interactants,	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  each	  person’s	  face	  is	  supported	  and	  maintained	  during	  the	  interaction	   (Goffman,	   1967,	   p.	   3).	   In	   other	  words,	   ‘since	   the	   claim	   of	   face	   is	   about	   one’s	  image	   held	   by	   others,	   one	   cannot	   claim	   face	   unilaterally	   without	   regard	   to	   the	   other’s	  perspective’	  (Lim,	  1994,	  p.	  210).	  	  
	  
3.3	  Behavioural	  Objective:	  Seeking	  Face	  and	  Saving	  Face	  
Prompted	  by	   face	   concern,	  people	   in	   general	  have	   two	  direct	  behavioural	   objectives:	   to	   seek	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face	  and	  to	  save	  face	  when	  face	  is	  lost.	  
	  
3.3.1	  Seeking	  face	  
For	  everyone,	  seeking	  face	  is	  a	  dynamic	  and	  continual	  life-­‐‑long	  process	  rather	  than	  a	  one-­‐‑time	  occurrence.	  No	  one	  can	  get	  face	  once	  and	  forever.	  Goffman	  (1955,	  p.	  214)	  states	  that	  ‘a	  person’s	  face	   clearly	   is	   something	   that	   is	   not	   lodged	   in	   or	   on	   his	   body,	   but	   rather	   something	   that	   is	  diffusely	  located	  in	  the	  flow	  of	  events	  in	  the	  encounter	  and	  becomes	  manifest	  only	  when	  these	  events	   are	   read	   and	   interpreted	   for	   the	   appraisals	   expressed	   in	   them’.	   Spatially,	   a	   person	  invariably	   has	   different	   face	   demands	  when	  he	   or	   she	   interacts	  with	   different	   people	   and	   in	  different	  situations.	  Temporally,	  the	  face	  gained	  from	  someone	  may	  be	  lost	  at	  some	  time	  in	  the	  future	  or	  may	  never	  be	  provided	  by	  others	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  
It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   to	   seek	   face	   is	   not	   always	   a	   conscious	   concern	   of	   individuals.	  Sometimes,	   this	   goal	   is	   deliberate	   and	   evident	   (for	   instance,	   when	   we	   prepare	   for	   a	   job	  interview	   or	   a	   public	   speaking	   engagement);	   other	   times,	   it	   is	   automatic	   and	   almost	  imperceptible	  (for	  example,	  when	  we	  mindlessly	  check	  our	  hair	  in	  the	  mirror	  before	  stepping	  out	   the	   front	  door)	   (Eilot,	  2013,	  p.	  2).	  According	   to	   the	  empirical	   study	  of	  Cupach	  and	  Metts	  (1994,	  p.	  4),	  couples	  in	  general	  have	  the	  continuous	  need	  to	  gain	  face	  from	  each	  other,	  but	  only	  a	  few	  of	  them	  sit	  at	  the	  dinner	  table	  and	  talk	  about	  their	  face	  needs.	  In	  this	  sense,	  face	  needs	  have	  become	  a	  goal	  that	  does	  not	  have	  much	  conscious	  thought	  behind	  it.	  
More	  often,	  face	  per	  se	  is	  not	  an	  end	  goal	  in	  itself.	  People	  always	  expect	  that	  gaining	  face	  will	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bring	  about	  realistic	  interest,	  closer	  interpersonal	  relationships,	  freedom	  of	  behaviour,	  feelings	  of	  respect	  and	  so	  on.	  These	  spillover	  effects	  are	  sometimes	  the	  real	  reason	  people	  seek	  face.	  	  
	  
3.3.2	  Saving	  face	  
To	  save	  face	  can	  be	  the	  effort	  to	  restore	  one’s	  discredited	  public	  image	  by	  creating	  a	  previously	  existing	  or	  a	  new	  more	  favourable	  one	  (Kim	  &	  Nam,	  1998,	  p.	  523).	  	  
The	  need	  to	  save	  face	  comes	  from	  the	  risk	  of	  losing	  face.	  Strictly	  speaking,	  losing	  face	  in	  real	  life	  is	  more	  often	  reflected	  as	  a	  process	  of	  erosion	  of	  face—a	  decline	  of	  recognition—rather	  than	  a	  total	   loss	   of	   one’s	   previously	   obtained	   recognition	   (Ho,	   1976,	   p.	   871;	  Wu,	   2013,	   p.	   157).	   For	  example,	   I	   feel	   I	   have	   lost	   face	  when	  my	   research	  work	   is	   criticised	   by	  my	   PhD	   supervisor;	  however,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  I	  have	  no	  face	  at	  all	  in	  front	  of	  him.	  	  
For	  everyone,	   face	   is	   ‘a	  vulnerable	   interpersonal	  commodity	  during	   interaction’	   (Oetzel	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  p.	  384)	  and	  any	   interaction	   is	  potentially	   face-­‐‑threatening.	   ‘Even	   the	  most	   skillfull	   and	  well-­‐‑intended	  communicator	  sometimes	   finds	  himself	  or	  herself	   in	  the	  position	  of	  having	   felt	  diminished	  by	  receiving	  a	  complaint	  or	  criticism	  from	  someone	  else’	  (Cupach,	  1994,	  p.	  5).	  ‘The	  possibility	  of	  losing	  face	  can	  arise	  not	  only	  from	  the	  individual’s	  failure	  to	  meet	  his	  obligations	  but	  also	  from	  the	  failure	  to	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  his	  expectations	  of	  them—that	  is,	  not	  only	  from	  the	  individual’s	  own	  actions,	  but	  also	  from	  how	  he	  is	  treated	  by	  others’	  (Ho,	  1976,	  p.	  873).	  Surely,	   sometimes,	   face	  may	  be	   lost	  only	  because	  of	  deliberate	  and	  unilateral	  provocation	  by	  others.	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Losing	   face	   often	   means	   negating	   one’s	   personal	   attributes	   or	   credit	   and	   further	   hindering	  one’s	   subsequent	   functioning	   in	   social	   encounters.	  During	   an	   interaction	   in	  which	  one’s	   face	  has	   been	   lost	   or	   threatened,	  most	   of	   the	   times	   this	   person	  will	   also	   feel	   uncomfortable	   and	  embarrassed,	  as	  the	  entire	  interaction	  has	  been	  disrupted	  (Cupach,	  1994,	  p.	  2).	  Compared	  with	  Westerners,	   Chinese	   people	   adopt	   a	  more	   pessimistic	   attitude	   towards	   the	   consequences	   of	  losing	   face.	   Jia	   (1997,	  p.	   45)	   argues	   that	   as	   face	   is	   the	  definition	  of	   being	   fully	  human	   in	   the	  Chinese	   context	   and	   it	   is	   the	   ticket	   to	   full	  membership	   in	   the	   community,	   to	   lose	   face	  would	  ‘negatively	   affect	   the	   community	   and	   consequentially	   the	   loser	   would	   be	   ostracized	   by	   the	  community’.	  	  
Based	  on	  the	  above	  negative	  effects	  of	  losing	  face,	  to	  save	  face	  is	  deemed	  a	  more	  vital	  objective	  than	   to	   gain	   face.	   ‘Not	   everyone	   is	   eager	   or	   needs	   to	   gain	   face,	   but	   everyone	  who	   cares	   for	  maintaining	   a	   minimum	   level	   of	   effective	   social	   functioning	   must	   see	   to	   it	   that	   his	   face	   is	  protected	  from	  being	  lost’	  (Ho,	  1976,	  p.	  872).	  Empirical	  psychological	  studies	  also	  reveal	  that	  in	  Chinese	  face	  culture,	  a	  prevention-­‐‑focused	  orientation	  that	  regulates	  the	  avoidance	  of	  losses	  is	  more	  salient	  and	  prevalent	  than	  a	  promotion-­‐‑focused	  orientation	  that	  regulates	  the	  attainment	  of	  gains	  as	  a	   self-­‐‑regulatory	  strategy	   (e.g.	  Higgins,	  1997;	  Eliot,	   et	  al.,	  2001;	  Hamamura,	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  For	  example,	  in	  daily	  life	  in	  China,	  being	  honest	  about	  one’s	  feelings	  in	  relationships	  is	  not	  acceptable	  as	  such	  behaviour	  bears	  the	  risk	  of	  offending	  the	  other’s	  face.	  Even	  if	  you	  really	  want	  to	  express	  anger	  or	  a	  complaint,	  hiding	  one’s	  real	  feelings	  and	  maintaining	  a	  temporary	  calm	  are	  still	  regarded	  as	  the	  most	  mature	  and	  wise	  ways	  to	  save	  each	  other’s	  face.	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3.4	  Facework:	  Self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  Others	  and	  to	  Relationship	  
3.4.1	  Essence	  of	  facework:	  self-­‐‑presentation	  
In	  previous	  studies,	   researchers	  had	  a	  generally	   limited	  understanding	  of	   facework,	   seeing	   it	  more	  as	   reactions	   to	   face-­‐‑threatening	  behaviours.	  Goffman	  (1967,	  p.	  12)	  defines	   facework	  as	  ‘communication	   designed	   to	   counteract	   face	   threats	   to	   self	   and	   others’.27	  For	   Brown	   and	  Levinson	   (1987),	   facework	   is	   largely	   described	   as	   appropriate	   and	   polite	   behaviour	   with	   a	  focus	   on	   face-­‐‑threat	   mitigation.	   Obviously,	   facework	   needs	   a	   more	   comprehensive	  understanding.	  In	  this	  study,	  I	  use	  the	  definition	  presented	  by	  Tae-­‐‑Seop	  Lim	  (1994,	  p.	  211):	  ‘the	  actions	   taken	  to	  deal	  with	   the	   face-­‐‑wants	  of	  one	  and/or	   the	  other’.	  Any	  action	   that	  expresses	  face	  concern	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  facework.	  	  
From	  the	  perspective	  of	  psychology,	  in	  essence,	  facework	  is	  a	  typical	  kind	  of	  self-­‐‑presentation,	  i.e.,	   ‘any	   behavior	   intended	   to	   create,	  modify,	   or	  maintain	   an	   impression	   of	   ourselves	   in	   the	  minds	   of	   others’	   (Eliot,	   2013,	   p.	   2).	   Depending	   on	   the	   object	   of	   the	   presentation,	   self-­‐‑presentation	   can	  be	  divided	   into	   self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  the	  self,	  to	  others	  and	  to	  relationship.	   The	  core	  argument	  of	  this	  book	  is	  that	  facework	  intrinsically	  consists	  of	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  others	  and	  to	  relationship.	  
Before	  explaining	  the	  three	  types	  of	  self-­‐‑presentation,	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘self ’	  should	  be	  clarified.	  Below	  is	  an	  explanation	  from	  Kwang-­‐‑Kuo	  Hwang	  (2011,	  p.	  126).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Goffman	   (1967)	   further	   categorises	   facework	   into	   two	   types.	  On	  many	  occasions,	   face-­‐‑threatening	   acts	   can	  be	   avoided	  or	  minimised	  before	  they	  occur	  through	  the	  use	  of	  preventive	  facework.	  On	  other	  occasions,	  face	  threats	  are	  not	  anticipated	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  face	  must	  be	  remediated	  through	  corrective	  facework.	  	  
	   93	  
Self	   is	  a	  psychologistic	  concept	  defining	  human	  beings	  as	   the	   locus	  of	  experience,	  including	   the	   most	   important	   aspect	   of	   experiencing	   oneself	   as	   a	   particular	  identity.	  Western	  psychologists	  usually	  assume	  that	  an	  individual’s	  competence	  in	  reflexive	   awareness	   creates	   a	   duality	   of	   self.	   The	   self	   as	   a	   subject	   integrates	  behavior	   and	   makes	   one	   distinctive	   from	   others,	   resulting	   in	   a	   sense	   of	   self-­‐‑identity.	   The	   self	   as	   an	   object	   of	   awareness	   enables	   one	   to	   examine	   one’s	  differences	  with	  other	  objects	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  to	  view	  oneself	  as	  a	  unique	  whole	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  personal	  identity.	  	  
	  
Self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  the	  self.	  
This	   term	   refers	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘match[ing]	   one’s	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	   one’s	   own	   ideal	   self ’	  (Baumeister	   &	   Hutton,	   1987,	   p.	   61).	   In	  most	   instances,	   it	   is	   mediated	   purely	   by	   a	   cognitive	  process,	  deciding	  a	  person’s	  ideas	  about	  ‘what	  he/she	  would	  like	  to	  be	  and	  thinks	  he/she	  really	  
can	  be,	  at	  least	  at	  his	  or	  her	  best’	  (Leary	  &	  Kowals,	  1990,	  p.	  35).	  Presumably,	  any	  self-­‐‑relevant	  thought	  or	  behaviour	  must	  involve	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  the	  self.	  ‘None	  would	  deny	  that	  people’s	  ideas	   about	   themselves	   are	   one	   factor	   that	   determines	   the	   public	   impressions	   they	   try	   to	  create’	   (Eilot,	   2013,	   p.	   21).	   In	   reality,	   when	   someone	   tries	   to	   perform	   self-­‐‑presentation	   for	  others,	  he	  or	  she	  is	  very	  likely	  to	  highlight	  certain	  aspects	  of	  themselves	  that	  they	  feel	  are	  easy	  to	   display	   to	   others.	   Also,	   when	   someone	   attempts	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	  relationship,	   they	  will	   tend	  to	  choose	  a	  relational	   identity	  that	  best	  suits	   their	  preferences	  or	  
	   94	  
expectations.	  
However,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	   the	   self	   cannot	   per	   se	   constitute	   a	  person’s	   facework.	   Due	   to	   the	   interactive	   attribute	   of	   face,	   the	   object	   of	   facework	   cannot	   be	  purely	  the	  self	  and	  should	  at	  least	  have	  one	  out-­‐‑of-­‐‑self	  factor—another,	  a	  relationship	  or	  both.	  	  
	  
3.4.2	  Facework	  as	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  others	  and	  to	  relationship	  
Self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  others	  
For	  a	  long	  time,	  academic	  interpretations	  of	  facework	  have	  only	  focused	  on	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  others.	  This	  kind	  of	  behaviour	  focuses	  on	  the	  perceptions	  one	  individual	  holds	  regarding	  how	  others	  expect	  him	  or	  her	  to	  be,	  implying	  that	  the	  core	  task	  of	  facework	  is	  to	  first	  understand	  the	  audience’s	  expectations	  and	  then	  to	  seek	  recognition	  by	  meeting	  the	  expectations.	  
‘Others’	  here	  refers	  not	  only	  to	  specific	  individuals	  but	  also	  to	  society	  at	  large.	  It	  is	  conceivable	  that,	  many	   times,	   the	   audience’s	   expectations	   are	   just	   the	   ground	   rules	   of	   social	   interaction;	  many	   performances	   facework	   are	   targeted	   at	   virtually	   making	   a	   person’s	   public	   image	  accommodate	  as	  closely	  as	  possible	  to	  prototypic	  characteristics	  endowed	  by	  social	  norms.	  In	  this	   case,	   the	   face-­‐‑giving	   side	   and	   face-­‐‑obtaining	   side	   just	   follow	   the	   commonly	   agreed	  upon	  scripts	   of	   facework	   with	   full	   deliberation,	   and	   the	   individual	   in	   facework	   is	   a	   role-­‐‑player	  ‘mechanically	  performing	  the	  role-­‐‑related	  behavior	  prescribed	  by	  the	  social	  structure’	  (King	  &	  Bond,	  1985,	  p.	  31).	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Self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship	  
Everyone	  would	  agree	  that	  compared	  with	  strangers,	  it	  is	  much	  easier	  to	  gain	  face	  from	  one’s	  own	   family	  members	   or	   friends	   or	   even	   from	   someone	   you	  may	   have	  met	   just	   once	   before.	  What	  is	  being	  recognised	  here	  is	  not	  one’s	  individualistic	  performance	  or	  features	  but	  instead	  the	  position	  he	  or	  her	  occupies	   in	  a	  particular	   relationship	   (Ringmar,	  2015,	  p.	  51).	   Just	   from	  daily	   life	   experiences,	  we	   have	   been	   able	   to	   conclude	   that,	   like	  meeting	   others’	   expectations	  may	  entail	  gaining	   face,	   showing	  or	  promoting	  a	  sound	  relationship	  with	  others	  may	  achieve	  the	  same	  effect	  in	  facework.	  
For	  a	  long	  time,	  the	  relational	  parameters	  of	  face	  and	  face	  behaviour	  were	  not	  identified	  (Ting-­‐‑Toomy,	  1994,	  p.	  2).	  Nowadays,	  a	  growing	  number	  of	   scholars	  conceptualise	   facework	  as	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship,	  namely,	  ‘a	  means	  of	  manipulating	  a	  given	  relationship	  for	  seeking	  recognition’	  (cf.	  Lim,	  1994,	  p.	  211;	  Zhou	  &	  Zhang,	  2015).	  
There	  are	  mainly	   two	  reasons	  why	  facework	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship.	  First,	  the	  social	  self	  is	  irreducibly	  a	  relational	  self,	  existing	  constantly	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  social	  selves	  (Arundale,	  2006,	  pp.	  200-­‐‑201).	  No	  one	  can	  view	  or	  treat	  others	  and	  the	  world	  at	   large	  without	   relational	   consideration.	   Second,	   as	   a	   relationship	   invariably	   manifests	   through	  interaction	   and	   face	   is	   the	   product	   of	   interaction,	   a	   person’s	   facework	   is	   a	   part	   of	   the	  relationships	  he	  or	  she	   is	   involved	   in.	  As	  Arundale	  (2006,	  p.	  202)	  argues,	   ‘face	  meanings	  and	  actions	  arise,	  and	  are	  maintained	  and	  changed	  in	  relationships’.	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The	  focus	  of	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship	  is	  on	  ‘properties,	  conditions,	  or	  states	  evinced	  in	  the	   interpersonal	   relationship’	   (Arundale,	   2010,	   p.	   2086).	  Most	   of	   the	   time,	   facework	   is	   very	  easy:	   to	   manifest	   an	   established	   connection	   you	   share	   with	   the	   opposite	   side,	   or,	   in	   other	  words,	  to	  remind	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  relationship	  and	  then	  to	  receive	  his	  or	  her	  recognition	  unconditionally.	  This	  is	  a	  universal	  fact	  applicable	  to	  the	  whole	  world	  and	  may	  even	  be	  the	  earliest	  social	  skill	  that	  a	  person	  acquires	  in	  life.	  Even	  as	  children,	  we	  realised	  that	  it	   is	  easier	   to	  seek	  recognition	  by	  greeting	   familiar	  persons	  or	  emphasising	  existing	  relations	  with	  others.	  The	  logic	  behind	  this	  behaviour	  is	  that	  it	  is	  natural	  and	  reasonable	  to	  give	  me	  face	  for	   the	  sake	  of	   the	  maintenance	  and	   improvement	  of	  our	  relationship.	  Giving	   face	  becomes	  a	  ‘fulfillment	  of	  natural	  relational	  obligation’	  (Levy	  &	  Kowalski,	  1990,	  p.	  41).	  
Another	   situation	   is	   that	   individuals	   can	   persistently	   attempt	   to	   characterise	   or	   adjust	   their	  position	  in	  a	  relationship	  so	  as	  to	  achieve	  recognition,	  especially	  when	  the	  person	  from	  whom	  you	  seek	  recognition	  has	  no	   idea	  or	  expectation	  about	  you.	   In	  this	  sense,	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship	   is	   not	   purely	   ‘presentation’	   but	   incorporates	   more	   elements	   such	   as	   the	  manipulation	   of	   the	   relationship,	   trying	   to	   change	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   relationship,	   giving	   a	  favourable	   interpretation	   to	   the	   relationship,	   exaggerating	   the	   intimacy	   of	   the	   relationship,	  positioning	  oneself	  as	  superior	  or	  inferior	  in	  status	  etc.	  All	  of	  these	  presentations	  are	  believed	  to	  be	  able	  to	   influence	  the	  target	  person’s	  perception	  of	  the	  relationship,	   to	  create,	  modify	  or	  maintain	  an	   impression	  of	   the	  other	  person	  and	  eventually	   to	  provide	  or	   feel	   the	  recognition	  for	  which	  one	  aspired.	  	  
Unlike	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  others,	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship	  represents	  a	  manifestation	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of	  relational	  ontology,	  i.e.	  shifting	  ‘analytical	  attention	  away	  from	  entities	  [the	  substance]	  with	  static	  and	  given	  properties,	  be	  they	  persons	  or	  states,	  to	  relations	  under	  constant	  construction	  among	  those	  entities’	  (Bousquet	  &	  Curtis,	  2011,	  p.	  49).	  This	  is	  the	  biggest	  difference	  between	  these	   two	   kinds	   of	   self-­‐‑presentation.	   In	   addition,	   it	   can	   be	   found	   that	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	  relationship	   is	   not	   necessarily	   geared	   towards	   pleasing	   an	   audience	   and	   usually	   does	   not	  reflect	  a	  person’s	  true	  characteristics.	  According	  to	  one’s	  judgment	  of	  a	  situation,	  someone	  may	  desire	  to	  present	  him/herself	  as	  helpless	  or	  needy,	  as	  morally	  virtuous	  or	  as	  seemingly	  familiar.	  All	  of	   these	  are	  very	   likely	   to	   involve	  playacting	  and	  affectation	  but	   indeed	  may	  be	  helpful	   to	  allow	  the	  recognition-­‐‑seeker	  to	  occupy	  a	  favourable	  position	  in	  the	  relationship	  and,	  moreover,	  help	  one	  acquire	  one’s	  desired	  recognition.	  
Surely,	   in	   real	   life,	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	   relationship	   and	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	   others	   are	   very	  often	  simultaneously	  and	  integratively	  adopted.	  It	   is	  hard	  to	  use	  only	  a	  single	  approach	  when	  trying	  to	  conduct	  successful	  or	  seamless	  facework.	  
	  
3.5	  The	  Cultural	  Origins	  of	  Chinese	  Face	  Culture	  
In	  a	  news	   report,	  Canadian	  businessman	   John	  Lombard,	  who	  has	  been	   in	  China	   for	  23	  years	  and	  understands	  Chinese	  psychology,	  expressed	  a	  feeling	  of	  frustration	  in	  the	  following	  words:	  
‘If	   I	   could	   choose,	   I	   still	   like	   the	   western	   way	   of	   communication,	   simple	   and	  straight.	  Mianzi	  [face]	  and	  Guanxi	  [human	  relation]	  are	  too	  difficult.	  I	  have	  learned	  for	   so	   many	   years,	   and	   only	   can	   avoid	   making	   big	   mistakes.’	   (As	   cited	   in	   A	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Canadian’s	  Successology	  about	  Chinese-­‐‑style	  Relations,	  Yin,	  2017)	  
A	   full	   understanding	   of	   face	   culture	   in	   Chinese	   society	   necessitates	   considering	   the	   complex	  cultural	   background,	   particularly	   the	   metaphysical	   foundations,	   that	   are	   deemed	   to	   be	  prerequisites	   for	   all	   Chinese	   people.	   In	   this	   section,	   Chinese	   face	   culture	   will	   be	   dealt	   with	  firstly	   from	   its	   linguistic	   perspective	   and	   secondly	   and	   mainly	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   roots	   in	  philosophical	  thought.	  
A	   good	   way	   to	   understand	   Chinese	   culture	   is	   to	   first	   understand	   Chinese	   philosophy.	   Feng	  Youlan	  (1948,	  p.	  3),	  the	  most	  outstanding	  Chinese	  philosopher	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  claims	  that,	  in	   Chinese	   culture,	   philosophy	   enjoys	   the	   same	   status	   as	   religion	   does	   in	   other	   cultures.	   He	  believes	  that	  Chinese	  philosophy	  focuses	  not	  only	  on	  practical	  knowledge	  that	  can	  help	  people	  deal	  with	  human	  affairs	  but	  also	  on	  super-­‐‑moral	  values	  that	  help	  them	  access	  and	  understand	  what	   lies	   beyond	   the	   tangible	   world	   (Ibid.,	   pp.	   6-­‐‑14).	   There	   is	   an	   interesting	   proverb	   that	  describes	  Chinese	  philosophy	  as	  follows:	  ‘It	  is	  not	  divorced	  from	  daily	  ordinary	  activities,	  yet	  it	  goes	  straight	  to	  what	  antedated	  Heaven	  [Chinese:	  不离日用常行内，直到先天未画前]’.	  	  
Among	   all	   the	   Chinese	   philosophical	   schools	   of	   thought,	   Confucian	   ethics	   has	   been	   and	  continues	  to	  be	  the	  most	  influential	  in	  the	  daily	  life	  and	  social	  order	  of	  the	  Chinese.	  Derk	  Boddc	  says,	  ‘it	  is	  ethics	  (especially	  Confucian	  ethics),	  not	  religion,	  that	  provided	  the	  spiritual	  basis	  in	  Chinese	   civilization’	   (1942,	   p.	   293).	   A	   number	   of	   scholars	   even	   regard	   Confucianism28	  as	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Confucianism	  refers	  to	  a	  system	  of	  philosophical	  and	  ethical	  teachings	  by	  the	  most	  celebrated	  Chinese	  philosopher	  Confucius	  (c.	   551–479	  B.C.)	   in	   the	   6th	   century	  B.C.	   It	   was	   the	   state	   orthodoxy	   in	   China	   until	   the	   early	   20th	   century	   and	   has	   had	   a	  widespread	  and	  profound	  influence	  in	  many	  East	  Asian	  societies.	  The	  basic	  concepts	  of	  Confucianism	  are	  ethical:	  love	  for	  one’s	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system	  of	  ethics	  (e.g.	  Needham,	  1970,	  p.	  24;	  Zaehner,	  1988,	  p.	  370)	  that	  serves	  to	  ‘to	  orient	  the	  life	  of	   the	  people	  and	   to	  define	   their	  moral	   standards	  and	  ethical	   ideal	   in	  most	  parts	  of	  East	  Asia’	   (Yao,	   2000,	   p.	   32).	   Obviously,	   Confucian	   ethics	   are	   also	   bound	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	  behavioural	   dynamics	   and	  prototypes	  of	   Chinese	   face	   culture.	  According	   to	   Jia	   (2001,	   p.	   20),	  ‘Confucianism	   played	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   making	   the	   Chinese	   concept	   of	   face	   become	   a	   more	  pervasive,	  more	  deeply	  rooted,	  more	  dominant	  form	  of	  life	  and	  government	  in	  Chinese	  society’.	  Sections	   3.5.2-­‐‑3.5.5	   will	   shed	   light	   on	   some	   of	   China’s	   core	   values,	   including	   its	   relational	  thinking,	  hierarchical	  view,	  rule	  of	  renqing,	  modesty	  and	  conformity.	  	  
	  
3.5.1	  Linguistic	  analysis	  of	  面	  and	  面子	  
In	   modern	   daily	   English,	   the	   term	   ‘face	   is	   ‘employed	   in	   only	   a	   small	   number	   of	   fixed	  expressions,	   such	   as	   “to	   save	   face”,	   “to	   lose	   face”,	   and	   “to	   put	   on	   a	   good	   face”’	   (Yu,	   2003,	   p.	  1686).	   In	   contrast,	   face	  has	   a	  much	  more	   flexible	   and	   diverse	   set	   of	  meanings	   in	   Chinese.	   A	  linguistic	   analysis	   is	  directly	   relevant	   to	  understand	   the	   status	  of	   the	  word	  面子	   [face]	   along	  with	  its	  various	  associations	  in	  Chinese	  language	  and	  thinking.	  	  
The	   Chinese	   character 面29	  can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   the	   14th	   century	   B.C.	   (Hu,	   1944,	   p.	   45;	   Jia,	  2001;	  Di,	  2011,	  P.	  88).	  Research	  on	  the	  Oracle	  Bone	  Inscription	  reveals	  that	  面 originally	  refers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  fellow	  man,	  filial	  piety,	  decorum,	  virtue	  and	  the	  ideal	  of	  the	  superior	  man.	  This	  study	  mainly	  focuses	  on	  its	  ethics,	  values	  and	  thoughts.	  
29	  The	   Chinese	   character	   子	   in	   the	   word	   面子	   is	   just	   a	   suffix	   for	   single-­‐‑syllable	   nouns	   and	   has	   no	   specific	   meaning.	  Consequently,	  I	  first	  and	  primarily	  discuss	  the	  meaning	  of	  面.	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to	   the	   physical	   face.	   However,	   in	   ancient	   times,	   this	   character	   took	   on	   some	   extensional	  meanings	   to	   describe	   a	   person’s	   social,	   moral	   and	   psychological	   characteristics.	   One	   of	   the	  earliest	  written	  appearances	  of	  this	  term	  is	  in	  the	  Classic	  of	  Poetry,	  the	  oldest	  existing	  work	  in	  Chinese	   literature.	  There	   is	   a	   very	   famous	  Chinese	  poem:	   ‘If	   a	  person	   can	  endure	   the	   sloppy	  appearance	  and	  lack	  of	  sense	  of	  shame,	  he	  only	  has	  his	  head	  rather	  than	  face’	  [Chinese:	  忍丑少
羞，无面有头].	   The	   Records	   of	   the	  Grand	  Historian30,	   a	   monumental	   book	   on	   the	   history	   of	  ancient	  China,	  completed	  around	  109	  B.C.,	  mentions	  a	  rebel	  leader	  called	  Xiang	  Yu	  who	  made	  a	  significant	  mark	  on	  China’s	  history	  when	  he	  decided	  to	  commit	  suicide	  after	  a	  crushing	  defeat:	  ‘Even	  though	  my	  hometown	  people	  pity	  me	  and	  still	  serve	  me	  as	  their	  king,	  I	  have	  had	  no	  face	  to	   face	   them’	   [Chinese:	   纵江东父老怜而王我，我何面目见之].	   This	   saying	   still	   appears	  frequently	  in	  daily	  conversations	  in	  China	  when	  someone	  feels	  desperate	  about	  a	  great	  failure	  or	  setback.	  
面子 as	  a	  word	  arguably	  first	  appeared	  in	  the	  early	  Ming	  Dynasty	  [1368-­‐‑1644]	  when	  it	  began	  to	  turn	  up	  frequently	  in	  the	  novels	  of	  that	  time	  (Di,	  2011,	  p.	  89).	  In	  various	  Chinese	  dictionaries,	  the	  explanations	  of	  the	  word	  面子	  are	  almost	  always	  similar—prestige	  or	  reputation.	  Evidently,	  these	   explanations	   are	  merely	  most	   people’s	   intuitive	   understanding	   of	   this	  word.	   From	   the	  linguistic	  perspective,	  面子 is	  a	  highly	  active	  and	  reproductive	  word	   in	   the	  Chinese	   language.	  Figure	  3.2	  presents	  some	  common	  phrases	  containing	  the	  word 面子,	  which	  show	  the	  diversity	  of	  Chinese	  behaviours	  around	  the	  concept	  of	  face.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Records	  of	  the	  Grand	  Historian	  [Chinese:	  史记]	  was	  begun	  by	  Sima	  Tan	  [165-­‐‑110	  B.C.)	  and	  completed	  by	  his	  son	  Sima	  Qian	  (145?-­‐‑86?	  B.C.),	  who	  is	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  father	  of	  Chinese	  historiography.	  Consisting	  of	  130	  chapters,	  it	  covers	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people	  from	  the	  days	  of	  the	  Yellow	  Emperor	  (2698-­‐‑2598	  B.C.)	  until	  the	  time	  of	  the	  historians.	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Chinese	  phrases	  about	  face	   English	  translation	  
爱面子/顾面子/好面子	   Be	  concerned	  about	  face	  
争面子/要面子/讲面子	   Seek	  face	  
给面子	   Give	  face	  
有面子	   Have	  face	  
保全面子/维持面子	   Maintain	  face	  
碍面子	   Bothered	  by	  face	  
丢面子/掉面子	   Lose	  face	  
卖面子	   Give	  face	  as	  a	  present	  
扫面子/伤面子/不给面子/驳…的面子	   Violate	  face	  
没面子	   Have	  no	  face	  
面子不好看/面子挂不住	   Have	  a	  bad	  face	  
留面子/挽回面子/找回面子	   Save	  face	  
不讲面子/不顾面子	   Have	  no	  consideration	  of	  sb.’s	  face	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撕破面子	   Cast	  aside	  all	  considerations	  of	  face	  
看在…的面子上	   For	  the	  sake	  of	  sb.’s	  face	  
Figure	  3.2.	  Chinese	  phrases	  about	  face.	  
	  
This	   linguistic	   phenomena	   leads	   to	   one	   question:	   why	   do	   the	   Chinese	   customarily	   use	   the	  character	  面	  and	  the	  word	  面子	  to	  refer	  to	  this	  complicated	  social	  and	  psychological	  behaviour?	  	  
From	  a	  biological	  point	  of	  view,	   the	  head	   is	   considered	   to	  be	   the	  most	   important	  part	  of	   the	  human	  body,	  and	  the	  face	  represents	  a	  person’s	  external	  image.	  Darwin	  (1997,	  p.	  572)	  says,	  ‘As	  the	   face	   with	   us	   is	   chiefly	   admired	   for	   its	   beauty,	   so	   with	   savages	   it	   is	   the	   chief	   seat	   of	  mutilation’.	  Moreover,	   the	  face	   is	  also	  the	  seat	  of	  emotion	  and	  expressions,	  which	  are	  reliably	  associated	  with	   certain	   emotional	   states	   (e.g.	   Ortony	   &	   Turner,	   1990;	   Russel,	   1994,	   p.	   102).	  Darwin	   (1997,	   pp.	   574-­‐‑576)	   emphasises	   that	   facial	   expressions	   corresponding	   to	   certain	  emotions	  are	  a	  biologically	   innate	  and	  evolutionally	   adaptive	  ability	  of	  human	  beings.	  Oatley	  and	  Jenkins	  (1992,	  p.	  67)	  observe,	  ‘by	  far	  the	  most	  extensive	  body	  of	  data	  in	  the	  field	  of	  human	  emotions	   is	   that	   on	   facial	   expressions	   of	   emotion’.	   In	   daily	   life,	   we	   all	   sense	   that	   facial	  expressions	  reveal	  our	  emotions	  to	  others	  unconsciously	  or	  consciously,	  and	  many	  of	  us	  have	  tried	  to	  interpret	  others’	  facial	  expressions	  to	  improve	  our	  interaction.	  Thus,	  it	  was	  but	  natural	  for	  the	  character	  面,	  from	  the	  start,	  to	  perform	  the	  task	  of	  describing	  one’s	  inner	  world.	  	  
According	  to	  historians,	   it	   is	  more	   likely	   that	   the	  word 面子 is	  derived	   from	  the	  character	  面,	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which	  means	  ‘mask’	  or	  ‘face	  tool’.	  Masks	  were	  ‘used	  in	  ceremonies	  as	  a	  means	  to	  communicate	  with	   the	   spirits	   and	   deities	   in	   primitive	   Chinese	   society’,	   and	   ‘later	   also	   functioned	   as	   an	  identity	   card	   for	   each	   tribe’	   (Sueda,	   2014,	   p.	   24).	   Owners	   of	   masks	   were	   always	   the	   most	  powerful	   men	   in	   the	   tribe—chiefs	   or	   priests.	   In	   a	   worship	   ceremony,	   a	   mask	   symbolised	   a	  sacred	  status	  and	  supernatural	  power,	  whereas	  losing	  a	  mask	  was	  akin	  to	  losing	  one’s	  identity	  card	  to	  verify	  one’s	  leadership	  or	  membership	  of	  a	  community	  (Yi,	  1996,	  pp.	  126-­‐‑127).	  As	  an	  extension	  of	  this	  logic,	  a	  mask	  served	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  status,	  prestige	  and	  group	  identification,	  and	   the	   character	  面	   was	   gradually	   adopted	   to	   describe	   people’s	   favoured	   public	   image	   in	  social	  life.	  Even	  today,	  people	  with	  much	  face	  in	  Chinese	  society	  are	  often	  described	  using	  the	  idiom	  神通广大,	  meaning	  ‘having	  great	  magic	  power	  and	  broad	  access	  to	  spirits’.	  
Culturally,	   Confucianism	   emphasises	   the	   complementary	   relationship	   between	   a	   person’s	  outward	  appearance	  and	  his	  or	  her	  inherent	  qualities.	  Once,	  a	  student	  of	  Confucius	  called	  Zi	  Xia	  asked	  him	  why	  a	  girl	  described	  in	  the	  Classic	  of	  Poetry	  could	  have	  an	  unusually	  beautiful	  face.	  Confucius	   replied	   that	   her	   pure	   soul	   granted	   her	   wonderful	   beauty.	   The	   old	   Chinese	   saying	  ‘Face	  springs	  from	  the	  heart’	  [Chinese:	  面有心生]	  means	  that	  a	  person’s	  face	  is	  the	  reflection	  of	  his	  or	  her	  state	  of	  mind.	  According	  to	  this	  logic,	  only	  someone	  with	  a	  pure	  and	  rich	  inner	  world	  would	   have	   a	   beautiful	   face.	   Meanwhile,	   Confucianism	   also	   underlines	   the	   necessity	   of	  maintaining	  a	  decent	  appearance.	  The	  Book	  of	  Rites,	  a	  core	  text	  in	  the	  Confucian	  canon,	  points	  out,	  ‘human	  nature	  is	  prescribed	  by	  propriety	  and	  justice.	  The	  first	  step	  of	  abiding	  by	  propriety	  and	   justice	   is	   to	   pay	   attention	   to	   personal	   grooming,	   have	   an	   elegant	   bearing	   and	  maintain	  courteous	   talking’.	   This	   shows	   that	   China’s	   traditional	   emphasis	   on	   etiquette	   included	   a	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concern	   with	   one’s	   outward	   appearance.	   Based	   on	   such	   complementary	   relationships	   that	  Confucianism	  advocates,	  we	  can	   infer	   that	   the	   traditional	  cultural	  context	  also	  contributed	   in	  one	  way	  or	   another	   to	   the	  expansion	  of	   the	   character	  面	   and	   the	  word	  面子	   at	   the	   semantic	  level.	  	  	  
	  
3.5.2	  Relational	  thinking	  and	  hierarchical	  view	  
Relational	  thinking	  in	  Chinese	  philosophy.	  
The	   underlying	   theme	   of	  most	   ancient	   Chinese	   philosophy	   is	   ‘to	   seek	   balance	   and	   harmony	  between	  humans	  and	  nature,	  humans	  and	  society	  and	  humans	  and	  ego’	  (Hwang,	  2011,	  p.	  127).	  This	   is	   closely	   related	   to	   the	   realistic	   needs	   of	   ancient	   Chinese	   society.	   Chinese	   philosophy	  arguably	  originated	  during	  the	  Eastern	  Zhou	  Dynasty	  (770-­‐‑256	  B.C.),	  when	  Chinese	  society	  had	  witnessed	   years	   of	   wars,	   social	   unrest	   and	   general	   discontent.	   The	   various	   philosophical	  theories	  (e.g.	  Daoism,	  Confucianism	  and	  Mohism)	  of	   the	  time	  were	  deeply	  rooted	   in	  practical	  concerns	   and	   primarily	   aimed	   to	   restore	   good	   order	   and	   relational	   harmony	   in	   society	  (Dessein,	  2001,	  pp.	  100-­‐‑101).	  ‘This	  pragmatic	  approach	  to	  philosophical	  questions	  conditioned	  the	  content	  of	  Chinese	  philosophical	  reflection	  for	  the	  coming	  ages’	  (Matthyssen,	  2012,	  p.	  48).	  Moreover,	  in	  a	  typically	  agricultural	  society,	  most	  people	  in	  ancient	  China	  were	  attached	  for	  life	  to	   a	   small	   community	   and	   had	   very	   limited	   freedom	   of	   mobility	   (Wei	   &	   Li,	   2013,	   p.	   64).	  Maintaining	  harmonious	  relationships	  with	  others	  naturally	  became	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  ancient	  Chinese	  daily	  life	  as	  well	  as	  the	  different	  systems	  of	  philosophy.	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Confucianism,	  as	  the	  most	  dominant	  school	  of	  philosophy	  in	  ancient	  as	  well	  as	  contemporary	  Chinese	   society,	   is	   a	   consistent	   ethic	   for	   guiding	   and	   restricting	   human	   relations.	   Confucian	  philosophy	  has	  two	  core	  viewpoints:	  
1)	  Man	   is	   a	   relational	   being.	   In	   the	   Confucian	  world,	  man	   cannot	   exist	   as	   an	   independent	  entity,	  and	  ‘all	  actions	  must	  be	  in	  a	  form	  of	  interaction	  between	  man	  and	  man’	  (Hu	  Shih,	  as	  cited	  in	   King	   &	   Band,	   1985,	   p.	   31).	   Since	   childhood,	   Chinese	   people	   are	   instructed	   that	   ‘an	  individual’s	  life	  can	  be	  meaningful	  only	  through	  coexistence	  with	  others’	  (Ho	  et	  al.,	  1991).	  On	  the	   one	   hand,	   the	   Chinese	   are	   highly	   sensitive	   to	   others	   (Hwang,	   2011,	   p.	   192),	   to	   ‘his/her	  relations	  with	  others,	  above,	  below,	  or	  on	  equal	  footing	  with	  him/her’	  (King	  &	  Bond,	  1985,	  p.	  31).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   they	   have	   no	   distinctive	   awareness	   of	   their	   own	   independence	   and	  habitually	  find	  it	  unnecessary	  to	  maintain	  a	  clear-­‐‑cut	  boundary	  between	  oneself	  and	  others.	  
2]	  Human	  relations	  are	  causal,	  having	  the	  power	  to	  constitute	  a	  person’s	  own	  existence,	  
uniqueness	   and	   intention.	   Specifically,	  man	   is	   socially	   situated,	   defined	   and	   shaped	   by	   the	  relational	  context	  (King	  &	  Band,	  1985,	  p.	  31),	  and	  the	  relation	  between	  man	  and	  material	  also	  depends	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  man	  and	  man.	  It	  is	  not	  strange	  that	  to	  most	  Chinese	  people,	  face	  or	  social	  recognition	  is	  just	  a	  natural	  corollary	  of	  harmonious	  or	  acceptable	  relationships.	  
From	  ancient	   times	  until	   today,	  Western	  philosophy	  has	   tended	   to	  worry	  about	   the	   inherent	  tension	  between	  individual	  autonomy	  and	  interdependence	  that	  comes	  with	  human	  relations,	  but	  such	  a	  contradiction	  has	  seemingly	  never	  been	  a	  part	  of	  Chinese	  people’s	  collective	  anxiety	  or	  primary	  philosophical	  question.	  Coherently,	  the	  Chinese	  seldom	  have	  any	  aspiration	  towards	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ideal	  individual	  autonomy	  through	  the	  gain	  of	  face.	  	  
	  
Relational	  thinking	  in	  Chinese	  social	  life	  
Guanxi	  
‘Without	  guanxi,	  you	  will	  achieve	  nothing.’	  
I	  have	  heard	  this	  saying	  countless	   times	  throughout	  my	   life.	  Chinese	  people	  generally	  believe	  that	   one	   effective	   way	   of	   getting	   things	   done	   is	   by	   establishing	   and	   improving	   guanxi	   i.e.	  interpersonal	   relations	   (e.g.	   King,	   1991;	   Hwang,	   2000,	   Hu	   et	   al.,	   2004).	   Below	   is	   a	   concise	  introduction	  of	  the	  Chinese	  understanding	  of	  the	  constitution	  and	  benefit	  of	  guanxi:	  
These	   include	   relationships	   founded	   on	   family	   ties,	   neighborly	   ties	   and	   ties	  springing	   from	  common	  geographic	  origins,	   ties	  of	   shared	  experience	  and	   ties	  of	  shared	  interest.	  It	  involves	  the	  use	  of	  such	  personal	  ties	  to	  circumvent	  bureaucratic	  procedures,	   obtain	   access	   to	   scarce	   resources	   and	   ensure	  preferential	   treatment.	  (Brick,	  2004,	  p.	  107)	  
Guan	  (2009,	  p.	  1)	  believes	  that	  unlike	  the	  Western	  concepts	  of	   ‘networking’	  or	   ‘social	  capital’,	  the	  Chinese	  concept	  of	  guanxi	  implies	  reciprocal	  obligation.	  In	  the	  Chinese	  mind,	  guanxi	  could	  ‘engender	  trust	  in	  a	  target	  person,	  which	  results	  in	  positive	  behaviors	  toward	  the	  target	  person,	  and	   these	  behaviors	  are	   reciprocated’	   (Leung,	  2010,	  p.	  231).	  Brantly	  Womack	   (2008,	  p.	  296)	  refers	   to	   the	   Chinese	   way	   of	   thinking	   as	   ‘the	   logic	   of	   relationships’,	   which	   optimistically	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assumes	  that	  both	  sides	  are	  better	  off	  if	  they	  maintain	  a	  good	  and	  stable	  relationship.	  For	  him,	  ‘this	   is	  a	   fundamentally	  different	  attitude	  from	  that	  of	  the	  modern	  West,	  which	  has	  tended	  to	  use	   the	   carpenter’s	   rule	   of	   its	   own	   norms	   to	   level	   and	   if	   necessary	   pressurise	   others	   into	  uniformity’	  (Ibid.).	  	  
Literature	  about	  China	  and	   its	  society	  always	  reminds	  foreigners	  of	   the	   importance	  of	  guanxi	  when	   interacting	   with	   the	   Chinese,	   depicting	   it	   as	   a	   crucial	   factor	   for	   achieving	   business	  success	   in	  China.	  Buckley	  et	  al.	   (2006)	  suggest	  that	   foreign	  entrepreneurs	   in	  China	  should	  be	  conscious	   of	   how	   to	  manipulate	  guanxi	  and	   play	   by	   its	   rules	   to	   establish	   better	   institutional	  connections	  with	  China’s	   local	  government	  and	  businessmen.	  There	  is	  certainly	  criticism	  that	  the	  Chinese	  tend	  to	  resist	   formal	  rules	  and	  prefer	   flexibility	  and	   ‘behind-­‐‑the-­‐‑scenes’	  business	  dealings	  even	  in	  today’s	  globalised	  and	  modern	  times.	  
The	  notion	  of	  guanxi	  also	   leads	  to	  reserved,	   indirect	  communication	  that	  tends	  to	  reveal	  only	  part	   of	   the	   story.	   In	   Chinese	   social	   life,	   ‘interpersonal	   discord	   and	   aggressiveness	   may	   be	  handled,	   not	   by	   direct	   confrontation,	   but	   by	   interactants	   exchanging	   well-­‐‑designed	  manipulative	  messages’	   (Chang,	  2001,	  p.	  159).	  Rendering	  direct	   and	  open	   criticism	  normally	  risks	   and	   destroys	   guanxi	   in	   Chinese	   social	   life,	   and,	   on	   many	   occasions,	   especially	   in	  interactions	  with	  superiors,	  such	  behaviour	   is	  morally	   impermissible.	  Leaving	  some	  room	  for	  others’	  mistakes	  or	  differences	  is	  the	  Chinese	  way	  of	  life.	  	  
Family	  and	  filial	  piety.	  
‘The	   Chinese	   always	   say	   of	   themselves	   that	   their	   nation	   is	   like	   “a	   tray	   of	   loose	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sands”	  [Chinese:	  一盘散沙],	  each	  grain	  being,	  not	  an	  individual	  but	  a	  family’.	  (Lin,	  1936,	  p.	  177)	  	  
Among	   the	   Chinese,	   perhaps	   the	   most	   important	   social	   relationships	   are	   those	   with	   one’s	  family	  members.	  In	  Western	  culture,	  family	  is	  regarded	  as	  the	  basic	  unit	  of	  the	  social	  structure;	  nevertheless,	   it	   can	   still	   be	   divided	   into	   a	   smaller	   unit	   i.e.	   a	   person	   with	   an	   independent	  personality	   and	   free	  will.	   However,	   in	   traditional	   Chinese	   society,	   the	  most	   basic	   social	   unit	  remains	   the	   family,	   and	   family	   cannot	   be	   divided	   into	   individuals	   (Yi,	   1996,	   pp.	   239-­‐‑240).	   A	  person’s	   identity,	   status,	   value,	   rights,	   duties	   and	   responsibilities	   are	   believed	   to	   be	   tightly	  linked	  with	  their	  families	  and	  family	  members.	  As	  Hsu	  (1983,	  p.	  124)	  notes,	  in	  America,	  success	  in	  one’s	   life	  mainly	  depends	  on	  whether	  one’s	  performance	  has	  been	  accepted	  or	  praised	  by	  one’s	  peers	  and	  by	  society	  at	  large;	  however,	  in	  China,	  success	  would	  be	  regarded	  as	  incomplete	  if	  it	  does	  not	  bring	  honour	  to	  your	  parents,	  family	  members	  and	  even	  your	  ancestors.	  
In	  addition,	  the	  Chinese	  view	  of	  relations	  has	  ingrained	  in	  it	  the	  concept	  of	  filial	  piety.	  That	  is,	  a	  person’s	   greatest	   responsibility	   in	   society	   is	   to	   respect,	   obey	   and	   support	   one’s	   parents,	   and	  doing	  so	  is	  more	  significant	  than	  any	  other	  affair	  or	  interest	  (including	  one’s	  own	  self-­‐‑interest)	  (Di,	  2011,	  pp.	  119-­‐‑120).	  Specifically,	   the	  minimum	  requirement	  of	   filial	  piety	   is	   to	  obey	  one’s	  parents’	   will	   unconditionally	   and	   support	   them	   when	   they	   become	   old,31	  and	   the	   greatest	  pursuit	  of	  life	  is	  to	  gain	  success	  and	  share	  it	  with	  one’s	  parents	  (Cai,	  2004,	  p.	  16).	  Furthermore,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Until	   now,	   so	  many	  Chinese	   still	   believe	   in	   the	   traditional	   idea	   that	   ‘raising	   children	   (especially	   sons)	   is	   aimed	  at	   guiding	  against	   troubles	   in	   the	   old	   age’	   [养儿防老].	   In	   Chinese	   society,	   not	   supporting	   and	   looking	   after	   one’s	   old	   parents	   is	   an	  unforgivable	  offence.	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Confucian	   ethics	   even	   regard	   filial	   piety	   as	   a	   substitute	   for	   laws	   or	   regulations.	   Confucius	  claims,	   ‘the	   father	   can	   conceal	   the	   misconduct	   of	   the	   son,	   and	   the	   son	   can	   conceal	   the	  misconduct	  of	  the	  father.	  Uprightness	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  this	  [Chinese:	  父为子隐，子为父隐，直
乃其中矣]’.	  It	  means	  that	  protecting	  the	  kinship	  between	  parents	  and	  children	  can	  be	  done	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  social	  justice	  or	  law	  and	  order.	  	  
This	   kind	   of	   thinking	   also	   extends	   to	   other	   kinds	   of	   interpersonal	   relationships	   such	   as	  between	  equals.	  For	  example,	  as	  a	  son	  or	  daughter,	  I	  have	  the	  duty	  to	  conceal	  the	  misconducts	  of	  my	   parents	   in	   front	   of	   other	   people;	   likewise,	   as	   a	   subordinate	   or	   student,	   I	   have	   a	   self-­‐‑evident	  obligation	  to	  conceal	  the	  mistakes	  or	  negative	  characteristics	  of	  my	  boss	  or	  teacher	  in	  front	  of	  others.	  	  
	  
Hierarchical	  view	  in	  Chinese	  social	  life.	  
According	  to	  Confucian	  ethics,	  the	  ideal	  nature	  of	  an	  interpersonal	  relationship	  is	  hierarchical	  rather	  than	  equal.	  To	  be	  specific,	   ‘the	  individuals	  are	  best	  recognized	  and	  understood	  by	  their	  unequal	  social	  status	  and	  positions	  in	  their	  social	  network	  rather	  than	  their	  personal	  attributes	  as	  equal	  human	  beings’	  (Markus	  &	  Kitayama,	  1991,	  p.	  528).	  China’s	  most	  prominent	  sociologist	  Fei	   Xiaotong	   (1998,	   pp.	   34-­‐‑35)	   claims,	   ‘the	   Chinese	   people’s	  most	   favorite	   saying	   is	   “all	   the	  people	   in	   the	  world	   are	   brothers”	   [Chinese:	  四海之内皆兄弟].	   However,	   this	   does	   not	  mean	  treating	  the	  brothers	  around	  the	  world	  with	  Christianity’s	  egalitarian	  love.	  Social	  interactions	  for	  the	  Chinese	  still	  need	  to	  comply	  with	  social	  ethics	  and	  hierarchy’.	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The	   Chinese	   hierarchical	   view	   is	   virtually	   a	   kind	   of	   family-­‐‑liked	   ranking	   one.	   According	   to	  Confucian	  ethics,	   ‘since	   the	   family	  serves	  as	   the	  basis	  of	   the	  society,	  one	  should	   interact	  with	  the	  outside	  world	  much	   in	   the	   same	  way	  as	  one	   relates	   to	  members	  of	   the	   family’	   (Chang	  &	  Holt,	  1994,	  p.	  104).	  ‘The	  regulating	  factors	  in	  family	  relationships	  are	  said	  to	  be	  extendable	  to	  the	  whole	  town,	  the	  whole	  society,	  and	  consequently,	  to	  the	  whole	  country’	  (Ibid.).	  Confucians	  regard	  the	  relationships	  between	  father	  and	  son,	  sovereign	  and	  subordinate,	  husband	  and	  wife,	  elder	   brother	   and	   younger	   and	   among	   friends	   to	   be	   the	   most	   fundamental	   relationships	   in	  society	  and	  have	  dubbed	  them	  the	  five	  cardinal	  relationships	  [Chinese:	  五伦].	  ‘Excepting	  for	  the	  relationship	  between	  friends,	  according	  to	  Confucianism,	  the	  other	  four	  relationships	  have	  an	  appropriate	   type	   of	   interaction	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   relative	   superior/inferior	   positions’	  (Hwang,	  2011,	  p.	  109).32	  	  
Confucians	   also	   note	   that	   the	   ideal	   relationship	   between	   father	   and	   son	   is	   the	   primary	  relational	   model	   for	   most	   interpersonal	   relationships	   i.e.	   to	   treat	   your	   sovereign,	   husband,	  elder	  bother	  and	  anyone	  who	  is	  superior	  to	  you	  just	  like	  you	  treat	  your	  parents	  i.e.	  according	  to	  Confucian	   ethics.33	  According	   to	   the	   Confucian	   classic	   Liji	   [English:	   Book	   of	   Rites],34	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Zheng	   Lihua	   (2012,	   p.	   91)	   believes	   that	   even	   between	   and	   among	   friends,	   Chinese	   people	   still	   use	   hierarchical	   views	   to	  manipulate	  friendship:	  ‘The	  ideal	  friendship	  in	  China	  is	  always	  compared	  to	  a	  “brotherhood”.	  That	  means	  that	  the	  younger	  one	  has	  the	  duty	  to	  look	  after	  and	  respect	  the	  older	  one	  [in	  a	  friendship].’	  
33	  In	  Chinese	  society,	  there	  are	  many	  sayings	  to	  highlight	  this	  thought.	  For	  example,	  ‘One	  day	  as	  a	  teacher,	  a	  life	  as	  your	  father’	  [Chinese:	  一日为师，终生为父],	  or,	   for	  girls,	   ‘Be	  obedient	   to	  your	   father	  at	  home,	  obey	  your	  husband	  after	  you	  get	  married’	  [Chinese:	  在家从父，出嫁随夫]	  or,	   ‘An	  elder	  bother	   is	   like	  a	   father’	   [Chinese:	  长兄为父].	  These	  sayings	  clearly	  show	  that	  the	  ‘father’	  is	  always	  the	  role	  model	  and	  must	  be	  respected	  and	  obeyed	  in	  social	  life.	  	  	  
34	  Liji,	  written	  during	   the	  Warring	  States	  Period	   (5th	   century–221	  B.C.),	   is	   a	   collection	  of	   texts	   from	  Confucius’	   students	   and	  other	  scholars	  of	  the	  time,	  describing	  the	  moral	  norms,	  social	  structures	  and	  ceremonial	  rites	  of	  the	  Zhou	  dynasty.	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following	  rules	  should	  be	  considered	  righteous	  by	  all	  humans:	  
Kindness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  father,	  and	  filial	  duty	  on	  that	  of	  the	  son;	  gentleness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  elder	  brother,	  and	  obedience	  on	  that	  of	  the	  younger;	  righteousness	  on	   the	  part	   of	   the	  husband,	   and	   submission	  on	   that	   of	   the	  wife;	   kindness	  on	   the	  part	  of	  the	  elders,	  and	  deference	  on	  that	  of	  juniors;	  benevolence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  ruler,	  and	  loyalty	  on	  that	  of	  the	  minister.	  (as	  cited	  in	  Hwang,	  2011,	  p.	  110)	  	  
It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Confucian	  ethics	  also	  put	  forward	  a	  code	  of	  conduct	  for	  superiors	  i.e.	  the	  superior	   party	   should	   take	   responsibility	   for	   the	   inferior,	   listen	   to	   him/her	   and	   care	   about	  his/her	  well	   being	   (Ringmar,	   2015,	   p.	   51).	   Accordingly,	   the	   ideal	   social	  model	   for	   traditional	  Chinese	  society	  is	  as	  follows:	  ‘The	  ruler	  looks	  after	  the	  people,	  the	  people	  respect	  the	  ruler,	  and	  at	  each	  level	  such	  an	  unequal	  but	  reciprocal	  system	  of	  exchange	  serves	  to	  maintain	  order’	  (Liu	  &	  Liu,	  2003,	  p.	  48).	  	  	  	  
Certainly,	  a	  person’s	  position	  is	  always	  changing	  in	  different	  social	  interactions,	  and	  he	  or	  she	  can	   also	   occupy	   different	   positions	   at	   the	   same	   time	   (Matthyseen,	   2012,	   p.	   80).	   In	   order	   to	  correctly	  obey	  hierarchical	   rules	   and	  avoid	  making	  mistakes	   in	  daily	   interactions,	  people	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  directly	  address	  each	  other	  by	  their	  names	  but	  more	  often	  use	  words	  or	  titles	  that	  show	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  their	  relationship.	  For	  instance,	  in	  English,	  the	  father’s	  and	  mother’s	  bothers	  are	  both	  addressed	  as	  ‘Uncle’;	  however,	  in	  Chinese,	  the	  father’s	  elder	  bother	  should	  be	  addressed	  as	  Bo	  [伯]	  and	  the	  younger	  brother	  as	  Shu	  [叔],	  while	  the	  mother’s	  brothers	  should	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be	  addressed	  as	  Jiu	  [舅].35	  Moreover,	  Chinese	  also	  uses	  a	  number	  of	  adjectives	  (mainly	  ‘big’	  or	  ‘small’)	  to	  rank	  and	  differentiate	  among	  themselves.	  For	  example,	  my	  father	  has	  four	  brothers	  and	   I	   am	  expected	   to	   respectively	   address	   them	  as	   ‘Big	  Bo’	   (the	  oldest	   brother),	   ‘Second	  Bo’	  (the	  brother	  younger	  than	  my	  Big	  Bo),	  ‘Fourth	  Shu’	  (the	  brother	  who	  was	  born	  just	  before	  my	  father)	  and	  ‘Small	  Shu’	  (the	  youngest	  brother).	  My	  mother	  only	  has	  two	  brothers,	  and	  I	  address	  them	  respectively	  as	   ‘Big	   Jiu’	  and	   ‘Small	   Jiu’.	   In	  China’s	  workplaces	  as	  well,	   it	   is	  very	   impolite	  and	  risky	  to	  address	  others,	  especially	  someone	  who	  is	  your	  superior,	  using	  their	  full	  name,	  and	  the	  common	  practice	  is	  to	  refer	  to	  them	  using	  the	  format	  ‘Title	  +	  Family	  Name’.	  Furthermore,	  even	   ‘among	   equals	   in	   China	   it	   is	   a	   gross	   breach	   of	   politeness	   to	   call	   a	   person	   by	   his	   given	  name”	  (Holcombe,	  2001[1895]:263).	  	  	  
	  
Effects	  on	  Chinese	  face	  culture.	  
Ø   Relational	   thinking	   in	   Chinese	   philosophy	   and	   social	   life	   constitutes	   the	  
fundamental	  dynamic	  of	  Chinese	  face	  concern	  and	  behaviours.	  ‘Under	  the	  influence	  of	  Confucian	  relationalism,	  Chinese	  people	  are	  concerned	  not	  only	  about	  enhancing	  or	  losing	  face	  of	  one’s	  “small	  self”,	  but	  also	  about	  enhancing	  or	  losing	  face	  of	  one’s	  “big	  self”	  arising	  from	  significant	  moral	  or	  social	  episodes’	  (Hwang	  &	  Han,	  2010,	  p.	  479).	  The	  bigger	  self	  can	  include	   family	   members,	   friends,	   the	   wider	   community	   and	   even	   one’s	   ancestors.	  Face	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  According	   to	  Confucianism,	  Bo	  deserves	   the	  most	   respect,	   followed	  by	  Shu	   and,	   finally,	   Jiu.	   There	   is	   also	   a	   similar	  naming	  system	  to	  refer	  to	  one’s	  parents’	  sisters.	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manifests	  as	  a	  collective	  property	  instead	  of	  an	  individual	  thing.36	  
Ø   The	   Chinese	   tend	   to	   think	   of	   facework	  more	   from	   the	   relational	   perspective.	   The	  kind	   of	   face	   a	   Chinese	   person	   gets	   can	   be	   considered	   a	   part	   of	   his	   or	   her	   public	   image,	  which	  not	  only	  depends	  on	  but	  is	  also	  determined	  by	  his	  or	  her	  relationship	  with	  others.	  The	  Chinese	  generally	  believe	  that	  if	  their	  relationships	  with	  others	  are	  managed	  well,	  face	  can	  be	  gained	  and	  saved	  easily.	  This	  study	  claims	  that	  such	  a	  mind-­‐‑set	  makes	  the	  Chinese	  focus	  more	  on	  self-­‐‑presentation	  in	  relationships	  (see	  more	  in	  Section	  3.6).	  	  
Ø   The	  Chinese	  concept	  of	  face	  is	  inherently	  hierarchical	  (Jia,	  1997,	  p.	  45).	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  status	  cannot	  be	  equated	  with	  face,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  contradictory	  to	  the	  viewpoint	  that	  in	   the	  Chinese	   context,	   status	   is	   the	  most	   important	   factor—and	  often	   the	  only	   factor—that	   determines	   whether	   one’s	   face	   exists	   or	   not	   and	   how	   much	   face	   can	   be	   gained.	  Correspondingly,	   ‘any	  factor	  that	  may	  damage	  one’s	  status	  or	  anything	  that	  may	  sway	  an	  individual’s	  status	  in	  their	  interpersonal	  network	  might	  make	  them	  feel	  face	  loss’	  (Hwang	  &	   Han,	   2012,	   p.	   488).	   In	   addition,	   giving	   face	   to	   superiors	   or	   high-­‐‑ranking	   people	  unconditionally	  is	  regarded	  as	  necessary	  and	  even	  compulsory	  in	  social	  interactions	  and	  is	  regarded	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  filial	  piety	  (see	  more	  in	  Sections	  3.6	  and	  3.7.1).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  When	  Western	   theorists	   discuss	   face,	   they	   basically	   regard	   it	   as	   a	   phenomenon	   based	   on	   a	   person’s	   individual	   needs	   or	  interests.	   For	   example,	   Goffman	   explains	   face	   concern	   like	   so:	   ‘He	  may	  want	   to	   save	   his	   own	   face	   because	   of	   his	   emotional	  attachment	  to	  the	  image	  of	  self	  which	  it	  expresses,	  because	  of	  his	  pride	  and	  honor,	  because	  of	  the	  power	  his	  presumed	  status	  allows	  him	  to	  exert	  over	  the	  other	  participants,	  and	  so	  on’	  (Goffman,	  1967,	  p.	  12).	  As	  such,	  Brown	  and	  Levinson’s	  concept	  of	  face	   centred	  on	   the	   individual	   aspect.	   For	   them,	   ‘this	   self-­‐‑image	  primarily	   concerns	   the	   individual’s	   desires,	   and	  only	   to	   the	  extent	  that	  the	  self	  depends	  on	  others’	  face	  being	  maintained	  does	  this	  image	  become	  public’	  (Yu,	  2001,	  p.	  1685).	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3.5.3	  The	  rule	  of	  renqing	  
Renqing:	  meaning	  and	  importance	  
Renqing	   [Chinese:	  人情]	   is	   an	   emic	   cultural	   aspect	   of	   Chinese	   society	   that	   has	   two	   kinds	   of	  meanings.	  The	  first	  is	  empathy	  and	  sympathy	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  psychology	  (Hwang,	  1987,	  p.	  953);	  the	  second	  is	  similar	  to	  favours,	  such	  as	  a	  gift	  presented	  by	  one	  person	  to	  another	  in	  the	  course	  of	  a	  social	  exchange	  (Spencer-­‐‑Oatey,	  2007,	  p.	  70).	  This	  section	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  first	  meaning	  of	  this	  concept.	  
The	  best	  saying	  that	  illustrates	  the	  rule	  of	  renqing	  in	  Chinese	  culture	  comes	  from	  Confucius:	  ‘Do	  not	   impose	  upon	  others	  what	  you	  do	  not	  desire	  yourself’	   [Chinese:	  己所不欲，勿施于人],	  or,	  from	   a	  more	   positive	   perspective,	   ‘now	   the	  man	   of	   perfect	   virtue,	  wishing	   to	   be	   established	  himself,	  seeks	  also	  to	  establish	  others;	  wishing	  to	  be	  enlarged	  himself,	  he	  seeks	  also	  to	  enlarge	  others’	  [Chinese:	  己欲立而立人，己欲达而达人].	  Specifically,	  if	  someone	  is	  able	  to	  understand	  another’s	   emotional	   responses	   to	   various	   life	   situations—feeling	   happy	   or	   sad	  when	   and	   as	  others	  do,	  or	  even	  catering	  to	  their	  tastes	  and	  avoiding	  whatever	  they	  dislike—then	  we	  may	  say	  that	   such	   a	   person	   knows	   renqing	   (Hwang,	   1987,	   p.	   953).	   In	   psychological	   terms,	   renqing	   is	  empathy,	  which	  is	  defined	  as	  ‘an	  affective	  state	  that	  stems	  from	  the	  apprehension	  of	  another’s	  emotional	  state	  or	  condition,	  and	  that	  is	  congruent	  with	  it’	  (Eisenberg	  &	  Miller,	  1987,	  p.	  91).	  In	  addition,	  renqing	  also	  involves	  the	  advocacy	  of	  sympathy.	  According	  to	  Confucian	  ethics,	  ‘when	  a	   member	   of	   one’s	   reticulum	   gets	   into	   trouble	   or	   faces	   a	   difficult	   situation,	   one	   should	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sympathize,	  offer	  help,	  and	  do	  a	  renqing	  for	  that	  person’	  (Hwang,	  1987,	  p.	  955).	  
Renqing	   rule	   highlights	   the	   necessity	   of	   the	   norm	   of	   reciprocity,37	  exerting	   a	  mutually	   restrictive,	   even	   coercive,	   power	   upon	   social	   practice.	   In	   facework,	  Chinese	  people	  are	  always	  under	   strong	   constraint	   to	  act	   in	  a	  manner	   consistent	  with	   the	  requirements	   for	  maintaining	  his/her	   face	  as	  well	  as	   for	   reciprocating	  a	  due	  regard	  for	  the	  face	  of	  others.	  (Ho,	  1976,	  p.	  873)	  	  	  	  	  
Renqing	  as	  a	  social	  norm	  holds	  a	  central	  position	  in	  Chinese	  society	  and	  behaviours.	  Lin	  Yutang	  (1936,	  p.	  86)	  describes	  it	  as	  follows:	  
For	  a	  Westerner,	  it	  is	  usually	  sufficient	  for	  a	  proposition	  to	  be	  logically	  sound.	  For	  a	  Chinese,	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient	  that	  a	  proposition	  be	  logically	  correct,	  but	  it	  must	  be	  at	  the	  same	  time	   in	  accord	  with	  human	  nature.	   In	   fact,	   to	  be	   ‘in	  accord	  with	  human	  nature’,	  to	  be	  renqing,	  is	  greater	  than	  to	  be	  logical.	  For	  a	  theory	  could	  be	  so	  logical	  as	   to	  be	   totally	  devoid	  of	   common	   sense.	  The	  Chinese	   are	  willing	   to	  do	   anything	  against	  reason,	  but	  they	  will	  not	  accept	  anything	  that	  is	  not	  plausible	  in	  the	  light	  of	  human	  nature.	  	  
For	  the	  Chinese,	  to	  say	  that	  a	  person	  ‘does	  not	  know	  about	  or	  is	  not	  concerned	  about	  renqing’	  implies	  that	  this	  person	  lacks	  worldly	  wisdom	  or	  has	  a	  cold	  and	  indifferent	  personality.	  Instead,	  when	  we	  praise	   someone	  and	  describe	   them	  as	  having	   a	   good	  understanding	  of	   renqing,	  we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  It	  has	  been	  admitted	  that	  the	  norm	  of	  reciprocity	  is	  a	  universal	  one,	  which	  is	  a	  basic	  moral	  rule	  of	  social	  cohesion	  in	  most	  cultures	  (Gouldner,	  1960;	  Levi-­‐‑Strauss,	  1969).	  However,	  there	  still	  exist	  differences	  in	  this	  norm	  among	  cultures,	  including	  its	  application	  to	  different	  domains	  of	  interpersonal	  ties,	  ways	  of	  repayment	  and	  levels	  of	  expectation	  (Hwang,	  2011,	  p.	  93).	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mean	   that	   this	   person	   has	   a	   high	   emotional	   quotient	   (EQ)	   and	   is	   good	   at	   dealing	   with	  interpersonal	  relationships.	  
	  
Manners	  of	  different	  orders	  
Confucianism	  advocates	  that	  one	  should	  apply	  the	  rule	  of	  renqing	   to	  everyone,	  but,	   in	  reality,	  Chinese	   people	   generally	   never	   attain	   this	   ideal.	   How	  widely	   the	   Chinese	  would	   like	   to	   give	  
renqing	  to	  others	  is	  also	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  this	  rule.	  
Individualism	   and	   collectivism	   are	   the	   two	   most	   frequently	   cited	   terms	   by	   theorists	   across	  disciplines	  in	  discussions	  on	  cultural	  differences	  between	  the	  East	  and	  the	  West	  (e.g.	  Hofstede,	  1980;	   Ting-­‐‑Toomy,	   1988;	   Triandis,	   1995).	   Generally	   speaking,	   in	   individualistic	   cultures,	  individuals	  assume	  responsibility	  for	  themselves	  and	  their	  immediate	  families.	  In	  collectivistic	  cultures,	   individual	  belongs	  to	  collectivities	  or	   in-­‐‑groups	  that	   look	  after	   them	  in	  exchange	   for	  their	   loyalty	   (Hofstede,	  1980).	  However,	  an	   increasing	  number	  of	   theorists	  have	  realised	   that	  collectivism	  is	  an	  incomplete	  conception	  of	  culture	  that	  cannot	  effectively	  capture	  the	  richness	  of	  interpersonal	  behaviours	  in	  Asian	  societies	  (e.g.	  Hui	  and	  Trandis,	  1986;	  Kin	  &	  Nam,	  1998,	  p.	  523).	  Renqing	   especially	   cannot	   be	   explained	   purely	   in	   terms	   of	   collectivism,	   as	   it	   does	   not	  explain	  why	  the	  Chinese	  tend	  to	  value	  renqing	  in	  some	  social	  groups	  but	  devalue	  or	  ignore	  it	  in	  others	  and	  why	  different	  people	  have	  different	  preferences	  about	  it.	  
Fei	   Xiaotong	   proposes	   the	   theory	   of	   Manners	   of	   Different	   Orders	   to	   describe	   the	   Chinese	  psychological	   characteristic	   of	   alienation.	   Fei	   (2005,	   pp.	   30-­‐‑31)	   compares	   the	   evolution	   of	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Chinese	   interpersonal	   relationships	   to	   a	   stone	   cast	   in	   water,	   generating	   ripples	   that	   move	  outward	  from	  the	  centre:	  the	  innermost	  ripples	  represent	  those	  closest	  to	  the	  social	  actor,	  with	  the	   different	   rings	   of	   the	   ripple	   effect	   representing	   different	   degrees	   of	   social	   intimacy	   and	  obligation.	   This	   metaphor	   thus	   ‘not	   only	   emphasizes	   the	   self-­‐‑centeredness	   of	   the	   Chinese	  individual,	   but	   also	   the	   high-­‐‑contextuality	   and	   elasticity	   of	   social	   relationships;	   each	   social	  relationship	  can	  take	  priority	  over	  another	  one	  depending	  on	  the	  context’	  (Matthyseen,	  2012,	  p.	  81).	  Clearly,	  Fei’s	  analogy	  defies	  the	  traditional	  classification	  of	  Chinese	  people	  or	  culture	  as	  ‘collectivist’,	  implying	  instead	  that	  a	  Chinese	  person’s	  social	  network	  will	  differentiate	  based	  on	  his	  or	  her	  judgment	  of	  the	  closeness	  of	  the	  relationships.	  
Fei	  Xiaotong	  further	  proposes	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘situational	  morality’	  i.e.	  ‘the	  closer	  the	  circle,	  the	  more	  [the]	  moral	  weight’	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  83).	  Relational	  closeness	  or	  hierarchy	  becomes	  the	  criteria	  for	  a	  person	  to	  determine	  whether	  to	  trigger	  his	  or	  her	  moral	  consciousness	  and	  responsibility.	  In	  other	  words,	  Chinese	  egocentrism	  can	   ‘expand	   to	   include	  other	   related	  persons,	  or	   shrink	  into	  a	  single	  self,	  according	  to	  the	  context’	  (Yeh,	  2010,	  p.	  77).	  A	  well-­‐‑known	  traditional	  Chinese	  saying	  describing	  the	  Chinese	  people’s	  public	  spirit	  is,	  ‘Each	  one	  sweeps	  the	  snow	  from	  his	  own	  doorstep	  and	  doesn’t	  bother	  about	  the	  frost	  on	  his	  neighbor’s	  roof’	  [Chinese:	  各人自扫门前雪，
不管他人瓦上霜].38	  The	  Chinese	  never	  deny	  their	  tendency	  of	  passivity	  and	  selfishness	  towards	  the	  marginal	  or	  peripheral	  ‘ripples’	  in	  their	  lives;	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  Chinese	  expand	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Regarding	   this	   saying,	   Chinese	   author	   Lin	   Yutang	   (1936,	   p.	   175)	   has	   made	   the	   following	   insightful	   comment:	   ‘Chinese	  courtesy	  cannot	  be	  defined…	  The	  Chinese	  people	  are	  not	  bad-­‐‑mannered	  toward	  their	  friends	  and	  acquaintances,	  but	  beyond	  that	   limit	  the	  Chinese	  as	  a	  social	  being	  is	  positively	  hostile	  toward	  his	  neighbor,	  be	  he	  a	  fellow-­‐‑passenger	  in	  a	  street	  car	  or	  a	  neighbor	  at	  the	  theatre-­‐‑ticket	  office.’	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benevolence	   is	   contingent	   on	   the	   circumstances	   and	   their	   individual	   preferences,	   both	  being	  neither	   fixed	   nor	   absolute.	   Fei	   (2005,	   pp.	   78-­‐‑79)	   described	   the	   Chinese	   thought	   process	   as	  follows:	  
In	  a	  society	  characterized	  by	  a	  differential	  mode	  of	  association,	  general	  standards	  have	  no	  utility.	  The	   first	   thing	   to	  do	   is	   to	  understand	   the	  specific	  context:	  Who	   is	  the	  important	  figure,	  and	  what	  kind	  of	  relationship	  is	  appropriate	  with	  that	  figure?	  Only	  then	  can	  one	  decide	  the	  ethical	  standards	  to	  be	  applied	  in	  that	  context.	  	  
Loving	  only	   those	  who	  are	   closely	   related	   to	  us	   and	   respecting	   superiors	   in	   proportion	  with	  their	  rank	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  the	  different	   levels	  and	  kinds	  of	  renqing	  applied	  in	  Chinese	  social	  life.	  In	  other	  words,	  ‘the	  degrees	  of	  permeation	  of	  renqing	  into	  different	  orders	  of	  relationships	  varies	  according	  to	  (1)	  the	  hierarchical	  system	  of	  social	  ordering	  and	  (2)	  the	  varying	  degree	  of	  relationship’	   (Deng,	   2013,	   p.	   144).	   These	   two	   criteria	   transform	   into	   the	   following	   concrete	  behaviours:	  	  
(1)   	  One	  should	  give	  more	  renqing	  to	  one’s	  superiors	  and	  not	  necessarily	  care	  much	  about	  one’s	  subordinates.	  
(2)   	  One	   naturally	   gives	   more	   renqing	   to	   those	   with	   whom	   one	   is	   intimate	  (even	  only	  nominally)	  and	  less	  to	  those	  with	  whom	  we	  have	  more	  distant	  relations	  (Chang	  &	  Holt,	  1994,	  p.	  104).	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Ø   The	   rule	   of	   renqing	   emphasises	   the	   compelling	   principles	   of	   empathy	   and	  
reciprocity,	  which	  constitute	  the	  core	  values	  of	  Chinese	  face	  culture.	  Specifically,	  if	  you	  want	  to	  have	  face,	  you	  also	  need	  to	  be	  concerned	  about	  others’	  face	  wants;	  if	  you	  do	  not	  want	   to	   lose	   face,	  you	  also	  should	  not	  make	  others	   lose	   face.	   In	   facework,	   if	   I	  have	  given	  you	  face,	  you	  should	  give	  me	  face	  in	  turn,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  	  
Ø   Hierarchical	  inequality	  and	  relational	  closeness	  (even	  nominal)	  are	  more	  likely	  
to	  prompt	  Chinese	  people’s	  face-­‐‑giving	  behaviours	   (see	  more	   in	  Sections	  3.6	  and	  3.7).	  	  
	  
3.5.4	  Modesty	  
Let’s	   begin	   this	   discussion	   by	   reviewing	   a	   critical	   historical	   fragment.	  On	  21	   February	   1972,	  American	  President	  Richard	  Nixon	  had	  an	  unprecedented	  meeting	  with	  Chairman	  Mao	  Zedong.	  Below	  is	  an	  excerpt	  of	  their	  dialogue:39	  
President	  Nixon:	  He	  [Dr	  Kissinger]	  is	  an	  expert	  in	  philosophy.	  
Dr	   Kissinger:	   I	   used	   to	   assign	   the	   Chairman’s	   collective	   writings	   to	   my	   classes	   at	  
Harvard.	  
Chairman	  Mao:	  Those	  writings	  of	  mine	  aren’t	  anything.	  There	  is	  nothing	  instructive	  
in	  what	  I	  wrote.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  The	  dialogue	  has	  been	  sourced	  from	  the	  USC	  US-­‐‑China	  Institute	  website.	  (2016,	  September	  24)	  Mao	  Zedong	  Meets	  Richard	  Nixon,	  February	  21,	  1972.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://china.usc.edu/mao-­‐‑zedong-­‐‑meets-­‐‑richard-­‐‑nixon-­‐‑february-­‐‑21-­‐‑1972.	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President	   Nixon:	   The	   Chairman’s	   writings	   moved	   a	   nation	   and	   have	   changed	   the	  
world.	  
Chairman	  Mao:	   I	  haven’t	  been	  able	  to	  change	  it.	  I’ve	  only	  been	  able	  to	  change	  a	  few	  
places	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  Peking.	  
Mao	  Zedong’s	  response	  is	  a	  very	  typical	  Chinese	  way	  of	  showing	  modesty	  as	  well	  as	  conducting	  facework.	  Obviously,	  no	  one	  would	  believe	  that	  Mao	  really	  thought	  that	  he	  was	  a	  politician	  who	  wrote	  non-­‐‑instructive	   things	  and	  was	  merely	  able	   to	   influence	   ‘a	   few	  places	   in	   the	  vicinity	  of	  Peking’.	   In	   the	   Chinese	   mind,	   this	   kind	   of	   argument	   only	   corroborates	   Mao’s	   moral	  consciousness	  in	  the	  face	  of	  praise.	  
Modesty,	   in	   a	   general	   sense,	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   ‘the	   public	   under-­‐‑representation	   of	   one’s	  favorable	  traits	  and	  abilities’	  (Cialdini	  et	  al.,	  1998,	  p.	  473).	  Researchers	  have	  widely	  concluded	  that	   modesty	   functions	   as	   one	   of	   the	   most	   dominant	   cultural	   norms,	   affecting	   how	   the	  motivation	   for	   self-­‐‑enhancement	   manifests	   among	   the	   Chinese	   (Kim,	   Cohen,	   et	   al.,	   2010;	  Kurman	  &	  Sriram,	  1997;	  Leung	  &	  Cohen,	  2011).	  Chinese	  modesty	  is	  not	  only	  a	  moral	  virtue	  but	  a	  kind	  of	   interpersonal	  skill	   and	  a	  means	   to	  seek	  recognition.	  The	  underlying	   logic	   is	   that	  by	  downplaying	   one’s	   personal	   qualities	   and	   successes	   and	   by	   highlighting	   one’s	   need	   to	  constantly	   learn,	   others	  would	   view	   oneself	   favourably,	  which	  would	   promote	   interpersonal	  acceptance,	  inclusion	  and	  harmony	  (Koh	  &	  Wang,	  2012,	  p.	  143).	  	  
Correspondingly,	   ignorance	   about	   modesty	   in	   Chinese	   society	   often	   leads	   to	   interpersonal	  tensions.	  For	  example,	  in	  Chinese	  academic	  circles,	  if	  a	  professor’s	  behaviour	  shows	  that	  he	  or	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she	  thinks	  he	  is	  knowledgeable,	  smart	  and	  wise,	  people	  would	  think	  of	  him	  or	  her	  as	  a	  tough	  character	  and	  would	  not	  feel	  comfortable	  being	  in	  their	  presence	  or	  part	  of	  their	  social	  circle	  (Matthyseen,	  2012,	  p.	  91).	  Similarly,	  claiming	  more	  recognition	  than	  one	  is	  granted	  by	  others	  is	  also	  considered	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  hierarchical	  system	  and	  a	  disruption	  of	  harmony	  (Lee	  et	  al.,	  2014,	  p.	  317).	  
Concrete	  means	   of	   showing	  modesty	   include	   (1)	   self-­‐‑effacement,	  which	   refers	   to	   restraining	  oneself	   in	   seeking	   praise	   or	   self-­‐‑interest;	   (2)	   other-­‐‑enhancement,	   which	   refers	   to	   showing	  concern	   for	   others	   and	   elevating	   others;	   (3)	   avoidance	   of	   attention-­‐‑seeking,	   which	   refers	   to	  building	   an	   appearance	   that	   does	   not	   draw	   attention	   to	   oneself,	   such	   as	   by	   wearing	   bland	  clothing	  and	  minimal	  accessories.	  	  
Self-­‐‑effacement	   and	   other-­‐‑enhancement	   are	   consistently	   simultaneous	  with	   and	   supplement	  each	  other	  in	  the	  Chinese	  method	  of	  showing	  modesty	  in	  one’s	  communication.	  Early	  sinologist	  Chester	  Holcombe	  (2001[1895],	  pp.	  260-­‐‑261)	  described	  this	  behavioural	  trend	  as	  follows:	  
To	  a	  large	  extent,	  it	  [the	  system	  of	  etiquette]	  deprives	  conversation	  of	  all	  freshness	  and	   originality	   by	   dictating	   a	   set	   form	   through	  which	   it	  may	   flow,	   and	   so	   covers	  simple	   questions	   between	   friends	   with	   a	   varnish	   or	   lacquer	   of	   extravagant	  adjectives	   and	   bombastic	   nouns,	   with	   fulsome	   compliment	   and	   intense	   but	  meaningless	  self-­‐‑depreciation,	  as	  to	  render	  it	  absurd	  and	  silly.	  
Below	   is	   an	   example	   from	  my	   own	   life.	   When	   my	   classmates	   and	   friends	   discovered	   that	   I	  would	   be	   going	   abroad	   to	   study	   on	   a	   four-­‐‑year	   scholarship,	   they	   expressed	   their	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congratulations	  to	  me	  in	  the	  following	  manner:	  
My	  classmate/friend:	  ‘Rui,	  congratulations!	  You	  are	  so	  good!’	  
I:	  ‘Thank	  you!	  I’m	  flattered.	  I	  have	  to	  say,	  if	  you	  had	  applied	  for	  that	  scholarship	  and	  competed	  with	  me,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  yours,	  not	  mine.’	  
My	  classmate/friend:	  ‘You	  are	  so	  modest,	  and	  I	  am	  incapable	  of	  doing	  that.’	  Or,	  ‘Are	  you	  kidding?	  How	  could	  I	  possibly	  compete	  with	  you?’	  
The	  self-­‐‑effacement	  and	  other-­‐‑enhancement	  seen	  in	  this	  example	  are	  typical	  of	  conversations	  between	   Chinese	   people.	   Both	   sides	  make	   every	   attempt	   to	   show	   a	   deep	   sense	   of	   modesty,	  while	   ritualistically	   redressing	   the	   other’s	   self-­‐‑trivialisation.	   This	   kind	   of	   interaction	   was	  described	  by	  Jia	  Wenshan	  (1997,	  p.	  50)	  as	  follows:	   ‘To	  Westerners,	  all	  these	  may	  sound	  like	  a	  false	   modesty,	   a	   waste	   of	   time	   and	   even	   funny’;	   however,	   such	   behaviors	   can	   be	   fully	  understood	  and	  proficiently	  manipulated	  by	  most	  Chinese	  people,	  and	  function	  as	  ‘an	  effective	  means	  to	  fulfill	  the	  relational	  needs	  of	  each	  participant	  in	  Chinese	  culture’	  (Ibid.).	  According	  to	  Brown	  and	  Levinson’s	   ‘negative	  face’	  theory	  (1987,	  p.	  68),	  compliments	  often	  limit	  a	  person’s	  freedom	   of	   action,	   and	   rejecting	   others’	   compliments	   will	   cause	   them	   a	   loss	   of	   face.40	  The	  Chinese	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   have	   such	   worries,	   and	   rejecting	   a	   compliment	   is	   mandatory	   and	  conforms	  to	  the	  Chinese	  standards	  of	  politeness.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  According	  to	  Brown	  and	  Levinson,	  when	  recipients	  accept	  a	  given	  compliment,	   they	  may	  feel	  constrained	  to	  denigrate	  the	  object	  being	  complimented,	  thereby	  damaging	  their	  own	  positive	  face	  desire	  in	  order	  to	  be	  liked	  by	  others.	  Complimentees	  may	  feel	   obliged	   to	   return	   the	   compliment,	   thus	   damaging	   their	   own	   negative	   face	   needs	   to	   act	   unimpededly	   (1987,	   p.	   68).	   In	  addition,	   in	  case	  of	  rejection	  responses,	  the	  recipient	  of	  the	  compliment	  appears	  to	  show	  disagreement	  in	  a	  direct,	  clear	  and	  unambiguous	  way,	  thus	  damaging	  the	  positive	  face	  needs	  of	  the	  complimenter.	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For	  the	  Chinese,	  the	  highest	  expression	  of	  modesty	  is	  avoiding	  attention-­‐‑seeking	  behaviour	  or,	  at	  least,	  pretending	  to	  be	  indifferent	  to	  one’s	  success.	  Chinese	  people	  tend	  to	  believe	  that	  ‘being	  in	   a	   high	   position—be	   it	   social,	   intellectual	   or	   moral—makes	   you	   more	   vulnerable	   to,	   for	  instance,	  the	  hatred	  and	  malice,	  jealousy,	  and	  slander	  of	  others’	  (Yang,	  1945,	  p.	  106).	  There	  is	  an	  abundance	  of	  Chinese	  sayings	  that	  reinforce	  this	  belief,	  such	  as,	  ‘tall	  trees	  catch	  much	  wind’	  [Chinese:	  树大招风],	  ‘a	  man	  dreads	  fame	  as	  a	  pig	  dreads	  being	  fat’	  [Chinese:	  人怕出名猪怕壮],	  ‘the	  outstanding	  bird	  usually	  bears	  the	  brunt	  of	  the	  attack’	  [Chinese:	  枪打出头鸟].	  Based	  on	  the	  very	  likely	  unfortunate	  consequences	  of	  immodesty,	  ‘being	  smart	  and	  possessing	  a	  high	  social	  position	  can	  be	  a	  burden,	  and	   the	  only	  way	   to	  protect	  oneself	   from	  this	   is	  by	  staying	  modest	  and	  not	  showing	  off,	  and,	  in	  the	  worst	  case,	  pretending	  not	  to	  know	  or	  not	  admitting	  to	  having	  a	  particularly	  high	  social	  position’	  (Ibid.).	  As	  noted	  in	  one	  Chinese	  book	  containing	  instructions	  on	  how	  to	   live,	   ‘not	  unfolding	  the	  real	  self,	  being	   in	  a	   lower	  position	  to	  get	  the	  upper	  hand—people	  who	  put	  themselves	  in	  a	  low	  position	  are	  the	  smartest’	  (Si,	  2007).	  ‘Keeping	  a	  low	  profile	  and	  achieving	  something’	  [Chinese:	  韬光养晦，有所作为]—the	  diplomatic	  strategy	  that	  China	  has	   insisted	  on	   for	  a	   long	   time,	   to	  a	  great	  extent	   reflects	   their	  attitude	   to	   life,	  which	   involves	  being	  content	  with	  remaining	  passive	  or	  ‘one	  step	  back	  today	  for	  two	  steps	  forward	  tomorrow’	  [Chinese	  saying:	  以退为进].	  
Based	  on	  this	  viewpoint,	  this	  thesis	  will	  propose	  that	  the	  overemphasis	  on	  modesty	  in	  Chinese	  society	  leads	  to	  a	  preference	  for	  weakness	  in	  Chinese	  facework	  (see	  more	  in	  Section	  3.7.2).	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3.5.5	  Conformity	  
Conformity	  in	  the	  sociological	  sense	  of	  the	  term	  refers	  to	  a	  tendency	  of	  individual	  members	  of	  a	  group	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  agrees	  with	  the	  norms	  of	  the	  group	  or	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  in-­‐‑group	   others	   (Kent,	   2007,	   p.	   97).	   A	   long-­‐‑held	   view	   is	   that	   conformity	   to	   some	   extent	   is	   a	  product	  of	  cultural	  conditioning	  and	  that	  relatively	  high	  levels	  of	  conformity	  can	  often	  be	  found	  in	   some	  national	   groups	   (Bond	  &	  Smith,	   1996,	   p.	   111).	  According	   to	  many	   empirical	   studies	  (e.g.	  Ibid.;	  Kramer,	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  p.	  246-­‐‑258;	  Hwang	  &	  Kim,	  2007,	  pp.	  232-­‐‑248),	  most	  people	  in	  the	   Chinese	   cultural	   context	   constantly	   exhibit	   the	   remarkable	   behavioural	   characteristic	   of	  conformity.	  Commonly,	   ‘there	   is	  an	  abiding	   fear	  of	  being	  on	  one’s	  own,	  of	  being	  separated	  or	  disconnected	   from	   the	   group;	   a	   desire	   for	   independence	   is	   cast	   as	   unnatural	   and	   immature’	  (Markus	   &	   Kitayama,	   1994).	   Additionally,	   in	   view	   of	   the	   deep-­‐‑rooted	   hierarchical	   culture	   of	  China,	  conformity	  very	  often	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  compliance	  with	  one’s	  superiors.	  
From	  the	  Chinese	  perspective,	  as	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  interpersonal	  communication	  is	  to	  pursue	  harmonious	  and	  conflict-­‐‑free	  relationships,	  harmony	  can	  be	  achieved	  only	  when	  people	  engage	  in	   the	   same	   code	   of	   conduct	   and	   sacrifice	   each	   individual’s	   uniqueness	   (cf.	   Chen,	   1998).	  Confucius	   made	   it	   clear	   that	   ‘people	   who	   have	   chosen	   different	   ways	   cannot	   make	   plans	  together’	  [Chinese:	  道不同，不相为谋],	  which	  means	  that	  ‘the	  harmony	  of	  a	  broth	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  no	  ingredient	  is	  sharply	  at	  odds	  with	  other	  ingredients’	  (Ni,	  2014,	  p.	  67).	  In	   essence,	   this	  pursuit	   of	  harmony	  ultimately	   aims	   for	   ‘a	  unity	  of	  differences,	   a	   synthesis	  of	  divergences,	   a	   confluence	   of	   contrasts’	   (Young,	   1994,	   p.	   45).	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   subjective	   and	  independent	  I	  is	  always	  seemingly	  not	  conspicuous	  at	  all,	  and	  the	  dichotomy	  of	  the	  self	  and	  the	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other	  is	  reshaped	  or	  dissolved	  at	  least	  at	  a	  surface	  level.	  If	  social	  interaction	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  Americans	  to	  express	  their	  authentic	  self,	  the	  Chinese	  culture	  treats	  communication	  as	  a	  means	  of	   ‘reaffirming	  the	  communicator	  as	  a	  member	  of	  society	  and	  of	  showing	  the	  common	  points	  with	   the	   other	   social	   actors’	   (Chang,	   1999,	   p.	   536).	   An	   empirical	   study	   finds	   that	   in	   Chinese	  home	   education,	   ‘self-­‐‑expression	   or	   the	   striving	   for	   autonomous	   behavior	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	  children	  are	  discouraged	  or	  suppressed	  as	  nothing	  more	  than	  selfishness’	  (Solomon,	  1971,	  p.	  69).	  
To	  most	  Westerners,	  conformity	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  negative	  trait.	   It	   is	  widely	  believed	  that	  everyone	  should	  be	  independent	  and	  have	  their	  own	  free	  will,	  and	  only	  when	  one’s	  ability	  or	  power	   cannot	   influence	   others	   should	   someone	   get	   in	   line	   with	   environmental	   forces	   or	  powerful	   others	   (Rothbaum,	  1982,	   p.	   5).	  As	  Rothbaum	  points	   out,	   conformity	   is	   a	   behaviour	  intended	   to	   passively	   adapt	   to	   the	   environment	   (Ibid.).	   For	   some	   theorists,	   conformity	   often	  leads	  to	  psychological	  conflicts	  or	  distress	  in	  the	  individual	  (e.g.	  Campell,	  1975;	  Bond	  &	  Smith,	  1996;	  Mahalik,	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Chinese	  conform	  with	  others,	  groups	  and	  norms	  as	  a	  way	  of	  securing	  a	  sense	  of	  social	  security.	  ‘They	  actively	  like	  to	  conform	  in	  [the]	  sense	  of	  being	  connected	   to	   others,	   and	  being	   connected	   to	   others	   has	   positive	   behavioral	   consequences	   in	  this	  context’	  (Kim	  &	  Markus,	  1999,	  p.	  786).	  	  
It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  Chinese	  conformity	  is	  very	  practical	  and	  flexible,	  very	  often	  nothing	  more	  than	  superficial	  conformity	  or	  compliance	  without	  internalisation	  (King	  &	  Bond,	  1985,	  p.	  35).	   A	   common	   saying	   aptly	   illustrates	   this	   Chinese	   characteristic:	   ‘See	   a	   man,	   talk	   human	  words;	  see	  a	  ghost,	  speak	  ghost	  language’	  [Chinese:	  见人说人话，见鬼说鬼话].	  As	  noted	  by	  Wu	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and	   Tseng	   (1998,	   p.	   9),	   ‘if	   one	   accepts	   this	   superficial	   conformity	   to	   sociocultural	   norms	   of	  conduct	  as	  a	  prevailing	  force	  in	  shaping	  Chinese	  perception	  and	  behavior	  in	  social	  interaction,	  it	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	  many	   social	   and	   political	  movements	   aimed	   at	  making	   fundamental	  changes	   in	   mainland	   Chinese	   society	   have	   not	   worked’.	   Moreover,	   Chinese	   people	   are	   not	  subject	   to	  the	   same	   pressure	   to	   ensure	   consistency	   between	   one’s	   inner	   beliefs	   and	   one’s	  external	   behaviour	   as	   Westerners	   (Hiniker,	   1969).	   For	   the	   Chinese,	   the	   maintenance	   or	  manipulation	  of	  such	  a	  discrepancy	  is	  just	  a	  rational	  way	  of	  life,	  which	  can	  bring	  about	  not	  only	  interpersonal	  harmony	  but	  also	  help	  achieve	  practical	  interests.	  As	  long	  as	  surface	  conformity	  can	   fulfil	   the	   task	   of	   promoting	   and	   maintaining	   relationships	   (especially	   hierarchal	  relationships),	  there	  is	  no	  moral	  or	  psychological	  pressure.	  	  
For	  example,	  once	  my	  father	  took	  me	  to	  a	  dinner	  with	  his	  friends.	  During	  the	  dinner,	  he	  and	  his	  friends	   discussed	   a	   controversial	   domestic	   political	   issue.	   I	   agreed	   with	   his	   friend	   and	   also	  presented	   a	   ‘challenging’	   opinion.	   At	   that	  moment,	  my	   father	   kept	   silent,	   but	   on	   leaving	   the	  dinner,	  he	  got	  angry	  with	  me:	   ‘Do	  you	  realise	  you	  make	  me	   lose	   face?	  We	  are	   father	  and	  son	  and,	  undoubtedly,	  should	  be	  in	  the	  same	  camp.	  You	  can	  have	  your	  own	  ideas	  in	  your	  heart,	  but	  in	  front	  of	  others	  you	  should	  stay	  on	  my	  side.	  If	  you	  cannot,	  at	  least	  keep	  quiet!’	  Fei	  Xiaotong	  (2005,	   p.	   116)	   notes	   that	   the	   ‘Chinese	   face	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   superficial	   obedience…	   Name	   and	  substance,	   speech	  and	  practice,	  discourse	  and	   thing,	   theory	  and	  reality,	  all	   can	  be	  separated’.	  Obviously,	  what	  my	  father	  required	  was	  merely	  ‘superficial	  obedience’	  in	  that	  situation	  rather	  than	   the	   actual	   acknowledgement	   of	   his	   viewpoint.	   I	   did	   fail	   to	   do	   what	   Fei	   says	   (Ibid.)—conform	  to	  my	  parent’s	  will	  while	  maintaining	  individual	  duplicity.	  	  
	   127	  
It	  follows	  that	  in	  interpersonal	  communication,	  Chinese	  people	  generally	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  more	  possible	   to	  establish	  and	  maintain	  a	  good	  relationship	  with	  those	  who	  are	  similar	   to	  them	  in	  some	  aspects.	  Concretely,	  similarity	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  helpful	  for	  ‘(1)	  establishing	  or	  enhancing	  interpersonal	   harmony;	   (2)	   preventing	   conflicts	   or	   reducing	   harmony-­‐‑threatening	   activities’	  (Wei	  &	  Li,	  2013,	  p.	  62).	  There	  are	  many	  popular	  Chinese	  idioms	  revealing	  this	  preference:	  one	  essential	  condition	  of	  becoming	  friends	  should	  be	  ‘cherish[ing]	  the	  same	  ideals	  and	  follow[ing]	  the	   same	   path	   [Chinese:	   志同道合];	   the	   best	   marriage	   is	   with	   one’s	   own	   kind	   of	   person,	  especially	  ‘from	  an	  equal	  position	  on	  the	  social	  ladder	  [Chinese:	  门当户对].	  When	  two	  Chinese	  lovers	   have	   to	   separate	   or	   end	   a	   marriage,	   the	   most	   commonly	   blamed	   reason	   (or,	   maybe,	  excuse)	  is	  that	  ‘we	  two	  have	  different	  personalities’	  [Chinese:	  个性不合].	  For	  most	  people,	  this	  difference	   could	   justify	   any	   interpersonal	   clashes	   as	   well	   as	   the	   decision	   to	   end	   their	  relationship.	  The	   ‘fellow	  complex’	  mentioned	  above	   is	   also	   a	   reflection	  of	   this	  mentality.	   Just	  because	  two	  persons	  are	  from	  the	  same	  or	  nearby	  places,	  the	  Chinese	  conclude	  that	  this	  point	  of	   similarity	   means	   that	   they	   must	   have	   a	   lot	   more	   in	   common	   (especially	   dietary	   habits,	  characteristics	  and	  temperament	  and	  are	  therefore	  more	  likely	  to	  establish	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  each	  other.	  	  
This	   study	   believes	   that	   the	   Chinese	   rely	   on	   interpersonal	   similarities	   when	   engaging	   in	  facework;	   in	  other	  words,	   face	  can	  be	  gained	  and	  saved	  more	  easily	  by	  seeking	  similarities	  in	  others	  or,	  perhaps,	  by	  becoming	  similar	  to	  others	  (see	  more	  in	  Section	  3.7.2).	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3.6	  Models	  of	  Chinese	  Facework:	  Dependence	  on	  Self-­‐‑Presentation	  to	  Relationship	  
Based	  on	  deep-­‐‑rooted	  Chinese	   cultural	  origins	  and	  many	  comparisons	  between	  Western	  and	  Eastern	  behavioural	  tendencies,	  I	  present	  in	  Figures	  3.3	  and	  3.4	  two	  models	  of	  facework41—the	  Western	  and	  the	  Chinese	  models	  of	  facework.	  The	  two	  models	  are	  based	  on	  a	  generalisation	  the	  cultural	   tendencies	   and	   behaviours	   of	   these	   two	   regions.	   They	   certainly	   cannot	   cover	   every	  individual	  case;	  they	  serve	  to	  show	  an	  overall	   trend	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  from	  these	  two	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  
	  
Figure	  3.3	  The	  Western	  Model	  of	  Facework	  
	  
Figure	  3.4.	  The	  Chinese	  model	  of	  facework.	  	  
The	  dotted	  line	  represents	  a	  non-­‐‑essential	  step;	  the	  solid	  line	  represents	  an	  essential	  step.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  The	  two	  models	  are	  based	  on	  a	  generalisation	  of	  the	  cultural	  tendencies	  and	  behaviours	  of	  these	  two	  regions.	  They	  certainly	  cannot	  cover	  every	  individual	  case	  but	  can	  show	  an	  overall	  trend	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  people.	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The	   two	   graphs	   reveal	   the	   basic	   difference	   between	   facework	   or	   the	   struggle	   for	   social	  recognition	  between	  China	  and	  the	  West:	  in	  the	  West,	  facework	  is	  largely	  determined	  by	  one’s	  own	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	   others;	   in	   China,	   facework	   largely	   relies	   on	   self-­‐‑expression	   in	   a	  relationship.	   In	   fact,	   it	   can	   be	   seen	   that	   many	   scholars	   have	   previously	   demonstrated	   this	  cultural	  disparity.	  Chang	  and	  Holt	  (1994,	  pp.	  126-­‐‑127)	  claim,	  
[The]	  Western	  understanding	  of	   facework	   is	  very	  much	   influenced	  by	   the	   idea	  of	  impression	   management,	   reflecting	   the	   dominant	   individualistic	   value	  characteristics	   of	   Western	   cultures.	   This	   can	   be	   contrasted	   with	   the	   Chinese	  conception	  of	  face	  which	  places	  more	  emphasis	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship.	  	  
The	  Western	  model	  essentially	  reflects	  the	  notion	  of	  individualism,	  namely,	  ‘a	  conception	  of	  the	  self	  as	  an	  autonomous,	   independent,	  and	  unique	  person’	   (Markus	  &	  Kitayama,	  1991,	  p.	  224).	  The	  gain	  or	  loss	  of	  face	  is	  primarily	  the	  result	  of	  a	  person’s	  individual	  behaviours	  or	  qualities,	  and	  facework	  should	  aim	  ‘to	  satisfy	  others’	  expectations’	  first.	  As	  Lu	  (2014,	  pp.	  510-­‐‑511)	  notes,	  ‘under	   the	   influence	   of	   individualism,	   westerners	   tend	   to	   achieve	   recognition	   of	   self-­‐‑image	  through	   autonomous	   behavior,	   self-­‐‑realization	   and	   personal	   development.	   The	   concept	   of	  equality	   is	  throughout	  various	  kinds	  of	  social	  relations,	  and	  all	   the	  aspects	   in	  facework,	  more	  often,	  are	  on	  an	  equal	  footing’.	  
On	   China’s	   part,	   a	   greater	   emphasis	   is	   placed	   on	   relationships	   among	   individuals	   than	   on	  individuals	  themselves.	  The	  core	  cultural	  norm	  of	  facework	  aims	  to	  achieve,	  foster	  and	  present	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interdependence	   with	   one’s	   audience	   (Kim	   &	   Nam,	   1998,	   p.	   526).	   Simply	   put,	   when	   a	  relationship	  is	  dealt	  with	  well,	  face	  would	  be	  in	  place.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  model	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  Chinese	  people	  ignore	  the	  role	  of	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  others.	  For	  the	  Chinese,	  if	  a	  person	   has	   good	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	   others	   but	   fails	   to	   shape	   or	   maintain	   a	   favourable	  relationship	  with	  his	  or	  her	  audience,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  gain	  a	  fully-­‐‑recognised	  and	  long-­‐‑sustained	  face,	  and	  even	  the	  face	  gained	  is	  very	  vulnerable	  and	  can	  be	  easily	  lost.	  However,	  if	  a	  person	  has	  unsuccessful	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	   others	   but	   successful	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	   relationship,	   it	   is	  still	  highly	  possible	  that	  he	  or	  she	  can	  gain	  face.	  	  
With	  regard	  to	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship	  in	  China,	  this	  thesis	  proposes	  the	  following	  two	  behavioural	  patterns	  of	  Chinese	  face	  culture:	  	  
Behavioural	  pattern	  I:	  Chinese	  face	  culture	  encourages	  people	  to	  show	  superiority	  when	  seeking	  recognition.	  
Behavioural	  pattern	   II:	  When	  one	  perceives	  oneself	   at	   the	   same	  or	   at	   an	   inferior	  status	  in	  an	  interaction,	  one	  tends	  to	  present	  oneself	  as	  an	  acquaintance,	  as	  a	  weak	  and	  as	  a	  counterpart	  in	  order	  to	  seek	  recognition.	  	  
The	  above	  arguments	  can	  be	  depicted	  as	  the	  flow	  chart	  presented	  in	  Figure	  3.5:	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Figure	  3.5.	  Chinese	  behavioural	  patterns	  of	  self-­‐‑presentation	  in	  relationships	  
Figure	   3.5	   shows	   that	   the	   first	   step	   in	   presentation	   in	   a	   relationship	   is	   ‘status	   judgment’,	   in	  which	   a	   person	   determines	   his	   or	   her	   own	   status	   compared	  with	   the	   other	   party.	   After	   this	  step,	  he	  or	  she	  can	  adopt	  different	  behavioural	  patterns	  or	  project	  a	  specific	  identity	  to	  seek	  or	  save	   face.	  The	  author	  believes	   that	  both	  behavioural	  patterns	  and	  relevant	   identities	  embody	  the	  cultural	  origins	  of	   face	  culture,	  coexist	  remarkably	   in	  Chinese	  facework	  and	  are	  verifiable	  through	  empirical	  research.	  Certainly,	  these	  two	  patterns	  also	  fully	  reflect	  the	  characteristics	  of	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship	  i.e.	  seeking	  recognition	  by	  taking	  the	  initiative	  to	  define,	  and	  make	  the	  relationship	  more	  intimate.	  	  	  
	  
3.7	  Two	  Behavioural	  Patterns	  
3.7.1	  Behavioural	  pattern	  I:	  Showing	  superiority	  
Behavioural	  pattern	  I:	  Chinese	  face	  culture	  encourages	  people	  to	  show	  superiority	  when	  seeking	  recognition.	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Behavioural	   pattern	   I	   can	   be	   intuited	   immediately	   by	   most	   people	   aware	   of	   Chinese	   face	  culture.	   Specifically,	   a	   person,	   no	  matter	   what	   position	   he	   or	   she	   occupies	   in	   an	   interaction	  (superior	  or	  inferior),	  always	  endeavours	  to	  highlight	  or	  even	  exaggerate	  his	  or	  her	  superiority.	  Such	   behaviour	   is	   expected	   to	   help	   confirm,	   magnify	   or	   balance	   the	   asymmetry	   of	   the	  relationship	  so	  that	  face	  can	  be	  gained	  or	  saved.	  	  	  
In	   Chinese	   society,	   superiors	   are	   endowed	   with	   the	   legitimacy	   to	   gain	   face	   from	   their	  subordinates,	  and	  subordinates	  generally	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  their	  duty	  as	  well	  as	  a	  virtue	  to	  give	  face	   to	   superiors,	   no	  matter	  what	   kind	  of	   self-­‐‑presentation	   they	   engage	   in	  with	   others	   (Lim,	  1994,	   p.	   219;	   Chang	  &	  Holtt,	   1994,	   p.	   119;	  Wei	   &	   Li,	   2013,	   p.	   64).	   In	   this	   sense,	   face	   is	   the	  primary	  Chinese	  social	   ideology	   that	   legitimatises	  pre-­‐‑existing	  hierarchical	  rectitude.	  As	  seen	  in	  Figure	  3.5,	  when	  a	  person	  is	  in	  the	  superior	  status	  during	  an	  interaction,	  he	  or	  she	  just	  needs	  to	  show	  the	  superiority,	  the	  claimed	  face	  can	  be	  acknowledged	  or	  saved	  automatically.	  	  
Moreover,	   the	   cultural	   norm	   is	   that	   ‘the	  higher	   the	   relative	  position	   one	   occupies,	   the	   better	  one’s	  ability	  to	  claim	  face’	  (Chang	  &	  Holtt,	  1994,	  p.	  119).	  Hwang	  regards	  this	  behavioural	  model	  as	  Chinese	   ‘procedural	   justice’	   (Hwang,	  2011,	  p.	  99).	  What	  needs	  to	  be	  added	   is	   that	  Chinese	  people	  also	  emphasise	  compliance	  with	  the	  rule	  of	  renqing	  i.e.	  the	  superior	  should	  also	  express	  their	   concern	   about	   the	   subordinate’s	   face-­‐‑wants.	   Only	   through	   this	   and	   by	   following	   the	  principle	  of	  reciprocity	  can	  the	  superior	  maintain	  face.	  
An	  equal	  or	   inferior	  person	   in	  an	   interaction	  can	  still	  emphasise	  or	  even	  overstate	  his	  or	  her	  importance,	  value	  and	  status.	  Such	  behaviours	  are	  obviously	  aimed	  to	  forge	  a	  sense	  of	  balance	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or	  closeness	  in	  the	  relationship,	  to	  draw	  the	  other’s	  attention,	  to	  change	  the	  existing	  cognition	  of	  their	  relational	  asymmetry	  and	  to	  seek	  recognition.	  Most	  often,	  such	  efforts	  do	  not	  alter	  the	  superior-­‐‑inferior	  distribution	  in	  a	  relationship,	  but	  it	  is	  indeed	  possible	  to	  reduce	  the	  perceived	  disparity	  of	  rank	  and	  to	  refresh	  the	  interactants’	  understanding	  of	  their	  relationship.	  
In	   social	   life,	   there	   are	   a	   variety	   of	   concrete	   methods	   to	   show	   (off)	   a	   person’s	   superiority,	  including	  adherence	  to	  a	  hierarchical	  system,	  employing	  a	  discursive	  strategy	  to	  flaunt	  oneself,	  conspicuous	  consumption,	  certain	  ritualised	  behaviours	  etc.	  Certainly,	   these	  behaviours	  must	  not	  be	  exclusive	  to	  the	  Chinese.	  
	  
3.7.2	  Behavioural	  pattern	  II:	  Present	  as	  acquaintance,	  weak	  and	  counterpart	  
Behavioural	  pattern	   II:	  When	  one	  perceives	  oneself	   at	   the	   same	  or	   at	   an	   inferior	  status	  in	  an	  interaction,	  one	  tends	  to	  present	  oneself	  as	  an	  acquaintance,	  as	  a	  weak	  and	  as	  a	  counterpart	  in	  order	  to	  seek	  recognition.	  
This	   pattern	   reveals	   an	   alternate	   behavioural	   strategy	   that	   is	   usually	   adopted	   by	   Chinese	  people	   but	   easily	   overlooked	   by	   observers.	  When	   engaging	   in	   facework,	   when	   one	   is	   at	   the	  same	  or	  at	  an	  inferior	  status	  compared	  with	  one’s	  audience,	  one	  tends	  to	  show	  some	  arresting	  identities	  to	  construct/reconstruct	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  relationship.	  	  
Having	   uncovered	   the	   cultural	   origins	   of	   Chinese	   face	   culture,	   this	   thesis	   proposes	   three	  relational	  identities	  that	  dominate	  Chinese	  self-­‐‑presentation	  in	  relationships	  when	  engaging	  in	  facework,	   especially	  when	   the	  actor’s	   status	   is	   inferior	   to	   the	  other’s.	  Chinese	  people	  believe	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that	  public	  image	  and	  behaviour	  derived	  from	  these	  three	  identities	  could	  effectively	  close	  the	  gap	  between	  them	  and	  those	  who	  are	  superior	  to	  them,	  can	  help	  cultivate	  a	  good	  relationship	  and,	  finally,	  help	  one	  gain	  face	  as	  expected.	  Three	  points	  should	  be	  noted	  here:	  	  
1)	  All	  of	  these	  identities	  are	  not	  necessarily	  based	  on	  one’s	  actual	  power	  or	  status	  and	  are	  sometimes	  only	  based	  on	  one’s	  preferences	  regarding	  or	  expectations	  from	  the	  relationship.	  	  
2)	   These	   three	   identity	   preferences	   all	   embody	   the	   rule	   of	   renqing,	   namely,	  presuming	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  empathy	  and	  reciprocity	  prevail	  in	  all	  humans.	  
3)	  Many	   behaviours	   stemming	   from	   these	   three	   identities	   are	   in	   fact	   only	   ‘front	  stage	   behaviours’,	   as	   Goffman	   (1959)	   proposed,	   only	   intended	   to	   create	   specific	  impressions	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  others	  and	  with	  a	  distinct	  dramatic	  colour.	  
	  
The	  acquaintance	  [熟人].	  
‘For	  the	  acquaintance’s	  face,	  just	  give	  you/me	  a	  face.’	  
This	  common	  Chinese	  saying	  shows	  that	  the	  identity	  of	  an	  acquaintance	  is	  a	  useful	  ‘voucher’	  to	  exchange	  and	  gain	  face.	  According	  to	  renqing,	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  face	  of	  another	  is	  in	  effect	  the	  distribution	  of	  renqing	  to	  the	  other.	  As	  one	  should	  give	  more	  renqing	  to	  those	  with	  whom	  one	  is	  more	   intimate	   (even	   only	   nominally),	   it	   is	   logical	   and	   appropriate	   to	   actively	   give	   face	   to	  acquaintances.	   Just	  as	  Hsiang	   (1974,	  p.	  103]	  observes,	   ‘there	   is	  no	  way	   to	   talk	  about	  renqing	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between	  strangers.	  To	  work	  for	  our	  acquaintances,	  to	  give	  them	  face,	  and	  to	  make	  them	  happy,	  is	   so-­‐‑called	   renqing’.	   In	   other	  words,	   if	   one	   cannot	   be	   categorised	   as	   an	   acquaintance,	   there	  must	  be	  little	  to	  no	  renqing	  involved,	  and	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  for	  one	  to	  claim	  face	  in	  the	  presence	  this	  person.	  
In	   English,	   acquaintance	   refers	   to	   a	   relationship	   less	   intimate	   than	   friendship.	   In	   Chinese,	  
acquaintance	   or	   熟人[shuren]	   literally	   means	   familiar	   person,	   which	   can	   be	   applicable	   for	  anyone	  you	  want	  to	  bring	  into	  your	  own	  circle	  and	  to	  indicate	  intimacy	  with.	  For	  the	  Chinese,	  a	  family	  member,	  a	  lover,	  a	  friend,	  a	  colleague,	  a	  classmate	  and	  all	  of	  one’s	  fellow	  townsmen	  can	  be	   regarded	   as	   acquaintances.	   Even	   two	   persons	  who	   have	  met	   only	   once	   can	   refer	   to	   each	  other	  as	  ‘an	  acquaintance’	  to	  others	  or	  when	  meeting	  for	  the	  second	  time.	  
Based	  on	  Fei	  Xiaotong’s	   theory	  of	  Manners	  of	  Different	  Orders,	   sociologist	  Ye	  Zhengtao	   (2013,	  pp.	  370-­‐‑371)	  proposes	  the	  concept	  of	  Chinese	  individual	  social	  network.	  There	  are	  two	  kinds	  of	  complementary	   social	   categories	   that	   have	   a	   distinct	   effect	   on	   Chinese	   pragmatic	   acts	   and	  interactional	  styles:	  One	  is	  the	  pair	  生人[stranger]	  and	  熟人[acquaintance],	  and	  the	  other	  is	  the	  pair	   自己人[insider]	   and	   外人[outsider].	   As	   shown	   in	   Figure	   3.6,	   the	   Insider	   category	  constitutes	   the	   central	   figure’s	   immediate	   inner	   circle,	   Acquaintance	   constitutes	   the	   next	  intermediate	  ring	  and	  Stranger	  occupies	  the	  outer	  or	  peripheral	  circle	  and	  is	  farthest	  from	  the	  central	  figure.	  By	  default,	  one’s	  kin	  (particularly	  those	  with	  whom	  one	  has	  a	  blood	  relationship)	  are	  regarded	  as	   Insiders	  and	  non-­‐‑kin	  as	  Outsiders.	  Consequently,	  outside	  one’s	   family,	  one	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  either	  a	  stranger	  or	  an	  acquaintance	  to	  the	  central	  figure.	  It	  can	  be	  found	  that	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  Chinese	  relation	  network	  are	  highly	  elastic	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  can	  be	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Figure	  3.6.	  Chinese	  social	  categories	  (Ye,	  2013,	  p.	  371)	  
This	   may	   seem	   to	   be	   a	   paradox	   to	   many	   foreigners.42	  These	   categorisations	   intentionally	  maintain	  relational	  ambiguity	  and	  flexibility.	  Matthyseen	  (2012,	  p.	  94)	  claims,	  ‘on	  the	  one	  hand	  there	   is	   the	   strong	   emphasis	   on	   strict	   hierarchical	   roles	   and	  well-­‐‑defined	   rules	   of	   behaviour	  that	  also	  govern	  how	  people	  of	  different	  status	  within	  their	  relationships	  should	  address	  and	  interact	   with	   one	   another,	   while	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	   is	   the	   Chinese	   verbal	   style	   often	  described	   as	   indirect,	   imprecise	   and	   ambiguous’.	   An	   old	   saying	   goes,	   ‘when	   the	  water	   is	   too	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clear,	   there	   will	   be	   no	   fish;	   when	   people	   are	   too	   scrutinising,	   they	   will	   not	   have	   followers’	  [Chinese:	   水至清则无鱼，人至察则无徒].	   The	   pursuit	   of	   vagueness	   or	   suggestiveness	   is	  necessary	   to	   maintain	   interpersonal	   relationships	   in	   Chinese	   culture—at	   the	   very	   least,	   to	  show	  a	  superficially	  friendly	  attitude	  towards	  others	  while	  also	  leaving	  plenty	  of	  room	  for	  the	  relationship	  to	  develop	  in	  various	  ways.	  
One	  important	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Chinese	  enact	  the	  identity	  of	  an	  acquaintance	  is	  by	  addressing	  others	  using	   intimate	  titles,	   family	  salutations	  and	  other	  terms	  of	  kinship.	  When	  two	  Chinese	  persons	  meet	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   they	  habitually	  ask	  each	  other’s	  age	  and	  then	  call	  each	  other	  ‘Brother’	  [哥/弟]	  or	  ‘Sister’	  [姐/妹]	  if	  they	  are	  younger.	  If	  they	  are	  much	  older,	  it	  is	  common	  to	  address	   this	   person	   as	   ‘Uncle’	  [叔]	   or	   ‘Aunt’	   [姨].	   In	   school	   or	   university,	   upperclassman	   and	  women	  are	  normally	  addressed	  as	   ‘Academic	  senior	  brother’	  [学长/师兄]	  or	   ‘Academic	  senior	  sister’	   [学姐/师姐]	  by	  younger	  students.	  Correspondingly,	   the	  younger	  ones	  are	  addressed	  as	  ‘Academic	  younger	  brother’	  or	  ‘Academic	  younger	  sister’.	  Students	  often	  address	  their	  teachers,	  including	   the	   female	   teachers,	   as	   ‘Academic	   father’	   [师父].	  More	   interestingly,	  male	   teachers’	  wives	  are	  addressed	  as	   ‘Academic	  mother’	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  respect.	  Similar	  rules	  also	  apply	   in	  the	  workplace.	   For	   example,	   I	   worked	   in	   a	   real	   estate	   company	   in	   Beijing	   for	   three	   years.	  Throughout	  my	  time	  there,	  I	  addressed	  my	  direct	  superior—a	  young	  lady	  who	  was	  four	  years	  older	   than	   me—as	   ‘Sister	   Bai	   Yu’.	   When	   I	   had	   been	   there	   three	   years,	   the	   newcomers	   also	  addressed	  me	   as	   ‘Brother	   Rui’	   from	   the	   very	   first	   day	  we	  met.	   In	  my	   own	   experience,	   such	  terms	   indeed	   increase	   intimacy	   among	   colleagues	   in	   a	   short	   period	   of	   time,	   and	   in	   the	   long	  term	   always	   remind	   everyone	   to	   give	   or	   save	   face	   for	   their	  work	   ‘’	   and	   ‘sisters’.	   In	   addition,	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friend,	  partner,	  neighbour	  and	  many	  other	  terms	  of	  endearment	  and	  closeness	  are	  often	  used	  by	  Chinese	  people	  to	  address	  those	  from	  whom	  they	  need	  to	  seek	  face,	  although	  sometimes	  these	  terms	  don’t	  necessarily	  reflect	  the	  actual	  nature	  of	  their	  relationship.	  	  	  
	  
The	  weak	  [弱者].	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  modesty	  constitutes	  an	   important	  cultural	  basis	  of	  Chinese	  face	  culture.	  Undoubtedly,	   modesty	   is	   not	   the	   equivalent	   of	   showing	   weakness	   but	   an	   overemphasis	   on	  modesty	  leads	  to	  the	  weak	  becoming	  accustomed	  to	  this	  thinking	  pattern	  as	  a	  way	  to	  seek	  and	  save	  face.	  	  
The	  representation	  of	  ‘the	  weak’	  in	  Chinese	  society	  first	  of	  all	  manifests	  as	  ‘being	  proactive	  to	  expose	  my	  limitations’	  (Lee,	  et	  al.,	  2014,	  p.	  318).	  The	  implied	  logic	  behind	  this	  behaviour	  is	  that	  ‘as	  one	  cannot	  evaluate	  his	  or	  her	  strength	  correctly	  and	  also	  cannot	  predict	  the	  consequence	  of	  action	  correctly	  in	  communication,	  it	  must	  be	  a	  wise	  move	  to	  demean	  oneself	  firstly.	  In	  this	  way,	   one	   can	   lower	   others’	   expectations	   of	   him/herself,	   meanwhile	   establishing	   a	   humble	  image	  to	  gain	  more	  praise’	  (Lu,	  2014,	  p.	  510).	  In	  this	  sense,	  Chinese	  facework	  is	  sometimes	  a	  kind	   of	   bi-­‐‑directional	   mental	   activity	   and	   behaviour,	   in	   which	   Chinese	   people	   conceal	  themselves	  while	  also	  showing	  themselves	  off.	  
A	  typical	  case	  is	  as	  follows:	  The	  Chinese	  will	  often	  invite	  their	  friends	  home	  for	  dinner.	  When	  having	  dinner	  with	  a	  Chinese	  family,	  you	  will	  find	  that	  the	  host	  always	  says	  things	  like,	  ‘We	  are	  sorry	   for	   not	   preparing	   good	   food	   today.	   Hope	   you	   don’t	  mind’,	   or,	   ‘My	   cooking	   is	   very	   bad.	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Please	  forgive	  me	  and	  give	  me	  face	  by	  having	  some’,	  even	  if	  in	  reality	  you	  have	  been	  offered	  a	  lot	  of	   delicious	   food.	   Such	   sayings	   have	   seemed	   to	   become	   a	   ritual	   configuration	   for	   all	   Chinese	  hosts	  at	  such	  occasions.	  The	  goal	  of	  promoting	  and	  protecting	  face	  by	  saying	  such	  things	  is	  very	  clear:	   if	   the	  banquet	   is	  very	  good	  and	  meets	   the	  guest’s	  expectations,	   the	  hosts	  will	   certainly	  receive	  more	  praise	  and	  face	  not	  only	  for	  their	  cooking	  but	  also	  for	  their	  virtue	  of	  humility;	  if	  the	   food	   is	   indeed	   bad	   or	   is	   not	   as	   per	   the	   guest’s	   taste,	   since	   the	   host	   has	   already	  acknowledged	  its	  weakness,	   the	  guest	  will	  not	  have	  the	  heart	  to	  complain	  and	  make	  the	  host	  lose	   face.	   A	   similar	   practice	   can	   be	   seen	   when	   Chinese	   people	   need	   to	   give	   a	   public	  performance.	  The	  performer	  will	  often	  say	  things	  like,	   ‘Just	  show	  my	  incompetence’	  [Chinese:	  
献丑]	   at	   the	   start	   and	   ‘Please	   do	   not	   laugh	   at	   my	   performance’	   [Chinese:	  见笑]	   at	   the	   end.	  Another	  behavioural	  trend	  of	  the	  weak,	  which	  has	  been	  mentioned	  in	  Section	  3.5.4,	  is	  to	  extol	  others	   while	   demeaning	   oneself.	   My	   own	   experience	   mentioned	   in	   Section	   3.5.4	   has	   fully	  demonstrated	  this	  behavioural	  model.	  
In	  addition,	  giving	  a	  rejection	  response	  in	  response	  to	  a	  compliment	  is	  another	  common	  way	  in	  which	   the	   Chinese	   show	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   weak.	   In	   fact,	   from	   the	   Western	   academic	  perspective,	  such	  behaviour	  is	  mostly	  meaningless,	  as	  disagreeing	  with	  the	  complimenter	  will	  inevitably	  threaten	  both	  sides’	  face	  needs	  (Brown	  &	  Levison,	  1987,	  p.	  178).	  Conversely,	  for	  the	  Chinese,	   this	   behaviour	   is	   not	   a	   real	   rejection	   of	   the	   compliment	   but	   only	   a	   performance	   of	  humility	  and	  self-­‐‑abasement	   in	  order	   to	  abide	  by	  cultural	  norms.	   In	   this	  way,	   complimentees	  can	  receive	  greater	  acknowledgement	  by	  demonstrating	  their	  knowledge	  of	  Chinese	  face,	  and	  complimenters	   feel	   their	   face	  has	  been	  enhanced	  as	   they	   recognise	   that	   the	  complimentee	   is	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being	  polite	  and	  respectful	   (Yu,	  2003,	  p.	  1702).	  A	   typical	  example	  of	   this	  behaviour	  has	  been	  presented	  in	  Section	  3.5.4.	  
	  
The	  counterpart	  [同类].	  
Based	   on	   the	   culture	   of	   conformity,	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   counterpart	   is	   salient	   in	   Chinese	  facework.	  Counterpart	   here	   refers	   to	   a	  person	  having	   the	   same	   function	  or	   characteristics	   as	  another.	   Just	   like	   the	   conceptualisation	   of	   acquaintance,	   the	   Chinese	   understanding	   of	  
counterpart	  is	  very	  broad	  and	  ambiguous.	   In	  daily	   life,	  any	  common	  point	  between	  or	  among	  two	  or	  more	  people	   can	   become	   the	   basis	   for	   a	   sense	   of	   identification	   and	   similarity,	  which	  then	  becomes	  a	  reliable	  foundation	  for	  relational	  improvement	  and	  face-­‐‑giving	  behaviour.	  The	  implied	   behavioural	   logic	   of	   adopting	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   counterpart	   is	   that	   because	  we	   are	  similar	  (or	  the	  same),	  giving	  me	  face	  is	  the	  same	  as	  giving	  face	  to	  yourself,	  and	  making	  me	  lose	  face	  is	  equivalent	  to	  making	  yourself	  lose	  face.	  
Fellow	  is	  a	  typical	  example	  of	  this	  in	  Chinese	  society.	  Fellow	  [Chinese:	  同乡/老乡]	  is	  a	  term	  that	  describes	   someone	   who	   comes	   from	   the	   same	   place	   as	   you	   and	   can	   also	   be	   termed	   fellow-­‐‑
townsman	  or	   fellow-­‐‑villager	   in	   English.	   The	   Chinese	  generally	  believe	   that	  human	  beings	   are	  shaped	  by	  the	  environment	  in	  which	  they	  grew	  up	  and	  live	  in.43	  Consequently,	  persons	  from	  the	  same	   place	   must	   have	   a	   lot	   in	   common	   and	   deserve	   each	   other’s	   trust	   and	   recognition,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  This	  idea	  is	  particularly	  reflected	  in	  the	  following	  well-­‐‑known	  Chinese	  proverb:	  ‘The	  unique	  features	  of	  a	  local	  environment	  always	  give	  special	  characteristics	  to	  its	  inhabitants’	  [Chinese:	  一方水土养一方人].	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especially	   when	   meeting	   outside	   their	   hometown.	   Usually,	   in	   the	   first	   such	   meeting,	   ‘the	  Chinese	  may	   start	   establishing	   a	   connection	  with	   a	   stranger	   by	   seeking	   information	   of	   their	  township’	  (Wei	  &	  Li,	  2013,	  p.	  65).	  When	  they	  discover	  that	  the	  other	  person	  is	  from	  the	  same	  place	   (village,	   town,	   city	   or	   province),	   the	   relationship	   of	   fellows	   will	   be	   immediately	  established	  and	  facework	  will	  also	  become	  easier.	  In	  Chinese	  universities,	  there	  are	  many	  such	  
fellow-­‐‑townsman	  organisations,	  most	  of	  which	  operate	  at	  the	  provincial	   level.44	  Students	  often	  seek	  help	  from,	  organise	  entertainment	  activities	  with	  and	  find	  jobs	  through	  their	  fellow	  clubs,	  and	   relationships	   established	   in	   these	   campus	   organisations	   can	   continue	   long	   after	  graduation.	  	  
Throughout	   history,	   any	   nation	   that	   has	   identified	   with	   Confucianism	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	  similar	   to	   China.	   Even	   today,	   many	   Chinese	   people	   in	   China	   are	   somewhat	   obsessed	   with	  Singapore,	  whose	   largest	   ethnic	   group	   comprises	   ethnic	   Chinese	  who	  believe	   that	   Singapore	  should	  always	  be	  on	  China’s	  side	  and	  give	  face	  to	  the	  country	  automatically,	  just	  because	  it	  has	  the	  same	  origin.	  	  
One	  way	  to	   identify	  someone	  as	  a	  counterpart	   is	   to	  begin	  by	  seeking	  and	  highlighting	  shared	  traits	   and	   similarities.	   This	   is	   in	   fact	   a	  widely	   adopted	  method	   of	   communication	   in	   human	  society.	   The	   other	   main	   way	   to	   do	   so	   is	   to	   conceal	   one’s	   personality	   or	   ideas.	   ‘Hiding	  personality	   and	   not	   highlighting	   individual	   differences	   is	   the	   core	   behaviour	   of	   Chinese	  conformity’	   (Di,	   2006,	   p.	   81).	   For	   the	   Chinese,	   this	   method,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   reduces	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  There	  are	  23	  provinces,	   five	  ethnic	  autonomous	  regions,	   four	  municipalities	  and	  two	  special	  administrative	  regions	  (Hong	  Kong	  and	  Macao)	  in	  the	  current	  PRC.	  All	  of	  them	  are	  provincial-­‐‑level	  administrative	  units.	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possibility	  of	  contradiction	  or	  conflict	  as	  well	  as	  the	  possibility	  of	   losing	  face.	  For	  example,	   in	  Chinese	   schools	   and	   universities,	   students	   seldom	   question	   their	   teachers	   or	   schoolmates	  directly	  even	  when	  they	  disagree	  with	  what	  they	  are	  told	  in	  class.	  As	  a	  Chinese	  student	  myself,	  I	  believe	  that	  if	  the	  other	  students	  have	  no	  problem	  and	  only	  I	  stand	  up	  to	  ask	  questions,	  it	  will	  make	  me	  seem	  too	  special,	  aggressive	  or	  even	  annoying.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	   facework,	  a	  directly	  posed	  question	  can	  make	  a	  teacher	  lose	  face	  if	  he	  or	  she	  does	  not	  have	  a	  good	  answer.	  Also,	  if	  the	  question	  itself	  is	  ‘stupid’	  or	  boring,	  it	  will	  also	  make	  the	  student	  asking	  the	  question	  lose	   face.	   At	   least	   on	   the	   surface,	   keeping	   silent	   can	   be	   a	   way	   of	   showing	   respect	   and	  identification	   to	   others,	   which	   is	   believed	   to	   maintain	   the	   face	   of	   everyone	   involved.	  Consequently,	  from	  an	  early	  age,	  Chinese	  people	  realise	  that	  it	  is	  better	  to	  ‘work	  under	  the	  table	  to	  exchange	  less-­‐‑than-­‐‑kind	  messages’	  (Chang,	  2001,	  p.	  159).	  	  
	  
3.8	  Core	  Assumptions	  of	  this	  Study	  
The	   discussion	   in	   Chapter	   3	   has	   revealed	   that	   face	   culture	   constitutes	   a	   kind	   of	   behavioural	  logic	  and	  moral	  reference	  for	  the	  Chinese	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  gain	  social	  recognition.	  The	  three	  key	  points	  mentioned	  below	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter:	  
l   Face	  refers	  to	  the	  public	  image	  that	  a	  person	  claims	  for	  him/herself	  and	  is	  also	  recognised	  by	  others.	  
l   Face	  is	  a	  collective	  rather	  than	  individual	  concept	  for	  the	  Chinese.	  	  
l   Chinese	   people	   emphasise	   the	   role	   of	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	   relationship	   in	   gaining	   and	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saving	  face.	  This	  manifests	  through	  two	  common	  behavioural	  patterns:	  
Ø   Behavioural	   pattern	   I:	   Chinese	   face	   culture	   encourages	  people	   to	   show	   superiority	  when	  seeking	  recognition.	  
Ø   Behavioural	   pattern	   II:	  When	  one	  perceives	   oneself	   as	   having	   the	   same	  or	   inferior	  status	  in	  an	  interaction,	  one	  tends	  to	  present	  oneself	  as	  an	  acquaintance,	  as	  a	  weak	  and	  as	  a	  counterpart	  in	  order	  to	  seek	  recognition.	  	  
Many	  studies	  from	  the	  field	  of	  social	  psychology	  have	  revealed	  that	  face	  is	  a	  universal	  theme	  of	  Chinese	  organisational	  behaviour	  or	  group	  activity	  (e.g.	  Ting-­‐‑Toomy,	  1994;	  Lee,	  1998;	  Chen	  &	  Farth,	  2010).	  Anecdotal	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  facework	  is	  a	  powerful	  consideration	  even	  for	  powerful	  Chinese	  decision-­‐‑makers	  (Kim	  &	  Nam,	  1998,	  p.	  522).	  Consequently,	  China	  as	  a	  state	  is	  surely	  worthy	  of	  being	  the	  object	  of	  research	  with	  regard	  to	   its	   face	  culture.	  State	  here	   is	  not	  only	   ‘a	   political	   community	   characterised	   by	   a	   particular	   culture’	   but	   also	   ‘a	   political	  community	   by	   virtue	   of	   its	   possession	   of	   a	   particular	   culture’	   (Lawson,	   2006,	   p.	   3).	   In	   this	  sense,	  China’s	  face	  diplomacy	  is	  virtually	  ‘giving	  expression	  externally	  to	  the	  same	  principles	  of	  social	  and	  political	  order	  that	  are	  manifested	  internally	  within	  Chinese	  society’	  (Liao,	  2013,	  p.	  44).	   In	   sum,	   the	   behavioural	   model	   at	   the	   personal	   level	   can	   be	   used	   to	   understand	   the	  behaviour	  at	  the	  level	  of	  state.	  
In	  this	  research,	  the	  two	  behaviour	  patterns	  mentioned	  above	  have	  been	  extrapolated	  to	  arrive	  at	   the	   following	   two	   assumptions	   about	   China’s	   diplomatic	   behaviours	   aimed	   at	   achieving	  international	  recognition:	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Ø   Behavioural	   pattern	   I:	   Chinese	   face	   culture	   encourages	  people	   to	   show	   superiority	  when	  seeking	  recognition.	  
Ø   Behavioural	  pattern	  II:	  When	  China	  perceives	  itself	  as	  being	  an	  equal	  or	  inferior	  in	  an	  interaction,	   it	   tends	   to	   present	   itself	   as	   an	   acquaintance,	   as	   a	   weak	   and	   as	   a	  counterpart	  in	  order	  to	  seek	  international	  recognition.	  	  
According	  to	  the	  theoretical	  analysis	  framework	  introduced	  in	  Section	  2.5.2,	  these	  assumptions	  can	  be	  depicted	  in	  terms	  of	  role	  theory.	  	  
This	  study	  aims	  to	  further	  investigate	  to	  what	  degree	  and	  how	  face	  culture	  as	  a	  source	  of	  role	  conception	   has	   translated	   into	   China’s	   role	   performances	   in	   its	   diplomatic	   discourse	   and	  observable	  actions.	  
	  
Figure	  3.7.	  Theoretical	  framework	  of	  this	  research.	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Chapter	  4	  




‘A	  large	  state	  should	  be	  like	  the	  lower	  reaches	  of	  a	  river,	  	  
with	  the	  frailty	  of	  a	  woman,	  where	  all	  rivers	  meet.’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  —Lao	  Zi	  
	  
It	   is	  generally	  known	   that	  being	   recognised	  as	  a	   ‘major	  power’	   is	  very	   important	   to	   the	  PRC.	  Whenever	  Chinese	  authorities	  pursue	  such	  recognition	  or	  silence	  any	  public	  mentions	  of	  their	  shortcomings	  or	  pour	  considerable	  resources	  into	  creating	  a	  positive	  image,	  a	  major	  motivation	  behind	  such	  actions	  is	  China’s	  traditional	  face	  culture.	  There	  even	  exists	  a	  specific	  term—‘face	  diplomacy’	  [Chinese:	  面子外交]—that	  is	  widely	  mentioned	  in	  academic	  literature	  and	  political	  comments.	   Meanwhile,	   face	   culture	   has	   increasingly	   acquired	   a	   bad	   reputation	   both	  domestically	  and	   internationally,	   as	   it	   is	  often	  blamed	   for	   the	  Chinese	  diplomacy’s	   irrational,	  emotional	  and	  pretentious	  actions.	  	  
The	   cultural	   analysis	   in	   Chapter	   3	   has	   proposed	   that	   there	   are	   two	   behavioural	   models	   of	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Chinese	  facework	  that	  manifest	  as	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship.	  The	  first	  one	  is:	  
Behavioural	  pattern	  I:	  Chinese	  face	  culture	  encourages	  people	  to	  show	  superiority	  when	  seeking	  recognition.	  
In	  this	  study,	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  such	  behavioural	  patterns	  coherently	  exist	  in	  China’s	  diplomatic	  activities:	  
Behavioural	  pattern	  I:	  China	  tends	  to	  perform	  the	  role	  conception	  of	  a	  major	  power	  to	  seek	  international	  recognition.	  
This	  chapter	  will	  explore,	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  face	  culture,	  whether	  and	  how	  China	  presents	  itself	  as	  a	  major	  power	  in	  order	  to	  seek	  international	  recognition.	  According	  to	  the	  theoretical	  framework	   of	   role	   theory,	   this	   chapter	   will	   prove	   whether	  major	   power	   as	   a	   national	   role	  conception	  exists	  in	  China’s	  diplomacy	  in	  its	  search	  for	  international	  recognition.	  What	  kinds	  of	  role	  performance	  in	  terms	  of	  face	  culture	  can	  confirm	  this	  role	  conception?	  It	  is	  a	  self-­‐‑evident	  fact	  that	  China’s	  motivation	  for	  and	  endeavours	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  as	  a	  major	  power	  have	  not	  been	  triggered	  only	  by	  face	  concern.	  This	  means	  that	  an	  investigation	  of	  this	  topic	  should	  take	  into	   account	   other	   factors	   that	   work	   together	   with	   face	   culture	   in	   China’s	   struggle	   for	  recognition.	  
To	  answer	   the	  above	  questions,	   this	   chapter	  proceeds	  as	   follows:	  The	   first	  part	   (Section	  4.1)	  introduces	   the	  research	  method	  of	  meta-­‐‑aggregation	  and	   its	  applications	   in	   this	   chapter.	  The	  second	  part	   (Sections	  4.2,	   4.3	   and	  4.4)	   elaborates	   on	   and	   analyses	  data	   collected	   from	   three	  different	   sources—interviews	   with	   Chinese	   diplomats,	   public	   opinion	   found	   online	   and	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international	  media	  reports.	  The	  third	  part	  (Section	  4.5)	  synthesises	  all	   the	  observations	  and	  opinions	  and	  presents	  some	  clear	  conclusions.	  
	  
4.1	  Research	  Method	  and	  Data	  Sources	  
4.1.1	  Introduction	  of	  Meta-­‐‑aggregation	  
Meta-­‐‑aggregation	   is	   an	   evidence-­‐‑orientated	   qualitative	   approach,	   whose	   aim	   is	   to	   identify,	  critically	  evaluate	  and	  summarise	  all	   the	   research	  materials	   (e.g.	   empirical	  evidence,	   existing	  research,	  interview	  records,	  quantitative	  data	  etc.)	  on	  a	  given	  subject	  (Korhonen,	  et	  al.,	  2013,	  p.	  1027;	  Pearson,	  2004,	  p.	  45).	  This	  method	   is	   ‘inspired	  by	   the	  work	  of	  Charles	  Sanders	  Peirce,	  William	   James	   and	   John	  Dewey,	  who	   developed,	   respectively,	   the	   philosophy	   of	   pragmatism’	  (Hannes	  &	  Pearson,	   2011,	   p.	   2).	   Currently,	   it	   is	   commonly	   employed	   in	  many	   fields	   of	   social	  science,	  especially	  health	  care	  study	  and	  public	  policy	  research.	  
The	  advantages	  of	   this	  method,	  according	  to	  Hannes	  and	  Pearson	  (2011,	  pp.	  2-­‐‑19)	  as	  well	  as	  my	  own	  understanding	  include	  the	  following:	  
Ø   To	   ensure	   that	   qualitative	   research	   follows	   an	   empirical	   path	   and	   to	   reduce	   the	  researcher’s	  subjective	  tendencies	  to	  a	  certain	  extent.	  	  
Ø   To	   integrate	   research	   materials	   from	   different	   sources,	   and	   summarise	   the	   prominent	  features	  of	  the	  research	  object	  by	  balancing	  common	  and	  competing	  findings.	  
Ø   To	  emphasise	  the	  utility	  of	  the	  research	  outcomes	  for	  practitioners	  and	  policy	  makers.	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The	  main	  reason	  I	  adopt	  meta-­‐‑aggregation	  for	  this	  study	  is	  that,	  first,	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  on	  how	   face	   culture	   influences	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   international	   recognition	   needs	   to	   be	  systematically	   reviewed.	   Meta-­‐‑aggregation	   can	   provide	   a	   clear	   and	   balanced	   research	  framework	   for	   dealing	   with	   various	   pieces	   of	   evidence.	   Second,	   the	   wide	   range	   of	  characteristics	  and	  processes	  intrinsic	  in	  China’s	  diplomacy,	  being	  situated	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  analysis,	   justify	   the	   use	   of	   this	   semi-­‐‑ecological	   method	   in	   the	   manifestation	   of	   cultural	  influences.	  Following	   the	   logic	  of	  meta-­‐‑aggregation,	   this	  research	  will	  mainly	   focus	  on	  micro-­‐‑level	   diplomatic	   participants	   and	   observers	   as	   well	   as	   the	   meso-­‐‑level	   acts	   of	   state,	   both	   of	  which	  are	  in	  turn	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  macro-­‐‑level	  social	  context	  associated	  with	  political	  systems	  and	  cultural	  values.	  
Based	   on	   common	   practices,	   the	   basic	   process	   of	   meta-­‐‑aggregation	   can	   be	   divided	   into	   the	  following	  four	  steps	  (Hannes	  &	  Pearson,	  2011;	  Pearson,	  2004):	  
1.   Problem	  statement:	  To	  clarify	  the	  research	  problems.	  
2.   Search	   for	   related	   research	  materials:	   The	   entire	   search	   process	   should	   be	   guided	   by	  formulated	  questions.	  
3.   Critical	  appraisal:	  According	  to	  certain	  inclusion	  standards	  (mainly	  the	  topic’s	  relevance	  and	  the	  outcome	  of	  interest),	  to	  select	  the	  appropriate	  materials	  from	  those	  previously	  collected.	  
4.   Analytical	  process:	  	  
1)   Extracting	  findings	  from	  the	  research	  material.	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2)   Categorising	  findings:	  Categories	  are	  to	  be	  merged	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  conceptual	  and	  descriptive	  similarities	  of	  the	  findings.	  
3)   Synthesised	   statements:	   To	   review	   all	   the	   developed	   categories	   and	   identify	  sufficient	  similarities	  to	  generate	  a	  comprehensive	  set	  of	  synthesised	  conclusions.	  
This	  study	  has	  been	  designed	  in	  line	  with	  the	  above	  steps—the	  steps	  adopted	  in	  this	  study	  are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  4.1.	  
	  
Figure	  4.1.	  The	  meta-­‐‑aggregation	  steps	  of	  this	  study.45	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  This	   chart	   refers	   to	   The	   Joanna	  Briggs	   Institute	  System	   for	   the	  Unified	  Management,	  Assessment	  and	  Review	  of	   Information	  
(Joana	  Briggs	  Institute,	  2007).	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4.1.2	  Data	  sources.	  
It	   is	  necessary	   to	  explain	   the	  data	  sources	  of	   this	  research.	  Researchers	  who	  explore	  Chinese	  diplomacy	  often	  complain	  that	  reliable	  evidence	  or	  primary	  data	  is	  difficult	  to	  collect,	  as	  most	  of	  the	  Chinese	  policy	  decision-­‐‑making	  processes	  are	  kept	  a	  secret.	  What’s	  worse	  is	  that	  China’s	  decision-­‐‑makers	  and	  diplomats	  seldom	  explicate	  the	  true	  purpose	  behind	  their	  foreign	  policy	  to	  the	  public	  and	  neither	  do	  they	  give	   interviews	  to	  the	  domestic	  or	   international	  media.46	  In	  addition,	   by	   and	   large,	   China’s	   diplomatic	   discourse	   is	   sometimes	   characterised	   as	   lacking	  substantial	   content.	   Given	   these	   facts,	   for	  many	  Western	   scholars,	   one	   of	   the	  most	   common	  practices	  is	  to	  scrutinise	  their	  Chinese	  counterparts’	  academic	  works	  and	  to	  search	  for	  possible	  clues.47	  However,	  what	  they	  ignore	  intentionally	  or	  unintentionally	  is	  that	  Chinese	  academia	  in	  general	  has	  limited	  connections	  with	  or	  influences	  on	  diplomatic	  practitioners.	  
In	  order	  to	  arrive	  at	  an	  authentic	  conclusion,	  this	  study	  tries	  to	  open	  and	  reveal	  the	  black	  box	  of	  China’s	   diplomacy	   as	  much	   as	   possible	   and	   to	   collect	   research	  materials	   from	   the	   following	  three	  multi-­‐‑group	  and	  multi-­‐‑channel	  sources:	  
1.   Interviews	  with	  Chinese	  diplomats	  
Those	  who	  are	  best	  qualified	  to	  comment	  on	  my	  topic	  of	  research	  are	  Chinese	  diplomats—the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  In	  recent	  years,	  this	  situation	  has	  improved	  to	  some	  extent.	  For	  example,	  in	  early	  2014,	  Chinese	  diplomats	  around	  the	  world	  actively	  published	  articles	  on	  or	  accepted	  interviews	  from	  foreign	  media	  channels,	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  China’s	  position	  on	  the	  Diaoyu	  Island	  dispute	  to	  the	  world.	  	  	  
47	  A	  typical	  work	  is	  David	  Shambaugh’s	  Coping	  with	  a	  Conflicted	  China.	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actual	   practitioners	   of	   Chinese	   diplomacy.	   Diplomats	   are	   not	   only	   representatives	   of	   their	  states	  but	  also	  defenders	  and	  performers	  of	  national	   role	  conceptions	  and	  cultural	  elements.	  All	   of	   their	   experiences,	   feelings,	   observations	   and	   thoughts	   can	   be	   considered	   the	   most	  reliable	  findings	  that	  can	  help	  determine	  the	  influence	  of	  face	  culture.	  	  
During	   February	   and	  March	   2016,	   I	   tried	   to	   contact	   32	   diplomats	   in	   China’s	   Foreign	   Affairs	  System	  [外事系统],	  of	  whom	  17	  agreed	  to	  an	  interview.	  Two	  things	  should	  be	  explained	  in	  this	  regard.	   First,	   given	   the	   socialist	   Party-­‐‑State	   political	   system,	   the	   PRC’s	   diplomacy	   is	   never	  exclusive	   to	   the	   Central	   Government	   or	   the	   Foreign	   Ministry.	   The	   highest	   decision-­‐‑making	  power	   is	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   the	  Central	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Leading	  Group	   that	   is	  affiliated	  with	   the	  Central	   Committee	   of	   the	   CCP,	   and	   the	   leader	   of	   this	   powerful	   group	   is	   always	   the	   General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  CPC.	  The	  concrete	  affairs	  are	  dealt	  with	  by	  the	  multiple	  government	  and	  Party	  agencies	  including	  the	  Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  the	  Commerce	  Ministry,	  the	  Defence	  Ministry,	  the	   State	   Security	   Ministry,	   the	   Overseas	   Chinese	   Affairs	   Office	   of	   the	   State	   Council,	   the	  International	   Department	   of	   the	   CPC	   Central	   Committee	   and	   Foreign	   Affairs	   Offices	   at	   the	  provincial	  level.48	  All	  of	  these	  departments,	  in	  Chinese	  political	  parlance,	  belong	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Affairs	   System,	   in	   which	   all	   of	   my	   interviewees	   work.	   Second,	   there	   is	   some	   difficulty	   in	  conducting	   academic	   interviews	   with	   Chinese	   diplomats.	   Due	   to	   the	   confidentiality	   and	  seriousness	  of	  their	  work,	   it	   is	  no	  surprise	  that	  nearly	  half	  the	  diplomats	  I	  contacted	  rejected	  my	  invitation	  politely,	  quickly	  and	  decisively.	  Even	  among	  those	  who	  accepted	  my	  request	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  See	  more,	  Yang,	  J.	  (2014).	  China's	  Diplomacy:	  Theory	  and	  Practice.	  Hackensack:	  World	  Scientific;	  Cabestan,	  J.	  P.	  (2009).	  China’s	  foreign-­‐‑and	  security-­‐‑policy	  decision-­‐‑making	  processes	  under	  Hu	  Jintao.	  Journal	  of	  Current	  Chinese	  Affairs,	  38(3),	  63-­‐‑97.	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were	   assured	   of	   anonymity,	   some	   still	   cherished	   their	   words	   such	   as	   if	   they	   were	   gold,	  constantly	  saying	  things	  like,	  ‘sorry,	  this	  is	  as	  much	  as	  I	  can	  say’	  during	  the	  interview	  process.	  I	  can	   fully	   understand	   their	   worries	   and,	   understandably,	   no	   one	   would	   like	   to	   assume	   any	  possible	  political	  risk	  when	  discussing	  ‘the	  real	  China’	  rather	  than	  ‘the	  official	  China’.	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	   the	   obtained	   data	   are	   still	   valuable	   and	   unique	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   such	   interviews	  with	  Chinese	  diplomats	  have,	  to	  my	  knowledge,	  rarely	  been	  conducted	  as	  part	  of	  academic	  research.	  
More	   than	   two-­‐‑thirds	  of	   the	   interviews	  were	  conducted	   face	   to	   face	   in	  Beijing,	  while	   the	  rest	  were	   conducted	  via	   telephone	  or	   the	  app	  Wechat.	  Due	   to	   the	  abstract	  nature	  of	  my	   research	  topic,	  the	  interviews	  were	  semi-­‐‑structured,	  meaning	  that	  there	  were	  some	  basic	  questions	  but	  also	   ‘a	  great	  deal	  of	  room	  for	  the	  respondents	  to	  elaborate	  and	  choose	  directions	  themselves’	  (Elgström,	  2007,	  p.	  953).	  The	  average	  time	  per	  interview	  was	  around	  30	  minutes.	  
	  
2.   Online	  public	  opinions	  	  
Many	  studies	  published	   in	   the	   last	   two	  decades	  have	  proved	   that	   the	  Chinese	  public	  opinion	  has	  played	  a	  discernable	  role	   in	  shaping	  major	  political	  outcomes,	  especially	   in	   the	  sphere	  of	  diplomacy	   (Alan,	   1996;	   Gries,	   2004;	   James,	   2013;	   Salmenkari,	   2013;	   Zhang,	   2006).	   This	   is	  firstly	  because	  of	  the	  CCP’s	  concern	  for	  its	  regime’s	  legitimacy.	  A	  host	  of	  realities	  have	  clearly	  shown	   that	   Chinese	   leaders	   have	   the	   sober	   consciousness	   and	   sufficient	   capability	   of	  responding	  to	  domestic	  demands	  and	  of	  making	  their	  power	  more	  legitimate	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  Chinese	   public	   and	   the	   outside	   world.	   It	   is	   universally	   acknowledged	   that	   in	   the	   past	   few	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decades,	   the	   Chinese	   regime	   has	   succeeded	   in	   retaining	   authority	   through	   nationalism	   and	  performance-­‐‑based	   legitimacy	   (Holbig	   &	   Gilley,	   2010,	   p.	   6;	   Roskin,	   2009,	   p.	   426).	   Second,	  China’s	  reform	  and	  opening	  up	  process	  that	  began	  in	  1978	  enabled	  the	  Chinese	  to	  learn	  more	  about	   international	   affairs	   than	  ever	  before,	   get	   access	   to	   a	  wide	   range	  of	   information	  about	  China’s	   external	   performance	   and	   also	   to	   have	   the	   freedom	   to	   express	   their	   independent	  political	   opinions	   through	   various	   types	   of	   media	   platforms,	   especially	   the	   Internet.	   These	  transformations	  contributed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Chinese	  public	  opinion	  figures	  prominently	  in	  the	   formulation	   of	   China’s	   national	   role	   conception.	   Today,	   Chinese	   people	   as	   a	   whole	   have	  become	  indispensable	  participants	  engaging	  with	  China’s	  diplomatic	  affairs.	  
The	   Internet	   in	   general	   and	   social	   media	   in	   particular	   is	   the	   most	   important	   platform	   for	  Chinese	   people	   to	   express	   their	   political	   viewpoints.	   Owing	   to	   the	   anonymity	   offered	   by	   the	  Internet,	   voices	   heard	   online	   are	   believed	   to	   be	   more	   credible	   than	   those	   heard	   on	   China’s	  television,	  radio,	  newspapers	  and	  magazines,	  which	  usually	  have	  to	  serve	  as	  a	   ‘mouthpiece	  of	  the	   Party’.49	  Certainly,	   the	   Chinese	   authorities	   have	   kept	   the	   reins	   tight	   on	   online	  media.	   As	  argued	   in	   Freedom	   House	   (2016),	   the	   government	   ‘has	   developed	   the	   world’s	   most	  sophisticated	  and	  multilayered	  apparatus	   for	  censoring,	  monitoring,	  and	  manipulating	  online	  content’.	  Suffice	  to	  say,	  since	  the	  political	  turmoil	  in	  1989,	  it	  operates	  as	  per	  the	  rules	  of	  social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  In	   the	   eyes	   of	  Westerners,	   China	   is	   home	   to	   the	   world’s	   most	   restrictive	  media	   environment.	   ‘The	   CCP	  maintains	   direct	  control	  over	  news	  coverage	  through	  its	  Central	  Propaganda	  Department	  and	  corresponding	  branches	  at	  lower	  administrative	  levels	  that	  determine	  the	  boundaries	  of	  permissible	  reporting’	  (Freedom	  House,	  2015).	  See	  also,	  for	  example,	  Sun,	  X.,	  &	  Michel,	  E.	  C.	  (2001).	  An	  Orchestra	  of	  Voices:	  Making	  the	  Argument	  for	  Greater	  Speech	  and	  Press	  Freedom	  in	  the	  People's	  Republic	  of	  China.	  Greenwood	  Publishing	  Group;	  King,	  G.,	  Pan,	  J.,	  &	  Roberts,	  M.	  E.	  (2013).	  How	  censorship	  in	  China	  allows	  government	  criticism	  but	  silences	  collective	  expression.	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  107(02),	  326-­‐‑343.	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management—do	   not	   jeopardise	   social	   stability,	   do	   not	   organise	   offline	   demonstrations	   or	  protests	   and	   do	   not	   threaten	   the	   CCP’s	   ruling	   (The	  Economist,	   2013).	   In	   this	   case,	   opinions	  about	  China’s	  diplomacy	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  accepted	  or	  tolerated	  by	  the	  censor	  authorities,	  especially	  compared	  with	  those	  about	  domestic	  politics.	  	  
The	   Chinese	   public	   opinions	   presented	   in	   this	   study	   are	   a	   collection	   of	   comments	   found	   on	  some	  of	  China’s	  most	  popular	  social	  networking	  sites.	  They	   include	  messages	  posted	  on	  Sina	  
Weibo,	  a	  Chinese	  microblogging	  website	  akin	  to	  Twitter;	  blogs	  from	  Sina	  Blog;	  posts	  on	  Tianya	  
Club,	  Tiexue	  Forum,	  Qiangguo	  Forum	  and	   some	  other	   online	   communities.50	  A	   few	   articles	   on	  online	  news	  outlets	  were	  also	  investigated.	  Although	  some	  foreign	  observers	  argue	  that	  some	  of	   the	   above	   sites	   have	   their	   respective	   political	   orientations,51	  the	   author	   is	   quite	   sure	   that	  various	   political	   opinions	   can	   be	   found	   on	   all	   of	   the	   online	   communities	   cited.	   From	   the	  numerous	  pages	  that	  involve	  the	  key	  words	  ‘face’	  [面子]	  and	  ‘Chinese	  diplomacy’	  [中国外交],	  I	  collected	  243	  comments	  by	  netizens	  and,	  after	  a	  critical	  analysis,	  used	  27	  of	  them	  for	  in-­‐‑depth	  research.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Some	   basic	   information	   about	   these	  websites:	   Sina	  Weibo	  and	   Sina	  Blog	   are	   owned	   and	   operated	   by	   Sina	   Corporation,	   a	  Chinese	  online	  media	  company.	  By	  September	  2015,	  the	  number	  of	  MAU	  (monthly	  active	  users)	  on	  Sina	  Weibo	  had	  reached	  212	  million	  (http://data.weibo.com/report/reportDetail?id=297).	  Due	  to	  the	  enormous	  influence	  of	  this	  Chinese	  version	  of	  Twitter,	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  departments	  of	  the	  CCP	  and	  the	  government	  have	  official	  accounts	  on	  it,	  which	  are	  used	  to	  release	  information	  and	   interact	  with	  netizens.	  Tiexue	  and	  Qiangguo	  Forum	   are	   the	  most	  popular	  Bulletin	  Board	   Sites	   (BBS)	   focusing	  mainly	   on	  political	   and	  military	   issues.	   The	   former	  was	   established	   by	   some	   amateur	  military	   fans,	   and	   the	   latter	   is	   run	   by	   the	   state-­‐‑owned	  People’s	  Daily.	  Tianya	  Club	  is	  one	  of	  the	  oldest	  and	  most	  dynamic	  Internet	  forums	  in	  China.	  As	  of	  2015,	  it	  was	  ranked	  by	  Alexa	  as	  the	  13th	  most	  visited	  site	  in	  the	  PRC	  (http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/tianya.cn).	  	  
51	  For	  example,	  according	  to	  Gries	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  and	  Shen	  (2012),	  Sina	  Blog	  is	  relatively	  liberal	  while	  Tiexue	  Forum	  is	  known	  for	  being	  nationalist.	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Admittedly,	   online	   data	   cannot	   be	   representative	   of	   the	   overall	   Chinese	   opinion,	   as	   ‘Internet	  users	   tend	   to	   be	   younger,	  more	   urban	   and	  more	   educated	   than	   the	   Chinese	   population	   as	   a	  whole’	   (Gries,	   Steiger,	   &	   Wang,	   2015,	   p.	   5).	   However,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   this	   group	   of	  people	   is	  more	   likely	   to	   participate	   in	   discussions	   on	   public	   policy,	   have	  more	   capability	   to	  make	   their	   voices	   heard	   and	   thus	   exercise	   a	   remarkable	   influence	   on	   China’s	   struggle	   for	  international	  recognition.	  
	  
3.   International	  media	  reports	  
‘International	   media’	   [Chinese:	  海外媒体]	   is	   a	   Chinese	   political	   term	   referring	   to	   the	   media	  industries	  of	  Hong	  Kong,	  Macau	  and	  Taiwan	  as	  well	  as	  the	  foreign	  media	  at	  large.	  Basically,	  all	  these	  media	   platforms	   are	   out	   of	   the	   CCP’s	   direct	   rulings52	  and,	   also,	   to	   a	   great	   degree,	   are	  guarded	  against	  by	  China’s	  rulers.	  The	  purpose	  of	  analysing	  international	  media	  reports	  is	  very	  clear—to	  understand	  the	  observations	  and	  comments	   from	  a	  third	  perspective.	  As	  a	  classical	  Chinese	  saying	  goes,	  ‘Generally,	  for	  matters	  under	  heaven,	  those	  closely	  involved	  cannot	  see	  as	  clearly	  as	  those	  outside’	  [Chinese:	  大凡天下事，当局者迷，旁观者清].	  More	  from	  a	  position	  of	  being	  observers	  of	  China’s	  face	  diplomacy,	  foreign	  journalists	  and	  commentators	  are	  supposed	  to	  have	  different	   feelings	  or	   judgments	  (that	  are	  not	  necessarily	  objective)	  about	  China’s	   face	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  As	   China’s	   special	   administrative	   regions,	   Hong	   Kong	   and	  Macau	   are	   relatively	   special	   cases.	   Press	   freedom	   in	   these	   two	  places	  is	  protected	  by	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights,	  unlike	  Mainland	  China	  that	  is	  under	  the	  pervasive	  control	  of	  the	  CCP.	  However,	  in	  recent	  years,	  journalists	  and	  media	  owners	  from	  Hong	  Kong,	  particularly	  those	  critical	  of	  Beijing,	  still	  come	  under	  increasing	  pressure	  from	  the	  government	  of	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Chinese	  authorities	  (Freedom	  House,	  2016).	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diplomacy.	  To	  begin	  with,	  I	  found	  87	  news	  reports	  or	  comments	  about	  my	  research	  topic	  in	  the	  international	  media,	  of	  which	  I	  selected	  39	  pieces	  for	  further	  study.	  
	  
4.2	  Views	  of	  Chinese	  Diplomats	  
All	  of	  the	  17	  interviewees	  have	  a	  similar	  understanding	  of	  the	  cultural	  meaning	  of	  face,	  namely,	  a	   person’s	   social	   image,	   status	   or	   dignity.	   They	   also	   admit	   that	   face	   culture	   indeed	   prompts	  China	  to	  pursue	  international	  recognition	  as	  a	  major	  power.	  Given	  their	  different	  fields	  of	  work	  and	  experiences,	  my	  respondents	  in	  fact	  have	  different	  perspectives	  on	  this	  issue.	  According	  to	  the	   meta-­‐‑aggregation	   method,	   the	   author	   summarises	   four	   categories	   of	   findings.	   The	   total	  number	  of	  interviewees	  is	  certainly	  limited.53	  In	  order	  to	  support	  some	  arguments,	  this	  section	  also	  cites	  the	  opinions	  of	  some	  of	  China’s	  foreign	  policy	  makers	  and	  high-­‐‑level	  diplomats	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  public	  speeches,	  interviews	  or	  articles.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  In	  Section	  4.2,	  unless	  otherwise	  referenced,	  the	  quotes	  are	  all	  from	  the	  17	  interviewees.	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4.2.1	  Face	  is	  important	  but	  not	  the	  most	  important	  
	  
Figure	  4.2.	  Answers	  to	  the	  question,	  ‘To	  what	  degree	  do	  you	  think	  face	  culture	  influences	  Chinese	  diplomacy	  today?’	  
	  
Figure	   4.2	   shows	   the	   interviewees’	   opinions	   on	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   Chinese	   face	   culture	  impacts	  China’s	  diplomacy.	  The	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  them	  chose	  the	  options	  a	  very	  great	  
deal	   or	  a	  lot.	   Simultaneously,	   almost	   all	   of	   them	  emphasised	   the	   fact	   that	  Chinese	  diplomacy	  predominantly	   aims	   to	   achieve	   national	   interests	   rather	   than	   recognition	   or	   international	  reputation.	  The	  most	  typical	  viewpoint	  is	  that	  China’s	  face	  or	  international	  recognition	  is	  a	  tool	  of	  diplomacy	  or	  a	  kind	  of	  national	  interest,	  which	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  serving	  national	  interests	  that	  are	  more	  important	  than	  face.	  Similar	  opinions	  are	  exemplified	  in	  the	  following	  quotes:	  
‘I	  classify	  international	  recognition	  issues	  as	  “technical	  matters”	  in	  my	  work,	  which	  there	  is	  always	  a	  way	  to	  solve.	  What	  is	  really	  troubling	  is	  still	  the	  national-­‐‑interest	  issues.’	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‘Very	  often,	  China	  indeed	  seems	  to	  sacrifice	  its	  interest	  only	  for	  applause.	  However,	  it	   is	   very	   likely	   that	   the	   people	   outside	   have	   no	   information	   about	   China’s	   real	  purpose,	   or	   it	   is	   somewhat	   likely	   that	   our	   decision-­‐‑makers	   indeed	   make	  miscalculations.	  Anyhow,	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  us	  to	  only	  focus	  on	  China’s	  face.’	  
‘China	  has	  consistently	  emphasised	   its	   “core	   interests”	   in	  recent	  years,	  which	  has	  told	  the	  world	  clearly	  that	  it	  will	  not	  abandon	  its	  pursuit	  of	  national	   interest	  only	  because	  of	  outside	  criticism	  or	  complaints.’	  	  
It	   is	   evident	   that	   among	   the	   group	   of	   Chinese	   diplomats,	   interest-­‐‑orientated	   pragmatism	  trumps	   fascination	   for	   face.	   In	   the	   article	   China’s	   Millennial	   Diplomacy	   and	   the	   National	  
Mentality,	   Ambassador	   Yuan	   Nansheng54	  (2011,	   p.	   66)	   states	   that	   Chinese	   face	   culture	   has	  closely	  paralleled	  Chinese	  diplomacy	  from	  ancient	  times	  until	  the	  present	  day,	  but	  after	  China’s	  reform	  and	  opening	  up	  in	  1978,	  it	  has	  been	  largely	  replaced	  by	  practical	  diplomacy.	  	  
	  
4.2.2	  The	  senior-­‐‑most	  leader	  is	  the	  key	  
Interviewees	   generally	   note	   that	   under	   China’s	   political	   system,	   the	   remarkableness	   of	   the	  
‘major	   power’	   identity	   must	   be	   endogenous	   to	   the	   state’s	   foreign	   strategy	   but	   may	   also	   be	  related	  with	  the	  senior-­‐‑most	  leader’s	  face	  consciousness.	  
Many	  of	  them	  mentioned	  that	  Mao	  Zedong,	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  PRC,	  was	  always	  keen	  to	  shape	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Yuan	  Nansheng	   is	   the	   former	  Chinese	  ambassador	   to	  Zimbabwe	  and	  Surinam	  and	   the	  current	  Vice	  President	  of	   the	  China	  Foreign	  Affairs	  University	  that	  is	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry.	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the	  image	  of	  a	  resurgent	  China,	  showing	  a	  tenacious	  sense	  of	  face	  in	  his	  decision-­‐‑making.	  ‘Led	  by	  Chairman	  Mao,	  China	  would	  rather	  let	  its	  people	  in	  hunger	  to	  provide	  substantial	  aid	  to	  the	  so-­‐‑called	  friendly	  countries.	  Aid	  to	  Vietnam	  or	  North	  Korea	  was	  of	  strategic	  significance	  at	  that	  time;	  however,	  aid	  to	  Albania	  and	  some	  remote	  African	  countries	  was	  only	  exchanged	  for	  their	  praise	   or	   being	   called	   as	   “Good	   Big	   Brother”	   [Chinese:	   好大哥]’.	   ‘After	   the	   Tangshan	  earthquake55,	  [the]	  Chinese	  government	  rejected	  foreign	  assistance,	  and	  one	  underlying	  reason	  was	   to	   protect	   its	   national	   image	   of	   self-­‐‑reliance.	   At	   that	   time,	   the	   country’s	   face	  was	  more	  important	  than	  people’s	  lives’.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  The	  1976	  Tangshan	  earthquake	   is	   the	  worst	   earthquake	  of	   the	  20th	   century	   in	   terms	  of	  death	   toll.	   The	  number	  of	  deaths	  reported	  by	  the	  Chinese	  government	  is	  around	  2,55,000.	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Figure	  4.3	  People	  Daily	  reports	  on	  the	  Beijing	  APEC	  summit	  on	  11	  November	  201456	  
	  
Certainly,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  pinpoint	  the	  Chinese	  top	  leaders’	  personal	  worldviews	  and	  instincts.	  A	  majority	  of	  respondents	  believe	  that	  President	  Xi	  has	  a	  strong	  enthusiasm	  to	  present	  a	  superior	  China	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  international	  recognition.	  Some	  of	  their	  observations	  are	  as	  follows:	  
‘The	  2016	  G20	  summit	  will	  be	  held	  in	  Hangzhou,	  where	  Xi	  Jinping	  once	  ruled	  for	  a	  long	  time.57	  It	  is	  not	  only	  an	  opportunity	  to	  show	  China	  as	  an	  already	  risen	  power	  to	   the	  world	  but	   also	   a	  moment	   to	   show	  Xi’s	  past	   career	   achievements	   to	   all	   the	  people.’	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  The	   screenshots	   of	   newspaper	   pages	   reflect	   that	   the	   Chinese	   domestic	   media	   is	   keen	   on	   creating	   the	   impression	   that	  President	  Xi	  is	  surrounded	  and	  respected	  by	  world	  leaders.	  
57	  From	  2002	  to	  2007,	  Xi	  Jinping	  was	  the	  CCP	  party	  chief	  of	  Zhejiang	  province.	  Hangzhou	  is	  the	  capital	  of	  Zhejiang.	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‘President	   Xi’s	   diplomacy	   in	   the	  US	   is	   committed	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   “new	  model	  of	  a	  major	  power	  relationship”.	  The	  primary	  goal	  seems	  to	  be	  not	  to	  stabilise	  the	   increasingly	   antagonistic	   relationship	   but	   to	   make	   America	   clearly	  acknowledge	  China’s	   status	  as	   a	  major	  power.	   Such	  a	   strategic	   intention	  more	  or	  less	  reflects	  the	  top	  leader’s	  cravings	  for	  outside	  respect.’	  	  
‘Beijing	   lacks	   enough	   snow	   but	   still	   could	   win	   the	   2020	   Winter	   Olympics	   bid;	  Beijing’s	  air	  pollution	  is	  known	  all	  over	  the	  world,	  but	  we	  still	  found	  a	  way	  to	  create	  
‘APEC	   Blue’.58	  I	   cannot	   find	   any	   difference	   between	   Xi	   and	   his	   predecessors	   in	  [their	  efforts	  to]	  showcase	  a	  perfect	  China	  to	  the	  world.’	  	  
Whether	  Chinese	  leaders	  are	  influenced	  strongly	  by	  face	  culture	  may	  be	  an	  eternal	  mystery,	  but	  one	  thing	   is	  certain—Chinese	  authorities	  are	  very	  aware	  of	  the	  prominence	  of	   face	  culture	   in	  Chinese	  social	  psychology.	  A	  craving	  for	  a	  superior	  China	  is	   invariably	  mingled	  with	  demands	  for	  the	  CCP’s	  legitimacy.	  	  
‘President	  Xi’s	  UK	  visit	  is	  described	  (by	  the	  Chinese	  diplomats)	  as	  the	  “super	  state	  visit”;	  his	  US	  visit	  is	  characterised	  by	  “a	  stream	  of	  pleasant	  surprises”.	  These	  words	  are	  not	  said	  to	  foreigners	  but	  to	  the	  Chinese.’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  ‘APEC	  Blue’	  [Chinese:	  APEC 蓝]	  is	  a	  term	  coined	  by	  Chinese	  netizens	  to	  describe	  the	  rare	  blue	  sky	  in	  Beijing	  during	  the	  2014	  APEC	   leader	   summit.	   As	  Beijing’s	   air	   pollution	   is	   extremely	   severe,	   during	  APEC	   in	   2014,	   the	   government	   followed	   a	   set	   of	  comprehensively	  strict	  measures	  to	  control	  air	  pollution,	  finally	  ensuring	  a	  blue	  sky	  and	  a	  healthy	  Beijing	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  summit.	  The	  Chinese	  public	   is	   familiar	  with	  such	   levels	  of	  control	  when	  the	  authorities	  need	  to	  host	   large-­‐‑scale	  political	  meetings	  or	  international	  events,	  such	  as	  the	  Beijing	  Olympic	  Games	  or	  the	  Shanghai	  Expo.	  Most	  foreign	  media	  outlets	  consider	  APEC	  Blue	  to	  be	  a	  typical	  face-­‐‑saving	  Chinese	  act.	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‘From	   2014’s	   APEC	   summit	   to	   2015’s	   China	   Victory	  Day	   parade	   and	   2016’s	   G20	  summit,	   he	   [President	   Xi]	   knows	   that	   the	   Chinese	   people	   are	   happy	   to	   see	   such	  diplomatic	  spectacles.	  President	  Xi	  is	  surrounded	  by	  world	  leaders,	  which	  reminds	  the	   Chinese	   people	   of	   the	   ancient	   glorious	   moments	   when	   “envoys	   from	  innumerable	  countries	  came	  to	  revere	  the	  Chinese	  emperor”	  [Chinese:	  万国来朝].	  Indeed,	   this	   may	   be	   a	   kind	   of	   backward	   worldview	   but	   is	   also	   the	   Chinese	  worldview.’	  
In	  this	  sense,	  dedicating	  all	  of	  one’s	  resources	  to	  host	  various	  international	  spectacles	  is	  just	  a	  response	  to	  the	  Chinese	  people’s	  political	  psychology;	   in	  other	  words,	  a	  shortcut	  to	  make	  the	  Chinese	  happy	  i.e.	  to	  gain	  regime	  legitimacy.	  
Meanwhile,	  a	   few	  respondents	  pointed	  out	   that	  Xi	   is	  a	  very	  practical	   leader	  and	  his	  decision-­‐‑making	  is	  less	  influenced	  by	  face	  culture.	  One	  respondent	  noted:	  	  	  
‘President	  Xi	  reiterates	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  “Three	  Confidences”,59	  which	  means	  that	  today’s	  Chinese	   leaders	  do	  not	  really	  care	  about	  what	  the	  outside	  world	  says	  and	  just	  advocate	  their	  citizens	  to	  “walk	  our	  road,	  let	  others	  say”.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  The	  Three	  Confidences	  Doctrine	   [Chinese:	  三个自信]	   is	   a	   political	   creed	   that	   the	   CCP	   and	   senior	   leaders	   have	   consistently	  emphasised	   since	   Xi	   Jinping	   took	   office.	   It	   is	   essentially	   a	   call	   to	   the	   Chinese	   people	   to	   be	   confident	   in	   our	   chosen	   path,	  confident	  in	  our	  political	  system	  and	  confident	  in	  our	  guiding	  theories.	  See	  also,	  Zheng,	  S.	  (2014).	  Rising	  Confidence	  Behind	  the	  “Chinese	  Dream”.	  Journal	  of	  Chinese	  Political	  Science,	  19(1),	  35-­‐‑48.	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4.2.3	  Face	  diplomacy	  to	  showcase	  China	  as	  a	  major	  power	  
China	   as	   a	  major	   power	   can	   be	   observed	   very	   saliently	   in	   the	   following	   role	   performances:	  diplomatic	   visits,	   diplomatic	   discourses,	   economic	   diplomacy	   and	   external	   assistance	   and	  responses	   to	   foreign	   criticism	   or	   crises.	   These	   behaviours	   usually	   have	   distinctive	  characteristics	  of	  face	  culture	  and	  are	  described	  as	  face	  diplomacy	  [Chinese:	  面子外交].	  
	  
Diplomatic	  visits	  
According	  to	  all	  of	  my	  respondents,	  China’s	  aspiration	  for	  superiority	  is	  witnessed	  most	  vividly	  in	  its	  diplomatic	  visits,	  especially	  by	  senior	  leaders.	  Logically,	  as	  Chinese	  face	  culture	  highlights	  the	   role	   of	   etiquette	   in	   manifesting	   distinctions	   between	   superior	   and	   inferior,	   the	   Chinese	  naturally	  pay	  a	   lot	  of	  attention	   to	   standards	  of	   reception	  and	  smaller	  details.	  The	  underlying	  concern	  is	  that,	  ‘at	  least	  in	  form	  and	  on	  surface,	  China	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  crucially	  important	  actor,	  a	  power	  “deserving	  more	  attention	  and	  welcome	  than	  others”’.	  
The	  former	  Chinese	  Consul	  General	  in	  San	  Francisco,	  Guo	  Changlin	  (China	  Review	  News,	  2013),	  has	  an	  insightful	  summary:	  	  
Over	  the	  years,	  for	  the	  senior	  leaders’	  visits,	  what	  China	  has	  assiduously	  sought	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  two	  things:	  first,	  at	  the	  reception	  level,	  the	  levels	  should	  be	  high;	  second,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  form	  of	  visit,	  our	  leader’s	  visit	  should	  be	  conducted	  like	  an	   ‘official	   state	  visit’.	   In	  short,	  our	  diplomacy	   is	   to	  strive	   for	   form,	  reception	  
and	  face…	  A	  Chinese	  leader’s	  visit	  to	  the	  US	  should	  focus	  on	  big	  issues	  that	  have	  a	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bearing	  on	  the	  bilateral	  relations	  and	  the	  global	  agenda;	  however,	  we	  [diplomats]	  usually	  spend	  too	  much	  time	  on	  issues	  regarding	  visiting	  form	  and	  reception.	  
Some	  interviewees	  point	  out	  that	  my	  study	  is	  simply	  making	  a	  fuss,	  because	  nearly	  every	  state	  cares	  a	  lot	  about	  diplomatic	  protocol	  and	  reception,	  which	  relates	  to	  whether	  a	  country	  attains	  the	  basic	  thin	  recognition	  as	  a	  sovereign	  state	  or	  not.	   ‘Just	  like	  the	  United	  States	  or	  some	  rich	  countries	   from	  Middle	   East	   go	   even	   further	   than	   China	   in	   the	   issue	   of	   diplomatic	   reception’.	  Nevertheless,	  a	  majority	  of	  them	  still	  provided	  me	  with	  many	  details	  about	  this	  aspect	  of	  face	  diplomacy.	  It	  can	  be	  found	  that	  on	  many	  occasions,	  means	  mistakenly	  become	  goals	  and	  form	  inappropriately	  replaces	  substance.	  	  	  
‘[During	  diplomatic	  visits],	   some	   leaders	  are	  very	  easily	  disappointed	  when	   their	  speeches	  are	  not	  appreciated	  by	   foreigners,	  or	   they	  complain	   that	   they	  don’t	   find	  the	  reception	  as	  “good”	  as	  they	  gave	  to	  the	  foreign	  guests	   in	  China.	  Consequently,	  we	   [diplomats]	   have	   to	   raise	   the	   level	   of	   reception	   as	   much	   as	   possible	   by	  ourselves,	  and	  of	  course	  the	  bill	  needs	  to	  be	  paid	  by	  our	  people	  in	  most	  cases.’	  	  
‘Whenever	   domestic	   officials	   visit	   the	   country	  where	   I	  work,	   one	   important	   and	  necessary	   task	   is	   to	   ensure	   that	   they	   can	  meet	   the	   foreign	   leaders	  whose	  official	  levels	   are	  higher	   than	   them.	   It	   seems	   that	  only	   in	   this	  way	   can	  our	  officials	  have	  face	  and	  our	  country	  can	  have	  face.’	  
‘As	  a	  customary	  practice	  [of	  China’s	  diplomacy],	  we	  need	  to	  organise	  many	  overseas	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Chinese60	  to	  welcome	  and	  see	  off	  our	  top	  leaders	  at	  the	  airport	  or	  while	  driving	  on	  the	  street	  during	  their	  visits.	  If	  there	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  an	  anti-­‐‑Chinese	  government	  demonstration,	   what	   we	   have	   to	   do	   is	   organise	   a	   larger	   supporting	   team	   to	  overwhelm	   them,	   ensuring	   that	   nothing	   will	   embarrass	   our	   leader.	   This	   is	   our	  Chinese	  characteristic.’	  
‘As	  a	  general	  rule,	  a	  top	  leader’s	  visit	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  accompanied	  by	  remarkable	  achievements	   of	   bilateral	   relationship.	   Even	   if	   there	   is	   indeed	   nothing,	   we	  [diplomats]	   still	   need	   to	   create	   “something”.	   It	   is	  no	  exaggeration	   to	   say	   that	  one	  visit	   of	   the	   top	   leaders	   will	   set	   our	   working	   relationship	   with	   the	   counterpart	  foreign	  ministry	  back	  for	  at	  least	  two	  years.’	  	  
It	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  my	  interviewees	  have	  some	  complaints	  about	  the	  tedious	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  completed	   for	   diplomatic	   visits.	   Very	   often,	   they	   have	   to	   sacrifice	   their	   own	   face	   to	   gain	   the	  country’s	  face.	  This	  just	  echoes	  Taiwanese	  scholar	  Hwang	  Guangguo:	  ‘Impacted	  by	  face	  culture,	  the	   Chinese	   officials	   need	   to	   know	   how	   to	   struggle	   for	   the	   face	   of	   the	  greater	   self.	   Only	   by	  maintaining	  the	  face	  of	  the	  collective,	  one	  could	  finally	  raise	  his	  or	  her	  personal	  face	  and	  have	  the	  possibility	  of	  climbing	  up	  the	  power	  hierarchy	  [in	  the	  bureaucratic	  system]’.	  
Certainly,	  the	  Chinese	  are	  not	  only	  picky	  about	  their	  own	  leaders’	  visits	  to	  foreign	  countries	  and	  but	  also	  keep	  trying	  to	  perfect	  foreign	  leaders’	  visits	  to	  China.	  In	  On	  China,	  Kissinger	  (2011,	  p.	  237)	   has	   admired	   how	   skilfully	   Chinese	   statesmen	   use	   hospitality,	   ceremony	   and	   carefully	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Most	  people	  who	  participate	  in	  such	  activities	  are	  overseas	  students	  and	  overseas	  Chinese	  businessmen.	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cultivated	   personal	   relationships	   as	   tools	   of	   statecraft.	   Simultaneously,	   the	   Chinese	   have	  realised	   that	   this	   is	   not	   always	   an	   appropriate	   practice.	   Ambassador	  Wu	   Jianmin61	  (Modern	  
Express,	  2009)	  says,	   ‘It	   is	  always	  a	  waste	   for	   the	  Chinese	   to	  entertain	   foreign	  guests.	  We	  care	  about	  our	  face,	  so	  we	  are	  overly	  afraid	  that	  guests	  will	  underestimate	  our	  power	  if	  the	  banquet	  is	  seemingly	  simple’.	  	  	  
	  
Diplomatic	  discourse	  
For	  the	  Chinese,	  using	  language	  (straightforwardly	  or	  implicitly)	  to	  remind	  others	  of	  hierarchy	  and	   to	   show	  superiority	   is	  an	  appropriate	  method	  of	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	   relationship	  and	  of	  seeking	   face.	   As	   one	   interviewee	   says,	   ‘in	   Chinese	   offcialdom,	   there	   is	   a	   common	   saying	   or	  instruction,	  “Standing	  position	  should	  be	  high”	  [Chinese:	  站位要高],	  which	  means	  that	  official	  wording	   and	   phrasing	   should	   appear	   grand	   and	   powerful’.	   Similarly,	   in	   China’s	   diplomatic	  language,	  “major	  power”	   is	  a	   frequently	  appearing	  term	  for	  China	  to	  stand	  at	  a	  high	  position.	  Rather	   than	   use	   straightforward	   language,	   the	   Chinese	   use	   metaphors,	   terms,	   concepts	   or	  seemingly	  modest	  utterances	  to	  keep	  enhancing	  their	  perceived	  status.	  	  
‘China	  refuses	  the	  title	  of	  G2,	  but	  many	  of	   its	  discourses	  reveal	  the	  determination	  and	  enthusiasm	  of	  being	  G‘x’	  in	  the	  world.’	  
‘Nowadays,	  a	  series	  of	  Chinese	  diplomatic	  terms,	  such	  as	  “New	  Type	  of	  Great	  Power	  
Relations”,	  “Global	  Partnership	  Network”,	  and	  “Major-­‐‑Power	  Diplomacy	  with	  Chinese	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Wu	  Jianmin	  is	  the	  former	  Chinese	  ambassador	  to	  Holland,	  France	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Office	  in	  Geneva.	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Characteristics”,	   have	   revealed	   China’s	   desire	   to	   become	   one	   of	   the	   few	   major	  powers	   in	   the	   world.	   The	   demands	   for	   gaining	   face	   worldwide	   indeed	   become	  more	  urgent.’	  	  
‘In	  private	  communication,	  some	  officials	  cannot	  help	  exaggerating	  our	  strength	  or	  burnishing	   the	   image	   of	   “major	   power”.	   Sometimes,	   these	   behaviours	  may	   easily	  stir	  bad	  feelings,	  and	  sometimes	  make	  others	  believe	  that	  China	  is	  a	  very	  developed	  country.’	  
‘China’s	  diplomatic	  discourse	   is	  generally	  modest	  and	  undemonstrative.	  However,	  very	  often,	  we	  are	  still	  eager	  to	  make	  our	  foreign	  audiences	  aware	  that	  China	  has	  come	  back	  to	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  world.	  Unavoidably,	  some	  statements	  must	  seem	  to	  be	  self-­‐‑aggrandising.’	  	  
Moreover,	  Chinese	  diplomats	  enthusiastically	  claim	  that	  China	  is	  destined	  to	  be	  a	  special	  major	  power.	  Related	  discourses	  always	  contain	  claims	  of	  China’s	  exceptional	  nature	  and	  uniqueness.	  The	  speech	  excerpt	  below	  is	  a	  good	  illustration	  of	  this:	  
As	   a	   poor	   and	   weak	   country	   in	   the	   past,	   China	   has	   gradually	   come	   back	   to	  international	   affairs,	   or,	   in	   other	   words,	   has	   occupied	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   world	  stage…	   And	   China	   has	   so	   many	   differences	   with	   many	   other	   traditional	   major	  powers.	   We	   have	   a	   peculiar	   political	   system,	   huge	   population	   and	   fast	   speed	   of	  development	  and	  will	   further	   rapidly	  develop.	  Consequently,	   it	   is	  understandable	  that	  others	  cannot	  understand	  us.	  (Former	  Chinese	  ambassador	  to	  Britain,	  Fu	  Yin	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[2013])	  
Despite	   such	  moves,	   Chinese	   officials	   are	   also	   very	   conscious	   of	   giving	   enough	   face	   to	   their	  contacts	  using	  language	  that	  can	  sometimes	  seem	  mechanical.	  Ambassador	  Lu	  Qiutian62	  (2000)	  writes	   in	   an	   article,	   ‘[On	   diplomatic	   occasions],	   we	   only	   have	   a	   few	   words	   to	   express	   our	  gratitude	   to	   [foreigners’]	   reception:	   “Your	   country	   is	   very	   beautiful”,	   “Your	   people	   are	   very	  
friendly”,	   and	   “Your	   reception	   is	   very	   considerate”.	   They	   [foreigners]	   always	   wonder	   why	   the	  Chinese	  do	  not	  have	  any	  special	  feelings	  about	  them	  as	  they	  travel	  a	  great	  distance	  to	  come	  to	  their	  country.	  This	  is	  a	  typical	  method	  of	  Chinese	  facework.	  As	  the	  Chinese	  saying	  goes,	  ‘There	  are	  never	  too	  many	  praises	  for	  anyone’	  [Chinese:	  好话不嫌多].	  
As	   expected,	   China	   avoids	   discussing	   differences	   openly.	   In	   an	   interview,	   the	   former	   State	  Councillor	   Dai	   Bingguo	   describes	   China’s	   diplomatic	   style	   as	   follows:	   ‘Defending	   your	  principles	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  intimidating	  or	  unfriendly.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  say	  serious	  words	  in	  a	  low	   voice’	   (The	  Beijing	  News,	   2016).	   This	   attitude	   clearly	   aims	   not	   to	   offend	   the	   face	   of	   the	  other	   side	   even	   in	   conflict	   situations.	   Some	   of	   the	   respondents	   also	   made	   some	   related	  comments:	  	  
‘Too	  many	  policy	  documents	  or	  leaders’	  speeches	  seem	  to	  be	  devoid	  of	  substance.	  We	   are	   still	   shy	   to	   put	   interest	   or	   conflict	   on	   the	   table	   and	   to	   discuss	   them	  straightforwardly.’	  	  
‘When	   dissatisfied	   with	   some	   country,	   China	   normally	   refrains	   from	   a	   full	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Lu	  Qiutian	  is	  the	  former	  Chinese	  ambassador	  to	  Luxembourg,	  Romania	  and	  Germany.	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expression	  of	  its	  real	  ideas,	  at	  least	  avoiding	  criticising	  someone	  by	  name.	  Although	  everyone	  knows	  the	  object	  of	  China’s	  dissatisfaction,	  from	  the	  Chinese	  perspective,	  careful	  speech	  can	  leave	  some	  leeway	  for	  the	  situation	  to	  possibly	  change.’	  
	  
Economic	  diplomacy	  and	  external	  assistance	  
Being	  generous	  with	  praise	  is	  a	  standard	  way	  of	  seeking	  face	  not	  only	  in	  social	  life	  but	  also	  in	  international	  relations.	  A	  common	  perception	  of	  Chinese	  diplomacy	  is	  that	  ‘we	  [Chinese]	  often	  sacrifice	   considerable	   interests	   for	   flashy	   national	   images,	   and	   commercial	   or	   economic	  interests	  are	  usually	  the	  first	  to	  suffer’.63	  	  
In	  addition,	  some	  of	  my	  respondents	  add	  that	  foreign	  countries	  are	  well	  aware	  of	  Chinese	  face	  concern	  and	  expertly	  take	  advantage	  of	  recognition	  or	  even	  blandishment	  as	  a	  bargaining	  chip.	  	  
‘Due	  to	  face	  culture,	  China’s	  diplomacy	  becomes	  very	  practical.	  For	  example,	  if	  one	  European	   country	   threatens	   to	   take	   action	   against	   our	   human	   rights	   issues,	   we	  habitually	   respond	  with	  Purchasing	  Diplomacy.	  That	  means,	   if	   you	  give	  me	   face,	   I	  will	  buy	  something	  from	  you	  in	  return;	  if	  you	  cannot,	  I	  will	  avoid	  you.	  Sweden	  must	  have	  the	  most	  understanding	  about	  this	  in	  recent	  years.	  But	  who	  knows	  how	  many	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  One	  speech	  of	  Philippine	  President	  Duterte	  can	  used	  as	  a	  corroboration	  of	  this	  opinion.	  At	  the	  Philippines-­‐‑China	  Trade	  and	  Investment	   Forum,	   he	   emphasised	   that	   the	   Philippines	   is	   more	   willing	   to	   receive	   Chinese	   loans	   and	   assistance.	   ‘We	  [Philippines]	   tend	   to	   borrow	  money	   from	  China,	   because	   sometimes	  China	   has	   provided	  us	  with	   long-­‐‑term	   loans,	   and	   then	  forgot	  to	  ask	  us	  to	  return	  the	  money	  due	  to	  our	  friendship.	  However,	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea	  would	  not	  do	  this’	  (Global	  Times,	  2016).	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unnecessary	  things	  China	  has	  bought	  just	  to	  save	  face?’	  
‘In	   Africa,	   many	   countries	   are	   good	   at	   extolling	   China	   to	   the	   skies	   or	   giving	   lip	  service	  to	  “my	  great	  friend	  China”.	  After	  some	  facework,	  they	  feel	  quite	  justified	  to	  ask	  for	  aid	  or	  to	  default	  on	  construction	  costs.	  When	  cooperating	  with	  Westerners,	  they	  know	  to	  do	  things	  according	  to	  contract;	  however,	  when	  dealing	  with	  China,	  they	  are	  used	  to	   ignoring	   the	  contract.	  They	  believe	   that	   their	  unremitting	  praise	  can	  make	  China	  grant	  whatever	  is	  requested.’	  	  
‘Southeast	   Asian	   countries	   are	   very	   familiar	   with	   the	   Chinese	   Confucian	   culture	  and,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  they	  also	  care	  about	  their	  face.	  They	  know	  well	  how	  to	  serve	  their	  own	  interest	  by	  giving	  recognition	  to	  China	  as	  a	  regional	  major	  power.’	  	  
In	   an	   essay,	   Chinese	   diplomat	   Zhai	   Hua	   (2009)	   claims	   that	   there	   are	   always	   foreigners	  intentionally	  using	  Chinese	  face	  psychology	  to	  make	  deals	  with	  China;	  in	  this	  case,	  international	  recognition	  has	  become	  their	  ‘efficient	  gift’,	  which	  has	  a	  low	  cost	  but	  high	  yield.	  
	  
4.2.4	  Fierce	  face	  when	  confronting	  criticism	  and	  crises	  
China	  has	  always	  been	  extremely	  vulnerable	  to	  foreign	  criticism,	  whether	  well	   intentioned	  or	  malicious.	  More	  often,	  the	  Chinese	  tend	  to	  regard	  foreign	  criticism	  as	  a	  denial	  of	  their	  country’s	  identity	   as	   a	   major	   power	   and	   are	   easily	   triggered	   to	   react	   emotionally.	   Ambassador	   Yuan	  Nansheng	  (2011)	  argues,	  ‘Due	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  face	  culture,	  if	  someone	  praises	  us,	  we	  will	  be	  overjoyed	  and	  eager	  to	  share	  this	  news	  with	  others.	  If	  someone	  criticises	  us,	  we	  will	  denounce	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them	   as	   an	   anti-­‐‑China	   force	   instinctively’.	   One	   interviewee	   claims,	   ‘In	   recent	   years,	   we	   have	  become	   firmer	   in	   our	   core	   issues	   of	   interest,	   but,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   we	   still	   fear	   critical	  opinions	  and	  care	  a	  lot	  about	  what	  others	  say’.	  	  
Xi	  Jinping	  addressed	  the	  Chinese	  attitude	  to	  foreign	  criticism	  in	  a	  rare	  candid	  speech.	  During	  an	  official	   visit	   to	   Mexico	   in	   February	   2009,	   the	   then	   Vice	   President	   Xi	   Jinping	   expressed	   his	  dissatisfaction	  with	  some	  foreigners	  in	  a	  meeting	  with	  Chinese	  citizens	  living	  overseas:	  
There	  are	  some	  foreigners	  who	  have	  eaten	  their	  fill	  and	  have	  nothing	  better	  to	  do,	  pointing	  their	  fingers	  at	  our	  affairs.	  China	  does	  not,	  first,	  export	  revolution;	  second,	  export	  poverty	  and	  hunger;	  or	  third,	  cause	  unnecessary	  trouble	  for	  you.	  What	  else	  is	  there	  to	  say?64	  
In	  Chinese	  face	  culture,	  publicly	  criticising	  one’s	  seniors	  is	  morally	  unacceptable.	  Through	  this	  seemingly	  impromptu	  speech,	  Xi	  Jinping	  classified	  foreign	  criticism	  or	  interference	  with	  China	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  unintelligible	  officiousness.	  Obviously,	  in	  his	  mind,	  a	  perfect	  world	  would	  consist	  of	  countries	   that	   can	   keep	   silent	   about	   other	   countries’	   internal	   affairs.	   His	   attitude	   clearly	  illustrates	  the	  consistent	  antipathy	  towards	  open	  and	  direct	  criticism	  in	  Chinese	  social	  life.	  This	  opinion	  is	  also	  echoed	  by	  the	  rule	  of	  renqing,	  namely,	  ‘If	  I	  don’t	  create	  trouble	  for	  you,	  why	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Information	   source:	   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnQ9M3PY7EI.	   At	   that	   time,	   this	   speech	   was	   not	   reported	   in	  China’s	  official	  state	  media	  but	  on	  some	  local	  TV	  stations,	  after	  which	  it	  spread	  quickly	  on	  the	  Internet.	  Many	  Chinese	  netizens	  on	  major	   websites	   applauded	   Xi’s	   tough	   response	   to	   foreign	   intervention	   and	   criticism.	   One	   such	   typical	   comment	   from	   a	  blogger	  was,	  ‘We	  have	  heard	  too	  much	  diplomatic	  eyewash	  when	  encountering	  foreign	  interference	  in	  the	  past,	  mostly	  nothing	  but	   strong	  protest	  or	  vehement	  condemnation.	  For	  so	   long	  a	   time	  we	  have	  not	  yet	  a	   chance	   to	  hear	  such	  a	   frank	  and	  direct	  voice’.	  (http://www.chinaelections.	  org/article/141/143	  301.html).	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you	  troubling	  me?’	  
To	  many,	  small	  countries	  are	  most	  certainly	  disqualified	  from	  criticising	  China,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  following	  comment	  from	  one	  of	  my	  interviewees:	  
Some	  leaders	  who	  have	  frequent	  contact	  with	  foreigners	  can	  react	  calmly	  to	  foreign	  criticism	   about	   China.	   Some	   other	   leaders	   (who	   are	   mainly	   responsible	   for	  domestic	   affairs)	   are	  not	   quite	   accustomed	   to	  being	   criticised	  by	   small	   countries	  and	  believe	  firmly	  that	  they	  are	  ineligible.	  	  
The	  common	  viewpoint	  is	  that	  guarding	  its	  image	  of	  ‘a	  power	  that	  cannot	  be	  bullied’	  is	  always	  at	  the	  core	  of	  China’s	  reactions	  to	  foreign	  crises	  (Gries,	  2004;	  Ho,	  2015;	  Loewenberg,	  2011).	  For	  the	  Chinese,	  any	  compromise	  can	  inevitably	  become	  an	  issue	  of	  losing	  face	  and	  national	  dignity.	  China’s	  performance	  in	  the	  2012	  Diaoyu	  Island	  conflict	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.65	  When	  explaining	  the	  vehemence	  of	  China’s	  reaction,	  former	  State	  Councillor	  Tang	  Jiaxuan	  told	  Japanese	  politicians	  in	  a	  meeting	  on	  29	  September	  2012	  that	  ‘the	  Japanese	  side	  was	  deaf	  to	  China’s	  advice	  and	  made	  the	   Chinese	   government	   “thoroughly	   lose	   face”	   [Chinese:	  颜面扫地]’	   (Yang,	   2012).	   In	  March	  2013,	   the	   senior	  People	  Liberation	  Army	  General	   Liu	  Yuan	   said	   in	   an	   interview,	   ‘The	  Diaoyu	  Island	  conflicts	  between	  China	  and	  Japan	  are	  actually	  a	  “face	  problem”.	  Both	  sides	  are	  in	  a	  fit	  of	  rage,	  struggling	  to	  save	   face’	   (Lin	  &	  Li,	  2013).	  Later,	   in	  March,	   in	  another	   interview,	  Liu	  Yuan	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  On	  11	  September	  2012,	   the	   Japanese	  government	  purchased	   the	  Diaoyu	   Islands	   from	   Japanese	  private	  owners	  in	  order	   to	  strengthen	  their	  control	  over	  disputed	  territories.	  This	  move	  rapidly	  led	  to	  a	  series	  of	  strong	  counter-­‐‑measures	  by	  the	  Chinese	  government	  and	  also	  prompted	  large-­‐‑scale	  anti-­‐‑Japan	  protests	  around	  China.	  As	  of	  early	  2013,	  the	  situation	  was	  ‘certainly	  the	  most	  serious	  for	  Sino-­‐‑Japanese	  relations	  in	  the	  post-­‐‑war	  period	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  risk	  of	  militarized	  conflict’	  (Christopher,	  2013).	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suggested	   that	   it	  was	   time	   to	  negotiate	  with	   Japan.	  According	   to	  him,	   ‘the	  Chinese	  Party	  and	  government	  has	  made	  totally	  right	  decisions	  on	  the	  Diaoyu	  Island	  conflicts…	  We	  have	  won	  the	  support	   and	  understanding	  of	   the	   international	   community.	  We	   could	   say	   that	  China	  and	  the	  
Chinese	  people	  have	  gained	  enough	  face’	  (Ibid.).	  
In	   such	  utterances,	   it	   is	   striking	   that	   the	   imperative	   to	   regain	   face	   is	  not	   conducive	   to	  easing	  conflicts,	  especially	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  conflict.	  And,	  seemingly,	  only	  when	  China	  feels	  that	  its	  role	  as	  a	  superior	  has	  been	  safeguarded	  and	  even	  promoted	  does	  it	  have	  the	  real	  willingness	  to	  negotiate	  with	  its	  opponent.	  
	  
4.2.5	  Harmonious	  ending	  
Some	   of	   my	   interviewees	   believe	   that	   face	   culture	   encompasses	   some	   positive	   normative	  elements	  and	  definitely	  promotes	  harmony	  among	  nations:	  
‘Concern	   for	   face,	  more	   often,	   has	   served	   as	   a	   constraint	   to	   China’s	   diplomacy.	   It	  causes	  us	  to	  uphold	  our	  ancestors’	  virtues:	  “What	  you	  do	  not	  want	  done	  to	  yourself,	  do	  not	  do	   to	  others”	   [Chinese:	  己所不欲勿施于人].	   If	   I	  do	  not	  want	   to	   lose	   face,	   I	  will	  maintain	  another’s	  face	  as	  much	  as	  possible.’	  	  
‘Face,	   for	   the	   Chinese,	   is	   ultimately	   aimed	   at	   the	   all-­‐‑embracing	   harmony	   of	  relationships.	   In	   the	   field	   of	   international	   relations,	   such	   cultural	   consciousness	  still	  pursues	  mutual	  respect	  and	  the	  coexistence	  of	  civilisations.’	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‘China’s	   seeking	   face	   in	   essence	   reflects	   its	   vision	   for	   the	   harmony	   of	   the	  international	  order	  and	  relationships—a	  kind	  of	  yearning	  for	  “a	  happy	  ending”.’	  	  
These	   comments	   highlight	   China’s	   tendency	   towards	   ego	   enhancement	   and	   shed	   light	   on	   its	  narcissistic	   approach	   to	   external	   affairs.	  However,	   it	   can	  be	   seen	   that	  while	   the	   interviewees	  had	  a	  tendency	  to	  amplify	  goodwill	  or	  self-­‐‑righteous	  ethics,	  they	  deliberately	  made	  no	  mention	  of	   the	   hierarchical	   views	   ingrained	   in	   face	   culture.	   In	   the	   Chinese	   mind,	   harmonious	  coexistence	  worthy	  of	  pursuit	  should	  clearly	  manifest	  in	  an	  inegalitarian	  and	  hierarchical	  form.	  	  
	  
4.3	  Online	  Public	  Opinions	  	  
Face	   is	  frequently	  used	  by	  the	  Chinese	  public	  when	  describing	  and	  evaluating	  political	   issues.	  Searching	  for	  the	  keyword	  face	  [Chinese:	  面子]	  online	  leads	  to	  numerous	  results.	  This	  section	  will	  present	  27	  carefully	  selected	  online	  comments	  with	  the	  goal	  to	  explore	  their	  notions	  about	  a	  superior	  China.	  
	  
4.3.1	  Every	  issue	  can	  be	  a	  face	  issue	  
An	  analysis	  of	  the	  findings	  shows	  that	  face	  culture	  has	  been	  internalised	  by	  the	  Chinese	  public	  in	  its	  understanding	  of	  China’s	  diplomacy.	  For	  the	  public,	  being	  recognized	  as	  major	  power	  is	  a	  preferential	   target	   for	  China’s	  diplomacy.	  Most	  diplomatic	   issues	   are	  viewed	  as	   face	   issues—whether	  or	  not	  China	  is	  respected	  as	  a	  major	  power	  by	  foreign	  others	  is	  an	  explicit	  criterion	  for	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the	  public	  to	  judge	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  China’s	  diplomacy.	  	  
	  
Figure	  4.4.	  Media	  photo	  from	  the	  9.3	  parade66	  
Before	  the	  parade,	  President	  Xi	  and	  other	  foreign	  leaders	  walked	  to	  Tiananmen	  Gate	  Tower.	  
	  
The	  2015	  China	  Victory	  Day	  Parade	   is	  particularly	   illustrative	  of	   such	   logic.	  On	  3	   September	  2015,	   the	   Chinese	   government	   held	   a	   military	   parade	   in	   Beijing	   to	   celebrate	   the	   70th	  anniversary	  of	  Victory	  over	  Japan	  Day	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  A	  key	  focus	  at	  this	  event	  for	  the	  Chinese	  public	  was	  how	  many	  foreign	  leaders	  would	  attend	  the	  ceremony,	  especially	  Western	  and	  Japanese	  leaders.	  Netizens’	  observations	  and	  comments	  largely	  centre	  around	  the	  concept	  of	  face,	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  following	  online	  post	  titles:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Picture	   source:	   Xinhua	   News	   Agency.	   (2015).	   Xi	   Jining	   attended	   Victory	   Day	   Parade.	   Retrieved	   2	   October	   2016,	   from	  http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2015-­‐‑09/03/c_128192441_6.htm.	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Ø   At	  China’s	  parade,	  which	  countries	  will	  give	  China	  face?	  
Ø   Western	  countries	  show	  indifference	  towards	  China’s	  parade.	  Putin	  and	  Park	  Geun-­‐‑hye	  
give	  the	  most	  face.	  
Ø   Why	  don’t	  America,	  Europe	  and	  Japan	  give	  China	  face?	  
Ø   The	  Cold	  War	  between	  the	  East	  and	  West	  and	  the	  face	  of	  a	  major	  power	  
Ø   Pyongyang	  gives	  no	  face	  to	  China;	  China	  cannot	  bear	  North	  Korea	  anymore	  
Ø   Abe	  does	  not	  give	  face	  to	  China	  and	  will	  lose	  four	  opportunities	  in	  the	  future	  
These	   titles	   illustrate	   the	   Chinese	   obsession	  with	   face-­‐‑attainment,	   and	   this	   parade	   seems	   to	  have	  been	  turned	  into	  a	  test	  of	  China’s	  international	  status.	  Many	  netizens’	  opinions	  reflect	  the	  same	  arrogance—since	  China’s	   face	   is	  well	  known,	  all	  countries	  should	  actively	  participate	   in	  its	  events.	  	  
‘The	   consistent	   goal	   of	   the	   Chinese	   government	   for	   this	   parade	   was	   President	  Obama’s	   attendance.	   However,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   parade,	   Obama	   was	   in	   Alaska,	  inspecting	  the	   impact	  of	  climate	  change	  on	  glaciers.	  To	  Beijing,	   this	  obviously	  did	  not	  give	  any	  face	  to	  Xi	  Jinping.’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  2)	  	  
‘North	  Korea	  refused	  to	  give	  face	  to	  China	  this	  time	  and	  only	  sent	  Choe	  Ryong-­‐‑Hae	  as	  its	  representative,	  not	  even	  the	  nominal	  head	  of	  state,	  Kim	  Yong-­‐‑Nam.	  Moreover,	  Pyongyang	  did	  not	   send	  any	  honour	  guard	   to	  participate	   in	   the	  parade.’	   (Netizen	  opinion	  3)	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‘What	  angers	  me	  most	  is	  that	  Singapore’s	  top	  leader	  did	  not	  attend	  the	  ceremony.	  [During	   the	   Second	   World	   War]	   Japan	   also	   occupied	   Singapore	   and	   committed	  horrendous	  crimes	  against	   its	  people…	  We	  should	  realise	   that	  Singapore	   is	  still	  a	  strategic	  pawn	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	  not	  our	  friend.’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  4)	  
‘Indonesia,	   which	   desperately	   needs	   Chinese	   investment,	   held	   off	   making	   a	  decision	  on	  whom	  to	  send	  to	  the	  parade	  for	  quite	  a	  long	  time,	  and	  eventually	  only	  sent	   a	   Minister	   from	   a	   fringe	   department.	   [It	   can	   be	   predicted	   that]	   Indonesia’s	  attitude	   towards	   Beijing	   will	   change,	   and	   its	   relationship	   with	   China	   will	  deteriorate.’67	  (Netizen	  opinion	  5)	  
‘Besides	  Czechoslovakia,	  no	  Western	  country	  sent	  a	  senior	  leader	  to	  attend	  China’s	  parade…	  I	  believe	  that	  it	   is	  not	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  face	  but	  also	  about	  revealing	  that	  the	  U.S.,	   Europe	   and	   Japan	   are	   forging	   a	   new	   alliance	   to	   contain	   China.’	   (Netizen	  opinion	  4)	  
These	   comments	   show	   that,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   Chinese	   netizens	   have	   high	   expectations	  regarding	   China’s	   gain	   of	   face.	   Despite	   having	   sent	   national	   representatives	   to	   the	   parade	   in	  question,	   some	  countries	   (e.g.	  North	  Korea	  and	   Indonesia)	  were	   still	   blamed	   for	  deliberately	  embarrassing	  China.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Chinese	  people	  seem	  to	  be	  easily	  satisfied	  with	  mere	  superficial	  obedience.	  They	  have	  no	  interest	  in	  examining	  whether	  China’s	  fundamental	  traits	  or	   values	   are	   truly	   accepted	  by	   foreigners.	  They	  are	   just	   eager	   to	   confirm	   if	   these	   foreigners	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  For	  the	  9.3	  Parade,	  Indonesia	  sent	  its	  Minister	  of	  Human	  Development	  and	  Cultural	  Affairs	  as	  its	  Presidential	  Envoy.	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attended	   China’s	   party	   humbly	   and	   on	   time,	   whether	   they	   praised	   the	   country	   and	   if	   they	  showed	  it	  enough	  respect.	  Thus,	  being	  a	  ‘major	  power’,	  for	  the	  Chinese	  public,	  more	  often	  than	  not	  is	  only	  a	  mask	  or	  surface-­‐‑level	  show.	  
In	  social	  life,	  the	  loss	  of	  face	  might	  be	  caused	  by	  deliberate	  provocation	  from	  others	  as	  well	  as	  due	   to	   an	   inevitable	  discrepancy	   ‘between	  what	   a	  person	   expects	   or	   claims	   from	  others	   and	  what	   others	   extend	   to	   him	   [or	   her]’	   (Ho,	   2015,	   p.	   873).	   The	   latter	   case	   may	   not	   involve	  malevolence.	   When	   encountering	   China’s	   loss	   of	   face,	   Chinese	   netizens	   generally	   have	   no	  patience	  to	  clarify	  the	  actual	  cause	  but,	  instead,	  easily	  equate	  dissent	  with	  disloyalty	  and	  tend	  to	   be	   irritated	   by	   any	   unsatisfying	   triviality.	   This	   kind	   of	   reaction	   reflects	   Ning	   Liao’s	  observation	  (2013,	  p.	  141)	  about	  China’s	  place	  in	  international	  relations	  today:	  ‘The	  confidence	  of	  the	  resurgent	  state	  uneasily	  coexists	  with	  an	  acute	  sense	  of	  frustration’.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  apparent	   conceit	   in	   fact	   exposes	   the	   feeling	  of	   insecurity	   felt	   by	   the	  Chinese,	  which	  prompts	  them	  to	  find	  every	  opportunity	  to	  confirm	  or	  demonstrate	  their	  unstable	  self-­‐‑importance.	  
	  
4.3.2	  Treat	  with	  partiality	  
The	   Chinese	   concept	   of	   face	   is	   inherently	   hierarchical,	   which	   highlights	   that	   giving	   face	   to	  superiors	  is	  morally	  necessary	  and	  behaviourally	  appropriate.	  Such	  thinking	  is	  closely	  tied	  with	  public	  opinion	  about	  international	  recognition.	  Many	  Chinese	  people	  still	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  every	  small	   country’s	   duty	   to	   actively	   give	   recognition	   to	   all	   great	   countries	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  hierarchical	  ethics.	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Many	  posts	   and	   comments	   online	   express	   the	   scornful	   response	   of	   the	   Chinese	   public	  when	  small	   countries	   fail	   to	   give	   face	   to	   China.	   A	   common	   viewpoint	   is	   that	   once	   a	   small	   country	  dares	  to	  not	  give	   face	  to	  China	  or,	   in	   fact,	   to	  make	  China	   lose	   face,	  every	  other	  country	   in	  the	  world	  will	  dare	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  The	  following	  comments	  all	  represent	  this	  point:	  
‘If	   North	   Korea,	   which	   is	   supported	   by	   China,	   dared	   to	   seize	   Chinese	   ships,	  everyone	  in	  the	  world	  could	  decline	  to	  give	  face	  to	  China.’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  13)	  
‘Once	  we	   let	   the	   small	  Philippines	   stir	  up	   trouble	   in	   the	  South	  China	  Sea,	  China’s	  face	  will	  be	  totally	  lost.’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  14)	  
‘Argentina	  did	  not	  give	   face	  at	  all	  and	  China	  should	  pay	   it	  back	  blow	  for	  blow…	  If	  China	   fails	   to	   have	   a	   hardline	   response,	   all	   the	   other	   countries	   will	   follow	  Argentina,	  and	  the	  safety	  of	   the	  Chinese	  citizens	  will	  be	  at	  risk.’	   (Netizen	  opinion	  15)	  
A	   sense	   of	   hierarchy	   is	   also	   reflected	   in	   the	   idea	   that	   it	   is	   acceptable	   to	   actively	   give	   face	   to	  major	  powers	  on	  many	  occasions.	  A	  major	  power	  for	  most	  Chinese	  people	   is	  one	  of	  the	  many	  developed	   countries	   and	   regional	   powers	   around	   the	   world.	   Netizens	   always	   indicate	   their	  understanding	   of	   or	   support	   for	   China’s	   concessions	   to	   other	   big	   countries,	   especially	   the	  United	  States,	  believing	  that	  China	  must	  give	  them	  face	  for	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  relationship	  or	  for	   its	   own	   long-­‐‑term	   interests.	   For	   example,	   in	   November	   2014,	   after	   attending	   the	   Beijing	  APEC	  leaders’	  summit,	  Obama	  also	  went	  to	  Beijing	  on	  a	  state	  visit.	  An	  online	  comment	  about	  this	  event	  stated,	  ‘It	  is	  imperative	  and	  valuable	  to	  give	  Obama	  a	  grand	  reception.	  If	  we	  give	  him	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enough	   face,	   he	  will	   naturally	  bear	   this	   in	  mind	   in	   the	   future’	   (Netizen	  opinion	  16).	  Another	  said,	   ‘China	  gave	  so	  many	  gifts	  and	  so	  much	  face	  to	  Obama,	  fully	  representing	  our	  sincerity	  to	  establish	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  great	  powers’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  17).	  Since	  2015,	   America	   has	   made	   several	   increasingly	   proactive	   attempts	   to	   infringe	   into	   the	   South	  China	   Sea’s	   expansions.	   Compared	   with	   the	   dominating	   attitude	   they	   adopt	   towards	   small	  countries,	  Chinese	  netizens	  seemed	  more	  calm	  and	  rational	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  U.S.	  One	  blog	  post	  said,	  ‘Why	  not	  give	  the	  U.S.	  some	  face	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea	  issues	  and	  allow	  it	  to	  put	  on	  a	  show	  for	  its	  followers?	  There	  is	  no	  need	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  tough	  and	  direct	  conflict	  with	  the	  U.S.’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  18).	  When	  China	  announced	  that	  it	  would	  finish	  the	  sea	  reclamation	  on	  some	  islands	  and	  reefs	   in	   June	  2015,	  one	  blog	  claimed	  that	   ‘China	   is	   just	  doing	  a	   favor	   for	   the	  U.S.,	  ensuring	  that	  it	  can	  get	  some	  face	  and	  we	  can	  gain	  our	  own	  interests’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  19).	  
	  
4.3.3	  Tit	  for	  tat	  
When	  China	  gains	  face.	  
According	  to	  the	  ethical	  code	  of	  face	  culture,	  the	  Chinese	  are	  extremely	  conscious	  of	  reciprocity.	  When	  China	   is	   perceived	   to	   receive	   recognition	   from	  others,	  many	  online	   comments	   suggest	  the	  importance	  of	  giving	  face	  in	  return	  in	  a	  timely	  fashion.	  The	  logic	  is	  very	  simple:	  if	  you	  give	  me	  face,	  I	  will	  give	  you	  face	  or	  interest	  in	  return;	  if	  you	  decline	  to	  give	  me	  face,	  I	  will	  return	  like	  for	  like.	  	  
To	   the	   senior	   foreign	   leaders	   who	   attended	   the	   9.3	   Parade,	   Chinese	   netizens	   commonly	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expressed	   their	   gratitude	   with	   lavish	   praise,	   believing	   that	   they	   had	   made	   the	   right	   choice	  between	   China	   and	   the	   U.S.	   They	   also	   often	   suggested	   the	   kind	   of	   respect	   the	   attending	  countries	   ought	   to	   receive	   from	   China.	   For	   example,	   one	   comment	   was,	   ‘the	   presence	   of	  President	   Park	   Geun-­‐‑hye	   carries	   the	   most	   weight.	   We	   should	   give	   her	   the	   highest	   level	   of	  welcome’	   (Netizen	   opinion	   6).	   Similarly,	   ‘Park	   Geun-­‐‑hye	   comes	   to	   Beijing	   under	   intense	  pressure	  from	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  She	  is	  admirable	  and	  we	  should	  think	  of	  how	  to	  return	  the	  favour	  to	  South	  Korea’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  2).	  	  
	  
When	  China	  is	  not	  given	  face	  or	  loses	  face	  
Even	  when	  China	   loses	   face,	   Chinese	  netizens	   continue	   to	   follow	   the	  principle	   of	   reciprocity,	  always	  proposing	  suggestions	  about	  counter-­‐‑measures	  that	  should	  be	  taken	  against	  those	  who	  failed	  to	  give	  China	  its	  anticipated	  recognition.	  Below	  are	  some	  comments	  about	  countries	  that	  did	  not	  attend	  the	  9.3	  Parade:	  
‘No	  matter	  what	  excuse	  Kim	  Jong	  Un	  has	  for	  not	  attending	  the	  parade,	  he	  has	  made	  a	  bad	  impression	  on	  the	  Chinese	  people…	  In	  the	  future,	  it	  will	  be	  more	  difficult	  for	  North	  Korea	  to	  get	  China’s	  political	  and	  economic	  support.’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  7)	  
‘The	  United	  States	  will	  suffer	  the	  consequences	  of	  not	  giving	  face	  to	  China…	  China’s	  tit-­‐‑for-­‐‑tat	  reactions	  have	  begun	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea…	  You	  Americans	  refuse	   to	   give	   us	   face,	   we	   Chinese	   will	   make	   you	   lose	   face	   in	   return.’	   (Netizen	  opinion	  8)	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‘Although	   the	   Philippines	   tirelessly	   challenges	   China’s	   core	   interests,	   China	   still	  keeps	  providing	   it	  with	  a	   lot	  of	  assistance.	  Now	  when	  China	  has	  a	  ceremony,	  as	  a	  neighbour,	  you	  should	  participate	  in	  it…	  The	  Philippines	  chose	  to	  follow	  Japan	  and	  did	  not	  give	  China	  face,	  and	  it	  will	  face	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  this	  for	  a	  long	  time.’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  9)	  
Apart	  from	  suggesting	  counter-­‐‑measures,	  the	  Chinese	  also	  react	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  face	  through	  ’self-­‐‑consolation’	   i.e.	  understating	  the	  unfavourable	  effects	  of	   the	   loss	  of	   face	  or	   labelling	  the	  other	  side	  as	  the	  one	  who	  has	  really	  lost	  face.	  A	  case	  in	  point	  is	  an	  incident	  on	  2	  February	  2009	  when	  
a	   protester	   threw	   a	   shoe	   at	   the	   then	   Chinese	   Premier	   Wen	   Jiabao	   during	   his	   speech	   at	  
	  
Figure	  4.5.	  Chinese	  State	  Television	  news	  report	  about	  Wen’s	  speech	  at	  Cambridge	  
University	  The	  title	  of	  this	  news	  item	  is,	  ‘A	  man	  disturbed	  Wen	  Jiabao’s	  speech	  at	  Cambridge	  University,	  drawing	  the	  strong	  opposition	  of	  the	  teachers	  and	  students	  present	  there.’	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Cambridge	  University.	  This	  incident	  was	  necessarily	  regarded	  as	  ‘making	  China	  lose	  face’	  by	  the	  Chinese	   authorities	   and	   the	   public.	   Even	  Wen	   Jiabao’s	   reaction	  was	   a	   bit	   too	   serious.68	  Many	  netizens	   strongly	   condemned	   this	   incident	   and	   also	   showed	   how	   to	   feel	   a	   sense	   of	   spiritual	  triumph	  through	  self-­‐‑consolation.	  	  	  
‘The	  one	  who	  lost	  face	  is	  not	  China	  but	  Cambridge	  University.	  It	  is	  surprising	  that	  Cambridge	  University,	  a	  palace	  of	  world	  civilization,	  treated	  a	  Chinese	  elder	  in	  this	  way…	  When	   you	   the	  Western	   politicians	   give	   lectures	   in	   China,	   we	  would	   never	  allow	  such	  a	  rogue	  to	  make	  such	  trouble.’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  10)	  
‘The	   British	   men	   are	   very	   clear	   that	   China	   cares	   about	   its	   face	   very	   much…	  Consequently,	   it	   can	   be	   seen	   that	   the	   UK	   government	   expressed	   a	   high-­‐‑profile	  apology	  immediately,	  making	  us	  regain	  enough	  face.’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  11)	  
‘The	   gesture	   of	   China’s	   Premier	   (in	   response	   to	   being	   attacked)	   shows	   not	   only	  calmness	  and	  wisdom	  but	  also	  Chinese	  uprightness,	  confidence,	  dignity	  and	  a	  great	  mind.	  Western	   politicians	   cannot	   be	   compared	   to	   ours	   in	   this	   respect.’	   (Netizen	  opinion	  12)	  
Turning	  defeats	  into	  victories	  is	  a	  typical	  face-­‐‑saving	  self-­‐‑deceptive	  tactic	  that	  the	  Chinese	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  After	   the	   shoe-­‐‑throwing	   incident,	  Wen	   continued	  his	   speech	   and	   condemned	   the	  behaviour:	   ‘Teachers	   and	   students,	   such	  despicable	  behavior	  cannot	  hold	  back	  the	   friendship	  of	   the	  Chinese	  and	  British	  people.	   [The]	  progress	  of	  mankind	  and	  [the]	  harmony	  of	  the	  world	  are	  the	  tides	  of	  history.	  No	  force	  can	  hold	  them	  back.’	  Related	  reports:	  The	  Telegraph.	  (2009).	  Shoe:	  Man	  charged	   for	   throwing	   shoe	   at	   Chinese	   Prime	   Minister.	   Retrieved	   April	   26,	   2016,	   from	  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-­‐‑and-­‐‑order/4445952/Shoe-­‐‑man-­‐‑charged-­‐‑for-­‐‑throwing-­‐‑shoe-­‐‑at-­‐‑Chinese-­‐‑Prime-­‐‑Minister.html.	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adept	  at.	  The	  above	  arguments	  all	  try	  to	  remedy	  the	  battered	  image	  of	  a	  major	  power	  from	  this	  embarrassment	   and	   to	   regain	   psychological	   balance	   by	   transforming	   a	   ‘loss	   of	   face’	   into	   the	  ‘gain	  of	  face’.	  
	  
4.3.4	  Criticism	  towards	  face	  diplomacy	  
There	  are	  a	  large	  number	  of	  different	  opinions	  in	  China	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  face	  diplomacy.	  Since	  I	  started	  this	  research,	  I	  have	  been	  asking	  every	  Chinese	  person	  I	  meet,	  ‘Do	  you	  support	  China’s	  face	  diplomacy?	  Do	  you	  support	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Chinese	  government	  tries	  to	  be	  recognised	  as	  a	  major	  power,	  no	  matter	  what	  price	  it	  has	  to	  pay?’	  I	  still	  do	  not	  have	  a	  clear	  idea	  about	  which	  side	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  fall	  on—supporting	  or	  opposing.	  Many	  believe	  that	  to	  seek	  face	  is	  always	  unquestionably	  justified	  in	  Chinese	  life,	  so	  it	  will	  be	  the	  same	  with	  the	  country.	  I	  once	  asked	  a	  taxi	  driver	  in	  Beijing	  whether,	  as	  a	  local	  citizen,	  he	  approved	  of	  so	  many	  international	  summits	   held	   in	   Beijing	   one	   after	   another	   and	  whether	   he	   felt	   troubled	   by	   these	   ‘perfectly’	  organised	  activities.	  He	  said,	   ‘I	  totally	  support	  these	  international	  activities.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  be	  bothered	  by	  these.	  What	  is	  Beijing	  for？It	   is	  a	  capital,	  meant	  to	  gain	  face	  for	  the	  country.	  The	  whole	  world	  does	  need	  to	  come	  to	  Beijing	  to	  see	  our	  country,	  our	  developments.	  We	  [Chinese]	  have	  been	  repressed	  for	  so	  many	  years,	  and	  it	  is	  time	  for	  us	  to	  “hold	  our	  heads	  high”	  [Chinese:	  
扬眉吐气]’.	  One	  of	  my	  young	  friends	  who	  grew	  up	  and	  still	  lives	  in	  Beijing	  expressed	  a	  different	  feeling:	   ‘Many	   people	   have	   become	   fed	   up	   with	   the	   non-­‐‑stop	   international	   summits	   held	   in	  China.	  The	  mentality	  of	  people	  who	   live	   in	  developed	  areas	   [of	  China]	  has	  been	  very	  mature,	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and	  they	  [the	  citizens]	  care	  more	  about	  their	  daily	  lives	  instead	  of	  the	  country’s	  face’.	  
Here	   are	   some	   fragments	   from	   an	   article	   called	   Hangzhou	   G20:	   Great	   Nation	   and	   Vanished	  
Society	  (Xu,	  2016),	  which	  documents	  how	  the	  Chinese	  government	  hosts	  international	  summits	  in	   order	   to	   gain	   face	   and	   how	   divergent	   the	   Chinese	   public’s	   opinions	   are	   regarding	   face	  diplomacy:69	  
Over	   the	   past	   several	   months,	   the	   main	   streets	   of	   Hangzhou	   have	   been	   purged,	  buildings	   along	   the	   streets	   repainted	   and	   all	   outdoor	   construction	   is	   required	   to	  stop	  before	  September.	  [During	  the	  conference]	  all	  the	  factories	  on	  the	  periphery	  of	  Hangzhou	   were	   scheduled	   to	   shut	   down	   in	   order	   to	   create	   the	   G20	   blue	   sky.	  Express	  deliveries	  in	  Zhejiang	  Province	  were	  tightly	  controlled,	  which	  resulted	  in	  a	  serious	   impact	   on	   Hangzhou’s	   e-­‐‑commerce	   and	   express	   industry.	   Many	   public	  institutions	   let	   their	   employees	   go	   on	   holiday	   from	   early	   September,	   and	  universities	   [in	   Hangzhou]	   postponed	   their	   opening	   dates.	   During	   the	   G20,	  Hangzhou’s	  citizens	  could	  visit	  scenic	  spots	  of	  Zhejiang	  province	  either	  for	  free	  or	  with	   heavy	   discounts,	   and	   even	   some	   attractions	   in	   Anhui	   and	   Guizhou	   offered	  discounts	  to	  citizens	  of	  Hangzhou.	  
In	  Hangzhou,	  many	  migrant	  workers	  were	  repatriated,	  and	  rental	  houses	  became	  vacant.	  All	   the	  small	   shops	  near	   the	  summit	  zone	  were	  closed	  and	  were	   formally	  given	  only	  very	  little	  compensation.	  All	  of	  these	  actions	  were	  claimed	  to	  be	  for	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  The	  2016	  G20	  Hangzhou	   summit	  was	   the	  11th	  G20	  meeting,	   held	  on	  4-­‐‑5	  September	  2016	   in	  Hangzhou,	   the	   capital	   of	   the	  Zhejiang	  Province.	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security	  of	  G20	  and	   citizens	  were	   required	   to	   comply	  with	   them	  unconditionally.	  The	   government	   indeed	  did	  not	   force	   all	   the	   citizens	   to	   leave	   their	   city	  but	   tried	  various	  means	  to	  make	  the	  hosts—the	  people	  of	  Hangzhou—not	  stay	  there	  [during	  the	   meeting].	   In	   early	   September,	   Hangzhou	   was	   like	   an	   empty	   city.	   More	  importantly,	  there	  is	  no	  law	  or	  formal	  regulation	  for	  many	  of	  the	  repatriations	  and	  limitations.	  
[…]	  
[On	  Chinese	  social	  media]	  comments	  sharply	  contrast	  between	  fervent	  praise	  and	  incessant	   complaints.	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	   identify	   which	   sound	   is	   louder	   and	   more	  real…	   People	   who	   dislike	   G20	   rebuke	   it	   as	   a	   Face	   Project	   [Chinese:	  面子工程],	  which	  cannot	  benefit	  the	  citizens,	  and	  some	  others	  say	  that	  G20	  is	  also	  their	  own	  affair	  which	  they	  would	  like	  to	  serve.	  The	  former	  set	  denounces	  the	  latter	  for	  being	  hypocritical	  and	  blindly	  patriotic;	   the	   latter	  criticizes	   the	   former	   for	  being	  selfish	  and	   immoral.	   Views	   of	   all	   parties…	   contend	   with	   each	   other	   fiercely	   and	   only	  emphasize	  that	  their	  own	  opinion	  must	  be	  right	  and	  others	  must	  be	  wrong.	  Various	  ideas	  are	  intolerant,	  mutually	  exclusive	  and	  cannot	  coexist	  with	  others.	  
Indeed,	   a	   large	   number	   of	   online	   users	   have	   a	   distinctly	   critical	   attitude	   towards	   face	  diplomacy.	   Of	   course,	   not	   all	   the	   criticism	   seen	   on	   Chinese	   websites	   is	   against	   the	   Chinese	  government—only	   some	   of	   it	   opposes	   certain	   diplomatic	   behaviours	   that	   seem	   to	   be	   too	  concerned	  with	  the	  country’s	  face.	  One	  prevailing	  view	  is	  that	  ‘it	  is	  time	  to	  say	  goodbye	  to	  face	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diplomacy’.	  (Netizen	  opinion	  20).	  
Ignoring	  cost	  
‘Today,	  Chinese	  citizens	  always	  criticize	  the	  government	  for	  allocating	  resources	  abroad	  when	  poverty	  and	  other	  pressing	  challenges	  still	  exist	  at	  home’	  (Shambaugh,	  2014).	  In	  the	  collected	  data,	  many	  netizens	  expressed	  their	  concern	  about	  China’s	  role	  as	  a	  self-­‐‑sacrificial	  actor	  in	  the	  search	  for	  recognition	  and	  want	  the	  government	  to	  handle	  diplomacy	  with	  the	  national	  interest	  in	  mind.	  Such	  ideas	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  following	  quotes:	  
‘Our	  diplomacy	  always	  overemphasizes	  face	  but	  neglects	  the	  protection	  of	  our	  core	  interests.	  We	  do	  not	   care	   about	   the	   scale	  of	   the	  honor	   guard	  or	  national	  dinners	  [hosted	   by	   foreigners].	   What	   we	   should	   be	   concerned	   about	   is	   our	   country’s	  interests.’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  21)	  
‘To	   show	  national	   strength,	  we	   either	   buy	   rich	   countries’	   national	   debts	  without	  considering	  the	  risks	  or	  conduct	  dollar	  diplomacy	  or	  purchasing	  diplomacy	  around	  the	  world.	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  naturally	  gain	  face,	  but	  no	  one	  is	  clear	  of	  what	  substantial	  interests	  we	  really	  gain.’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  22)	  
‘China	  is	  still	  not	  rich	  and,	   in	  fact,	   there	  are	  many	  vast	  areas	  that	  are	  poorer	  than	  the	  countries	  we	  give	  aid	  to.	  It	  is	  bitterly	  disappointing	  that	  our	  government	  keeps	  throwing	  money	  lavishly	  to	  the	  outside	  world	  only	  to	  gain	  face	  as	  a	  major	  power.’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  23)	  
‘The	   term	   ‘APEC	   Blue’	   has	   a	   special	   meaning,	   referring	   to	   something	   that	   is	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beautiful	  but	  fleeting	  and	  ultimately	  inauthentic.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  such	  beauty,	  for	  a	  superficially	   glamorous	   face,	   we	   always	   waste	   manpower	   and	   money.’	   (Netizen	  opinion	  24)	  
	  	  	  
Empty	  slogans	  
Some	  people	  think	  China	  should	  reduce	  its	  diplomatic	  slogans	  and	  titles	  intended	  only	  to	  show	  its	   greatness,	   but	   which	   seldom	   really	   bring	   international	   recognition	   to	   China	   and,	   in	   fact,	  often	  increase	  misunderstandings	  with	  other	  countries.	  According	  to	  one	  blog	  post,	   ‘In	  recent	  years,	  China’s	  diplomatic	  authority	  has	  invented	  many	  new	  terms,	  new	  slogans,	  new	  concepts,	  such	   as	  Great	  Power	  Diplomacy,	  Diplomatic	  Confidence,	  Diplomatic	  Composure,	  New	  Pattern	  of	  
Relationship	   between	   Great	   Powers…	   If	   these	   concepts	   were	   proposed	   by	   the	   United	   States	  Secretary	   of	   State	   or	   the	   Russian	   Foreign	   Minister,	   the	   whole	   world	   would	   take	   their	  implications	   seriously.	   However,	   because	   they	   have	   been	   coined	   by	   Chinese	   diplomats,	  everyone	  knows	  that	   they	  are	  only	   intended	  to	  prettify	  China’s	   image	  and	  please	  the	  Chinese	  leaders	  and	  public’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  25).	  
	  
Circumventing	  criticism	  
It	   is	   generally	   believed	   that	   face	   concern	   is	   a	   sign	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   self-­‐‑confidence.	   One	   article	  presents	   the	   following	   sharp	   criticism,	   ‘China	   only	   develops	   relations	   with	   states	   who	   are	  obsequious	   to	  us,	  and	   it	   treats	  negatively	   the	  states	  who	  criticize	  us…	  We	  should	  realize	   that	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only	  the	  countries	  that	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  the	  world	  dare	  to	  criticise	  China’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  25).	  Some	  netizens	  expect	  that,	  with	  China’s	  rise,	  it	  could	  develop	  a	  more	  mature	  and	  confident	   mentality	   and	   heed	   the	   counsel	   of	   outside	   voices.	   One	   typical	   opinion	   is,	   ‘Two	  questions	  are	  worth	  our	  consideration.	  First,	  how	  do	  foreigners	  make	  comments	  on	  China?	  Do	  they	  judge	  China	  independently	  and	  objectively?	  Second,	  what	  is	  the	  real	  purpose	  behind	  their	  comments?	  If	  some	  only	  say	  nice	  things,	  does	  this	  mean	  they	  are	  really	  friendly	  towards	  us?	  If	  some	  criticize	  us	  without	  mercy,	  do	  they	  really	  hate	  China?’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  26).	  
	  
The	  domestically	  oriented	  international	  image.	  
The	   public	   has	   been	   progressively	   conscious	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   much	   of	   China’s	   international	  recognition	  has	  been	  created	  by	  Chinese	  authorities	  and	   the	  media,	   to	  promote	   the	  domestic	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  regime.	  ‘Contemporary	  Chinese	  diplomacy	  still	  has	  a	  very	  strong	  sense	  of	  face,	  and	   the	   official	   propaganda	   departments	   are	   always	   committed	   to	   singing	   the	   country’s	  praises.	  Our	  newspapers	  only	  publish	  foreigners’	  praise	  and	  good	  words’	  (Netizen	  opinion	  27).	  When	  China	  had	  conflicts	  with	  Japan	  over	  the	  Diaoyu	  Islands	  in	  early	  2013,	  one	  netizen	  noted	  that	   during	   that	   period,	   our	   media	   emphasised	   that	   ‘the	   Japanese	   leaders	   unceasingly	   seek	  compromise,	   but	   our	   leaders	   deliberately	   alienate	   them’	   (Netizen	   opinion	   27).	   The	   only	  information	  conveyed	  is	  that	  ‘China	  has	  restored	  its	  lost	  face	  from	  Japan’	  (Ibid.).	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4.4	  Reports	  from	  Overseas	  Medias	  
China’s	   face	  diplomacy	   is	  an	  enduring	   topic	   in	   international	  media	  reports.	  Face	  as	  a	  cultural	  concept	   is	   often	   cited	   along	   with	   some	   other	   typically	   Chinese	   behavioural	   patterns.	   In	  addition,	  the	  international	  medias	  also	  closely	  observes	  foreign	  countries	  and,	  specifically,	  how	  they	  respond	  to	  China’s	  face	  diplomacy.	  
	  
4.4.1	  Crucial	  diplomatic	  goal	  
The	  international	  medias	  often	  report	  that	  China’s	  heightened	  sense	  of	  face	  culture	  constitutes	  its	  key	  motivational	  factor	  for	  seeking	  international	  acclamation.	  	  
Whenever	   China	   hosts	   major	   international	   events,	   the	   term	   of	   face	   is	   always	   mentioned	   to	  describe	   the	   Chinese	   government’s	   elaborate	   preparations	   and	   hospitable	   reception.	   For	  example,	  regarding	  the	  authority’s	  measures	  to	  control	  air	  pollution	  in	  Beijing	  during	  the	  2014	  APEC	  summit,	  George	  Chen	  (2014)	  commented,	  ‘It’s	  no	  secret	  that	  the	  new	  Chinese	  leadership	  is	   so	   keen	   to	   show	   off	   the	   country’s	   economic	   success	   by	   hosting	   the	   APEC	   summit	   that	  anything	  that	  is	  considered	  counter-­‐‑productive	  to	  having	  “face”	  for	  China	  should	  be	  eliminated	  by	   all	   means’.	   Bowen	   Press	   (2016)	   described	   2016’s	   Boao	   Forum	   for	   Asia	   in	   the	   following	  words:	  ‘At	  the	  last	  moment	  of	  the	  closing	  performance	  and	  dinner,	  most	  of	  the	  guests	  and	  staff	  members	  must	   feel	   relieved	   about	   this	   boring	   and	  marathon	   forum,	   as	   this	   extravagant	   and	  luxurious	  show	  is	  only	  another	  face	  project	  of	  the	  Chinese	  government’.	  The	  grandest	  meeting	  in	   the	   first	   half	   of	   2017	   must	   have	   been	  the	  Belt	  and	   Road	  forum	   held	   in	   Beijing,	   which	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attracted	   heads	   of	   29	   states	   and	   representatives	   from	   more	   than	   190	   countries	   and	  international	  organisations.	  Kadira	  Pethiyagoda	  (2017)	  says,	   ‘The	  Silk	  Road	  Summit,	  covering	  China’s	  One	  Belt,	  One	  Road	  (OBOR)	  initiative,	  is	  as	  much	  about	  celebrating	  Beijing’s	  rise	  as	  the	  2008	   Olympics	   were… This	   is	   infused	   with	   the	   concept	   of	  mianzi	  or	   face,	   which	   prioritizes	  recognition	  by	  others’.	  	  
Certainly,	  face	  concern,	  or	  the	  fetishising	  of	  protocol	  and	  hierarchy	  in	  diplomatic	  visits,	  has	  also	  been	  noticed	  by	  the	  media.	  When	  reporting	  on	  the	  first	  official	  meeting	  between	  President	  Xi	  and	  President	  Trump	  in	  April	  2017,	  Reuters	  voices	  China’s	  real	  focus:	  
‘Ensuring	   President	   Xi	   does	   not	   lose	   face	   is	   a	   top	   priority	   for	   China,’	   a	   Chinese	  official	  said.	  U.S.	  Presidents’	  meetings	  with	  their	  Chinese	  counterparts	  are	  usually	  more	  tightly	  scripted	  than	  with	  other	   foreign	   leaders,	  something	  Chinese	  officials	  insist	   on	   to	   make	   sure	   they	   are	   treated	   with	   the	   decorum	   they	   believe	   befits	   a	  global	  power.	  (Brunnstrom,	  Spetalinick,	  &	  Blanchard,	  2017)	  
An	   article	   from	   the	   South	  China	  Morning	  Post,	   a	   newspaper	   from	   Singapore,	   points	   out	   that	  ‘summit	  diplomacy	  is	  perceived	  differently	  in	  Beijing	  and	  Washington,	  with	  Chinese	  diplomats	  appearing	   to	   attach	  more	   importance	   to	   protocol	   and	   American	   ones	   preferring	   to	   focus	   on	  substance	  over	   form,	  and	   that	   raises	   the	   stakes	  enormously’	   (Shi,	  2017).	   In	  particular,	   ‘small	  symbols	  such	  as	  their	  [Xi	  and	  Trump’s]	  handshakes	  are	  all	  part	  of	  diplomacy	  and	  often	  cited	  as	  diplomatic	   accomplishments’	   (Ibid.).	   On	   the	   same	   issue,	  TIME	   (2017)	   says,	   ‘Donald	   Trump’s	  hands	  are	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  protocol-­‐‑conscious	  Chinese	  delegation’,	  and	  ‘any	  tomfoolery	  like	  an	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Abe	  handshake	  would	  not	  be	  easily	  laughed	  off’70	  (Campbell,	  2017).	  
An	   indispensable	   way	   of	   accommodating	   China’s	   face	   demands	   is	   to	   ensure	   that	   Chinese	  leaders	  enjoy	  diplomatic	  courtesies	   that	  are	  above	  their	   level.	  For	  example,	   in	   June	  2014,	   the	  British	  media	   commonly	   published	   report	   along	   these	   lines:	   ‘Chinese	   officials	   threatened	   to	  sabotage	  an	   important	  diplomatic	   trip	   to	  Britain	  by	   the	  Communist	  country’s	  prime	  minister	  (i.e.,	   Li	   Keqiang)	   unless	   he	   could	  meet	   the	  Queen’	   (Webb,	   2014).	   Then,	   interestingly,	   China’s	  official	  media	  also	  responded	  to	  the	  accusation.	  An	  editorial	  in	  the	  Global	  Times	  (2014)	  says,	  ‘It	  is	  completely	  normal	  and	  proper	  for	  the	  Chinese	  premier	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  British	  Queen,	  who	  should	  make	  her	  own	  contribution	  to	  the	  success	  of	  this	  diplomatic	  event… A	  rising	  country	  should	  understand	   the	  embarrassment	  of	   an	  old	  declining	  empire	  and	  at	   times	   the	  eccentric	  acts	  it	  does	  to	  hide	  such	  embarrassment’.	  
Whenever	   China	   is	   confronted	  with	   a	   diplomatic	   crisis,	  maintaining	   or	   saving	   face	   is	   always	  viewed	   as	   the	   first	   priority	   of	   the	   Chinese	   authorities.	  When	   Japan	   seized	   a	   Chinese	   fishing	  vessel	  that	  strayed	  close	  to	  the	  disputed	  Diaoyu	  Islands	  in	  September	  2010,	  Hong	  Kong’s	  Apple	  
Daily	  stated	  that	  Beijing’s	  primary	  task	  must	  have	  been	  to	  preserve	  its	  face	  as	  a	  regional	  major	  power.	  ‘According	  to	  past	  experience,	  China’s	  sanction	  against	  or	  compromise	  with	  Japan	  could	  not	  guarantee	  consistency,	  which	  were	  always	  subordinate	   to	  only	   the	  CPC’s	   face	  rather	   than	  national	   interests	   and	   public	   opinions’	   (Ping,	   2010).	   In	   2010,	   when	   the	   Nobel	   Committee	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  The	  background	  here	  is	  that	  on	  10	  February	  2017,	  President	  Donald	  Trump	  and	  Japanese	  Prime	  Minister	  Shinzo	  Abe	  shared	  a	   19-­‐‑second	   handshake	   during	   a	   photo-­‐‑op	   at	   the	  White	   House.	   During	   the	  whole	   process,	   Trump	   is	   believed	   to	   have	   been	  impolite	  and	  mighty,	  embarrassing	  his	  Japanese	  counterpart.	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awarded	  the	  Chinese	  literary	  critic	  Liu	  Xiaobo	  the	  Nobel	  Peace	  Prize,	  this	  event	  was	  ‘a	  horrible	  embarrassment	   that	   makes	   China	   lose	   face’	   (Peter,	   2010).	   Regarding	   China’s	   reactions,	   the	  
Telegraph	  states	  that	  ‘China	  responded	  like	  a	  scolded	  child	  determined	  to	  spoil	  the	  party,	  doing	  everything	  in	  its	  power	  to	  undermine	  the	  Nobel	  ceremony’	  (Ibid.).	  
The	   Chinese	   media	   is	   the	   main	   force	   behind	   presenting	   China’s	   international	   face	   to	   its	  domestic	   audience.	   CNBC	   notes	   that	   for	   Xi	   Jinping’s	   state	   visit	   to	   Britain	   in	   2015,	   ‘China’s	  propaganda	  machine	  has	  cranked	   into	  top	  gear	  as	  Chinese	  President	  Xi	   Jinping	  takes	  a	  grand	  tour	  of	  Britain,	  with	  media	  lauding	  the	  “super	  state	  tour”	  as	  a	  “breakthrough”	  in	  U.K.-­‐‑Chinese	  relations’	   (Kit,	   2015).	  Sky	  News	   also	   observed	   that	   ‘as	   far	   as	   anyone	   following	  China’s	  media	  coverage	  is	  concerned,	  the	  President’s	  visit	  is	  an	  unmitigated	  and	  quite	  extraordinary	  success’	  (Katie,	  2015).	  On	  the	  content	  of	  the	  report,	  ‘Chinese	  media	  obsessively	  chronicled	  every	  detail	  of	  Xi’s	  state	  visit,	  describing	  each	  dish	  served	  at	  the	  state	  dinner,	  along	  with	  the	  significance	  of	  flowers	  used	  for	  the	  decor	  (the	  rose	  is	  precious	  in	  the	  East	  and	  the	  West)	  and	  the	  21-­‐‑gun	  salute’	  (David,	  2015).	  
To	  sum	  up,	  Chinese	  diplomacy	  has	  a	  soft	  spot	  for	  positive	  attention	  given	  to	  Chinese	  leaders	  in	  the	  foreign	  press.	  Although	  China	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  rational	  international	  actor,	  its	  pursuit	  of	  international	  recognition	  makes	  it	  tend	  to	  neglect	  some	  more	  valuable	  issues	  or	  interests,	  or	  to	  be	  seemingly	  easily	  satisfied	  with	  mere	  superficial	  respect.	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4.4.2	  Behind	  the	  scenes	  
For	  the	  Chinese,	  preserving	  face	  is	  much	  more	  imperative	  than	  being	  candid	  about	  one’s	  true	  feelings	   in	  public.	  According	   to	   this	   logic,	   the	  most	   secure	  way	  of	  dealing	  with	   interpersonal	  contradictions	  is	  to	  ‘prevent	  conflicts	  from	  rising	  to	  the	  surface’	  (Kirkbride,	  Tang,	  &	  Westwood,	  1991)	  or	  at	  least	  to	  maintain	  superficial	  stability	  in	  a	  relationship.	  This	  also	  means	  that	  Chinese	  facework	  is	  habitually	  conducted	  in	  a	  very	  theatrical	  way	  or,	  as	  a	  saying	  goes	  in	  China,	  ‘do	  one	  thing	  in	  front	  of	  people	  and	  another	  behind	  their	  backs’	  [Chinese:	  人前一套，人后一套].	  
This	  kind	  of	   facework	   is	  often	  witnessed	   in	  how	  China	  deals	  with	  problems	  under	   the	   table.	  Australian	   journalist	   John	   Garnaut	   (Cited	   from	   China	   Review	   News,	   2009)	   emphasises	   the	  necessity	   of	   conducting	   diplomacy	  with	   China	   privately.	  He	   believes	   that	   foreign	   leaders	   can	  indeed	  discuss	  any	  taboo	  topic	  with	  Beijing	  or	  take	  any	  measure	  that	  may	  violate	  China’s	  core	  interests,	  but	  the	  trick	  is	  to	  do	  it	  silently.	  Deutsche	  Welle	  (2014)	  summarises	  the	  communication	  skills	  needed	   to	  get	   along	  with	  China	  as	   follows:	   ‘Do	  not	  make	  China	   lose	   face;	  do	  not	   adopt	  symbolic	  measures;	   do	   not	   [create	   a]	   hue	   and	   cry,	   and	   just	   insist	   silently’.	   One	   commentary	  published	   in	   The	   New	   York	   Times	   suggests	   that	   American	   politicians	   should	   be	   more	  considerate	   and	   flexible	   when	   dealing	   with	   China’s	   human	   rights	   issues.	   Concretely,	   ‘the	  Chinese	   are	   saying	   to	   Americans,	   if	   you	   grant	   me	   face,	   I	   can	   be	   reasonable;	   if	   solving	   the	  problem	  will	  help	  me,	  I’ll	  consider	  it.	  But	  don’t	  expect	  me	  to	  make	  concessions	  under	  pressure’	  (Min,	  2011).	  	  
Cited	  from	  the	  Chinese	  website	  of	  the	  Financial	  Times,	  Xue	  Li	  (2017),	  a	  scholar	  at	  the	  Chinese	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Academy	   of	   Social	   Science,	   criticises	   the	   leaders	   of	   Singapore	   for	   making	   Sino-­‐‑Singapore	  relations	  tense	  following	  2016’s	  South	  China	  Sea	  incident:	  	  
They	  [the	  leaders	  of	  Singapore]	  think	  little	  of	  the	  function	  of	  face	  culture	  in	  China’s	  diplomacy	  and	  tend	  to	  use	  the	  western	  ways	  of	  thinking	  to	  deal	  with	  China,	  e.g.,	  to	  react	   publicly,	   ignore	   private	   communication,	   highlight	   rationality	   and	   law,	   and	  neglect	  emotion	  and	  politics.	  They	  do	  not	  distinguish	  properly	  between	  ‘issues	  that	  can	  be	  publicly	  declared’	  and	   ‘issues	   that	   should	  be	  privately	   communicated’.	  For	  the	  Chinese,	  all	  of	  these	  behaviors	  seem	  to	  be	  ‘not	  my	  kind	  of	  people’	  [Chinese:	  非
我族类].	  This	  may	  be	  the	  deep	  reason	  why	  this	  time	  the	  Chinese	  who	  have	  different	  political	  attitudes	  all	  feel	  antipathy	  against	  Singapore.	  
	  
4.4.3	  Foreigners’	  understanding	  of	  China’s	  face	  diplomacy	  
Foreign	   leaders	   have	   commonly	   shown	   sophistication	   in	   their	   understanding	   of	   China’s	   face	  diplomacy	  and	  have	  been	  successful	  at	  trying	  to	  do	  good	  by	  giving	  recognition	  to	  China.	  
Nowadays,	  the	  worldwide	  consensus	  is	  that	  China	  would	  be	  happy	  to	  pay	  substantial	  costs	  just	  to	  be	  recognised	  as	  superior.	  According	  to	  Apple	  Daily,	  ‘During	  visits	  to	  some	  countries,	  the	  top	  Chinese	  leaders	  are	  willing	  to	  spend	  money	  heedlessly	  on	  the	  meaningless	  title	  “partnership”	  or	  some	  lavish	  praise.	  For	  Hu	  Jintao’s	  and	  Xi	  Jinping’s	  state	  visit	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  China	  respectively	  spent	  24.9	  billion	  and	  27.1	  billion	  dollars	  on	  American	  goods.	  Both	  were	   typical	  examples	  of	  “Big	  Gift	  Diplomacy”	   [Chinese:	  大礼外交]’	   (Ping,	   2012).	   The	   international	  media	   also	   noticed	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that	   foreign	   leaders	   are	   familiar	   with	   China’s	   face	   concerns.	   According	   to	   21CB.com,	  ‘Consciously	  aware	  or	  not,	  Obama	  seems	  astutely	  privy	   to	   the	  Chinese	  government’s	   cultural	  emphasis	   on	   face’	   (Sue,	   2009).	   The	   Hong	   Kong-­‐‑based	  Ming	  Newspaper	   points	   out	   that	   it	   is	  totally	  expected	  that	  on	  his	  2015	  state	  visit	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  Xi	  would	  receive	  a	  grand	  reception,	  as	  ‘Obama,	  who	  has	  known	  very	  well	   about	  Chinese	   face	   culture	   just	   adopts	  a	   realistic	   tactic	  of	  “China	  gains	   face	  and	  America	  gains	   interests”.	  He	  used	   the	  ceremony	   to	  welcome	  Xi	   Jinping,	  making	  his	  Chinese	  guest	  feel	  at	  home’	  (Ding,	  2015).	  	  
Certainly,	  President	  Obama	  is	  not	  the	  only	  leader	  who	  expertly	  caters	  to	  China’s	  face	  diplomacy.	  For	  Xi’s	  2015	  state	  visit	  to	  the	  U.K.,	  the	  Guardian	  notes	  that	  ‘Britain’s	  determination	  to	  build	  a	  golden	   era	  of	   relations	  with	  China	   and	   its	   increasing	   silence	  on	   issues	   such	   as	  human	   rights	  marks	  a	  striking	  U-­‐‑turn	  for	  David	  Cameron’	  (Tom,	  2015),	  who	  had	  dared	  to	  openly	  criticise	  the	  human	  rights	  conditions	  in	  China	  in	  the	  past.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  the	  fierce	  criticism	  that	  Britain	  has	  abandoned	   its	  political	  principles	  by	  cosying	  up	  China,	  British	  officials	  claimed	  that	   they	   ‘can	  achieve	   more	   by	   raising	   issues	   such	   as	   human	   rights	   behind	   the	   scenes	   than	   by	   hectoring	  Beijing	  publicly’	  (Reuters,	  2015).	  
In	  October	  2015,	  German	  Chancellor	  Angela	  Merkel	  made	  her	  eighth	  official	  visit	  to	  China.	  One	  article	   published	   on	  Deutsche	  Welle’s	   website	   praises	  Merkel’s	   diplomatic	   skills:	   ‘On	   the	   one	  hand,	   she	   never	   stops	   offering	   criticism	   to	   China,	   exuding	   her	   confidence	   as	   a	   leader	   of	   a	  European	  major	  power;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  she	  also	  knows	  what	  she	  said	  can	  make	  China	  gain	  enough	   face”	   (Deutsche	  Welle,	   2015).	   Interestingly,	   when	   journalists	   met	   with	   the	   Chinese	  Prime	  Minister	   Li	   Keqiang,	  Merkel	   said,	   ‘We	   can	   also	   provide	   beautiful	   pomp	   to	   the	   Chinese	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guests…	  The	  only	  problem	  is	  that	  we	  Germans	  do	  not	  have	  a	  queen’	  (Ibid.).	  
China’s	  neighbours	  are	  believed	  to	  have	  more	  cultural	  advantages	  than	  the	  Westerners	  when	  it	  comes	   to	   responding	   to	   Chinese	   face	   concerns.	   As	   argued	   by	   Niu	   Baiyu	   (2014),	   a	   political	  commentator	  from	  Hong	  Kong,	  the	  Japanese	  government	  has	  a	  very	  thorough	  understanding	  of	  China’s	  face	  culture:	  ‘A	  common	  dynamic	  can	  be	  found	  very	  easily	  in	  the	  Sino-­‐‑Japan	  diplomatic	  history:	  Japan	  often	  stirs	  up	  trouble	  and	  then	  shows	  a	  very	  tough	  posture	  just	  like	  China	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  a	  conflict.	  However,	  when	  Japan	  achieves	  its	  goal,	  it	  will	  soften	  the	  attitude	  very	  quickly,	   be	   obsequious	   to	   China	   and	   give	   China	   enough	   face.	   The	  Chinese	   authorities	  will	   be	  very	  satisfied	  with	  this	  pattern	  of	  treatment.	  However,	  eventually,	  we	  can	  find	  that	  China	  gets	  nothing	  more	  than	  face	  but	  loses	  many	  interests,	  and	  Japan	  just	  seemingly	  loses	  some	  face	  but	  gains	  the	  expected	  substantial	  interests’.	  
More	   often,	   the	   international	   media	   makes	   negative	   comments	   about	   foreign	   support	   for	  China’s	   face	  diplomacy,	  generally	  criticising	  their	   leaders	  or	  governments	   for	  being	  subject	   to	  blatant	  realism	  with	  China.	  For	  example,	  according	  to	  Apple	  Daily,	  ‘The	  British	  government	  has	  converted	  diplomacy	  into	  an	  undisguised	  transaction	  with	  China.	  There	  is	  no	  value	  involved	  in	  the	  communication,	  only	  money	  and	  price’	  (Tao,	  2015).	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  foreign	  observers,	  giving	  face	  to	  China	  without	  any	  principles	  will	  make	  China	  more	  aggressive	  and	  unscrupulous.	  When	  President	  Obama	  cancelled	  his	  meeting	  with	  the	  Dalai	  Lama	  before	  his	  visit	  to	  China	  in	  2009,	  
Spero	  News	   pointed	   out,	   “While	   President	   Obama	  might	   have	   thought	   he	   was	   giving	   face	   to	  China’s	  government	  by	  deferring	  the	  meeting,	  it	  could	  be	  construed	  by	  many	  in	  China	  as	  a	  back	  down—something	   that	   would	   entail	   significant	   loss	   of	   face	   for	   America—a	   sure	   sign	   of	   its	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weakness’	  (Constance,	  2009).	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  
4.5	  Conclusion	  
Following	   this	   categorisation	   of	   the	   three	   kinds	   of	   research	   material,	   the	   next	   step	   is	   to	  generate	  a	  comprehensive	  set	  of	  synthesised	  conclusions	  about	  the	  core	  research	  questions.	  	  
	  
4.5.1	  Face	  culture:	  An	  enduring	  motivational	  factor.	  
China’s	  goal	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  major	  power	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  is	  bound	  to	  be	  the	  result	  of	  various	  factors	   related	   to	   China’s	   realities	   and	   values.	   One	   thing	   is	   for	   sure:	   face	   culture,	   as	   a	  motivational	  factor,71	  triggers	  and	  drives	  China’s	  need	  to	  be	  recognised	  as	  a	  major	  power.	  For	  most	   Chinese	   people,	   when	   they	   think	   of	   their	   struggle	   for	   international	   recognition,	   they	  habitually	  regard	  it	  as	  the	  same	  game	  they	  play	  in	  their	  social	  lives	  i.e.	  the	  highest	  priority	  is	  to	  be	   a	   superior	  member	   of	   the	   pre-­‐‑existing	   hierarchy;	   the	  most	   ideal	   situation	   is	   to	   enjoy	   the	  voluntary	  respect	  of	  one’s	  self-­‐‑conscious	  inferiors.	  	  	  
Diplomats’	   viewpoints	   shed	   light	   on	  how	   face	   culture	  mirrors	   the	   ideas	   of	   Chinese	  decision-­‐‑	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Existing	   research	   on	  China’s	   goal	   to	   be	   recognised	   as	   a	  major	   power	   is	   concerned	  more	  with	   the	  historical	   factors.	  Many	  scholars	  believe	  that	  China’s	  pursuit	  of	  recognition	  is	  embedded	  in	  its	  long	  history	  of	  dominating	  East	  Asia	  and	  regarding	  itself	  as	  ‘the	  only	  civilization	  under	  heaven’	  [Chinese:	  天朝上国].	  While	  admitting	  the	  role	  of	  Chinese	  history	  in	  shaping	  its	  diplomacy	  today,	  I	  also	  believe	  that	  we	  should	  not	  exaggerate	  or	  overestimate	  the	  influence	  of	  history.	  This	  is	  because,	  as	  argued	  by	  Ja	  lan	  Chong	  (2013,	  p.	  18),	  fewer	  and	  fewer	  people	  today	  have	  had	  a	  direct	  experience	  of	  China’s	  history	  of	  humiliation,	  and	  no	  one	  alive	  today	  has	  personal	  memories	  of	  the	  ‘Confucian’	  world	  order	  or	  tributary	  system.	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makers	  and	  diplomatic	  practitioners.	  Specifically,	  due	  to	  face	  concern,	  Chinese	  diplomats	  give	  all	  or	  unnecessary	  amounts	  of	  their	  consideration	  to	  China’s	  role	  conception	  as	  a	  major	  power,	  and	   they	   sometimes	   even	   sacrifice	   their	   own	   face	   to	   gain	   face	   for	   the	   country.	   Moreover,	  although	  many	  of	  my	  interviewees	  are	  intensely	  aware	  that	  the	  pursuit	  of	  such	  a	  role	  is	  often	  unwisely	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  national	  interest	  or	  substantial	  content,	  they	  still	  admit	  that	  face	  culture	  remains	  entrenched	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people	  and	  is	  difficult	  to	  change.	  Constructing	  and	  safeguarding	  China	  as	  a	  major	  power	  has	  become	  the	  preeminent	  objective	  of	  their	  work.	  
The	   frequent	   references	   to	   face	   culture	   have	   been	   attributed	   to	   the	   Chinese	   public’s	  expectations	   from	   their	   country’s	   diplomats.	   A	   large	   proportion	   of	   Chinese	   people	   are	  predisposed	   to	  viewing	  diplomatic	   issues	  as	   face	   issues.	  They	   commonly	  believe	   that	   to	  gain	  international	   recognition	   as	   a	   major	   power	   is	   a	   necessary	   and	   even	   primary	   diplomatic	  objective,	   and	   it	   is	   eminently	   reasonable	   to	   use	   the	   national	   face	   culture	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	  international	  relations.	  	  
In	  addition,	  supporting	  China’s	  facework	  in	  its	  bid	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  major	  power	  has	  become	  a	  practical	  bargaining	  tool	  that	  foreign	  countries	  often	  utilise	  in	  their	  dealings	  with	  China.	  	  
	  
4.5.2	  Conceptualising	  China’s	  role	  as	  a	  major	  power	  
This	   chapter	   has	   presented	   and	   analysed	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   China	   tends	   to	   enact	   the	   role	  conception	   of	   a	  major	   power	   in	   order	   to	   seek	   international	   recognition.	   A	  more	  meaningful	  discovery	  of	  this	  analysis	  is	  that	  this	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  manifestation	  of	  China’s	  desire	  for	  power	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or	  for	  its	  emotional	  satisfaction	  but	  has	  been	  configured	  and	  reconfigured	  by	  many	  elements	  of	  face	  culture	  ‘that	  have	  been	  institutionalized	  as	  the	  constitutive	  and	  regulative	  meanings	  of	  the	  collective	   identity’	   (Liao,	   2012,	   p.	   140).	   In	   this	   sense,	   face	   culture	   is	   demonstrated	   to	   be	   an	  idiosyncratic	  template	  by	  which	  China	  constructs	  and	  interprets	  its	  national	  role	  conception	  for	  recognition.	  Through	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   collected	   research	  material,	  we	   can	   answer	   a	   critical	  question:	  What	  kind	  of	  major	  power	  does	  China	  want	  to	  be?	  
In	  social	  life,	  a	  Chinese	  person	  ‘links	  face	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  social	  hierarchy	  he	  or	  she	  lives	   in’	   (Arundale,	   2006,	   p.	   197).	   People	   have	   been	   accustomed	   to	   seeking	   recognition	   and	  shaping	   their	   image	   in	   asymmetrical	   relationships,	   or,	   in	   other	   words,	   people	   are	   used	   to	  highlighting,	   maintaining	   or	   shaping	   relational	   asymmetry	   to	   gain	   social	   recognition.72	  The	  research	   findings	   of	   this	   book	   have	   proven	   the	   logic	   that	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   international	  recognition	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  individual	  strength	  but	  more	  a	  kind	  of	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship—a	  matter	  of	  the	  relational	  self.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Chinese	  people	  seem	  to	  ‘have	  no	  distinctive	   awareness	   of	   their	   own	   existence’	   (Hwang,	   2011,	   p.	   192),	   and	   almost	   every	  endeavour	  for	  international	  recognition	  needs	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  connected	  with	  others	  (and,	  for	  China,	  the	  more,	  the	  better).	  Williams	  (1997,	  p.	  358)	  argues	  that	  ‘when	  states	  enter	  into	  the	  process	  of	  recognition,	  what	  they	  seek	  is	  recognition	  of	  their	  independence	  as	  an	  end	  in	  itself ’.	  However,	   China	   seems	   to	   seek	   its	   independence	   as	   an	   end	   in	   coexistence	   between	   itself	   and	  others.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  their	  considerations	  of	  recognition	  are	  often	  unhesitatingly	  centred	  around	  a	  relational	  self	  that	  occupies	  a	  superior	  status.	  From	  the	  political	  elite	  to	  the	  common	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  A	  concrete	  cultural	  analysis	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Sections	  3.6	  and	  3.7.1.	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public,	   the	  Chinese	   are	  usually	   extremely	   sensitive	   about	   their	   country’s	   relative	  position	   i.e.	  above,	  below	  or	  on	  an	  equal	  footing	  with	  others.	  	  
Based	  on	  the	   logic	  of	   face	  culture,	  China’s	  conceptualisation	  as	  a	  major	  power	  is	  essentially	  a	  
sense	   of	   centrality,	   which	   prompts	   China	   to	   unceasingly	   pursue	   being	   seen	   as	   the	  
symbolic	  centre	  of	  international	  society.	  A	  classical	  saying	  from	  the	  Dao	  De	  Jing	  [Chinese:	  道
德经],	  a	  fundamental	  text	  of	  ancient	  Chinese	  philosophy,	  describes	  this	  sense	  of	  centrality	  very	  aptly:	  
Big	  country	  shall	  behave	   like	   the	  downstream	  of	  a	  river	  (receptive	  of	  all	  the	  rivers	  
from	   the	  upstream).	   It	   shall	   act	   as	   the	   womb	   of	   the	   world	   (nurturing	  all	   things,	  
helping	   everybody	  wherever	   possible),	   and	   the	   center	   for	   people	   of	   the	   world	   to	  meet	  and	  build	  diplomatic	  relations.73	  
It	  delineates	  an	  ideal	  state	  as	  indicated	  by	  face	  culture:	  Like	  ‘the	  lower	  reaches	  of	  a	  river’,	  China	  does	   not	   need	   to	   control	   the	   flow	   of	   the	   direction	   of	   every	   tributary	   and	   just	   needs	   to	  wait	  effortlessly	   for	  all	   the	  surrounding	  streams	   to	  come	   to	   it.	   It	   is	  China’s	  destiny	   to	  become	   ‘the	  centre	  for	  the	  people	  of	  the	  world	  to	  meet	  and	  build	  diplomatic	  relations’.	  In	  other	  words,	  just	  like	  attending	  a	  performance,	  China	  can	  totally	  accept	  adopting	  an	  insignificant	  role	  or	  sitting	  silently	  in	  the	  audience,	  but	  it	  always	  insists	  on	  standing	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  stage	  or	  sitting	  in	  the	  best	  seat	  in	  the	  auditorium.	  In	  the	  Chinese	  mind,	  obtaining	  a	  sense	  of	  centrality	  can	  make	  China’s	  status	  as	  a	  major	  power	  more	  substantial	  and	  will	  automatically	  allow	  it	  to	  gain	  face	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  The	   translation	  here	   is	   cited	   from	  Chung	  Boon	  Kuan’s	   (2013)	  Lao	  Zi	  Philosophy	  of	  Liberal	  Government.	  The	  original	   title	   in	  Chinese	  is 大邦者下流，天下之牝，天下之交也。	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real	  recognition	  from	  others.	  This	  logic	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  three	  findings	  below:	  
1.	  The	  centrality	  China	  seeks	  is	  not	  a	  hub-­‐‑and-­‐‑spoke	  network,	  in	  which	  actors	  are	  virtually	  ‘tied	  to	   the	   central	   node	   and	   must	   go	   through	   the	   network	   to	   communicate	   with	   each	   other’	  (Ronfeldt	  &	  Arquilla,	  2001,	  p.	  316).	  
2.	   The	   centrality	   China	   seeks	   does	   not	   require	   substantial	   homogeneity,	   which	   means	   that	  China	  does	  not	  care	  about	  whether	  the	  other	  actors	  in	  the	  same	  network	  are	  same	  or	  similar	  in	  nature	  to	  itself.	  
3.	  The	  centrality	  China	  seeks	  is	  not	  a	  sense	  of	  hegemony.	  In	  its	  struggle	  for	  recognition,	  China	  does	  not	   seek	   to	  exclude	  other	  great	  powers’	   existence	  or	   remarkableness	  or	   to	  establish	  an	  exclusive	  sphere	  of	  influence.	  
In	   this	   sense,	   the	   recognition	   China	   struggles	   for	   is	   never	   only	   (or	   sometimes	   totally	   not)	   a	  confirmation	   of	   its	   power	   capabilities	   but	   always	   a	   courteous	   reception	   that	   meets	   the	  expectations	   of	   the	   Chinese	   people.	   A	   predilection	   of	   formalism	   exists	   remarkably	   in	  
China’s	   struggle.	   The	   so-­‐‑called	   face	   diplomacy	   largely	   manifests	   as	   a	   movement	   towards	  formalism,	   a	  meticulous	   search	   for	   respectful	   treatment	   and	   a	   self-­‐‑entertaining	   performance	  conducted	   by	   perfectionists.	   More	   often,	   China	   does	   not	   have	   great	   ambition,	   and	   what	   it	  pursues	  is	  just	  a	  relative	  advantage	  over	  others,	  no	  matter	  how	  slim	  the	  advantage	  is	  (c.f.,	  Pan,	  2016,	  p.	  312).	  
We	  can	  also	  easily	  understand	  some	  of	  China’s	  behavioural	  conflicts:	  China	  would	  like	  to	  be	  a	  central	   player	   to	   show	   off	   its	   power	   but	   not	   necessarily	   to	   be	   a	   determining	   force	   to	   exert	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power	   on	  many	   substantial	   affairs;	   China	   likes	   the	   feeling	   of	   being	   surrounded	   by	   the	   other	  international	  actors	  on	   the	  world	  stage	  but	  shows	  very	   little	   interest	   in	  establishing	  a	  closed	  camp	  under	  its	  control	  or	  ‘exporting	  one	  ultimate	  value	  or	  system	  to	  the	  outside	  world’	  (Zhang,	  2011,	  p.	  15).	  One	  case	  in	  point	  is	  that	  China	  attaches	  importance	  to	  its	  status	  as	  a	  permanent	  member	  of	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  and	  relishes	  such	  political	  theatre	  in	  which	  it	  always	  stands	  at	   the	   centre;	   meanwhile,	   ‘Beijing	   usually	   takes	   a	   lowest-­‐‑common-­‐‑denominator	   approach,	  adopting	   the	  safest	  and	   least	   controversial	  position	  and	  waiting	   to	  see	   the	  positions	  of	  other	  governments	  before	  revealing	  its	  own’	  (Shambaugh,	  2014).	  	  	  	  	  	  
Another	  important	  finding	  of	  this	  research	  is	  the	  Chinese	  illusion	  of	  international	  recognition.	  As	   the	   collected	   data	   indicates,	   Chinese	   people	   strongly	   believe	   their	   country,	   as	   an	  unquestioned	   superior,	   is	   entitled	   to	   certain	   recognition	   and	  privileges	   accorded	   to	   it	   by	   the	  international	  community,	  which	  is	  in	  line	  with	  norms	  regulating	  face	  in	  their	  social	  lives.	  They	  expect	  all	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  world	  to	  respect	  its	  self-­‐‑righteous	  hierarchical	  ethics,	  and	  small	  countries	  especially	  are	  expected	  to	  give	  China	  face	  much	  more	  self-­‐‑consciously.	  According	  to	  this	  logic,	  in	  the	  Chinese	  mind,	  the	  least	  they	  desire	  is	  no	  loss	  in	  its	  perceived	  status	  as	  a	  major	  power,	  and	  the	  thin	  recognition	  they	  pursue	  is	  essentially	  a	  kind	  of	  equality	  among	  other	  major	  powers	   and	   not	   among	   all	   the	   international	   actors.	   As	   Deng	   Yong	   (2008,	   p.	   8)	   argues,	   ‘the	  Chinese	  consider	  the	  rise	  of	  China	  a	  restoration	  of	  fairness	  rather	  than	  gaining	  advantage	  over	  others’.	  It	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  sense	  of	  hierarchy	  results	  in	  Chinese	  people	  confusing	  
‘thin	  recognition’	  with	   ‘thick	  recognition’,74	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously.	  There	   is	  no	   idea	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  A	   related	   discussion	   on	   thin	   recognition	   and	   thick	   recognition	   can	   be	   found	   in	   Section	   1.1.1.	  Thin	  recognition	  means	   that	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or	   expectation	   of	   ‘equality’,	   either	   in	   the	   context	   of	   international	   law	   or	   egalitarian	   values.	  Consequently,	  when	  China	  fails	  to	  gain	  the	  aspired	  thick	  recognition	  from	  the	  outside	  world,	  it	  irrationally	  believes	  that	  it	  is	  not	  being	  given	  even	  the	  bare	  minimum	  recognition	  it	  deserves	  as	  a	   ‘normal’	   country.	   People	   have	   an	   ‘all-­‐‑or-­‐‑nothing’	   approach,	   which	   cannot	   accept	   any	  intermediate	   or	   partial	   result	   in	   the	   context	   of	   international	   recognition.	   The	   Chinese	  government	   and	   official	  media	   often	   complain	   that	   other	   governments	   or	   foreign	   politicians	  ‘hurt	   the	   feelings	  of	   the	  Chinese	  people’.75	  By	  this	   token,	  Chinese	  people’s	   feelings	  are	   indeed	  very	   easily	   hurt	   by	   others	   as	   they	   always	   have	   exaggerated	   expectations	   of	   recognition	   and	  confuse	  equality	  with	  superiority.	  	  	  	  
Last	  but	  not	  the	  least,	  China’s	  quest	  to	  be	  identified	  as	  a	  major	  power	  can	  sometimes	  end	  
with	   ostensible	   recognition	   or	   temporary	   praise	   in	   place	   of	   sincere	   and	   consistent	  
acknowledgement.	  As	  argued	  by	  Tang	  and	  Qi	  (2008,	  p.	  65),	  ‘others’	  recognition	  always	  brings	  us	   [Chinese]	   pleasure,	   even	   the	   hypocritical	   ones;	   nevertheless,	   others’	   derecognition	   must	  annoy	   us,	   even	   the	   sincere	   or	   friendly	   ones’.	   It	   is	   acceptable	   for	   China	   that	   ‘there	   is	   a	  discrepancy	   between	   diplomacy	   rhetoric	   and	   diplomacy	   in	   its	   practical	   form	   of	   policies	   and	  actions’	  (Scott,	  2015,	  p.	  261).	  China	  does	  not	  really	  require	  any	  real	  or	  complete	  recognition	  of	  its	   status	   as	   a	   major	   power.	   Many	   of	   the	   time,	   just	   a	   superficial,	   ceremonial	   and	   verbal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ‘formally,	  a	  state	  has	  an	  equal	  status	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  others’	  (Wendt,	  1999,	  p.	  237).	  Thick	  recognition	  means	  ‘acknowledge[ment]	  of	  particular	  qualities	  that	  characterize	  actors	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  differences,	  which	  underlines	  particularistic	  features	  of	  identity’	  (Strombom,	  2014,	  p.	  171).	  
75	  ‘Hurt	  the	  feelings	  of	   the	  Chinese	  people’	   [Chinese:	  伤害中国人民感情]	   is	  a	  political	  phrase	  commonly	  used	  by	  members	  of	  the	  Chinese	  government	  and	  media.	  This	  meme	  usually	  occurs	   in	   tandem	  with	  other	   standard	  kvetching:	   ‘grossly	   interfered	  with	  China’s	  internal	  affairs’,	  ‘hurt	  the	  feelings	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people’,	  ‘harmed	  the	  China-­‐‑XYZ	  relations’.	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acknowledgement	  will	  suffice.	  Japanese	  Sinologist	  Watanabe	  Hidekata’s	  (as	  cited	  in	  Zhai,	  2011,	  p.	   31)	   comment	   on	   China’s	   ancient	   diplomacy	   remains	   relevant	   to	   describing	   the	   Chinese	  mentality	  even	  today:	  
Since	  ancient	   times,	   the	  Chinese	  have	   cared	   too	  much	  about	   face.	  They	  had	  been	  respectful	   of	   barbarians	   and	   constantly	   had	   to	   bow	   and	   kowtow	   in	   order	   to	  survive.76	  Even	   in	   such	   conditions,	   they	   still	   referred	   to	   themselves	   as	   ‘Elder	  Brother’	  and	  their	  opponent	  as	  ‘Younger	  Brother’,	  which	  was	  able	  to	  give	  them	  full	  satisfaction.	  
	  
4.5.3	  China’s	  righteousness	  and	  self-­‐‑righteousness	  
Scholars	  generally	  believe	  that	  the	  Chinese	  concern	  with	  face	  can	  become	  a	  source	  of	  conflict	  but	  can	  also	  serve	  as	  a	  facilitator	  of	  social	  interactions	  (Gries,	  2004,	  p	  27).	  It	  is	  mainly	  because	  face	   culture	   ‘keeps	   up	   the	   consciousness	   of	   moral	   boundaries,	   maintains	   moral	   values	   and	  expresses	  the	  force	  for	  social	  sanction’	  (Ho,	  2015,	  p.	  3).	  According	  to	  Major	  Locke	  (2007,	  p.	  39),	  ‘striving	   for	   face	   creates	   a	   social	   pressure	   to	   become	   the	   best	   person,	   both	   internally	   and	  externally,	   that	   one	   can	   be	   for	   the	   good	   of	   society’.	   Correspondingly,	   many	   normative	  components,	   such	   as	  mutual	   respect,	   reciprocity	   and	   the	   pursuit	   of	   relational	   harmony,	   also	  constitute	   core	   norms	   that	   underpin	   China’s	   role	   conception	   and	   purposive	   actions	   on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Throughout	  history,	  there	  have	  been	  many	  occasions	  when,	  in	  order	  for	  the	  regime	  to	  survive,	  ancient	  Chinese	  dynasties	  had	  to	  be	  obsequious	  to	  perceived	  barbarians,	  many	  of	  whom	  came	  from	  Mongolia	  and	  Middle	  Asia.	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foreign	  relations	  front.	  In	  other	  words,	  China’s	  struggle	  for	  recognition	  involves	  some	  righteous	  and	  credible	  aspects.	  
First,	   being	   endowed	   with	   the	   moral	   values	   that	   emphasise	   coexistence	   with	   others	   and	  stability	  of	  relationships,	  the	  pursuit	  for	  a	  superior	  China	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  not	  a	  battle	  over	  the	  zero-­‐‑sum	  resource	  of	  social	  status	  but	  more	  a	  sense	  of	  cooperation	  for	  achieving	  harmony	  
in	  relationships.	  China	  never	  shows	  any	   interest	   in	  monopolising	  the	  status	  of	  being	  a	  great	  power.	   During	   the	   process	   of	   struggle	   for	   recognition,	   in	   fact,	   it	   performs	  many	   considerate	  actions	   to	  maintain	   and	   promote	   relational	   closeness	  with	   other	   actors	   and	   demonstrates	   a	  keen	  consciousness	  of	  respecting	  the	  others’	  recognition	  needs	  as	  well.	  Very	  often,	  China	   is	  a	  passionate	  actor,	  which	  would	  like	  to	  fulfil	  its	  duty	  of	  offering	  its	  recognition	  to	  others.	  
Second,	   the	   mediating	   effects	   of	   face	   culture	   make	   China’s	   international	   image	   and	  
behaviour	   less	   assertive	   and	  more	   defensive.	  For	   the	   Chinese,	   public	   criticism	   should	   be	  avoided	  as	  such	  behaviour	  can	  make	  both	  sides	  lose	  face.	  Specifically,	  the	  safest	  way	  to	  guard	  against	   the	   loss	  of	   face	  would	  be	   to	   reduce	   the	  possibility	  of	  public	  conflict	  or	  debate.	  As	  we	  have	   seen	   so	   far,	   China	   does	   not	   desire	   reputation	   maximisation	   as	   much	   as	   conflict	  minimisation.	  Apart	   from	  some	  diplomatic	   crises,	   face	   culture	   always	  prompts	  China	   to	   seek	  the	   ‘proper’	  way	   to	  avoid	  any	   involvement	   in	  a	  direct	   and	  public	   confrontation.	  China’s	   ideas	  and	  behaviours	   very	  often	   represent	   a	   self-­‐‑disciplined	   image,	  which	   consistently	   emphasises	  the	   necessity	   of	   preserving	   both	   self’s	   and	   other’s	   face.	   For	   example,	   over	   the	   past	   several	  decades,	   ‘China’s	   increasing	   interest	   in	  rehabilitating	   its	   international	  reputation	  kept	   it	   from	  openly	   confronting	   the	  West’	   (Kleine-­‐‑Ahlbrandt	  &	  Small,	  2007,	  p.	  41).	  As	  described	  by	  Wang	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Hongying	   (2003,	   p.	   62),	   ‘publicly,	   Beijing	   took	   a	   strong	   position	   defending	   its	   stand	   against	  sanctions	  imposed	  by	  Western	  countries…	  Privately,	  however,	  pragmatic	  leaders	  tried	  to	  avoid	  a	  confrontational	  policy	  against	  the	  United	  States’	  (Wang,	  2003,	  p.	  62).	  
Third,	  China	  seeks	  to	  be	  recognised	  as	  a	  major	  power	  worthy	  of	   trust	  and	  cooperation.	  This	  study	  has	  repeatedly	  argued	  the	  Chinese	  rule	  of	  renqing:	   ‘A	  normal	  relationship	  does	  not	  require	   symmetry	   of	   partners	   or	   equality	   of	   exchanges,	   but	   it	   does	   require	   reciprocity’	  (Jorgensen	  &	  Wong,	  2016,	  p.	  65).	  Closely	  related	  to	  the	  reciprocal	  principle,	  the	  Chinese	  logic	  of	  dealing	  with	  international	  recognition	  is	  quite	  explicable:	  if	  I	  give	  you	  face,	  you	  should	  give	  me	  face	   in	   return;	   if	   you	   give	  me	   face,	   I	   will	   actively	   give	   you	   the	   same	   or	   a	   greater	   amount	   in	  return.	  This	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  foreign	  leaders	  generally	  have	  sufficient	  trust	   in	  China’s	  credentials—they	  are	  certain	  that	  their	  praise,	  hospitality	  and	  discreet	  diplomatic	  actions	  will	  get	  them	  what	  they	  want	  from	  China.	  
Meanwhile,	   it	   should	   be	   remembered	   that,	   under	   the	   influence	   of	   face	   culture,	   China	   is	  
unlikely	  to	  become	  an	  altruist	  or	  moral	  perfectionist.	  	  
First	   of	   all,	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   recognition	   still	   safeguards	   a	   strictly	   hierarchical	   and	  
explicitly	  inegalitarian	  society.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  China	  orally	  positions	  itself	  as	   ‘a	  sovereign	  state	   in	   the	   strict	   Westphalian	   sense’	   (Zhang,	   2010,	   p.	   281),	   which	   vocally	   prioritises	   the	  principle	  of	  sovereign	  equality	  as	  a	  basic	  norm	  in	  international	  relations.	  President	  Xi	  Jinping	  (as	  cited	  in	  Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  2015)	  has	  said,	  ‘politically,	  China	  supports	  equality	  among	  all	  countries,	  big	  or	  small’.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  China	  seizes	  every	  possible	  opportunity	  to	  show	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itself	  as	  a	  key	  decision-­‐‑maker	  in	  global	  affairs,	  the	  focus	  of	  global	  attention	  and	  an	  exceptional	  country	  that	   is	   inherently	  different	   from	  other	  Western	   ‘hegemons’.	  No	  doubt,	   it	   truly	   ‘enjoys	  the	  symbols	  of	  being	  a	  major	  power’	   (Shambaugh,	  2014),	  and	  many	  of	  China’s	  behaviours	   in	  fact	  fit	  a	  much	  wider	  pattern	  of	  disregarding	  its	  claimed	  pursuit	  of	  equality	  among	  nations.	  The	  international	   relationship	   envisioned	   by	   China’s	   role	   conception	   as	   a	  major	   power	   is	   as	   Qin	  Yaqing	  (2010,	  p.	  42)	  notes,	   ‘not	   that	  between	  the	  animals	   in	   the	  Hobbesian	   jungle,	  equal	  and	  hostile;	  not	  that	  between	  the	  humans	  in	  the	  Lockean	  society,	  equal	  and	  competitive;	  not	  even	  that	  between	  the	  states	  in	  the	  Kantian	  culture,	  equal	  and	  friendly.	  Rather,	  it	  was	  that	  between	  the	  father	  and	  sons	  in	  the	  Confucian	  family,	  unequal	  but	  benign’.	  
Second,	  China’s	  behaviours	  are	  displayed	  and	  conducted	  in	  a	  distinctly	  transactional	  way.	  Beneath	   the	   veneer	   of	   harmony	   and	   politeness,	   there	   are	   invariably	   realistic	   considerations,	  calculation	  and	  manipulation.	  As	  a	  barrage	  of	  international	  criticism	  points	  out,	  China	  tends	  to	  transform	   the	   issue	   of	   recognition	   into	   a	   transaction,	   which	   only	   pays	   heed	   to	   short-­‐‑term	  interests	  and	  occasional	  amusement	  among	  nations.	  As	  one	  interviewee	  (Interview	  2)	  revealed,	  international	  recognition	  can	  be	  described	  as	  merely	  a	  ‘technical	  matter’,	  which	  seems	  to	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  an	  actor’s	  inherent	  values	  and	  beliefs	  and	  can	  always	  be	  achieved	  or	  solved	  by	  means	  of	  ‘mutual	  benefit	  and	  win-­‐‑win	  results’	  [Chinese:	  互利共赢].77	  	  
Third,	  although	  beneficial	   for	   relational	   stability,	  avoidance	  of	  public	  criticism	  and	  conflict	  
deafens	   the	   Chinese	   government	   and	   public	   to	   what	   others	   really	   perceive	   and	   think	  
about	  China	   (c.f.,	   Scott,	   2015,	   p.	   261).	   In	   fact,	   there	   are	   philosophical	   Chinese	   proverbs	   like	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  ‘Mutual	  benefit	  and	  win-­‐‑win	  results’	  is	  a	  core	  diplomatic	  principle	  that	  China	  always	  emphasises	  in	  its	  diplomatic	  discourse.	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listen	  to	  one	  side	  you	  will	  be	  enlightened,	  heed	  only	  one	  side	  you	  will	  be	  benighted	  [Chinese:	  兼
听则明，偏信则暗],	   but	   out	   of	   face	   concern,	   they	   still	   like	   to	   heed	   the	   favourable	   side	   in	  international	   situations.	   Obviously,	   de-­‐‑criticism	   efforts	   inevitably	   lead	   to	   the	   ‘great	   power	  autism’,	  which	  makes	   it	  more	  difficult	   for	  Chinese	  people	  to	  understand	  alternative	  visions	  of	  how	  the	  world	  works	  and	  how	  societies	  should	  be	  organised	  (Westad,	  2012,	  p.	  5).	  It	  will	  also	  result	  in	  a	  paradox	  —the	  struggle	  for	  international	  recognition	  ultimately	  causes	  more	  loss	  of	  international	  recognition.	  	  
To	   sum	  up,	   China’s	   face	  diplomacy	   intended	   for	   it	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   a	  major	  power	  proves	   Sole-­‐‑Farra’s	  observation	  of	  the	  Chinese	  national	  characteristics:	  ‘Absolute	  distinctions	  such	  as	  those	  indicated	  by	  the	  “either-­‐‑or”	  point	  of	  view	  do	  not	  meet	  with	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  Chinese	  mind;	  accordingly,	   the	   Chinese	   can	   be	   at	   one	   and	   the	   same	   time	   both	   extremely	   idealistic	   and	  extremely	  realistic’	  (Solé-­‐‑Farràs,	  2016,	  p.	  12).	  As	  such,	  the	  role	  conception	  of	  a	   ‘benign	  major	  power’	  also	  reflects	  this	  reconfiguration	  between	  idealism	  and	  realism,	  between	  the	  moral	  self-­‐‑consciousness	   mainly	   embedded	   in	   Confucianism	   and	   the	   Chinese	   exceptionalism	   of	   ‘the	  Superior’.	  
	  
4.5.4	  Behavioural	  characteristics	  
There	   is	   a	  widespread	   belief	   that	   China’s	   diplomacy	   has	   a	   particularly	   elusive	   nature,	  which	  often	   seems	   baffling	   and	   hard	   to	   predict.	   In	   spite	   of	   this,	   one	   could	   nonetheless	   argue	   that	  China	  has	  some	  repetitious	  and	  predictable	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  maintains	  its	  face:	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l   Compared	  with	  many	  other	  countries,	  China	  focuses	  too	  much	  on	  the	  symbols	  rather	  than	  the	  substance	  of	  diplomacy.	  
l   China	  likes	  using	  economical	  means	  and	  financial	  assets	  to	  purchase	  recognition.	  
l   In	  the	  process	  of	  diplomacy,	  China	  tends	  to	  highlight	  its	  achievements	  but	  to	  solve	  conflicts	  discreetly.	  
l   Face-­‐‑threatening	   moves	   or	   seemingly	   assertive	   actions	   are	   a	   primary	   source	   of	   China’s	  worries.	   With	   regard	   to	   diplomatic	   issues,	   the	   Chinese	   are	   intensely	   sensitive	   to	   fine	  details	   and	   can	   easily	   scale	   up	   a	   conflict	   if	   they	   believe	   they	   have	   not	   received	   the	  recognition	  they	  expected.	  	  
l   In	   diplomatic	   crises,	   especially	   in	   the	   early	   stages,	   it	   is	   difficult	   for	   China	   to	   make	  concessions.	  There	  is	  always	  a	  compelling	  need	  to	  wipe	  out	  and	  reverse	  its	  loss	  of	  face.	  
	  
4.5.5	  Multiple	  factors	  influencing	  face	  culture	  
For	  a	  state,	  the	  struggle	  for	  international	  recognition	  must	  be	  mediated	  by	  competition	  among	  various	  ideational	  factors.	  It	   is	  a	  basic	  truth	  that	  multiple	  motivational	  factors	  simultaneously	  coexist	   and	   jointly	   determine	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   favourable	   acknowledgement.	   This	  means	  that	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  face	  culture	  affects	  China’s	  diplomacy	  is	  not	  only	  determined	  by	  the	  culture	  itself	  but	  also	  depends	  on	  many	  other	  dynamics.	  Especially	  in	  the	  political	  process,	  we	  can	   see	   that	   Chinese	   face	   culture	   is	   combined	   with	   or	   absorbed	   by	   some	   political	   and	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ideological	  elements.	  
	  
Figure	  4.7.	  Various	  factors	  affecting	  face	  culture	  in	  Chinese	  diplomacy.78	  
	  
Senior	  leaders’	  ideas.	  
Given	  the	  nature	  of	  China’s	  political	  regime,	  senior	  Chinese	  leaders’	  ideas	  about	  face	  form	  the	  basis	   of	   China’s	   face	   diplomacy.	   If	   the	   senior-­‐‑most	   Chinese	   leader	   has	   a	   strong	   awareness	   of	  face	  culture,	  he	  or	  she	  will	  very	  possibly	  emphatically	  consider	   international	  recognition	  and	  conduct	   facework	   in	   diplomatic	   issues.	   Conversely,	   if	   the	   leader	   is	   practical	   and	   is	   less	  concerned	  with	  external	  validation,	   the	  prevalence	  of	  China’s	   face	  diplomacy	   is	   likely	   to	   fade	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  ‘+’	  refers	  to	  a	  positive	  correlation;	  ‘-­‐‑’	  refers	  to	  a	  negative	  correlation.	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away.	  For	  observers,	  the	  current	  problem	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  recognise	  which	  way	  President	  Xi	  Jinping	  leans.	  
Based	  on	  a	  comparison	  between	  him	  and	  his	  predecessor	  Hu	  Jintao,	  this	  thesis	  tends	  to	  believe	  that	   President	   Xi	   has	   a	   relatively	   strong	   sense	   of	   face.	   Since	   President	   Hu’s	   term,	   China	   has	  invested	   substantial	   resources	   in	   public	   diplomacy	   and	   many	   national-­‐‑level	   image-­‐‑enhancement	  projects.	  Meanwhile,	  we	  can	  also	  note	  that	  Hu	  always	  emphasises	  the	  necessity	  of	  expressing	   a	   relatively	   objective	   national	   image	   to	   the	   world.	   In	   China’s	   2003	   national	  propaganda	   work	   meeting,	   Hu	   claimed,	   ‘we	   should	   introduce	   the	   developments	   of	   China’s	  socialist	   material,	   spiritual	   and	   political	   civilization	   to	   the	   world	   comprehensively	   and	  
objectively”	  (Xinhua,	  2003).	  The	  then	  Chinese	  Premier	  Wen	  Jiabao	  (2007)	  made	  the	  same	  point	  in	   a	   2007	   article:	   for	   external	   propaganda	   to	   work,	   ‘we	   should	   introduce	   China’s	   reform,	  opening-­‐‑up	  and	  modernization	  drive	  to	  the	  world	  comprehensively,	  accurately	  and	  timely,	  and	  
should	   not	   sidestep	   our	   country’s	   problems’.	   As	   a	   Taiwanese	   scholar	   commented,	   ‘the	  management	   of	   national	   image	   in	   Hu’s	   terms	   embodied	   the	   characteristics	   of	   rationality,	  pragmatism	  and	  mildness’	  (Chen,	  2015,	  p.	  77).	  
During	   President	   Xi’s	   term,	   it	   can	   be	   easily	   seen	   that	   his	   arguments	   about	   China’s	   role	  conception	  as	  a	  major	  power	  have	  become	  more	  ambitious.	  In	  2013,	  Xi	  proposed	  the	  objective	  of	   ‘The	   Four	   Images	   of	   a	   Major	   Power’.	   He	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   international	   image	   of	  contemporary	  China	  should	  be	   those	  of	   ‘a	  civilisation’,	   ‘a	  big	  Oriental	  country’,	   ‘a	   responsible	  great	  power’	  and	   ‘the	  great	  socialist	  nation’	  (People	  Daily,	  2013)	   .	  More	  remarkably,	   in	  2014’s	  central	  conference	  on	  work	  relating	  to	  foreign	  affairs,	  Xi	  stressed	  that	  China	  should	  develop	  a	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distinctive	  diplomatic	  approach	  befitting	  its	  role	  of	  a	  major	  country.	  He	  argues,	  ‘we	  should,	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   summing	   up	   our	   past	   practice	   and	   experience,	   enrich	   and	   further	   develop	  principles	  guiding	  our	  diplomatic	  work,	  and	  conduct	  diplomacy	  with	  a	  salient	  Chinese	  feature	  and	  a	  Chinese	  vision’	  (Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  2014).	  From	  these	  changes	  in	  his	  arguments,	  it	  can	   be	   inferred	   that	   President	   Xi	   is	  more	   eager	   to	   show	   China’s	   superiority	   and	   to	   gain	   the	  world’s	  respect.	  	  
	  
Demand	  for	  regime	  legitimacy	  
As	  one	  interviewee	  notes,	  ‘China’s	  leaders	  today	  do	  not	  really	  care	  about	  genuine	  international	  recognition,	  as	  they	  know	  that	  no	  matter	  how	  hard	  they	  work,	  China	  will	  still	  remain	  an	  alien	  for	  many	  countries.	  In	  this	  situation,	  China	  could	  be	  satisfied	  with	  surface	  recognition	  and	  just	  makes	  itself	  seem	  like	  a	  recognised	  country	  to	  its	  domestic	  citizens’.	  In	  many	  cases,	  China’s	  face	  diplomacy	  is	  actually	  intended	  more	  to	  gain	  domestic	  legitimacy.	  At	  the	  political	  elite	  level,	  the	  demands	  for	  the	  CCP’s	  regime	  legitimacy	  are	  positively	  associated	  with	  face	  culture,	  with	  both	  having	   been	   often	   integrated	   in	   the	   minds	   of	   decision-­‐‑makers	   or	   diplomats.	   Theoretically	  speaking,	   lacking	  the	   legitimacy	  conferred	  by	  competitive	  elections,	  authoritarian	   leaders	  are	  more	   likely	   than	   democratic	   leaders	   to	   transpose	   the	   external	   legitimacy	   to	   their	   internal	  legitimation	   (Deng,	   2008,	   p.	   28).	   For	   contemporary	   China,	   seeking	   the	   ‘confirmation	   of	   the	  success	  of	  the	  party-­‐‑state’	  (Noesselt,	  2014,	  p.	  30)	  has	  been	  routinised	  as	  an	  overriding	  policy	  objective	  of	  Beijing’s	  diplomacy.	  When	  the	  needs	   for	  regime	   legitimacy	  become	  stronger,	   face	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culture	  will	  naturally	  be	  able	  to	  play	  a	  greater	  role	  China’s	  attentiveness	  to	  and	  construction	  of	  its	  role	  conception	  as	  a	  major	  power.	  
Simultaneously,	   the	   CCP’s	   quest	   for	   legitimacy	   has	   been	   orientated	   towards	   the	   revival	   of	  numerous	   traditional	   cultural	  elements	  of	  Chinese	  culture	   (Holbig	  &	  Gilley,	  2010,	  p.	  21).	   Just	  like	  Thomas	  Christensen’s	  argument	   (1996,	  p.	  37),	   ‘since	   the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	   is	  no	  longer	  communist,	  it	  must	  be	  even	  more	  Chinese’.	  In	  this	  milieu,	  face	  culture	  also	  becomes	  an	  important	   cultural	   reference	   for	   Chinese	   authorities	   to	   make	   their	   struggles	   for	   recognition	  meet	  the	  expectation	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people.	  
	  
Popular	  nationalism.	  
At	  the	  mass	  public	  level,	  China’s	  popular	  nationalism	  and	  face	  culture	  are	  positively	  related	  to	  each	  other.	  	  
In	   China,	   face	   is	   never	   an	   individual	   concept.	   ‘Chinese	   people	   are	   concerned	   not	   only	   about	  enhancing	  or	  losing	  face	  of	  one’s	  small	  self,	  but	  also	  enhancing	  or	  losing	  face	  of	  one’s	  big	  self	  arising	  from	  significant	  moral	  and	  social	  episodes’	  (Jackson,	  2013,	  p.	  156).	  Under	  the	  influence	  of	  nationalism,	  obviously,	  the	  country	  is	  the	  ‘significant	  big	  self ’	  for	  many	  people.	  In	  most	  cases,	  the	   two	   ideational	   components	   are	   completely	   interwoven	   into	   the	   public	   opinion	   basis	   of	  China’s	   diplomacy.	   Safeguarding	   China’s	   face	   in	   any	   situation	   is	   evidently	   important	   to	   the	  nationalists,	  and	  ‘an	  obsession	  with	  national	  face	  is	  the	  hall	  mark	  of	  Chinese	  nationalists’	  (Gries	  &	  Peng,	  2002,	  p.	  177).	  The	  analysis	  in	  Section	  4.3	  shows	  that	  the	  Chinese	  public	  opinion	  often	  
	   215	  
manifests	   as	   an	   excessive	   appeal	   for	   international	   recognition,	   hyper-­‐‑sensitivity	   to	   foreign	  criticism	  or	  offences	  and	  emotional	  responses	  to	  negative	  feedback,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  embedded	  in	  its	  face	  culture	  and	  can	  also	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  nationalism.	  	  
	  
Constraints.	  
Meanwhile,	  there	  are	  also	  two	  constraints	  to	  circumscribing	  the	  effects	  of	  face	  culture.	  	  
First,	  at	  the	  political	  elite	  level,	  interest-­‐‑orientated	  pragmatism	  trumps	  consciousness	  for	  face.	  Interviewees	  in	  this	  study	  generally	  believe	  that	  face	  diplomacy	  is	  only	  one	  part	  of	  their	  overall	  diplomatic	  endeavours,	  and	  their	  work	  still	  serves	  substantial	  interest	  and	  is	  not	  simply	  meant	  to	  gain	  superficial	  recognition.	  	  
Second,	  although	  Chinese	  people	  are	  traditionally	  face-­‐‑conscious,	  many	  of	  them	  have	  started	  to	  increasingly	  adopt	  a	  practical	  attitude	  towards	  face.	  As	  illustrated	  in	  Section	  4.3,	  many	  people	  tend	   to	   evaluate	   the	   gain	   or	   loss	   of	   face	   diplomacy	   critically,	   not	   focusing	   on	   international	  recognition.	  	  
In	  many	  studies,	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  domestic	  public	  in	  China’s	  diplomacy	  tends	  to	  be	  problematic	  and	  static.	  The	  Chinese	  people	  are	  frequently	  stigmatised	  as	  a	  unitary	  whole—either	   the	   silent	   majority	   or	   the	   naıv̈e	   nationalists—who	   are	   easily	   manipulated	   by	  Chinese	  authorities	  or	  controlled	  by	  the	  sentiments	  of	  nationalism.	  Some	  scholars	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously	  neglect	  today’s	  progressively	  diversified	  Chinese	  society	  and	  a	  large	  group	  of	  Chinese	  citizens	  who	  have	  a	  relatively	  mature	  approach	  towards	  the	  world	  and	  themselves.	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Undoubtedly,	   ‘China	  as	  a	  major	  power’	  is	  a	  common	  quest	  of	  international	  recognition	  for	  the	  Chinese	  people;	  however,	  many	  have	  begun	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  true	  meaning	  of	  this	  objective	  and	  on	  what	  such	  a	  struggle	  would	  cost	  China.	  As	  shown	  in	  Section	  4.3.4,	  when	  China	  shows	  off	  its	  power,	   generosity	   or	   so-­‐‑called	   ‘friendliness’	   to	   some	   foreign	   countries,	   it	   is	   always	  met	  with	  public	  doubt,	  criticism	  or	  aversion	  to	  its	  face	  diplomacy.	  When	  a	  foreign	  country	  gives	  us	  face,	  some	  people	  do	  not	  feel	  pride	  but	  worry	  about	  the	  cost.	  These	  public	  opinions,	  to	  some	  extent,	  can	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  by	  decision-­‐‑makers	  and	  further	  constrain	  China’s	  face	  diplomacy	  to	  a	  certain	  degree.79	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  One	   case	   in	  point	   is	   from	  one	   interviewee	   in	   this	   survey:	   ‘When	  Beijing	  was	  holding	   the	  2014	  APEC	  and	   then	  bid	   for	   the	  Winter	  Olympics,	  the	  Beijing	  media	  was	  required	  to	  not	  spread	  a	  lot	  of	  high-­‐‑profile	  propaganda,	  as	  the	  authorities	  had	  sensed	  that	  the	  public	  was	  tired	  of	  and	  even	  had	  many	  complaints	  about	  this	  series	  of	  international	  events	  that	  disrupted	  their	  daily	  lives’.	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  find	  many	  reports	  and	  comments	  in	  China’s	  official	  newspapers	  responding	  to	  the	  public	  criticism	  to	  face	  diplomacy,	  all	  of	  which	  reveals	  that	  the	  Chinese	  authorities	  are	  conscious	  of	  reducing	  or	  concealing	  some	  of	  their	  face	  behaviours.	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Chapter	  5	  
Behavioural	  Pattern	  II:	  A	  Multifaceted	  China	  in	  Front	  of	  the	  EU	  
	  
我们算是一个大国，这个大国又是一个小国。	  —邓小平	  	  
‘We	  should	  count	  as	  a	  great	  power,	  
but	  this	  great	  power	  is	  also	  a	  small	  power.’	  
—Deng	  Xiaoping	  	  
5.1	  Research	  Framework	  
5.1.1	  Research	  questions	  and	  assumptions	  
The	   core	  question	  we	  pose	   in	  Chapter	  6	   is	   ‘how	  does	   face	   culture	  affect	  how	  China	  presents	  itself	   before	   other	   major	   powers	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   their	   recognition?’	   The	   research	   results	  presented	  so	  far	  have	  fully	  demonstrated	  that	  face	  culture	  is	  a	  cultural	  construct	  within	  which	  international	  perceptions	  of	  China	  and	  its	  diplomatic	  behaviours	  are	  forged.	  This	  chapter	  will	  further	  adapt	  these	  findings	  to	  create	  an	  explanatory	  framework	  that	  will	  shed	  light	  on	  China’s	  struggle	  for	  recognition	  from	  others	  it	  considers	  major	  powers.	  
According	  to	  a	  cultural	  analysis	  of	  this	  research,	  there	  is	  another	  model	  through	  which	  Chinese	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seek	  face:	  
Behavioural	  pattern	   II:	  When	  one	  perceives	  oneself	   at	   the	   same	  or	   at	   an	   inferior	  status	  in	  an	  interaction,	  one	  tends	  to	  present	  oneself	  as	  an	  acquaintance,	  as	  a	  weak	  and	  as	  a	  counterpart	  when	  seeking	  recognition.	  	  
This	  leads	  to	  an	  assumption	  about	  China’s	  diplomatic	  activities	  aimed	  at	  gaining	  international	  recognition:	  
Behavioural	   pattern	   II:	  When	  China	  perceives	   itself	   at	   the	   same	  or	   at	   an	   inferior	  status	  in	  an	  interaction,	  it	  tends	  to	  present	  itself	  as	  an	  acquaintance,	  weak	  and	  as	  a	  counterpart	  when	  seeking	  international	  recognition.	  	  




China’s	  role	  performance	  
The	  Acquaintance	   Use	   interpersonal	   salutations	   to	   describe	   each	   other	   and	   to	  develop	  a	  relationship	  
The	  Weak	   Highlight	  one’s	  own	  disadvantages	  and	  status	  as	  inferior	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The	  Counterpart	   Depict	   oneself	   as	   the	   same	  kind	   of	   international	   actor	   as	   the	  other	  major	  powers.	  
Figure	  5.1.	  Hypotheses	  of	  the	  model	  of	  China’s	  struggle	  for	  recognition	  from	  major	  powers.	  
	  
Based	  on	  the	  approach	  of	  role	  theory,	  an	  empirical	  analysis	  will	  be	  conducted	  to	  validate	  the	  above	  assumptions	  in	  the	  model	  presented	  in	  Figure	  5.1	  and	  to	  examine	  the	  significance	  of	  face	  culture.	   The	   following	   two	   sections	   5.1.2	   and	   5.1.3	   will	   outline	   the	   case	   selection	   and	   data	  resources.	   Sections	   5.2,	   5.3	   and	  5.4	  will	   then,	   respectively,	   present	   the	   empirical	   findings	   on	  these	  three	  role	  conceptions,	  and	  Section	  5.5	  will	  provide	  an	  overall	  summary.	  
	  
5.1.2	  Case	  selection	  
It	   can	   be	   observed	   that	   Chinese	   decision-­‐‑makers,	   scholars	   and	   the	   general	   public	   commonly	  value	   the	   EU	   as	   a	   major	   power,	   which	   has	   a	   higher	   or	   equal	   status	   compared	   with	   China.	  Additionally,	  China	  has	  a	   lot	  of	  demands	  and	  constantly	  seeks	  recognition	  from	  Europe.	  All	  of	  this	  ensures	  that	  there	  was	  enough	  empirical	  proof	  to	  conduct	  this	  study.	  	  
This	   section	   will	   present	   three	   key	   reasons	   why	   China’s	   EU	   diplomacy	   is	   suitable	   as	   a	   case	  study	  for	  this	  research,	  while	  revealing	  the	  current	  mainstream	  Chinese	  perceptions	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  whole.	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1.	  The	  EU	  as	  a	  major	  power:	  From	  a	  strategic	  perspective.	  
There	  is	  ‘a	  remarkable	  homogeneity,	  uniformity	  and	  conformity	  in	  [the]	  Chinese	  perceptions	  of	  Europe	  and	  Sino-­‐‑European	  relations’	  (Shambaugh,	  2007,	  p.	  128).	  Generally,	  the	  Chinese	  have	  a	  more	   ideal	   viewpoint	   of	   the	   EU’s	   strategic	   position	   in	   the	   world	   than	   the	   Europeans	  themselves.	  	  
Perceptions	  of	  China’s	  decision	  makers	  
From	   the	   beginning,	   the	   EU	   and	   its	   leading	   member	   states	   (namely,	   Britain,	   France	   and	  Germany)	  have	  belonged	  to	  the	  category	  of	  China’s	   ‘Great	  Power	  Diplomacy’.	  The	  term	   ‘Great	  Power	   Diplomacy’	   [Chinese:	  大国外交)	   originally	   appeared	   in	   official	   discourses	   during	   the	  Jiang	  Zemin	  period	  (from	  the	  early	  1990s	  to	  the	  early	  2000s)	  and	  is	  still	  widely	  used	  in	  Chinese	  diplomacy	  today.	  Although	  Beijing	  has	  never	  given	  a	  clear	  definition	  or	  elaboration	  of	  this	  term,	  it	   is	   generally	   believed	   that	  America,	   Russia,	   Britain,	   France,	   Germany,	   Japan	   and	   the	   EU	   are	  categorised	   as	   China’s	   perceived	   ‘great	   powers’.	   The	   following	   empirical	   analysis	   will	   also	  reveal	  more	  about	  Chinese	  leaders’	  understanding	  of	  the	  EU’s	  status.	  
	  
Perceptions	  of	  Chinese	  scholars	  
Chinese	  scholars	  have	  overly	  generalised	  ideas	  about	  the	  EU’s	  position,	  tending	  to	  depict	  it	  as	  an	  independent	  and	  complete	  pole	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  Although	  they	  note	  the	  difficulty	  in	   forging	   a	   consensus	  within	   the	   expanded	   EU	   system,	   ‘there	   is	   still	   a	   strong	   propensity	   to	  view	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  single	  unitary	  entity	  acting	  with	  common	  purpose	  on	  the	  international	  stage’	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(Shambaugh,	  2007,	  pp.	  128-­‐‑129).	  
According	   to	   some	   Chinese	   academic	   arguments,	   the	   EU	   has	   been	   a	   reasonably	   adequate	  partner	  to	  develop	  a	  multi-­‐‑polar	  global	  order,	  to	  counter	  American	  hegemony.	  The	  underlying	  logic	   is	   that	   the	   importance	   and	   independence	   of	   the	   EU	   are	   bound	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	  emerging	  world	  multi-­‐‑polarisation,	  which	   is	   beneficial	   for	  China’s	   rise	  under	   the	  pressure	  of	  American	   hegemony	   (Zhu,	   2007,	   p.	   154).	   Shambaugh	   notes	   that	   Chinese	   academic	   views	   of	  Europe’s	  role	  in	  the	  world	  ‘largely	  derivate	  from	  [the]	  broader	  Chinese	  understanding	  of,	  and	  preferences	  for,	  the	  global	  system	  and	  order’	  (Shambaugh,	  2007,	  p.	  128).	  Zhu	  Liqun	  admits	  that	  ‘there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  wishful	  thinking	  going	  on	  in	  Chinese	  scholarly	  circles	  and	  a	  strong	  tendency	  to	  project	   Chinese	  wishes	   for	   global	   order	   on	   to	  what	   they	   perceive	   to	   be	   European	   “realities”’	  (Zhu,	  2007,	  p.	  149).	  Such	  cognitive	  dissonance	  easily	  leads	  Chinese	  academics	  to	  overstate	  the	  EU’s	  power	  and	  advantages	  and	  to	  understate	  its	  disadvantages.	  
	  
Perceptions	  of	  the	  Chinese	  public	  and	  elite.	  
In	   China,	   public	   knowledge	   about	   the	   EU	   mainly	   comes	   from	   state-­‐‑controlled	   television,	  newspapers	  and	  the	   Internet	  (Dong,	  2013,	  p.	  238),	  so	   it	   is	  not	  surprising	   that	  Chinese	  public	  opinion	  about	  the	  EU	  is	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  in	  line	  with	  the	  country’s	  official	  position.	  
According	  to	  a	  2010	  survey	  entitled	  Chinese	  view	  of	  the	  EU,80	  the	  Chinese	  general	  public	  chose	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  This	  research	  project	  was	  led	  by	  the	  China	  Policy	  Institute	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Nottingham	  and	  funded	  by	  the	  EU’s	  Seventh	  Framework	  Program.	  Two	  large-­‐‑scale	  surveys	  were	  conducted	  between	  June	  and	  August	  in	  2010	  to	  investigate	  in	  detail	  what	  the	  Chinese	  people	  think	  of	  the	  EU.	  One	  sampled	  3019	  respondents	  among	  the	  registered	  residents	  of	  six	  big	  Chinese	  cities	  in	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the	  EU	  as	  the	  third	  most	  influential	  political	  actor,	  only	  following	  the	  United	  States	  and	  China,	  and	   the	   Chinese	   elite	   believes	   that	   the	  EU	   could	   rank	   second	   in	  world	   politics,	  which	  would	  make	  it	  more	  important	  than	  China	  and	  only	  a	  little	  less	  important	  than	  the	  United	  States	  (Li	  &	  Ying,	  2013,	  p.	  20).	  In	  the	  global	  economic	  realm,	  both	  the	  Chinese	  public	  and	  its	  elite	  choose	  the	  EU	   as	   the	   second	   most	   influential	   actor	   (Ibid.).	   Another	   research	   also	   discovers	   that,	   when	  compared	  with	   similar	   surveys	   conducted	  before	   the	  European	  debt	   crisis,	   the	  proportion	  of	  the	   Chinese	   public	   viewing	   the	   EU	   as	   a	   world	   power	   still	   shows	   an	   upward	   trend,	   and	   an	  absolute	  majority	  of	  Chinese	  people	  agree	  that	  China	  should	  cooperate	  more	  closely	  with	  the	  EU	  (Dong,	  2013,	  p.	  238).	  	  
	  
2.	  The	  EU	  as	  a	  major	  power:	  From	  the	  value	  perspective	  
In	   fact,	  Chinese	  people	  view	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  superior,	  not	  only	  because	  of	   its	  material	  power	  and	  strategic	  significance	  but	  also	  due	  to	  their	  positive	  perception	  of	  European	  values,	  models	  and	  norms	  (Harnish,	  2015,	  p.	  143).	  	  
While	   China	   claims	   to	   be	   constructing	   a	   new	   global	   order,	   China’s	   international	   behaviours	  largely	  mirror	  the	  Western	  worldviews	  and	  consistently	  show	  its	  unspoken	  desire	  to	  become	  a	  member	  of	  the	   ‘Western	  Club’	  (Dams	  &	  Paul,	  2015).81	  As	  an	  illustration,	  the	  past	  few	  decades	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  order	  to	  explore	  the	  public	  perception	  of	  the	  EU;	  the	  other	  surveyed	  members	  of	  five	  elite	  groups	  about	  their	  views,	  including	  222	  governmental	  officials,	  203	  entrepreneurs,	  100	  scholars,	  123	  media	  workers	  and	  134	  NGO	  activists	  (Li	  &	  Ying,	  2013,	  pp.	  5-­‐‑6).	  The	  results	  of	  the	  surveys	  and	  their	  analyses	  were	  published	  in	  the	  book	  China	  and	  European	  Union	  (Dong,	  Wang,	  &	  Dekker,	  2011).	  
81	  Chinese	   scholar	  Wang	   Hui	   (2011)	   expresses	   a	   similar	   viewpoint:	   ‘PRC	   China’s	   opening-­‐‑up	   policy	   is	   just	   from	   a	   one-­‐‑way	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have	  witnessed	   China	   firmly	   seeking	   integration	  with	   the	   current	   international	   regimes	   and	  showing	   a	   profound	   interest	   in	   ensuring	   that	   international	   rules	   and	   institutions	   function	  effectively	  (Geeraerts,	  2013,	  p.	  9).	  Across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	   issues,	  China	   is	  acting	  more	   like	  an	  established	  great	  power	  than	  a	  revisionist	  one,	  as	  it	  is	  well	  aware	  that	  the	  liberal	  international	  order	  in	  fact	   ‘provides	  it	  with	  greater	  benefits	  than	  if	   it	  tries	  to	  change	  this	  order’	  (Ikenberry,	  2014,	  p.	  56).	  	  	  	  	  	  
Among	   the	   great	   powers	   or,	   more	   specifically,	   between	   America	   and	   the	   EU,	   the	   latter	   is	  undoubtedly	  a	  more	  favourable	  referent	  for	  China	  when	  embracing	  Western	  values.	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  Chinese,	  America’s	  China	  policy	  is	  ‘engagement	  plus	  containment’,	  but	  the	  EU	  emphasises	  cooperation	  instead	  of	  competition	  and	  seldom	  takes	  any	  so-­‐‑called	  ‘hegemonic	  actions’	  against	  China82	  (Men,	  2006,	  p.	  804;	  Song,	  2001).	  Consequently,	  even	  in	  the	  field	  of	  human	  rights,	  the	  EU	  is	   seen	  as	  a	  more	   reliable	  dialogue	  partner,	  which	  can	  cope	  with	  divergence	   in	  a	  way	   that	   is	  neither	   confrontational	   nor	   loud	   (Chen,	   2003;	   Harnish,	   2015,	   p.	   153).	   Nowadays,	   the	  implications	  of	   the	  European	  models	  are	  comprehensive	  and	  profound.	  Specifically,	   ‘from	  the	  domestic	  political	   and	   social	  development	   and	  China’s	  preference	   in	   international	   affairs,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  silhouette	  of	  the	  European	  models’	  (Song,	  2010,	  p.	  755).	  Odgaard	  and	  Biscop	  (2006,	  p.	   11)	   note	   that	   ‘EU	  multilateral	   policies	   are	   seen	   as	   a	   role	  model	   by	   China’,	   especially	  with	  regard	   to	   conflict	   resolution	  and	   the	  non-­‐‑use	  of	   force.	  Liu	  Xige	   (2003,	  p.	  29)	   claims	   that	   ‘the	  successful	   experience	   of	   the	   European	  model	   is	   used	   as	   a	   reference	   for	   China’s	   own	   foreign	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  opening	  (to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  camp)	  to	  another	  one-­‐‑way	  opening,	  i.e.,	  the	  opening	  towards	  the	  West’.	  	  	  
82	  ‘Hegemonic	  action’	   is	  a	  frequently	  occurring	  political	   term	  in	  China,	  used	  by	  the	  Chinese	  government	  or	  media	  to	  describe	  the	  interference	  of	  the	  Western	  powers	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  other	  countries.	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policy’.	   Zhu	   Liqun	   (2007,	   p.	   155)	   believes	   that	   China	   understands	   the	   EU	   more	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	  its	  own	  development,	  hoping	  to	  use	  its	  experiences	  as	  a	  point	  of	  reference.	  
According	   to	   Zhu	   Liqun’s	   survey	   of	   550	   Chinese	   university	   students	   in	   2007,	   Chinese	  youngsters	   think	  highly	  of	   the	  EU’s	  significance	   to	  China	  and	  appreciate	   the	  European	  model	  over	   the	  US	  model	   in	   the	   sphere	  of	   international	   relations.	  One	   representative	   result	   is	   cited	  below	  (Zhu	  2007,	  p.	  162):	  
	  
Figure	  5.2.	  Answers	  to	  the	  question,	  ‘Which	  is	  the	  better	  model	  to	  follow	  when	  dealing	  with	  international	  affairs?’	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international	  terrorism’	  (Ibid.,	  p.	  35).	  
	  
Figure	  5.3.	  The	  Chinese	  public’s	  attitude	  towards	  major	  world	  powers.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5.4.	  The	  Chinese	  elite’s	  attitude	  towards	  major	  powers.	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In	   recent	   decades,	   Chinese	   perceptions	   of	   the	   EU	   have	   undergone	   some	   significant	   changes.	  The	   year	   2008	   is	   generally	   regarded	   as	   a	   turning	   point	   for	   Sino-­‐‑European	   relations,	   when	  ‘ideology	  and	  differences	  on	  some	  specific	  issues	  are	  increasingly	  straining	  bilateral	  relations’	  (Li,	  2016,	  p.	  25).	   ‘There	  has	  been	  remarkable	  frustration	  within	  Chinese	  foreign	  policy	  circles	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  increasingly	  becoming	  more	  difficult	  to	  placate	  and	  that	  the	  previous	  economic	  diplomacy	  seems	  less	  effective	  now’	  (Ibid.).	  Many	  Chinese	  people	  also	  have	  a	  strong	  aversion	  to	  the	  ‘normative	  superiority’	  based	  on	  the	  EU’s	  normative	  power	  identity.	  For	  example,	  ‘the	  EU’s	  effort	   to	   uphold	   human	   rights	   has	   even	   been	   read	   as	   evidence	   of	   a	   persistent	   Cold	  War	   and	  imperialist	  mentality	  seeking	  to	  subjugate	  China’	  (Jørgensen	  &	  Reuben,	  2016,	  p.	  59).	  	  
After	  the	  Eurozone’s	  debt	  crisis,	  Beijing	  obviously	  felt	  more	  confident	  and	  positive	  in	  steering	  the	  orientation	  of	  its	  bilateral	  relationship.	  According	  to	  Nicola	  Casarini	  (2012,	  p.	  47),	  ‘Chinese	  leaders	  are	  today,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  modern	  history,	  in	  the	  position	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  West’s	   economic	   woes	   while	   also	   lecturing	   European	   policy	   makers	   on	   their	   economic	   and	  fiscal	  policies’.	   Some	  observers	  believe	   that	   the	   significance	  of	   the	  EU	   in	   the	  Chinese	  mind	   is	  declining.	  Szczudlik-­‐‑Tatar	  (2015,	  p.	  7)	  believes	  that,	  despite	  China	  still	  claiming	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  an	   important	   strategic	   partner,	   ‘it	   seems	   that	   it	   is	   playing	   a	   lesser	   role	   in	   China’s	   diplomacy	  than	  before	  the	  crisis	  and	  is	  still	  perceived	  more	  as	  an	  economic	  partner	  than	  a	  political	  power	  to	   be	   reckoned	  with’.	   In	   China’s	   official	  media	   reports,	   the	   image	   of	   Europe	   has	   been	   tightly	  connected	   with	   the	   words	   ‘bankrupt’,	   ‘unemployment’,	   ‘decline’	   and	   ‘poverty’.	   Influenced	   by	  such	  media	   fuelling,	   it	   is	   very	  natural	   that	   Chinese	  people	  have	   the	   impression	   that	  China	   is	  experiencing	   a	   rapid	   rise	   while	   the	   Europe	   is	   facing	   intractable	   problems,	   and	   a	   power	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realignment	  between	  these	  two	  actors	  is	  doomed	  to	  take	  place.	  	  
	  
3.	  Political	  divergence	  and	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship.	  
The	  author	  believes	  that	  the	  implications	  of	  face	  culture	  can	  play	  a	  remarkable	  role	  in	  China’s	  diplomacy	  with	  the	  EU,	   largely	  because	  China	  has	  to	  circumvent	  the	  EU’s	  expectations	  and	  to	  rely	  on	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship	  to	  gain	  European	  recognition.	  	  
China	  and	  the	  EU	  share	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  common	  interests	  and	  viewpoints,	  but	  there	  are	  still	  many	  misalignments.	  The	  most	   troubling	  aspect	   is	   that	   ‘the	  Sino-­‐‑EU	  relationship	  has	   “never”	  surpassed	   the	   difficulties	   caused	   by	   different	   ideologies	   and	   values’	   (Huo,	   2005,	   p.	   1).	   Both	  sides	  have	  realised	   that	   ‘these	  differences	  are	  not	  matters	   to	  be	  resolved	  easily	  by	  relying	  on	  common	  interests’	  (Stanzel,	  2007,	  p.	  262),	  and	  any	  individual	  case	  associated	  with	  values	  can	  easily	  grow	  into	  a	  conspicuously	  disruptive	  factor	  in	  their	  bilateral	  relation.	  	  
	  
Issue	   The	  EU’s	  approach	   China’s	  approach	  
Sovereignty83	   ·	  Limited	  and	  relative	  rights. ·	  Europeans	  prefer	  to	  interpret	  sovereignty	  more	  as	  accountabilities	  
·	  Absolute,	  inseparable,	  entitled	  rights ·	  China	  seems	  to	  cling	  to	  the	  most	  traditional	  understanding,	  making	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Chinese	  scholar	  Pan	  Zhongqi	   (2013,	  p.	  31)	  has	   summarised	   this	   in	  an	   interesting	  way:	   ‘Historically,	   sovereignty	  was	  what	  Europeans	  invented	  and	  what	  the	  Chinese	  were	  forced	  to	  accept;	  today	  it	  is	  what	  Europeans	  try	  to	  bury	  and	  what	  the	  Chinese	  still	  hold	  dear’.	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than	  as	  rights.	   independence	  and	  non-­‐‑intervention	  the	  core	  diplomatic	  principles.	  
Human	  rights	  
·	  Civil	  and	  political	  rights ·	  Europeans	  value	  individual	  rights. ·	  Human	  rights	  outweigh	  sovereignty,	  and	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  restrict	  state	  sovereignty	  to	  protect	  human	  rights.	  
·	  Economic	  and	  social	  rights ·	  China	  values	  collective	  rights. ·	  State	  sovereignty	  is	  the	  prerequisite	  for	  and	  the	  foundation	  of	  human	  rights.	  
Democracy	  
·	  The	  EU	  emphasises	  the	  universality	  of	  democracy,	  including	  some	  critical	  concepts	  e.g.	  fair	  competitive	  election,	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  free	  civil	  society. ·	  Process	  of	  democratisation	  could	  involve	  external	  interference	  or	  pressure.	  
·	  Chinese	  authorities	  emphasise	  its	  unique	  path	  to	  democracy	  with	  Chinese	  characteristics	  and	  advocates	  expanding	  citizens’	  political	  participation	  in	  an	  orderly	  way.	  ·	  China	  will	  not	  democratise	  in	  an	  American	  or	  European	  way,	  and	  any	  democratic	  improvement	  cannot	  threaten	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  CCP	  
Strategic	  partner	  
·	  Europeans	  tend	  to	  pursue	  clarity	  in	  common	  strategic	  objectives	  and	  values.	  ·	  More	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	  the	  current	  problems	  or	  divergences. ·	  The	  EU	  wants	  China	  to	  be	  a	  
multilateral	  partner.	  
·	  Chinese	  pursues	  stability	  of	  relationships	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  seeking	  common	  ground	  while	  having	  certain	  differences.	  ·	  China	  regards	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  multipolar	  partner.	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Multipolarity	  
·	  The	  EU	  member	  states	  have	  different	  viewpoints	  about	  multipolarity. ·	  Europeans	  focus	  on	  the	  destabilising	  potential	  of	  emerging	  powers	  and	  a	  power	  shift	  from	  West	  to	  East.	  	  
·	  China	  focuses	  on	  its	  rise	  as	  a	  pole.	   ·	  Multipolarity	  is	  a	  historical	  inevitable	  trend,	  conducive	  to	  the	  peace	  and	  stability	  of	  the	  world.	  
Multilateralism	  
·	  Effective	  multilateralism. ·	  Adherence	  to,	  and	  advocacy	  of,	  international	  law	  and	  institutions.	  
·	  An	  indispensable	  aspect	  of	  European	  values.	  
·	  Practical	  multilateralism ·	  China	  emphasises	  the	  dominant	  position	  of	  the	  sovereign	  state	  and	  is	  less	  committed	  to	  a	  rule-­‐‑based	  international	  system	  than	  the	  EU.	  ·	  Multilateralism	  is	  an	  important	  means	  of	  promoting	  multipolarity. 	  	  
Figure	  5.5.	  Divergent	  political	  values	  between	  China	  and	  the	  EU.	  
	  
In	   the	  eyes	  of	  many	  Europeans,	   a	  world	   ruled	  by	  China	  would	  be	  an	  explicit	  departure	   from	  Western	   norms,	   standards	   and	   experiences	   (Jacques,	   2010).	   The	   EU	   and	   its	   member	   states	  always	   desire	   and	   attempt	   to	   transform	   China,	   ‘helping	   China	   understand	   and	   observe	  international	   norms,	   improving	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   in	   China,	   and	   encouraging	   the	   Chinese	  government	  to	  respect	  human	  rights	  and	  political	  pluralism’	  (Li,	  2016,	  p.	  14).	  	  
However,	  due	  to	  the	  value	  divergences	  between	  both	  sides,	  China	  shows	  no	  interest	  in	  meeting	  many	  of	  the	  European	  expectations.	  In	  an	  open	  speech,	  Catherine	  Ashton	  admitted	  that	  the	  EU	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could	   do	   little	   to	   change	   Chinese	   society,	   and	   ‘China	  will	   not	  match	   EU	   standards	   of	   human	  rights	  and	  rule	  of	  law	  for	  some	  time	  to	  come’	  (as	  cited	  in	  Euobservor,	  2010).	  In	  a	  2009	  policy	  report	   published	   by	   the	   European	   Council	   on	   Foreign	  Relations,	   the	   EU’s	   China	   strategy	   has	  been	  described	  as	  ‘anachronistic’	  (Fox	  &	  Godement,	  2009,	  p.	  16).	  ‘China	  has	  paid	  little	  heed	  to	  European	  values	  and	   today	  Beijing	  regularly	  contravenes	  or	  even	  undermines	   them’	   (Ibid.).84	  Meanwhile,	   observers	   generally	   believe	   that	   ‘with	   its	   rise,	   China	   is	  more	   and	  more	   likely	   to	  adhere	  [to]	  its	  own	  values’	  (Wang,	  2011;	  see	  also,	  Geeraerts,	  2016;	  Jørgensen	  &	  Reuben,	  2016,	  p.	  59).	  
How	   to	   gain	   the	   EU’s	   recognition	   while	   remaining	   destined	   to	   fall	   short	   of	   European	  expectations	   represents	   a	   tough	   challenge	   for	   Chinese	   decision-­‐‑makers.	   As	   a	   method,	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	   relationship	   inevitably	   becomes	   one	   important	   alternative	   that	   can	   be	  characterised	  as	  not	  only	  a	  product	  of	  cultural	  consciousness	  but	  also	  a	  rational	  choice	  based	  on	  political	  realities.	  	  
In	  line	  with	  the	  above	  theoretical	  discussion,	  the	  following	  chapter	  will	  investigate	  China’s	  role	  conception	  as	  an	  acquaintance,	  weak	  and	  a	  counterpart	  of	  the	  EU	  in	  its	  struggle	  for	  recognition.	  It	  will	  seek	  to	  trace	  the	  complex	  process	  of	  role	  conception	  and	  construction	  of	  China	  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis	  the	   EU	   and	   to	   outline	   the	   empirical	   proof	   of	   its	   resulting	   role	   performances.	   Considered	  together,	   the	  Chinese	   leaders’	  and	  diplomats’	   rhetoric,	   the	   formal	  official	   statements	  of	  China	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Some	  scholars	  believe	  that	  the	  EU	  has	  failed	  to	  transform	  China	  and	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  has	  been	  transformed	  by	  China.	  Feng	  Zhongping	   (2013,	  p.	  42)	  notes,	   ‘the	  most	  prominent	  adjustment	  of	   the	  EU’s	  policy	   towards	  China	  was	   that	  pragmatism	  was	  widely	   accepted	   as	   an	   important	   principle	   in	   conducting	   intercourse	   with	   China”.	   Holslag	   (2010)	   claims	   that	   ‘the	   interest	  replacement	  idea	  has	  been	  accepted	  by	  EU	  authorities’.	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and	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   observable	   diplomatic	   behaviours	   all	   point	   to	   the	   plausibility	   of	   the	  evidence	  of	  China’s	  role	  performance.	  
	  
5.1.3	  Data	  sources	  
The	  qualitative	  data	  for	  this	  research	  has	  been	  drawn	  from	  the	  Chinese	  political	  elite’s	  official	  statements	  from	  2008	  to	  2015.	  This	  period	  includes	  former	  President	  Hu	  Jintao’s	  second	  term	  (2008-­‐‑2012)	  and	  the	  first	  three	  years	  of	  President	  Xi	  Jinping’s	  first	  term	  (2013-­‐‑2015).	  	  
‘Political	  elite’	  here	  refers	   to	   the	  politicians	  and	  officials	  who	  currently	  hold	  or	  have	  held	   the	  post	  of	  China’s	  President,	  Premier,	  Chairman	  of	  National	  Congress,	  State	  Councillor	  responsible	  for	  foreign	  affairs,	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Deputy	  Foreign	  Minister	  and	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  ASEAN	  and	  AU,	  during	  the	  period	  2008-­‐‑2015.	  For	  the	  readers’	  convenience,	  Figure	  5.6	  lists	  the	  specific	  persons.	   Needless	   to	   say,	   they	   are	   the	   decision-­‐‑makers	   of	   China’s	   diplomacy,	   who	   can	   be	  regarded	  as	  the	  primary	  performers	  of	  China’s	  national	  role	  conceptions.85	  Moreover,	   in	  most	  situations,	   they	   have	   the	   unrestrained	   authority	   to	   pursue	   their	   preferred	   policies	   and	  dominate	   the	   domestic	   political	   discourse,	   which	   greatly	   reduces	   the	   role	   conflicts	   that	  frequently	  occur	  in	  the	  decision-­‐‑making	  process	  of	  Western	  regimes.	  
	  	  	  
	   Premier	   Chairman	   State	   Foreign	   Vice	   Ambassador	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  A	  related	  theoretical	  discussion	  is	  in	  Section	  2.5.	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Figure	  5.6.	  Members	  of	  the	  Chinese	  political	  elite	  chosen	  for	  this	  study.	  
	  
It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   this	   chapter	   investigates	  China’s	  diplomatic	  discourse	  not	  only	   in	   the	  context	   of	   the	   EU	   but	   also	   the	   ASEAN	   (Association	   of	   Southeast	   Asia)	   and	   the	   AU	   (African	  Union).	  The	  previous	  section	  explained	  that,	  to	  the	  Chinese,	  the	  EU	  is	  one	  of	  the	  very	  few	  major	  powers	  whose	  international	  status	  is	  higher	  than	  its	  own.	  Obviously,	  although	  Beijing	  treats	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Conventionally,	  there	  are	  always	  6-­‐‑8	  officials	  serving	  as	  the	  Deputy	  Minister	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry.	  This	  study	  only	  focuses	  on	  those	  who	  are	  responsible	  for	  European,	  African	  or	  Asian	  affairs.	  
87	  Since	  2001,	  China	  has	  sent	  an	  ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  and,	  so	  far,	  four	  diplomats	  have	  occupied	  this	  post.	  In	  2008,	  Xue	  Hanqin	  was	  appointed	  as	  the	  first	  ambassador	  to	  the	  ASEAN.	  In	  2015,	  Kuang	  Weilin	  served	  as	  the	  first	  ambassador	  to	  the	  AU.	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ASEAN	  and	  the	  AU	  countries	  as	  ‘equal’	  partners	  on	  paper,	  it	  never	  actually	  views	  them	  as	  major	  powers	   and	  more	   often	   still	   plays	   the	   role	   of	   ‘Big	   Brother’	   before	   them.	   In	   this	   sense,	   if	   the	  hypothesis	  of	  this	  research	  is	  true,	  then	  China’s	  role	  performance	  before	  the	  EU—its	  perceived	  superior—should	  be	  eminently	  different	   from	  its	  performance	   to	   the	  ASEAN	  and	  the	  AU—its	  perceived	  inferiors.	  A	  comparative	  study	  of	  this	  is	  expected	  to	  augment	  research	  credibility	  and	  reveal	  the	  saliency	  of	  face	  culture.	  	  	  
Consequently,	   statements	   made	   by	   members	   of	   the	   political	   elite	   include	   their	   discourse	  relating	   to	   the	   EU,	   ASEAN	   and	   AU	   in	   formal	   speeches,	   diplomatic	   conversations,	   press	  interviews,	   printed	   articles	   etc.	   All	   the	   data	   are	   publicly	   available	   in	   digitalised	   form,	  mainly	  obtained	  from	  the	  websites	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  Missions	  of	  China	  to	  the	  EU,	  ASEAN	  and	  AU	  and	  Xinhua	  News	  Agency.	  The	  study	  involves	  collecting	  discourse	  materials	  of	  1,95,000	  Chinese	  characters	  about	  the	  EU,	  1,03,000	  about	  the	  ASEAN	  and	  92,000	  about	  the	  AU.	  	  
Nvivo	  software	  was	  used	  as	  the	  key	  research	  tool	  throughout	  the	  process	  of	  data	  collection	  and	  analysis.88	  It	  was	  used	  to	  extract	  concrete	  discourses	  that	  match	  different	  role	  conceptions	  and	  to	  present	  the	  proportion	  of	  related	  discourses	  for	  a	  comparative	  study.	  
	  
5.2	  Acquaintances	  and	  Partners	  
Chapter	  3	  revealed	  that	  Chinese	  people	  tend	  to	  play	  the	  role	  of	  acquaintance	  when	  seeking	  face	  from	  their	  superiors.	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  such	  a	  role	  conception	  can	  be	  transformed	  into	  a	  useful	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Nvivo	  software	  was	  operated	  in	  strict	  accordance	  with	  Bazeley	  and	  Jackson’s	  textbook	  Qualitative	  Data	  Analysis	  with	  Nvivo.	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‘voucher’	   to	   gain	   social	   recognition.	   One	   common	   practice	   is	   to	   refer	   to	   a	   relationship	   using	  intimate	  titles	  that	  are	  designed	  to	  exaggerate	  and	  essentially	  promote	  relational	  closeness.	  	  
‘Only	   a	   few	   articles	   have	   tried	   to	   understand	   the	   underlying	   dynamics	   of	   the	   Sino-­‐‑EU	  partnership	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  level	  of	  ideas	  and	  perceptions’	  (Kumar,	  2012,	  p.	  5).	  This	  section	  tries	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   whether	   and	   why	   China’s	   role	   conception	   as	  acquaintance	   lead	   to	  presentations	   as	   partner.	   Moreover,	   how	   does	   this	   manifest	   its	   face	   culture-­‐‑-­‐‑isn't	   this	   a	  manifestation	  of	  face	  culture?	  
	  
5.2.1	  Distinctiveness	  of	  the	  title	  ‘partner’	  
Partner	  or	  partnership	  has	  been	  a	  popular	  conceptual	  and	  policy	  tool	  available	  to	  international	  actors,	   ‘which	  is	  perceived	  by	  these	  actors	  as	  somehow	  legitimate	  and	  useful	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  their	   foreign	   policy	   goals’	   (Feng	  &	  Huang,	   2014,	   p.	   37).	   Simultaneously,	   views	   and	   practices	  regarding	  this	  concept	  always	  vary	  from	  country	  to	  country.	  	  
The	   Chinese	  word	   ‘partner’	   [伙伴],	   according	   to	   the	   Contemporary	  Chinese	  Dictionary	  (CASS,	  1997,	   p.	   576),	   refers	   to	   those	  who	   have	   joined	   the	   same	   organisation	   or	   are	   engaged	   in	   the	  same	  activities.	  To	  the	  Chinese,	  this	  word	  is	  synonymous	  with	  ‘acquaintance’	  [熟人],	  which	  can	  broadly	   refer	   to	   various	   interpersonal	   relationships,	   including	   friend,	   lover,	   colleague,	  classmate	  or	  someone	  with	  whom	  you	  have	  just	  had	  brief	  contact.	  There	  is	  no	  clear	  semantic	  boundary	   in	   Chinese	   to	   clarify	   what	   exact	   kind	   of	   actors	   can	   qualify	   as	   ‘partner’,	   and	   such	  ambiguity	  or	  elasticity	  grants	  language	  users	  the	  power	  of	  individual	  interpretation.	  In	  light	  of	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this,	  China’s	  preference	  for	  this	  term	  has	  an	  emic	  cultural	  basis.	  
‘The	  concept	  of	  “partnership”	  emerged	  within	  Chinese	  diplomacy	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War’	  (Feng	  &	  Huang,	  2014,	  p.	  1).	  In	  1993,	  China	  established	  its	  first	  partnership	  with	  Brazil.	  Initially,	  China’s	   partnership	   diplomacy	   showed	   a	   distinct	   preference	   towards	   major	   or	   regional	  powers. 89 	  Since	   the	   early	   2000s,	   partnership	   diplomacy	   has	  constituted	  one	   of	   the	  most	  notable	  dimensions	  of	  China’s	  multi-­‐‑faceted	  diplomacy,	  which	  is	  perceived	  by	  Beijing	  as	  a	  legitimate	  and	  useful	  tool	  for	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  bilateral	  relations	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  its	  foreign	   policy	   goals	   (Ibid.).	   In	   December	   2014,	   Foreign	   Minister	   Wang	   Yi	   announced	   that	  China’s	   global	   partnership	   network	   had	   basically	   taken	   shape.	   ‘China	   has	   established	   72	  partnerships,	   of	   varying	   forms	   and	   degrees,	   with	   67	   countries	   and	   five	   regions	   or	   regional	  organizations’	   (Wang,	   2014).90	  Currently,	   the	   common	   viewpoint	   of	   Chinese	   scholars	   is	   that	  partnership	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  kind	  of	  normal	  relationship	  between	  or	  among	  international	  actors,	   ‘a	  denial	  of	  the	  past	  alliance	  [of	  the	  Cold-­‐‑War	  period]’	  (Wang	  &	  Wan,	  2013,	  p.	  14;	  see	  also	  Men	  &	  Liu,	  2015;	  Zhang,	  2016,	  pp.	  41-­‐‑42).	  Nguyen	  (2015,	  p.	  57)	  summarises	  the	  basic	  connotations	  of	  China’s	  partnership	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  ‘A	  partnership	  means	  that	  neither	  party	  should	  view	  the	  other	  one	  as	  an	  enemy;	  the	  parties	  need	  to	  treat	  each	  other	  with	  respect	  and	  equality;	  the	  parties	  should	  not	  intervene	  in	  each	  other’s	  internal	  affairs;	  the	  parties	  need	  to	  coordinate	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Public	   information	   reveals	   that	   by	   2000,	   China	   had	   established	   a	   partnership	   with	   12	   countries	   and	   international	  organisations—Brazil	   (1993),	  Russia	   (1994),	   India	   (1996),	  Pakistan	   (1996),	  France	   (1997),	  America	   (1997),	  Canada	   (1997),	  the	  ASEAN	  (1997),	  EU	  (1998),	  Britain	  (1998),	  Japan	  (1998)	  and	  South	  Korea	  (1998).	  
90	  According	  to	  the	  author’s	  statistics,	  as	  of	  late	  2015,	  China	  has	  established	  partnerships	  with	  78	  countries	  and	  five	  regional	  organisations.	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each	  other	  to	  advance	  their	  common	  political	  and	  economic	  interests	  and	  they	  need	  to	  support	  each	  other	  in	  international	  affairs’.	  	  	  	  	  
The	   rapid	   development	   of	   China-­‐‑EU	   relations	   since	   the	   1990s	   has	   seen	   both	   sides	   forging	  partnerships	  and	  positioning	  each	  other	   from	  a	  strategic	  perspective.	   In	  1998,	  China	  and	   the	  EU	  established	  a	  ‘Constructive	  Partnership’;	  in	  2002,	  both	  sides	  upgraded	  it	  to	  ‘Comprehensive	  Partnership’;	   in	   2003,	   both	   sides	   claimed	   to	   have	   established	   a	   ‘Comprehensive	   Strategic	  Partnership’.	   The	  period	  2003-­‐‑7	  has	   been	   commonly	   regarded	   as	   the	   ‘honeymoon’	   period	   of	  China-­‐‑EU	   relations,	   which	   was	   abruptly	   followed,	   since	   2008,	   by	   a	   series	   of	   mutual	  disappointments	   in	   the	  context	  of	  some	  key	   issues.	  Today,	  both	  sides	  engage	  with	  each	  other	  more	  closely	  and	  also	  take	  a	  more	  realistic	  attitude	  towards	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  partnership	  (Chen,	   2010,	   pp.	   10-­‐‑11;	   Renard,	   2011,	   p.	   20;	   Li,	   2016,	   p.	   25;	   Nguyen,	   2015,	   p.	   47).	   Holstag	  (2011,	  p.	  299)	  claims	  that	  ‘there	  is	  thus	  a	  marked	  gap	  between	  the	  proclaimed	  strategic	  nature	  of	   the	  Sino-­‐‑European	  partnership	  and	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  strategic	  objectives	  are	  defined	  or	  translated	  into	  concrete	  policies’.	  	  
In	  line	  with	  a	  comparative	  study,	  we	  can	  easily	  find	  that	  there	  is	  a	  distinguishing	  quantitative	  difference	   in	   the	   arguments	   about	   ‘partner’	   between	   China’s	   discourse	   towards	   the	   EU	   and	  those	  towards	  the	  ASEAN	  and	  AU	  (Figure	  5.7).	  Statistics	  reveal	  that	  China,	  when	  discussing	  the	  EU	  and	  Sino-­‐‑EU	   relations,	   devotes	  much	  more	  of	   its	  discourse	   to	   forging	   its	   role	   as	   ‘partner’	  compared	  with	  its	  discourse	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  ASEAN	  and	  AU.91	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  The	  calculation	  was	  automatically	  generated	  by	  Nvivo	  software	  after	  content	  encoding.	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Figure	  5.7.	  Frequency	  of	  appearance	  of	  the	  topic	  ‘partner’	  in	  China’s	  diplomatic	  discourse.	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word	  ‘partner’	  appeared	  only	  twice:	  ‘At	  present,	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Forum	  on	  China-­‐‑Africa	  Cooperation	  and	  a	  new	  type	  of	  strategic	  partnership,	  China-­‐‑Africa	  relations	  have	  entered	  a	   fast-­‐‑track	   of	   all-­‐‑round	   development’	   (Xi,	   2013);	   ‘[China]	   will	   establish	   the	   cooperative	  partnership	   of	   the	  cross-­‐‑nation	   and	  cross-­‐‑region	   infrastructure	  construction	  in	  Africa’	   (Ibid.).	  Similarly,	   in	   President	   Xi’s	   speech	   entitled	   ‘Deepen	   Cooperative	   Partnership	   and	   Co-­‐‑build	  Beautiful	  Homeland	  of	  Asia’	  delivered	   in	  Singapore	   (Xi,	   2015A),	  despite	   speaking	  a	   lot	   about	  China-­‐‑ASEAN	   relations,	   he	   did	   not	   mention	   the	   words	   ‘partner’	   or	   ‘partnership’	   even	   once.	  Some	  observers	  claim	  that	  China’s	  partner	  diplomacy	  seems	  to	  be	  pursued	  at	  the	  rhetoric	  level	  in	  the	  form	  of	  lip	  service.	  Its	  discourse	  towards	  the	  ASEAN	  and	  AU	  reveal	  that	  even	  calling	  it	  lip	  service	  would	  be	  an	  exaggeration.	  
Given	   the	   amount	   of	   discourse	   shown	   in	   Figure	   5.7,	   China	   shows	   how	   important	   its	   role	   as	  
partner	   is	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   EU.	   At	   first	   glance,	   over	   the	   past	   few	   years,	   ‘partner’	   and	  ‘partnership’	  have	  emerged	  as	  the	  most	  distinctive	  words	  mentioned	  in	  the	  meta-­‐‑narrative	  of	  China’s	  EU	  diplomacy,	  permeating	  almost	  all	  its	  official	  discourse	  to	  Europe,	  at	  the	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	   levels.	   This	   behavioural	   trend	   fits	   the	   expected	   performance	   for	   the	   identity	   of	  ‘acquaintance’,	   namely,	   borrowing	   an	   interpersonal	   salutation	   to	   describe	   each	   other	   and	   to	  seek	  recognition.	  	  
Towards	  the	  EU,	  China’s	  discourse	  of	  being	  ‘partner’	  is	  certainly	  not	  a	  meaningless	  instrument	  of	   diplomatic	   rhetoric	   and	   has	   noticeably	   capitalised	   on	   three	   topics:	   1)	   historical	   review	   of	  China-­‐‑EU	   relations;	   2)	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   China-­‐‑EU	   strategic	   partnership;	   3)	   policy	  statements	  about	  China-­‐‑EU	  cooperation	  in	  various	  spheres.	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The	  Chinese	  political	  elite	  routinely	  stresses	  the	  rapid	  evolution	  of	  the	  China-­‐‑EU	  partnership	  in	  most	   speeches.	   Such	   a	   discursive	   strategy,	   apparently,	   is	   aimed	   at	   reminding	   the	   European	  audiences	   that	   both	   sides	   have	   been	   ‘acquaintances’	   for	   a	   long	   time.	   A	   typical	   case	   is	   cited	  below,	  from	  Yang	  Yanyi	  (Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  2015),	  the	  current	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  EU:	  
In	  the	  past	  four	  decades,	  China-­‐‑EU	  relations	  have	  experienced	  ups	  and	  downs,	  but	  the	   general	   trend	   is	   positive	   and	   forward,	   and	   the	   mainstream	   is	   dialogue	   and	  cooperation.	   Since	   the	  new	   century,	   China-­‐‑EU	   relations	  have	   represented	   a	   stair-­‐‑like	   development:	   from	   1998’s	   ‘cooperative	   partner’,	   2001’s	   ‘comprehensive	  cooperative	   partner’,	   2003’s	   ‘comprehensive	   strategic	   partner’	   to	   2014’s	  comprehensive	  strategic	  partner	  for	  ‘peace,	  growth,	  reform	  and	  civilization.	  
The	   other	   two	  kinds	   of	   topics	  will	   be	   elaborated	  upon	   in	   subsequent	   sections,	  which	   aim	   to	  identify	  the	  cultural	  characteristics	  embodied	  in	  the	  Chinese	  discourse.	  
	  
5.2.2	  Conceptualisation	  of	  strategic	  partnership	  
Being	  recognised	  as	  a	   strategic	  partner	   is	   an	  unremitting	  goal	  of	  China’s	  EU	  diplomacy.	  Soon	  after	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   China-­‐‑EU	   comprehensive	   strategic	   partnership,	   David	  Shambaugh	   (2004,	   p.	   243)	   claimed	   that	   China	   and	   the	   EU	   constituted	   ‘an	   emerging	   axis	   in	  world	  affairs’.	   It	  now	  appears	   that	   this	   argument	   is	   a	   little	   exaggeratory.	  However,	   like	  many	  other	   diplomatic	   concepts,	   the	   term	   ‘partnership’	   indeed	   has	   its	   normative	   components	   and	  performative	   characteristics.	   Theoretically,	   languages	   ‘may	   not	   only	   describe	   the	   material	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world	  but	  also	  can	  be	  utilized	  by	  speakers	  to	  perform	  a	  set	  of	  particular	  actions’	  (Blanco,	  2016,	  p.	  43).	  Through	  linguistic	  exchange,	  actors	  can	  constantly	  position	  and	  reposition	  themselves,	  create	  relationships	  with	  one	  another	  and	  also	  establish	  or	  modify	  the	  rules	  that	  govern	  their	  relationship	  (Ibid.,	  pp.	  40-­‐‑44).	   It	  can	  be	  observed	  that	  both	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  keep	  exporting	  their	   respective	  values	  and	  expected	   rules	   to	  each	  other	   in	   the	  discourse	   framework	  of	   their	  partnership.	  
At	  a	  general	  level,	  China’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  this	  notion	  serves	  two	  discursive	  functions:	  1)	  a	  description	  of	  established	  fact,	  embodying	  some	  particular	  attributes	  pertaining	  to	  both	  sides’	  interactions,	  and	  2)	  a	   formative	  process	  of	  China’s	  normative	  orientation	  towards	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  bilateral	  relationship.	  
The	   first	  one	   is	   always	  presented	   in	  a	  descriptive	   form,	  noting	   the	  on-­‐‑going	   cooperation	  and	  significance	  of	  China-­‐‑EU	  relations:	  
‘The	  establishment	  of	  [a]	  comprehensive	  strategic	  partnership	  between	  China	  and	  the	   EU	   is	   [a]	   mutually	   beneficial	   cooperation	   between	   the	   largest	   developing	  country	  and	  the	   largest	  group	  of	  developed	  countries,	   friendly	  exchange	  between	  two	   great	   ancient	   civilizations,	   and	   candid	   dialogue	   between	   different	   social	  systems.’	  
—Former	  Chinese	  Premier	  Wen	  Jiabao	  
	  (Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  2009)	  
‘The	  European	  Union,	  either	  before	  or	  after	  [the]	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon,	  has	  always	  been	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China’s	  vital	  strategic	  partner.	  There	  are	  dialogues	  between	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  with	  diverse	   forms	   and	   high	   frequency,	   which	   are	   very	   rare	   in	   China’s	   other	  partnerships.’	  
	  	  —Former	  Vice	  Foreign	  Minister	  Fu	  Ying	  
	  (Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  2010)	  
‘The	  China-­‐‑EU	  comprehensive	  strategic	  partnership	   is	  not	  only	  a	  strategic	  choice,	  but	   also	   strategic	   necessity…	   Under	   the	   current	   situation,	   the	   most	   prominent	  strategic	   significance	   of	   this	   partnership	   is	   that	   it	   has	   an	   irreplaceable	   role	   in	  realizing	  their	  respective	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  goals.’	  
—Former	  Chinese	  ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  Song	  Zhe	  (2011A)	  
‘After	   a	   40-­‐‑year	   cultivation,	   [the]	   China-­‐‑EU	   relation	   has	   become	   one	   of	   the	  most	  important,	  stable,	  constructive	  and	  influential	  partnerships	  in	  today’s	  world.’	  
—Vice	  Foreign	  Minister	  Wang	  Chao	  (2015)	  
‘It	  is	  hard	  to	  argue	  that	  all	  strategic	  partners	  are	  of	  equal	  or	  vital	  importance	  to	  China’	  (Feng	  &	  Huang,	  2014,	  p.	  8).	  However,	  from	  the	  statements	  cited	  above,	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  China	  sincerely	  wants	  the	  EU	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  one	  of	  China’s	  priorities	  in	  its	  partnership	  diplomacy.	  
The	  second	  discursive	  trend	  seems	  more	  noteworthy	   in	  China’s	  partnership	  narratives	   in	   the	  context	   of	   the	   EU.	   Beijing	   struggles	   for	   explanatory	   power	   regarding	   the	   normative	   values	  contained	  in	  the	  term	  ‘strategic	  partnership’.	  Since	  the	  start,	  Beijing	  has	  been	  unwilling	  to	  be	  a	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passive	  recipient	  of	  ‘Normative	  Power	  Europe’.	  
As	   early	   as	   2004,	   the	   then	   Premier	   Wen	   Jiabao	   (2004)	   put	   forward	   China’s	   definition	   of	  ‘comprehensive	  strategic	  partnership’:	  	  
By	  ‘comprehensive’,	  it	  means	  that	  the	  cooperation	  should	  be	  all-­‐‑dimensional,	  wide-­‐‑ranging	   and	   multi-­‐‑layered.	   It	   covers	   economic,	   scientific,	   technological,	   political	  and	  cultural	  fields,	  contains	  both	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  levels,	  and	  is	  conducted	  by	   both	   governments	   and	   non-­‐‑governmental	   groups.	   By	   ‘strategic’,	   it	  means	   that	  the	   cooperation	   should	  be	   long-­‐‑term	  and	   stable,	   bearing	  on	   the	   larger	  picture	  of	  China-­‐‑EU	  relations.	  It	  transcends	  the	  differences	  in	  ideology	  and	  social	  system	  and	  is	  not	  subjected	  to	  the	  impacts	  of	  individual	  events	  that	  occur	  from	  time	  to	  time.	  By	  ‘partnership’,	   it	   means	   that	   the	   cooperation	   should	   be	   equal-­‐‑footed,	   mutually	  beneficial	  and	  win-­‐‑win.	  
Through	   a	   textual	   analysis	   as	   part	   of	   this	   study,	   I	   conclude	   that	   over	   the	   last	   few	   decades,	  China’s	   normative	   propositions	   regarding	   the	  China-­‐‑EU	  partnership	   still	   carry	   forward	   these	  ideas.	  Four	  recurring	  keywords	  can	  help	  reveal	  the	  core	  values:	  
	  
Keyword	   Core	  appeal	   Typical	  statement	  
Strategicness	   ·	  To	  pursue	  global-­‐‑level	  influence. ·	  To	  maintain	  the	  
·	  ‘China	  and	  the	  EU	  should	  exceed	  the	  bilateral	  range,	  strengthen	  cooperation	  in	  international	  affairs,	  jointly	  promote	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stability	  of	  the	  bilateral	  relationship.	   multilateralism,	  participate	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  global	  rules	  and	  systems	  and	  together	  shape	  the	  post-­‐‑crisis	  global	  pattern	  and	  international	  order.’	  (Song,	  2010A)	  	  ·	  ‘The	  essence	  of	  the	  China-­‐‑EU	  relationship	  lies	  in	  its	  strategic	  nature.	  The	  China-­‐‑EU	  relationship	  is	  strategic	  because	  our	  cooperation	  is	  long-­‐‑term,	  stable	  and	  comprehensive.	  It	  is	  not	  affected	  by	  our	  differences	  in	  ideology	  and	  social	  systems.	  It	  is	  not	  about	  immediate	  gains	  or	  losses	  over	  any	  particular	  matter	  at	  any	  particular	  time.	  And	  temporary	  difficulties	  and	  setbacks	  have	  never	  made	  us	  lose	  confidence	  in	  our	  cooperation.’	  (Wen	  Jiabao,	  as	  cited	  in	  Xinhua	  News	  Agency,	  2012A)	  
Comprehensiveness	   ·To	  emphasise	  the	  objective	  of	  all-­‐‑round	  cooperation	  
‘So-­‐‑called	  comprehensiveness	  means	  that	  China-­‐‑EU	  relations	  should	  be	  all-­‐‑round,	  wide-­‐‑ranging	  and	  multi-­‐‑level…	  Both	  sides	  can	  conduct	  extensive	  dialogue	  and	  cooperation	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  politics,	  security,	  diplomacy,	  economy	  and	  trade,	  technology,	  society,	  culture,	  political	  party,	  military	  etc.’	  (Yang	  Yanyi,	  as	  cited	  in	  Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  2015)	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Mutual	  advantage	   ·	  To	  pursue	  mutually	  beneficial	  economic	  benefits	  
·	  ‘[China	  and	  the	  EU]	  should	  place	  development	  as	  a	  top	  priority	  and	  pursue	  a	  path	  of	  mutual	  benefit	  and	  common	  development.’	  (Wen	  Jiabao,	  2009)	  	  
Inclusiveness	  
·	  To	  call	  for	  mutual	  respect,	  stated	  plainly,	  and	  to	  demand	  that	  the	  Europeans	  be	  respectful	  of	  China’s	  political	  system	  and	  values.	  	  
·	  ‘[China	  and	  the	  EU]	  must	  respect	  each	  other’s	  cultural	  traditions,	  social	  systems	  and	  ideologies	  in	  an	  open	  and	  inclusive	  spirit.’	  (Ibid.)	  ·	  ‘China	  and	  the	  EU	  differ	  in	  social	  systems,	  cultural	  background	  and	  development	  stage.	  It	  is	  only	  natural	  that	  we	  hold	  different	  views	  on	  some	  issues.	  However,	  the	  divergences	  should	  not	  affect	  the	  main	  stream	  of	  China-­‐‑EU	  relations.’	  (Wu	  Hailong,	  2013)	  
Figure	  5.8.	  China’s	  normative	  arguments	  about	  the	  China-­‐‑EU	  strategic	  partnership.	  
	  
Many	  European	  analysts	  criticise	  China’s	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  EU’s)	  phrase	  ‘strategic	  partnership’	  for	  being	  rather	  empty:	  there	  is	  neither	  formal	  criteria	  for	  defining	  a	  given	  third	  international	  actor	  as	  a	  strategic	  partner	  nor	  a	  clear	  identification	  of	  common	  interests	  and	  goals	  (e.g.	  Berkofshy,	  2005,	  pp.	  14-­‐‑15;	  Grevi,	  2010,	  p.	  1;	  Sandschneider,	  2009,	  p.	  325;	  Zhang,	  2016,	  pp.	  463-­‐‑479).92	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  This	   research	   concurs	  with	  Blanco’s	   opinion	   (2016,	   p.	   40)	   that	  many	   current	   studies	   on	  partnership	   treat	   it	   as	   a	   form	  of	  organisation,	  a	  concept	  with	  a	  single	  meaning	  and	  a	  set	  of	  standard	  practices,	  meanwhile	  neglecting	  the	  actual	  meanings	  and	  functions	  of	  this	  term.	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The	  most	   typical	   viewpoint	   is	   that	   the	   Sino-­‐‑EU	   strategic	   partnership	   is	   unworthy	   of	   a	   title,	  ‘neither	  “strategic”	  nor	  “partner”’	   (Shambaugh,	  2013,	  p.	  90).	  The	  EU	  practitioners,	  clearly,	  do	  not	  have	  a	  clear	  and	  unified	  understanding	  of	   this	  concept.	  One	  EU	  diplomat	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  (as	  cited	   in	  Rettem,	  2010),	   ‘It’s	   like	   love—no	  one	  can	  define	   it.	  You	  only	  know	  what	   it	   is	  when	  you	  experience	  it’.	  	  
Figure	   5.8	   shows	   that,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   China	   possesses	   its	   own	   ideological	   notions	   about	  
partnership	   and	   seeks	   a	   regulative	   framework.	   One	   thing	   easily	   overlooked	   by	   people	   (and	  often	  confused	  by	  Westerners)	   is	   that	  China’s	  normative	  expectations	  are	  orientated	   towards	  the	   maintenance	   of	   a	   relationship	   rather	   than	   any	   implicit	   or	   explicit	   conditionality	   that	   is	  applied	  to	  define	  actorness.	  Maintaining	  relational	  stability	  and	  foreseeability	  becomes	  China’s	  basic	  and	  primary	  demand	  from	  the	  EU.	  Among	  the	  arguments	  mentioned,	  there	  is	  almost	  no	  unilaterally	  normative	   requirement	  or	   thought	  about	  what	  kind	  of	   actor	   the	  EU	  should	  be	   in	  international	  society	  or	  its	  interior	  regions;	  China	  only	  has	  expectations	  regarding	  the	  common	  objectives,	  relational	  rules	  and	  consequences	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  itself	  and	  the	  EU.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	   the	  Chinese	  mind,	   ‘proper	  naming	   is	  believed	   to	  be	  capable	  of	  establishing	  proper	  reality”	  (Jia,	  1997,	  p.	  52).	  China’s	   reliance	  and	  emphasis	  on	   the	   term	  partner	   are	   consistent	  with	   the	  Chinese	   epistemological	   preference	   of	   face	   culture,	   namely,	   people	   often	   arbitrarily	   define	  themselves	  as	  an	  acquaintance	  and	  then	  include	  anyone	  they	  wish	  to	  bring	  into	  their	  circle.	  In	  most	  cases,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  clarify	  what	  personal	  quality	  engenders	  the	  materialisation	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  acquaintance	  or	  a	  clear-­‐‑cut	  circumscription	  separating	  this	  identity	  from	  others.	  In	   much	   the	   same	   way,	   China	   labels	   the	   EU	   as	   a	   partner	   and	   feels	   satisfied	   with	   the	   EU’s	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acceptance,	  but	  it	  is	  never	  eager	  to	  give	  a	  clear	  definition	  of	  this	  title	  and	  seems	  to	  intentionally	  maintain	  a	  sense	  of	  ambiguity	  in	  the	  relational	  construction.	  
To	  sum	  up,	  China’s	  pursuit	  of	  the	  EU’s	  recognition	  as	  a	  partner	  is	  a	  typical	  manifestation	  of	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship—by	  giving	  prominence	  to	  the	  closeness	  achieved	  and	  the	  maturity	  of	   the	  bilateral	  relations,	  by	  asserting	  the	  ambiguous	   identity	  of	  partner	   in	  order	  to	  establish	  new	  webs	   of	  meanings	   that	  may	   engender	   the	   novel	   presupposition	   or	   positioning	   between	  China	  and	  the	  EU.	  According	  to	  China’s	  expectations,	  if	  the	  EU	  recognises	  the	  necessity,	  state	  or	  prospect	  of	  developing	  a	  strategic	  partnership	  with	  China,	  the	  EU	  would	  voluntarily	  reduce	  or	  even	   stop	   paying	   attention	   to	   China’s	   individual	   qualities,	   especially	   its	   political	   system	   and	  values	  that	  are	  drastically	  different	  from	  those	  of	  the	  Europeans,	  and	  that	  it	  would	  ultimately	  acknowledge	  China	  as	  a	  genuinely	  acceptable	  partner.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  if	  only	  to	  maintain	  the	  existing	  beneficial	  elements	  of	  their	  partnership,	  the	  EU	  is	  expected	  to	  repress	  its	  hostility	  or	  distrust	  towards	  China.	  
	  
5.2.3	  Categorisation	  of	  partners	  
China	   uses	   the	   term	   partner	   to	   depict	   specific	   foreign	   policies	   towards	   the	   EU,	   and	   this	  phenomenon	   of	   its	   discourse	   is	   seldom	   seen	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   ASEAN	   and	   AU.	   This	   also	  provides	   us	   with	   a	   better	   perspective	   to	   analyse	   the	   copious	   political	   connotations	  underpinning	  this	  concept.	  The	  author	  classifies	  the	  related	  discourses	  into	  four	  categories	  of	  policies:	  Political	  and	  Security	  Partner,	  Economic	  Partner,	  Cultural	  Partner	  and	  Human	  Rights	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Partner.	  Analysing	  the	  frequency	  of	  these	  topics’	  appearance	  in	  its	  discourse	  using	  Nvivo,	  it	  can	  be	   found	   that	   at	   the	   content	   level,	   there	   are	   statistically	   significant	   differences	   among	   the	  appearance	  of	   these	   four	   topics.	  This	   is	  presumably	  because	  China	   just	  wants	   to	  be	  a	  partial	  partner	  of	  the	  EU,	  not	  a	  real,	  complete	  partner.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5.9.	  Frequency	  of	  dour	  different	  types	  of	  partnerships	  in	  China’s	  discourse	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  EU.	  
	  
Economic	  partner	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strategic	  partnership.’	  
—Former	  Chinese	  ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  Wu	  Hailong	  	  
(as	  cited	  in	  Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  2013)	  
‘Together,	  China	  and	  EU	  member	  states	  account	  for	  1/4th	  of	  the	  world’s	  population	  and	  1/3rd	  of	  the	  global	  economy.	  Interaction	  of	  the	  two	  markets	  certainly	  generates	  considerable	   energy.	   China	   and	  Europe	  may	  be	  different	   in	   terms	  of	   the	   political	  system	   and	   guiding	   principle.	  But	   given	   Europe’s	   long	   tradition	   of	   commercial	  diplomacy,	   there	   are	   many	   areas	   where	   the	   two	   sides	   can	   have	   practical	  cooperation.’	  
—Prime	  Minister	  Li	  Keqiang	  (2015A)	  
An	   initial	   observation	   is	   that	   China’s	   statements	   about	   partnership	   are	   dominated	   by	   its	  economic	   and	   trade	   concerns.	   A	   large	   number	   of	   Chinese	   leaders’	   speeches	   reflect	   their	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  close	  economic	  ties	  they	  enjoy	  with	  the	  EU	  and	  regard	  them	  as	  ballast	  for	  the	  whole	  partnership.	  In	  2016,	  China	  was	  the	  EU’s	  second	  trade	  partner	  after	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  the	  EU	   is	  China’s	  biggest	   trading	  partner	   (European	  Commission,	  2016).	  The	  China-­‐‑EU	  economic	  partnership	  has	  rapidly	  expanded	   into	  various	  new	   fields,	  and	   ‘both	  sides	  have	  established	  a	  China-­‐‑EU	  climate	  change	  partnership,	  urbanization	  partnership,	  and	  strategic	  partnership	  on	  energy	   consumption	   (Chinese	   Foreign	  Ministry,	   2012A).	   This	   progress	   echoes	   the	   opinion	  of	  Wouters	  et	  al.	   (2012,	  p.	  5):	   ‘From	  the	  Chinese	  point	  of	  view,	   the	   importance	  of	  Europe	   is	  not	  perceived	   in	   a	   consistent	   a	   way.	   Nevertheless,	   Europe	   has	   always	   been	   valued	   as	   a	   major	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economic	  partner	  for	  bilateral	  trade,	  and	  a	  source	  of	  technology	  and	  investment’.	  	  
Economic	  complementarity	  is	  construed	  as	  an	  inherent	  advantage	  of	  being	  economic	  partners.	  As	  argued	  by	  China’s	  top	  diplomat	  Yang	  Jiechi	  (2011),	  ‘China	  and	  the	  EU	  vary	  in	  development	  stage	   and	   position	   in	   the	   global	   industrial	   chain.	   The	   two	   sides	   have	   different	   strengths	   in	  technology,	  capital,	  market,	  product	  and	  managerial	  expertise.	  There	  is	  a	  lot	  we	  can	  offer	  each	  other	  economically’.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  China	  continually	  reiterates	  the	  perennial	  significance	  of	  the	  EU	  to	  its	  economic	  development,	  praising	  the	  EU	  as	  ‘a	  key	  party	  that	  China	  can	  work	  with	  to	  achieve	   industrialization,	  urbanization,	   IT	   application	  and	  agricultural	  modernization	  as	  well	  as	   its	   “Two	  Centenary	  Goals”’93	  (Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  2014A).	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   it	   also	  continues	  reminding	  Europeans	   to	  discover	  China’s	  vast	  market	  and	   tremendous	  commercial	  opportunities.	  One	  example	  is	  Ambassador	  Song	  Zhe’s	  argument	  (2009D):	  ‘China-­‐‑EU	  economic	  cooperation…	   will	   reduce	   living	   expenses	   by	   hundreds	   of	   Euros	   for	   every	   European	   family,	  reduce	  production	  costs	  for	  European	  enterprises,	  contribute	  to	  the	  curbing	  of	  inflation	  in	  the	  European	  countries,	  and	  create	  millions	  of	  job	  opportunities	  in	  Europe’.	  	  
Following	  the	  European	  debt	  crisis,	  China	  addressed	  this	  issue	  in	  a	  timely	  manner,	  ‘through	  the	  lens	  of	  their	  longstanding	  support	  for	  a	  stronger	  and	  more	  united	  EU	  that	  could	  work	  alongside	  Beijing	   to	   counter	  American	   hegemony’	   (Casarini,	   2012,	   p.	   36),	  mainly	   by	   continuing	   to	   buy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  ‘Two	  Centenary	  Goals’	  [两个一百年]	   is	   a	   set	  of	   goals	  proposed	  by	  General	  Secretary	  Xi	   Jinping	   following	   the	  18th	  National	  Congress	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  China	  held	  in	  2012.	  It	  includes	  1)	  the	  centenary	  of	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  China	  in	  2021,	  at	  which	  point	  a	  moderately	  well	  off	  society	  would	  have	  been	  achieved;	  2)	  the	  centenary	  of	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  PRC	  in	  2049,	  at	  which	  point	  China	  will	  have	  become	  a	  ‘strong,	  democratic,	  civilized,	  harmonious,	  and	  modern	  socialist	  country’	  (Xinhua	  News	  Agency,	  2012B).	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Eurozone	   bonds	   and	   increasing	   investments	   in	   industrial	   assets	   and	   infrastructure	   projects	  across	  Europe.	  Simultaneously,	  Beijing	  also	  lost	  no	  time	  in	  raising	  its	  international	  profile	  and	  portraying	   itself	   as	   a	   truly	   reliable	   partner	   to	   the	   European	   audiences.	   This	   manifested	   in	  Beijing’s	  clear	  intent	  to	  ‘use	  the	  financial	  assistance	  to	  Europe	  as	  a	  bargaining	  power’	  (Duggan,	  2016,	   p.	   45),	   at	   best	   getting	   some	   face	   like	   through	   the	   acceptance	   of	   its	   market	   economy	  status.	  At	   the	  6th	  China-­‐‑European	  Business	   Summit,	  October	  2010,	   the	   then	  Chinese	  Premier	  Wen	  Jiabao	  (2010)	  described	  China’s	  efforts	  in	  these	  emotional	  words:	  
In	  the	  cold	  winter	  of	  January	  2009,	  I	  visited	  Europe	  and	  brought	  with	  me	  not	  only	  the	   confidence	   needed	   to	   overcome	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   but	   also	   a	   procurement	  delegation	  to	  place	  orders	  to	  the	  European	  countries.	  The	  EU	  is	  a	  strategic	  partner	  
to	  China,	   and	  China	  did	  not	   look	  on	  unconcerned	  when	  some	  Eurozone	  countries	  were	   in	   trouble.	   We	   continued	   to	   hold	   and	   buy	   Euro-­‐‑denominated	   bonds	   and	  helped	  Iceland,	  Greece,	  Spain,	  Portugal	  and	  Italy	  in	  their	  most	  difficult	  time.	  We	  will	  continue	  to	  render	  assistance	  and	  tide	  some	  countries	  over	  their	  difficulties.	  China	  
is	  a	  friend	  indeed	  and	  I	  believe	  the	  entrepreneurs	  here	  all	  know	  it.	  
In	   addition,	   as	   an	   economic	   partner,	   China	   seldom	   mentions	   issues	   concerning	   multilateral	  economic	   governance.	  There	   is	   limited	   evidence	   to	   show	   that,	   at	   least	   at	   the	  discourse	   level,	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  are	  jointly	  endeavouring	  to	  shape	  the	  agenda	  of	  global	  economic	  issues.	  	  	  
It	  is	  completely	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  international	  relations,	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘partnership’	  should	  be	  ‘based	  on	  mutual	  interests’	  (Crossick,	  2008,	  p.	  264).	  No	  matter	  what	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the	  meaning	  of	  the	  terms	  partner	  or	  partnership,	  they	  can	  certainly	  be	  used	  to	  describe	  China-­‐‑EU	   economic	   and	   trade	   cooperation,	   given	   their	   size	   and	   prospects.	   Meanwhile,	   due	   to	   the	  predominance	  of	  such	  economic	  issues	  and	  interests,	  many	  other	  fields	  of	  policy	  are,	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  marginalised	  in	  the	  process	  of	  partnership	  construction.	  	  
	  
Political	  and	  security	  partner.	  
International	   politics	   and	   security	   is	   a	   field	   in	   which	   Beijing	   relentlessly	   wishes	   to	   forge	   a	  united	  front	  with	  the	  EU	  and	  to	  achieve	  breakthroughs	  in	  some	  issues	  (e.g.	  the	  cancellation	  of	  the	  arms	  embargo).	  	  
On	   31	  March	   2014,	   during	   an	   official	   visit	   to	   the	   EU	   headquarters	   in	   Brussels,	   President	   Xi	  Jinping	  first	  put	  forth	  the	  idea	  that	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  should	  establish	  a	  partnership	  for	  peace,	  growth,	  reform	  and	  civilisation.	  Later,	  on	  2	  April,	  China	   issued	   its	  second	  policy	  paper	  on	  the	  EU,	   which	   expatiated	   on	   these	   four	   kinds	   of	   partnerships.	   Among	   these	   four	   partnerships,	  peace	  and	  reform	  certainly	  belong	  to	  the	  political	  and	  security	  category.	  	  
‘China-­‐‑EU	  partnership	  for	  peace:	  China	  stands	  ready	  to	  work	  with	  the	  EU	  to	  bring	  the	  two	  major	  forces	  closer	  to	  pursue	  peaceful	  development	  in	  a	  multi-­‐‑polar	  world,	  respect	   and	   accommodate	   each	   other’s	   core	   interests	   and	  major	   concerns,	  make	  the	  international	  order	  and	  international	  system	  more	  just	  and	  equitable,	  advocate	  democracy	   in	   international	   relations	   and	   create	   a	   peaceful,	   stable,	   equitable	   and	  orderly	   development	   environment	   for	   all	   countries.’	   (Chinese	   Foreign	   Ministry,	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2014B)	  
‘China-­‐‑EU	  partnership	  for	  reform:	  China	  stands	  ready	  to	  work	  with	  the	  EU	  to	  better	  align	   China’s	   comprehensive	   deepening	   of	   reform	   with	   the	   EU’s	   reform	   and	  readjustment,	  draw	  upon	  each	  other’s	  reform	  experience,	  share	  reform	  dividends,	  jointly	  improve	  the	  ability	  of	  reform	  and	  governance,	  and	  actively	  participate	  in	  the	  formulation	  and	  reform	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  global	  governance.’	  (Ibid.)	  
These	  words	  underscore	  how	  China	   and	   the	  EU	  bear	   the	   shared	   responsibility	   of	   promoting	  global	  peace	  and	  development	  and	  also	  have	   individual	  needs	   for	   internal	   reforms.	  However,	  such	  arguments	  are	  still	   steeped	   in	  abstract	  and	  vague	  objectives.	  For	  example,	  Beijing	  never	  proposes	  concrete	  methods	  for	  how	  to	  advocate	  democracy	  in	  international	  relations;	  nor	  does	  it	  make	  specific	  suggestions	  for	  practical	  cooperation	  with	  the	  EU.	  	  	  
In	  fact,	  in	  2014’s	  policy	  paper	  as	  well	  as	  in	  several	  speeches	  by	  Chinese	  leaders,	  China	  has	  listed	  various	  specific	  political	  and	  security	  issues	  and	  outlined	  what	  kind	  of	  partner	  it	  wishes	  to	  be:	  	  
Political	  Affairs	  
l   Give	   full	   play	   to	   the	   role	   of	  the	  China-­‐‑EU	  Summit	   in	   providing	   political	   guidance	   to	   China-­‐‑EU	  relations	  
l   Step	  up	  high-­‐‑level	  exchanges	  and	  political	  dialogue	  with	  EU	  institutions	  and	  member	  states.	  
l   Uphold	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  UN	  and	  support	  the	  UN	  in	  playing	  its	  leading	  role	  in	  world	  affairs.	  
l   Deepen	  exchange	  and	  cooperation	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  Asia-­‐‑Europe	  Meeting.	  
l   Enhance	  cooperation	  and	  exchange	  between	  legislative	  bodies	  and	  political	  parties.	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l   Push	  for	  a	  peaceful	  resolution	  for	  regional	  hotspot	   issues	  such	  as	  the	  Iranian	  nuclear	  issue,	  the	  
Middle	  East	  peace	  process	  and	  the	  conflicts	  in	  Syria	  and	  Ukraine.	  
l   Enhance	  dialogue	  about	  affairs	  in	  Africa,	  Middle	  East	  and	  the	  Arctic.	  
l   Enhance	  China-­‐‑EU	   cooperation	  on	  domestic	   affairs,	   including	  human	  resources,	  social	  security,	  
public	  administration,	  judicial	  reform,	  policy	  law	  enforcement	  etc.	  
Security	  Affairs	  
l   Promote	   cooperation	   in	  escort	  missions	   and	   safeguard	  peace	   in	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Aden	  and	  waters	  off	  
the	  Somali	  coast.	  
l   Promote	  cooperation	  in	  peacekeeping	  operations	  in	  Africa.	  
l   Step	  up	  counter-­‐‑terrorism	  exchanges	  and	  cooperation.	  
l   Uphold	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   multilateral	   disarmament	   regime	   and	   strengthen	   international	  
nuclear	  security.	  
l   Strengthen	  cyber-­‐‑security	  dialogue	  and	  cooperation.	  
l   Step	  up	  personnel	  exchanges	  at	  various	  levels	  in	  the	  military	  between	  China	  and	  the	  EU.	  
Figure	  5.10.	  China’s	  proposals	  about	  political	  and	  security	  partners.	  
	  
As	  indicated	  in	  Figure	  5.10,	  there	  are	  three	  key	  features	  that	  can	  be	  summarised	  as	  follows:	  	  
Firstly,	   the	   impressive	   diversity	   of	   issues.	   There	   is	   clearly	   not	   only	   a	   sense	   of	   bilateral	  cooperation	  in	  the	  context	  of	  various	  global	  and	  domestic	  issues	  but	  also,	  remarkably,	  trilateral	  geopolitical	  cooperation	   in	  many	  areas,	   including	  Eastern	  Europe,	   the	  Middle	  East,	  Africa	  etc.	  All	  of	  these	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  stark	  reminder	  of	  the	  statement	  of	  Javier	  Solana	  (2014):	  ‘The	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EU	  and	  China	  are	  natural	  partners	  on	  key	  global	  issues’.	  Nguyen	  (2015,	  p.	  58)	  argues	  that	  one	  basic	   conceptual	   difference	   is	   that	   China	   perceives	   strategic	   partnerships	   only	   as	  means	   for	  manipulating	   bilateral	   relations,	   while	   the	   EU	   believes	   that	   such	   a	   partnership	   should	   be	  predicated	  on	  cooperation	  in	  global	  governance.	  Anyhow,	  this	  study	  has	  shown	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  the	   realm	   of	   politics	   and	   security,	   China	   would	   like	   to	   promote	   global-­‐‑level	   strategic	  coordination.	  
In	   addition,	   on	  many	   international	   and	   domestic	   affairs,	   China	  wittingly	   positions	   itself	   as	   a	  modest	   learner	   before	   the	   EU	   and	   shows	   strong	   interests	   in	   drawing	   on	   the	   EU’s	   successful	  experience.	  Its	  concerns	  focus	  on	  issues	  directly	  related	  to	  people’s	  livelihood,	  like	  urbanisation	  and	   social	   security.	   Not	   surprisingly,	   China	   is	   also	   mindful	   of	   excluding	   some	   issues	   like	  democracy	  or	  Chinese	  ethnic	  minorities	  from	  the	  political	  agenda.	  According	  to	  Chinese	  scholar	  Zhao	   Chen	   (2012),	   the	   EU’s	   approach	   to	   global	   governance	   can	   be	   described	   as	  ‘constitutionalism	   based	   on	   human	   rights’,	   in	   contrast	   to	   China’s	   approach	   of	   ‘egalitarianism	  based	   on	   sovereignty’.	   As	  Mattlin	   observes	   (2012,	   p.	   187),	   in	   EU-­‐‑China	   relations,	   democracy	  has	  largely	  been	  a	  non-­‐‑issue.	  	  	  
Second,	  Beijing	  concentrates	  on	  its	  role	  in	  the	  international	  regime	  with	  regard	  to	  political	  and	  security	   cooperation.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   members	   of	   China’s	   political	   elite	   seem	   to	   be	   faithful	  institutionalists,	  always	  overtly	  willing	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  member	  states	  through	  bilateral	   and	   multilateral	   regimes.	   As	   argued	   by	   Ambassador	   Song	   Zhe	   (2009A),	   ‘dozens	   of	  dialogue	   mechanisms	   at	  different	  levels	  and	   through	  different	  channels	   have	  constituted	   an	  effective	  platform	  to	  deepen	  political	  mutual	  trust	  and	  enrich	  the	  strategic	  partnership’.	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China	   always	   mentions	   multilateralism	   filtered	   through	   the	   UN.	   It	   especially	   attaches	   great	  importance	  to	  the	  sole	  authority	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  (especially	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council)	  in	  legitimate	  collective	  actions	  concerning	  global	  security.	  This	  exposes	  the	  profound	  differences	   between	   China	   and	   the	   EU	   with	   regard	   to	   international	   intervention	   and	   R2P	  	  (Responsibility	   to	   protect).	   The	   European	   approach	   is	   ‘more	   favorable	   to	   the	   international	  interference	   in	   each	   other’s	   domestic	   affairs	   if	   necessary’	   (Song,	   2010,	   p.	   771).	   The	   Chinese	  approach	  is	  ‘still	  sovereignty-­‐‑centrism’	  (Ibid.)	  and	  sticks	  to	  ‘the	  way	  provided	  in	  the	  past	  by	  the	  UN	   for	   anchoring	   any	   intervention	   in	   the	   consent	   of	   the	   five	   permanent	   Security	   Council	  members’	  (Attina,	  2016,	  p.	  185).	  	  
Last	  but	  not	  least,	  China	  shows	  serious	  concern	  for	  the	  areas	  geopolitically	  close	  to	  the	  EU	  e.g.	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Africa	   and	   the	  Arctic.	  Meanwhile,	   either	   in	   the	  2014	  policy	  paper	   or	   all	   the	  speeches	   cited	   in	   this	   study,	   it	   never	  mentions	   any	   political/security	   problems	   in	   the	   Asian-­‐‑Pacific	   region,	   such	   as	   the	   South	   China	   Sea	   dispute	   or	   the	   North	   Korea	   nuclear	   issues.	  Seemingly,	  China	  has	  no	  intention	  of	  handling	  its	  proximal	  troubles	  with	  the	  EU,	  its	  partner,	  in	  whatever	  form.	  It	  can	  be	  speculated	  that,	  first,	  China	  may	  be	  unwilling	  to	  let	  the	  EU	  interfere	  in	  conflicts	   in	   East	   Asia,	   because	   a	   host	   of	   these	   problems	   are	   directly	   linked	   with	   China’s	  proclaimed	  sovereignty	  or	  core	  interests.94	  Second,	  Chinese	  leaders	  may	  have	  no	  expectation	  of	  the	   EU’s	   capability	   to	   help	   resolve	   Asian	   disputes	   as	   there	   is	   a	   ‘lack	   of	   European	   strategic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  According	   to	   the	  whitepaper	   entitled	  China’s	  Peaceful	  Development	  2011	   (Information	  Office	   of	   the	   State	  Council	   of	   China,	  2011),	  China’s	  core	  interests	  include:	  1)	  state	  sovereignty;	  2)	  national	  security;	  3)	  territorial	  integrity;	  4)	  national	  reunification;	  5)	   China’s	   political	   system	   established	   by	   the	   Constitution	   and	   overall	   social	   stability;	   6)	   basic	   safeguards	   for	   ensuring	  sustainable	  economic	  and	  social	  development.	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interest	  or	  presence	  of	  European	  military	  forces	  in	  Asia’	  (Shambaugh,	  2005,	  p.	  20).	  Briefly,	  one	  thing	   is	   indubitable:	   Beijing	   has	   strategic	   ambitions	   to	   expand	   its	   influence	   in	   Europe’s	  neighbouring	  areas	  and	  also	  to	  achieve	  what	  President	  Xi	  (2014A)	  said	  at	  the	  4th	  Conference	  on	  Interaction	  and	  Confidence-­‐‑Building	  Measures	   in	  Asia:	   ‘It	   is	   for	   the	  people	  of	  Asia	   to	   run	   the	  affairs	  of	  Asia,	  solve	  the	  problems	  of	  Asia	  and	  uphold	  the	  security	  of	  Asia’.	  
	  
Cultural	  partner.	  
China’s	  discourse	  about	  being	  a	  cultural	  partner	  is	  relatively	  prominent.	  For	  China,	  the	  priority	  is	   to	   strengthen	  mutual	  understanding	  and	   consolidate	  public	   support	   for	  bilateral	   relations.	  China	   also	   shows	   a	   strong	   interest	   in	   including	   as	  many	   fields	   and	   topics	   as	   possible	   in	   the	  content	  of	   its	   cultural	   exchanges.	  At	   the	  Third	  meeting	  of	   the	  China-­‐‑EU	  High-­‐‑level	  People-­‐‑to-­‐‑people	  Dialogue	  Mechanism,	  State	  Councillor	  Liu	  Yandong	  mentioned	  seven	  key	  aspects	  of	  the	  China-­‐‑EU	   cultural	   exchanges,	   including	   educational	   cooperation,	   technological	   cooperation,	  cultural	  communication,	  media	  cooperation,	  youth	  exchanges,	  women’s	  issues	  and	  cooperation	  in	  tourism	  (as	  cited	  in	  Mission	  of	  China	  to	  the	  EU,	  2015A).	  
Besides	  discussions	  about	  practical	  cooperation,	  another	  trend	  of	  this	  discourse	  is	  that	  Chinese	  leaders	   and	   diplomats	   continually	   stress	   the	   necessity	   of	   maintaining	   the	   diversity	   of	  civilisations,	   as	   if	   this	   value	  was	   not	   shared	   by	   the	   Europeans.	   Two	   such	   examples	   are	   cited	  below:	  
‘China-­‐‑EU	  partnership	   for	  civilization:	  China	  stands	  ready	  to	  work	  with	  the	  EU	  to	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bring	  the	  two	  major	  civilizations	  in	  the	  East	  and	  West	  closer	  and	  set	  an	  example	  of	  different	   civilizations	   seeking	   harmony	   without	   uniformity,	   promoting	   diversity,	  learning	  from	  each	  other	  and	  enjoying	  common	  prosperity.’	  
—China’s	  Policy	  Paper	  on	  the	  EU	  
	  (Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  2014A)	  
‘As	  cultural	  partners,	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  should	  push	  for	  boarder	  and	  deeper	  cultural	  exchanges	   as	   per	   the	   principles	   of	   equality	   and	   friendship.	   During	   the	   exchange	  process,	   China	  wishes	   that	   the	   EU	   side	  would	   understand	   a	   comprehensive,	   real	  and	   complex	   China	   from	   the	   objective,	   historical,	   and	   multi-­‐‑dimensional	  perspectives.’	  
—China’s	  ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  Yang	  Yanyi	  (2014)	  
Obviously,	   China	   advocates	   a	   spirit	   of	   inclusiveness,	   namely,	   ‘recognizing	   all	   societies	   and	  cultures	  as	  coexisting	  and	  equal	  stakeholders	   in	   the	  global	  order’	   (Ding,	  2008,	  p.	  197).	   It	   is	  a	  typical	  kind	  of	  cultural	  pluralism,	  namely,	  the	  universalism	  that	  China	  pursues	  is	  fully	  based	  on	  a	   recognition	  of	  national	  particularism.	  An	  undemonstrative	  effort	   for	   the	  decentralisation	  of	  the	   EU’s	   normative	   superiority	   can	   be	   observed	   in	   China’s	   discursive	   construction.	   For	   the	  Chinese,	   ‘Europe’	  is	  not	  a	  universal	  concept	  (Wang,	  2012,	  p.	  4)	  or,	   in	  other	  words,	   ‘Europe’	  is	  provincialised	  as	  an	  ordinary	  and	  regional	  part	  of	  the	  world	  civilisation.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  quite	  understandable	  that	  President	  Xi	  Jinping	  (2014D)	  claims	  that	  ‘exchanges	  and	  mutual	  learning	  among	   civilizations	   must	   not	   be	   built	   on	   the	   exclusive	   praise	   or	   belittling	   of	   one	   particular	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civilization’.	  
Meanwhile,	   these	   discourses	   also	   help	   fulfil	   an	   obscure	   political	   intention:	   they	   strive	   to	  subsume	   the	  differences	  of	   the	  political	   systems	  of	  both	   sides	   into	   a	  normal	  phenomenon	  of	  cultural	   heterogeneity;	   thus,	   there	   is	   no	   necessity	   to	   assess	   each	   side	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	  universalised	   standard.	   More	   bluntly,	   the	   value	   of	   diversity	   should	   be	   orientated	   towards	  political	  coexistence	  between	  China	  and	  the	  EU;	  the	  ‘harmony’	  Beijing	  is	  most	  concerned	  about	  is	  the	  ‘continued	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  leadership’s	  “regime	  survival”	  within	  China’	  (Scott,	  2012,	   p.	   56).	   For	   the	   EU,	   a	   strategic	   partnership	   should	   be	   built	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   ‘a	   mutual	  perspective	  on	  basic	  values’	  (Nguyen,	  2015,	  p.	  58);	  however,	  China	  tries	  to	  persuade	  the	  EU	  to	  accept	  another	  kind	  of	  rule	  of	  ‘getting-­‐‑along’,	  namely,	  ‘the	  “other”	  has	  a	  right	  to	  exist	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  currently	  presents	  itself ’	  (Greenhill,	  2008,	  p.	  363).	  In	  this	  sense,	  as	  China’s	  cultural	  partner,	  it	  is	  recommended	  that	  the	  EU	  give	  China	  some	  basic	  thick	  recognition	  by	  admitting	  its	  existence	   (or,	  more	   accurately,	   its	   political	   regime)	   as	   a	   different	   but	   harmless	   ‘civilizational	  model’	  and	  by	  treating	  China’s	  political	  or	  human	  rights	  situation	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  ‘seeking	  harmony	  but	  not	  uniformity’.95	  
	  
Human	  rights	  partner.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  ‘Seeking	  harmony	  but	  not	  uniformity’	  [Chinese:	  和而不同]	  from	  The	  Analects	  of	  Confucius	  is	  a	  frequently	  mentioned	  principle	  in	  China’s	  diplomatic	  discourse.	  According	  to	  Wang	  Jiarui	  (2015,	  p.	  122),	  the	  former	  Director	  of	  the	  International	  Department	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party,	  ‘the	  idea	  of	  “seeking	  harmony	  but	  not	  uniformity”	  is	  embodied	  in	  the	  support	  that	  China	  has	  voiced	  for	  the	  diversity	  of	  civilizations,	  and	  in	  its	  commitment	  to	  the	  coexistence,	  joint	  development,	  and	  common	  prosperity	  of	  different	  civilizations’.	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A	   commitment	   to	   human	   rights	   and	   fundamental	   freedom	   is	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   EU’s	   global	  foreign	   policy,	   and	   the	   promotion	   of	   human	   rights	   always	   constitutes	   a	   core	   part	   of	   its	  engagement	  with	   China.	   The	   EU	   believes	   that	   bilateral	   cooperation	   in	   this	   sphere	   should	   be	  strengthened	   and	   should	   aim	   to	   achieve	   positive	   results	   in	   line	   with	   the	   development	   of	   a	  China-­‐‑EU	   partnership	   (European	   Commission,	   2006,	   p.	   4).	   The	   EU	   also	   fully	   realises	   the	  Chinese	  authorities’	  hyper-­‐‑sensitivity	  on	  this	  issue.	  As	  early	  as	  1994,	  the	  EU’s	  first	  policy	  paper	  to	   China	   had	   put	   forth	   the	   principle	   of	   ‘quiet	   diplomacy’:	   ‘To	   make	   progress,	   all	   the	   EU	  institutions	  should	  pursue	  human	  rights	  issues	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  carefully	  timed	  public	  statements,	   formal	   private	   discussions	   and	   practical	   cooperation’	   (European	   Commission,	  1994,	  p.	  6).	  Facing	  the	  EU’s	  work	  to	  resolve	  its	  human	  rights	  issues,	  China	  has	  been	  very	  good	  at	  giving	  low-­‐‑key	  responses	  or	  reactions	  in	  a	  perfunctory	  manner.	  
This	  attitude	  is	  also	  epitomised	  in	  China’s	  discourses	  about	  partnership	  with	  the	  EU.	  As	  seen	  in	  Figure	  5.9,	   it	   is	   striking	   that	   the	  number	  of	  human	   rights-­‐‑related	  discourses	  has	   stayed	  very	  low	  compared	  to	  others.	  Below	  is	  an	  example	  of	  one	  such	  prodigiously	  limited	  speech:	  
‘We	  attach	  so	  much	  importance	  to	  principles	  of	  equality	  and	  mutual	  respect,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  we	  can	  conduct	  constructive	  dialogues	  [about	  human	  rights	  issues]	  with	  the	  EU	  and	  European	  countries.’	  
—Former	  Foreign	  Minister	  Yang	  Jiechi	  
(as	  cited	  in	  Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  2008)	  
‘As	  per	  the	  principles	  of	  equal	  dialogue	  and	  seeking	  common	  ground	  while	  putting	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aside	  differences,	   China	   will	   conduct	   in-­‐‑depth	   dialogue	   on	   human	   rights	   issues	  with	   the	   EU,	   and	   strengthen	   the	   EU’s	   knowledge	   and	   understanding	   about	   the	  Chinese	   view	   of	   human	   rights,	   achievements	   in	   the	   field	   of	   human	   rights,	   the	  strategy	  of	  rule	  by	  law	  in	  China,	  etc.	  Both	  sides	  should	  take	  a	  long-­‐‑term	  and	  broad	  perspective	   to	   have	   open	   communication,	   enhance	   mutual	   trust,	  remove	  misgivings,	  increase	  positive	  factors	  and	  eliminate	  negative	  interference.’	  
—China’s	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  Yang	  Yanyi	  (2015)	  
‘The	  EU	  side	  should	  attach	  equal	  importance	  to	  all	  forms	  of	  human	  rights,	  including	  civil,	   political,	   economic,	   social	   and	   cultural	   rights	   and	   the	   right	   to	   development,	  view	   China’s	   human	   rights	   situation	   in	   an	   objective	   and	   fair	  manner,	   stop	   using	  individual	  cases	  to	  interfere	  in	  China’s	  judicial	  sovereignty	  and	  internal	  affairs,	  and	  create	  a	  good	  atmosphere	  for	  human	  rights	  dialogue	  and	  cooperation	  between	  the	  two	  sides.’	  
—Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry	  (2014A)	  
The	  above	  statements	  contain	  a	  clear	  message:	  the	  issue	  of	  human	  rights	  should	  be	  based	  on	  mutual	  and	  equal	   communication	   (or,	   in	   the	  Europeans’	  words,	   ‘unconditional	  engagement’),	  not	  on	  one-­‐‑sided	  information	  or	  begging	  for	  recognition.	  China	  remains	  on	  high	  alert	  regarding	  human	  rights	  issues,	  stereotypically	  believing	  that	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  member	  states	  never	  view	  its	  human	   rights	   ‘in	   an	   objective	   and	   fair	  manner’.	   This	   also	   illustrates	   that	   the	   promotion	   and	  development	   of	   a	   partnership	   does	   not	   fundamentally	   alter	   the	   Chinese	   political	   elite’s	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perception	  of	   the	  EU	  in	  a	  political	  sense	   i.e.	   ‘the	   foreign	  hostile	   force’96	  that	  may	  threaten	  the	  CCP’s	  rule	  and	  suppress	  China’s	  rise.	   ‘The	  EU’s	  efforts	  to	  uphold	  human	  rights	  has	  even	  been	  (mis)read	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  persistent	  Cold	  War	  and	  imperialist	  mentality	  seeking	  to	  subjugate	  China’	  (Jørgensen	  &	  Wong,	  2016,	  p.	  59).	  
	  
In	  the	  above	  discussion	  about	  the	  categorisation	  of	  partners,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  again	  that	  China’s	  role	  performance	  as	  a	  partner	  is	  still	  mainly	  aimed	  at	  manifesting	  increasing	  closeness	  in	  the	  relationship	  and	  spreading	  its	  own	  epistemology	  for	  theorising	  its	  identity.	  Meanwhile,	  China’s	  endeavours	  to	  be	  recognised	  as	  partner’	  also	  serve	  some	  mundane	  concrete	  ends.	  There	  are	  at	  least	  three	  clear	  goals:	  economic	  interests,	  regime	  security	  and	  strategic	  coordination	  with	  the	  EU	  at	  a	  global	   level.	  The	  most	   important	  value	   that	  China	  wishes	   to	  enact	   in	   its	   socialisation	  with	   the	   EU	   is	   that	   every	   state/international	   actor	   is	   entitled	   to	   pursue	   the	   model	   of	  governance	  and	  values	  it	  finds	  favourable.	  As	  such,	  the	  EU’s	  recognition	  of	  China	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  shared	  interests	  and/or	  a	  sense	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  their	  relationship	  rather	  than	  a	  foundation	  of	  shared	  values	  or	  satisfaction	  with	  China’s	  inherent	  characteristics.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  ‘The	   foreign	   hostile	   force’	   [Chinese:	   境外敌对势力]	   or	   ‘the	   international	   anti-­‐‑China	   force’	   [Chinese:	   国际反华势力]	   are	  China’s	  political	  terms	  used	  to	  describe	  any	  state,	  organisation	  or	  even	  person	  who	  challenges	  or	  criticises	  its	  political	  regime,	  ruling	  party	  or	  leaders.	  These	  terms	  frequently	  appear	  in	  China’s	  domestic	  political	  discourse.	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5.3	  The	  Weak,	  Developing	  Country	  and	  the	  Historical	  Victim	  
China’s	   face	   is	   conventionally	   tightly	   linked	   with	   the	   rules	   or	   norms	   of	   its	   vertical	   or	  asymmetrical	   relationships.	   In	   seeking	   social	   recognition,	   Chinese	   people	   tend	   to	   present	  themselves	   as	   weak	   when	   interacting	   with	   those	   they	   perceive	   to	   be	   their	   superior.	   It	   is	  commonly	   believed	   that	   by	   downplaying	   one’s	   personal	   strengths	   and	   achievements,	   others	  would	   view	   one	   more	   favourably,	   thus	   promoting	   interpersonal	   acceptance	   (Koh	   &	   Wang,	  2012,	   p.	   143).	   Specifically,	   a	   stereotypical	   manner	   of	   representation	   is	   to	   be	   proactive	   in	  exposing	  one’s	  own	  limitations,	  even	  if	   they	  do	  not	  relate	  to	  one’s	  reality	  (Lee,	  et	  al.,	  2014,	  p.	  318).	   Correspondingly,	   this	   study	   posits	   that	   under	   the	   influence	   of	   face	   culture,	   China	  performs	   the	   role	   conception	   of	   the	   weak	   in	   its	   interactions	   with	   the	   EU,	   over-­‐‑promoting	  international	  images	  of	  China	  as	  a	  developing	  country	  and	  a	  historical	  victim.	  
	  
5.3.1	  The	  distinctiveness	  of	  the	  weak	  
We	  can	  readily	  observe	  that	  in	  some	  international	  presentations,	  Chinese	  leaders	  intentionally	  downplay	  the	  positional	  change	  in	  China’s	  role	  in	  the	  world	  system,	  while	  still	  accentuating	  its	  significant	   residual	   socio-­‐‑economic	  problems	   and	  never	   tire	   of	   talking	   about	   how	  China	  was	  violated	   and	   isolated	   by	   the	  Western	   powers	   and	   Japan	   in	   the	   past.	   All	   of	   their	   arguments	  essentially	   aim	   at	   crafting	   two	   images—that	   of	   a	   developing	   country	   and	   a	   historical	   victim.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  assumption	  proposed	  by	  this	  thesis,	  the	  concrete	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  these	  two	   images	   are	  more	   remarkable	   in	   China’s	   diplomatic	   discourse	  with	   the	   EU,	   its	   perceived	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superior,	  than	  those	  with	  the	  ASEAN	  and	  AU,	  its	  perceived	  inferiors.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5.11:.	  Frequency	  of	  mentions	  of	  weak	  in	  China’s	  discourse.	  
	  
Coding	  all	   the	  arguments	  describing	  China	  as	  a	  developing	  country	  and	  a	  historical	  victim	   in	  the	  selected	  material	  through	  Nvivo	  yields	  the	  above	  data.	  All	  of	  the	  results	  coincide	  with	  the	  proposed	   assumption,	   namely,	   compared	  with	   the	   ASEAN	   and	   AU,	   China	   projects	   these	   two	  roles	  in	  its	  presentation	  to	  the	  EU	  to	  a	  much	  greater	  extent.	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seen	  in	  the	  following	  statements:	  
‘Many	   current	   disputes	   in	   Asia	   are	   a	   relic	   of	   the	   past,	   and	  most	   Asian	   countries	  including	   China	   are	   victims.	   We	   should	   properly	   handle	   problems	   and	   seek	  peaceful	   solutions	   through	   direct	   dialogue	   and	   coordination,	   ensuring	   these	  disputes	  never	  plague	  us.’	  
—Vice	  Foreign	  Minister	  Liu	  Zhenmin	  (2014)	  
‘Both	  China	  and	  Africa	  were	  subjected	  to	  aggression	  and	  oppression	  by	  colonialism	  and	  imperialism	  in	  the	  past,	  and	  we	  both	  deeply	  value	  independence	  and	  equality.	  Neither	   of	   us	   has	   imposed	   our	   own	  will	   on	   others	   or	   interfered	   in	   each	   other’s	  internal	   affairs.	   We	   both	   stand	   for	   resolving	   problems	   arising	   from	   cooperation	  through	  equal	  consultation.’	  
—Prime	  Minister	  Li	  Keqiang	  (2014)	  
‘China	  continues	  to	  act	  like	  a	  small	  country	  with	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  global	  system	  at	  large	  and	  therefore	   little	   responsibility	   for	   it’	   (Bergsten,	  2008,	  pp.	  64-­‐‑64).	   In	   some	  cases,	   its	  discourses	  about	  being	  a	  developing	  country	  suggest	  that	  the	  ASEAN	  and	  the	  AU	  should	  not	  rely	  too	  much	  on	   China’s	   assistance,	   highlighting	   its	   still	   limited	   national	   power	   and	   awareness	   of	   avoiding	  dollar	  diplomacy:	  
‘On	   the	   other	   hand,	   China	   is	   a	   developing	   country.	   We	   must	   consider	   our	   own	  capacity	   when	   providing	   assistance	   to	   others...	   We	   hope	   to	   receive	   greater	  understanding	  and	  support	  from	  others	  for	  China’s	  policy	  and	  position.’	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—Vice	  Foreign	  Minister	  Zhai	  Jun	  	  
(As	  cited	  in	  Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  2012B)	  
Next,	  we	  will	  explore	  China’s	  discourse	  around	  being	  weak	  with	  the	  EU,	  not	  only	  for	  its	  cultural	  characteristics	  but	  also	  its	  specific	  political	  meaning.	  
	  
5.3.2	  Developing	  country	  
There	   is	   no	   doubt	   that,	   by	   most	   standards,	   China	   is	   a	   developing	   country.	   What	   confuses	  observers	   is	   why	   China	   is	   so	   insistent	   on	   using	   this	   term	   when	   describing	   itself,	   given	   the	  extent	  of	   its	  power	   (Summers,	  2014,	  p.	   16).	  This	   section	   tries	   to	   illustrate	   that	  China	  adopts	  discursive	  strategies	  to	  reinforce	  its	  international	  recognition	  as	  weak	  with	  the	  EU.	  
First	   of	   all,	   most	   remarkably,	   the	   Chinese	   political	   elite	   would	   like	   to	   expose	   China’s	  disadvantages,	   to	   garnish	   an	   image	  of	   a	  developing	   country	   through	   specific	   data	  or	   striking	  comparisons.	   They	   frequently	   refer	   to	   China’s	   immense	   population	   pressure,	   uneven	  development	   between	   rural	   and	   urban	   areas	   and	   huge	   gap	  with	   the	  West	   in	   the	   spheres	   of	  science,	   technology,	   social	  welfare,	   education	  etc.	   In	  President	  Xi	   Jinping’s	   speech	   (2014B)	  at	  the	   College	   of	   Europe,	   Bruges,	   one	   paragraph	   specially	   discusses	   China’s	   identity	   as	   a	  ‘developing	  country’,	  which	  is	  clearly	  an	  emblematic	  reference:	  
China	  is	  the	  world’s	  biggest	  developing	  country.	  China	  has	  made	  historic	  progress	  in	  development.	  It	  is	  now	  the	  second	  largest	  economy	  in	  the	  world.	  It	  has	  achieved	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in	   several	   decades	   what	   took	   developed	   countries	   centuries	   to	   achieve.	   This	   is	  without	   doubt	   a	   proud	   achievement	   for	   a	   country	  whose	  population	   exceeds	   1.3	  billion.	   In	   the	   mean	   time,	   we	   are	   clearly	   aware	   that	   the	   large	   size	   of	   China’s	  economy,	  when	  divided	  by	  1.3	  billion,	  will	  send	  China	  to	  around	  the	  80th	  place	  in	  terms	   of	   per	   capita	   GDP.	   In	   China,	   over	   74	   million	   people	   rely	   on	   basic	   living	  allowances.	  Each	  year,	  more	  than	  10	  million	  urban	  people	  will	  join	  the	  job	  market.	  And	   several	   hundred	   million	   rural	   people	   need	   to	   be	   transferred	   to	   non-­‐‑agricultural	  jobs,	  and	  settle	  down	  in	  urban	  areas.	  More	  than	  85	  million	  people	  are	  with	   disabilities.	   And	   more	   than	   200	   million	   people	   are	   still	   living	   under	   the	  poverty	   line	  set	  by	  the	  World	  Bank.	  And	  that	   is	  roughly	  the	  population	  of	  France,	  Germany	  and	  UK	  combined.’	  
Recently,	   China	  has	   even	  admitted	   to	   certain	  political	  disadvantages,	   despite	   such	  discourses	  never	  emerging	  in	  its	  official	  addresses	  to	  the	  domestic	  audience	  and	  the	  ASEAN	  and	  AU.97	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  speech	  at	  the	  Royal	  Society	  of	  Britain	  in	  2011,	  former	  Prime	  Minister	  Wen	  Jiabao	  admitted,	  ‘To	  be	  frank,	  corruption,	  unfair	  income	  distribution	  and	  other	  ills	  that	  harm	  people’s	  rights	   and	   interests	   still	   exist	   in	   China.	   The	   best	  way	   to	   resolve	   these	   problems	   is	   to	   firmly	  advance	   the	   political	   structural	   reform	   and	   build	   socialist	   democracy	   under	   the	   rule	   of	   law’.	  Certainly,	   leaders	   attribute	   these	   unavoidable	   political	   problems	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   China	   is	   a	  developing	  country	  and	  certainly	  not	  due	  to	  the	  failures	  or	  mistakes	  of	  their	  ruling.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  More	  often,	  in	  official	  discourse	  with	  the	  ASEAN	  and	  AU,	  Beijing	  notes	  that	  it	  would	  like	  to	  ‘exchange	  experience	  in	  the	  area	  of	  governing	   the	   country’	   [Chinese:	  交换治国理政的经验],	  which	   shows	   its	   confidence	   and	   interest	   in	   promoting	   the	   so-­‐‑called	  ‘China	  model’.	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Second,	  China	  often	  claims	  that	  its	  status	  as	  a	  developing	  country	  determines	  its	  peaceful	  rise	  in	  the	  global	  sphere.	  The	  underlying	  logic	  is	  that	  since	  China	  is	  a	  developing	  country	  that	  is	  and	  will	  be	   ‘primarily	  preoccupied	  with	  solving	   its	  domestic	  problems’	  (Heberer,	  2014,	  p.	  101),	   it	  has	   no	   capability	   or	   motivation	   to	   challenge	   the	   existing	   world	   order.	   A	   platitude	   that	  frequently	  appears	  in	  China’s	  discourse	  is,	  ‘For	  China,	  the	  most	  populous	  developing	  country,	  to	  run	   its	   own	  affairs	  well	   is	   its	  most	   important	   contribution	   to	  world	  peace	   and	  development’	  (Yang,	   2011).	   This	   repetitious	   discourse	   about	   China	   being	   a	   developing	   country	   is	   quite	  formulaic,	  but	   it	   is	  designed	  to	  shield	  China	  from	  the	   inveterate	   ‘China	  Threat	  Theory’,	  which	  aims	  to	  eliminate	  the	  negative	   image	  of	  China	  as	  a	  revisionist	  state	  or	  a	  troublemaker.	  Below	  are	  some	  conspicuous	  examples:	  
‘Despites	   its	   success	   in	   its	   development,	   China	   remains	   the	   largest	   developing	  country.	   There	   is	   an	   arduous	   task	   ahead	   before	  the	  goals	  of	  modernization	  are	  reached.	   Consequently,	   China	   adheres	   to	   an	  independent	   foreign	  policy	  of	  peace,	  pursues	   the	  win-­‐‑win	  strategy	  of	  opening-­‐‑up	  and	  never	  seeks	  hegemony.’	  
—Former	  Chinese	  Premier	  Minister	  Wen	  Jiabao	  
(As	  cited	  in	  Xinhua	  News	  Agency,	  2009)	  
‘China’s	  road	  to	  modernization	  is	  a	  long	  one.	  To	  govern	  such	  a	  big	  country	  with	  1.3	  billion	  people,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  meet	  people’s	  basic	  daily	  needs.	  The	  Chinese	  want	  better	  education,	  more	  stable	  jobs,	  better	  social	  security,	  a	  more	  comfortable	  living	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environment	   and	   a	   richer	   cultural	   life…	   Addressing	   the	   day-­‐‑to-­‐‑day	   issues	   in	  governance	  in	  China	  requires	  persistent	  and	  enormous	  efforts	  on	  our	  part.	  That	  is	  why	  China’s	  pursuit	  of	  peaceful	  development	  is	  not	  only	  a	  foreign	  policy	  goal,	  but	  more	  importantly,	  a	  compelling	  domestic	  imperative.’	  
—Chinese	  Prime	  Minister	  Li	  Keqiang	  (2013)	  
Third,	  based	  on	   its	   role	   conception	  as	  a	  developing	   country,	  Chinese	   leaders	  believe	   that	   the	  Europeans	   should	   show	   sympathy	   and	   give	   China	   more	   assistance	   and	   recognition.	   Beijing	  frequently	  suggests	  that	  Europeans	  should	  understand	  how	  difficult	  and	  arduous	  it	  is	  to	  govern	  such	  a	  complex	  country.	  98	  In	  face	  culture,	  self-­‐‑effacement	  is	  always	  associated	  with	  and	  leads	  to	  implicit	   self-­‐‑enhancement.	   Consequently,	   when	   China	   is	   enumerating	   its	   weaknesses,	  sometimes	   it	   also	   emphasises	   that	   the	   CCP’s	   regime	   legitimacy	   is	   based	   on	   its	   substantial	  governmental	  achievements	  in	  dealing	  with	  these	  problems.	  Below	  is	  a	  typical	  demonstration	  of	  this:	  
More	  than	  10	  million	  people	  are	  still	   living	  below	  [the]	  poverty	  line,	  a	  population	  equal	  to	  that	  of	  Belgium.	  Each	  year,	  China	  needs	  to	  create	  more	  than	  30	  million	  new	  jobs,	   about	   the	   whole	   number	   of	   the	   UK’s	   work	   force.	   Last	   week,	   when	   we	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  In	   an	   interview	   in	  2013,	   the	   former	  Chancellor	  of	  Germany,	  Helmut	   Schmidt,	   expressed	   surprise	  when	  he	  heard	   that	   ‘the	  average	  Chinese	  person	  lives	  into	  his	  or	  her	  seventies’	  (according	  to	  a	  World	  Health	  Organization	  [WHO]	  report,	  life	  expectancy	  in	  China	  in	  2013	  was	  76	  years),	  as	  he	  originally	  believed	  that	  life	  expectancy	  in	  China	  was	  just	  58	  or	  59	  years	  (South	  Review,	  2014).	   It	   can	   be	   seen	   that	   even	   for	   Schmidt	  who	   is	   viewed	   as	   an	   ‘old	   friend	   of	   the	   Chinese	   people’	   and	  who	   has	   had	   close	  contact	   with	   and	   in-­‐‑depth	   knowledge	   of	   China,	   there	   were	   still	   some	   misunderstandings	   and	   stereotypes—the	   ordinary	  European	  can	  thus	  be	  excused	  for	  holding	  similar	  beliefs	  about	  China.	  	  	  
	   269	  
commemorated	   the	   anniversary	   of	   the	   Sichuan	   earthquake,	   15	  million	   displaced	  people	   in	   the	  disaster	  area	   have	   been	   relocated.	   It’s	   almost	   [like]	   giving	   every	  Dutch	   family	   a	   new	   home…	  The	   Chinese	   government	   and	   leaders	   should	   deploy	  and	   implement	  various	  policies	  prudently,	   carefully	  and	  steadily,	  pay	  attention	   to	  every	  step	  of	  their	  work,	  promote	  economic	  growth	  and	  safeguard	  social	  harmony.	  Their	  labor	  and	  toil	  cannot	  be	  easily	  imagined	  by	  an	  outsider.’	  
—Song	  Zhe	  (2009B)	  
When	  the	  Europeans	  want	  to	  discuss	  human	  rights	  or	  democracy	  with	  China,	  Chinese	  officials	  always	  have	  two	  shields	  to	  safeguard	  face:	  1.	  We	  are	  still	  a	  developing	  country,	  and	  these	  issues	  are	   not	   a	   priority;	   2.	   The	   Chinese	   government	   has	   made	   significant	   progress	   over	   the	   past	  several	  years	  in	  improving	  the	  well	  being	  of	  Chinese	  people.	  In	  the	  Chinese	  mind,	  the	  country’s	  underdevelopment	   is	   a	   justifiable	   reason	   to	   discuss	   any	   unfavourable	   issue.	   Evidence	   of	   this	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  speech	  by	  the	  former	  Ambassador,	  Song	  Zhe	  (2011B):	  
China	   started	   industrialization	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   [a]	   socialist	   system.	   Halfway	  into	  industrialization,	  China	  has	  begun	   to	   focus	   on	   and	   solving	   problems	   like	  distributive	  justice,	  social	  welfare,	  democratic	  decision-­‐‑making,	  etc.	  Moreover,	  [the]	  Chinese	  population	  is	  more	  than	  twice	  the	  European	  population.	  Currently,	  we	  can	  be	   regarded	   generally	   successful,	   but	   the	   confronting	   problems	   are	   also	  unprecedented.	  When	  you	  Europeans	  observe	  China,	  please	  approach	  it	  more	  with	  a	   historical	   perspective,	   and	   respect	   the	   development	   path	   China	   chose	   for	   itself	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and	  the	  on-­‐‑going	  significant	  practices.	  
As	   such,	   the	   following	   interview	   of	   the	   then	   Vice	   Foreign	   Minister	   Fu	   Ying	   with	   German	  Newspaper	  Der	  Spiegel	  explicates	  this	  point	  very	  well:	  
Der	  Spiegel:	   ‘We	  Europeans	  certainly	  acknowledge	  China’s	  progress	  in	  some	  fields	  like	   poverty	   alleviation,	   but	   what’s	   not	   acceptable	   for	   us	   is	   your	   government	  abridges	   the	   citizens’	   freedom	   of	   speech	   and	   assembly	   and	   bans	   them	   from	  launching	  political	  parties.’	  
Fu	   Ying:	   ‘When	   you	   criticize	   China	   for	   doing	   or	   not	   doing	   something,	   you	   are	  actually	   using	   your	   own	   standards	   to	   judge.	   Do	   you	   still	   remember	   your	   human	  rights	   situations	  when	  you	  were	   at	   the	   early	   stage	  of	   industrialization	   like	  China	  now	  is?	  Currently,	  you	  have	  created	  [a]	  high	  welfare	  state.	  Food	  and	  clothing	  are	  no	  long[er]	   a	   problem	   for	   you.	   However,	   we	   Chinese	   just	   got	   rid	   of	   the	   time	   of	  economic	   difficulty	   a	   short	   time	   ago,	   and	   people	   of	   my	   generation	   have	  experienced	  hunger.	   If	   you	   insist	   on	   using	   your	   own	   standards	   to	   judge	  China,	   if	  you	  always	  expect	  China	  to	  be	  a	  Western	  country,	  you	  will	   invariably	  be	  confused	  by	  such	  expectations.’	  (As	  cited	  in	  Chinese	  Embassy	  to	  Germany,	  2010)	  
Fu	  Ying	  made	  no	  effort	  to	  persuade	  her	  audience	  to	  accept	  China’s	  political	  and	  human	  rights	  situations.	  Fu’s	  arguments	  always	  revolve	  around	  China’s	  role	  as	  a	  developing	  country,	  which	  is	  still	   ‘at	   the	   early	   stage	   of	   industrialization’.	   Such	   contextualisation	   sends	   the	  message:	   ‘Since	  you	   Europeans	   have	   also	   experienced	   the	   same	   phase	   of	   development,	   you	   should	   have	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empathy	   and	   should	   understand	   China’s	   behaviours	   and	   values;	   since	   the	   Chinese	   have	   just	  emerged	   from	   a	   difficult	   period,	   you	   should	   be	   magnanimous	   in	   understanding	   China’s	  differences	  and	  change	  your	   self-­‐‑centred	   standards’.	  The	  moral	   appeals	   implied	   in	   the	  above	  discourse	   are	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   emphasis	  of	   the	   rule	  of	   renqing	  in	  Chinese	   face	   culture	  (see	  more	  in	  Section	  3.5.3).	  	  
	  
5.3.3	  Historical	  victim.	  
This	  study	  assumes	  that	  the	  role	  conception	  as	  weak	  leads	  to	  China’s	  emphasis	  on	  its	  image	  as	  a	  historical	  victim.	  According	   to	  Chinese	  official	  arguments	  about	  modern	  history,	  during	   the	  period	   1840-­‐‑1949,	   China	   was	   a	   semi-­‐‑colonial	   and	   semi-­‐‑feudal	   state,	   which	   was	   subject	   to	  constant	   aggression	   and	   enslavement	   by	   the	   Western	   powers	   and	   Japan.	   China’s	   narratives	  about	  being	  a	  historical	  victim	  are	  primarily	  based	  on	  this	  collective	  memory	  of	  ‘the	  century	  of	  national	  humiliation’.	  
For	   a	   long	   time,	   scholars	   in	   various	   fields	   have	   sensed	   that	   China’s	   international	   identity	   is	  rooted	   in	  being	  a	  victim	  of	  historical	  aggression,	  which	   is	  not	  only	  on	  account	  of	   its	   sense	  of	  humiliation	  but	   also	  a	   calculated	  political	  manoeuvre.	  Lucian	  Pye	   (1968,	  pp.	  71-­‐‑72)	  noted	   in	  the	  1960s	  that	  the	  Chinese	  political	  elite	  is	  very	  ardent	  in	  derailing	  ‘the	  real	  and	  imagined	  way	  [in	   which]	   years	   ago	   [China	  was]	   grossly	   and	   cruelly	  mistreated	   by	   others’.	   Ho	   (2015,	   p.	   8)	  believes	  that	  the	  century	  of	  humiliation	  has	  been	  a	  critical	  historical	  narrative	  that	  has	  framed	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  China	  relates	  with	  the	  world,	  especially	  the	  West.	  Wang	  Gungwu	  (2002,	  p.	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vi)	  notes	  that	  the	  Chinese	  seem	  to	  love	  the	  past	  humiliation	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  ‘they	  know	  how	  to	  fight	  it	  and	  employ	  it	  in	  political	  struggle’.	  The	  contrastive	  analysis	  of	  this	  research	  also	  reveals	  that	   such	   a	   victim	   mentality	   seems	   to	   be	   more	   noticeable	   in	   China’s	   discourses	   with	   its	  perceived	  superiors.	  This	  section	  will	  explore	  how	  China	  represents	  itself	  as	  a	  historical	  victim	  with	  the	  EU.	  
First,	  a	  recurring	  theme	  around	  China	  being	  a	  historical	  victim	  is	  that	  since	  it	  was	  invaded	  and	  enslaved	  by	  Western	  imperialism,	  it	  is	  and	  will	  always	  be	  an	  innately	  righteous	  force	  promoting	  world	  peace	  and	  development,	  never	  seeking	  the	  violent	  and	  disastrous	  paths	  chosen	  by	  rising	  powers	  in	  Western	  history.	  China’s	  past	  humiliations	  have	  been	  transformed	  into	  its	  adherence	  to	   peaceful	   success	   and	   have	   become	   ‘an	   integral	   part	   of	   projecting	   its	   identity	   as	   a	   moral	  regime	  in	  world	  politics’	  (Kim,	  1994,	  p.	  408).	  Below	  are	  some	  typical	  arguments:	  
‘China	   was	   once	   bullied	   by	   foreign	   powers	   and	   therefore	   knows	   dearly	   the	  humiliation	  of	   inequality.	  China	  will	  never	  bring	  such	  agony	   to	  others.	  Nor	  will	   it	  pursue	   its	   own	   development	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   others’	   interests.	   China’s	  cooperation	  effort	  benefits	  both	  China	  and	   its	  partners	  and	   facilitates	  both	  sides’	  social	  and	  economic	  development.’	  
—Former	  Chinese	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  Song	  Zhe	  (2009B)	  
‘Even	  when	  China	  indeed	  becomes	  strong	  and	  developed,	  it	  will	  not	  bully	  the	  weak.	  This	   is	   because	   we	   Chinese	   suffered	   so	   much	   from	   wars	   and	   chaos	   in	   modern	  history	  that	  we	  do	  not	  want	  to	  see	  such	  history	  repeat	  itself	  to	  others.	  “Do	  not	  do	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unto	  others	  what	  you	  do	  not	  want	  others	  to	  do	  unto	  you.”	  This	  ancient	  teaching	  is	  a	  core	  Chinese	  value	  and	  an	  abiding	  belief	  for	  us.’	  
—Chinese	  Prime	  Minister	  Li	  Keqiang	  (2013)	  
Second,	   the	   discourse	   around	   being	   a	   historical	   victim	   illustrates	   that	   China,	   which	   has	  naturally	  had	  a	  historical	  trajectory	  different	  from	  Europe’s,	  has	  adopted	  an	  idiosyncratic	  path	  in	   its	   politics	   and	   development.	   In	   this	   sense,	   ‘historical	   victim’	   becomes	   China’s	   standard	  rhetoric	  to	  rationalise	  its	  peculiarities	  and	  demands.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  domestic	  politics,	  Beijing	  wishes	   for	   the	  Europeans	   to	  understand	   the	  historical	   inevitability	   of	   establishing	   a	   socialist	  regime	  in	  China.	  As	  argued	  by	  an	  article	  in	  Qiushi,99	  the	  so-­‐‑called	  ‘Chinese	  path’	  [Chinese:	  中国
道路[	  means	  that	  ‘after	  experiencing	  a	  different	  course	  of	  history,	  we	  surely	  oppose	  to	  tailoring	  Chinese	   reality	   to	  Western	   logic	   and	  mechanically	   applying	  Western	   experiences	   to	   evaluate	  China’	  (Chen,	  2015,	  p.	  66).	  
Regarding	   foreign	   affairs,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   historical	   victim	   is	   often	   used	   to	   support	   China’s	  sensitivity	   to	   state	   sovereignty.	   The	   logic	   is	   that	   as	   China	   has	   been	   a	   victim	   of	   colonialism,	  maintaining	  its	  status	  as	  an	  equal	  sovereign	  state	  has	  become	  a	  paramount	  aim	  and	  a	  mother	  principle	   that	   guides	   its	   foreign	   policy	   (Chen,	   2016,	   p.	   783;	   Pan,	   2012,	   p.	   22).	   One	   typical	  manifestation	  of	  this	  is	  China’s	  explanation	  for	  its	  inflexible	  non-­‐‑interference	  policy.	  According	  to	  the	  following	  speech	  by	  President	  Xi	  (2014B),	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  such	  a	  policy	  is	  justified	  as	  an	  inevitable	  choice	  based	  on	  historical	  experience:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Qiushi	  [English:	  seeking	  truth]	  is	  the	  official	  magazine	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  China.
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As	  a	  result	  of	  incessant	  foreign	  invasions,	  China	  experienced	  great	  social	  turmoil,	  and	  its	  people	  had	  to	  live	  a	  life	  of	  extreme	  detestation.	  Poverty	  prompted	  a	  call	  for	  change,	  and	  people	  experiencing	  turmoil	  are	  inspired	  by	  stability.	  After	  a	  hundred	  years	  of	  persistent	  and	  unyielding	  struggle,	  the	  Chinese	  people,	  sacrificing	  losses	  of	  tens	  of	  millions	  of	  lives,	  ultimately	   took	   their	   destiny	   back	   into	   their	   own	   hands.	   Nevertheless,	   the	  memory	  of	  
foreign	  invasion	  and	  bullying	  has	  never	  been	  erased	  from	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people.	  	  
And	   that	   explains	  why	  we	   cherish	   so	   dear	   the	   life	  we	   live	   today.	   The	   Chinese	   people	  want	  peace;	  we	  do	  not	  want	  war.	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  China	  follows	  an	  independent	  foreign	  policy	  of	  peace.	  China	  is	  committed	  to	  non-­‐‑interference	  in	  other	  countries’	  internal	  
affairs.	  And	  China	  will	  not	  allow	  others	  to	  interfere	  in	  its	  own	  affairs.	  This	   is	   the	  position	  that	  we	  have	  upheld	  in	  the	  past.	  It	  is	  what	  we	  will	  continue	  to	  uphold	  in	  the	  future.	  
In	   some	   of	   its	   discourse,	   the	   West	   is	   unequivocally	   blamed	   for	   China’s	   past	   and	   current	  weaknesses,	   and	   the	   unspoken	   message	   is	   that	   Europeans	   are	   not	   qualified	   to	   instruct	   or	  accuse	  China.	  Such	  behaviour	   is	  more	   ‘tit-­‐‑for-­‐‑tat’	  and	  also,	  according	   to	  me,	  converts	   ‘China’s	  problems’	   into	   ‘Europe’s	   mistakes’.	   In	   the	   afore-­‐‑mentioned	   interview	   (as	   cited	   in	   Chinese	  
Embassy	  to	  Germany,	  2010),	  Fu	  Ying	  demonstrates	  this	  idea:	  
Der	  Spiegel:	  ‘Regarding	  human	  rights	  standards,	  you	  seem	  to	  like	  to	  compare	  China	  with	  Europe	  in	  the	  early	  19th	  century.’	  
Fu	  Ying:	  ‘Chinese	  scholars	  in	  the	  late	  Qing	  Dynasty	  had	  wished	  to	  learn	  the	  Western	  ideas	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  tried	  to	  reform	  China’s	  feudalist	  system,	  but	  they	  quickly	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found	   that	   the	   Westerners	   at	   that	   time	   had	   a	   limited	   understanding	   of	   human	  rights	   and	   no	   interest	   in	   sharing	   human	   rights	   with	   Chinese	   people.	   In	   the	  Concession	   era,	   foreigners	   were	   above	   the	   Chinese	   and	   human	   rights	   were	  exclusive	   to	   them.	  Consequently,	  China’s	   first	  human	   rights	  wave	  had	  no	   success.	  The	   second	  wave	   included	   the	  workers’	   and	   students’	  movements,	   supported	   by	  the	   Chinese	   Communist	   Party.	   However,	   the	   PRC	   had	   been	   blocked	   by	   the	  West	  since	   its	   establishment.	   That	   means	   that	   many	  Western	   ideas,	   including	   human	  rights,	  were	  rejected	  at	  that	  time.’	  
Third,	  in	  recent	  years,	  China	  has	  especially	  emphasised	  its	  role	  as	  a	  victim	  of	  Japanese	  invasion	  during	  World	  War	   II	   in	   order	   to	   seek	   support	   from	   the	   Europeans.	   Since	   2009,	   due	   to	   the	  territorial	   disputes	   and	   historical	   problems	   between	   China	   and	   Japan,	   Sino-­‐‑Japan	   relations	  have	  deteriorated	  steadily	  and	  both	  sides	  are	  involved	  in	  a	  media	  war.	  As	  the	  EU	  has	  no	  alliance	  with	  Japan	  as	  well	  as	  no	  conflict	  of	  fundamental	  interest	  with	  China,	  Beijing	  wishes	  for	  the	  EU	  to	  be	  on	  its	  side,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  common	  understanding	  of	  World	  War	  II	  and	  China’s	  past	  suffering.	  To	  a	  large	  degree,	  China	  regards	  the	  Europe	  as	   ‘the	  third	  party	  for	  balancing	  China-­‐‑Japan	   relations’	   (Huang,	   2016,	   p.	   54),	   which	   is	   expected	   to	   contribute	   to	   China’s	   ‘hedging	  strategy	   against	   the	   always-­‐‑fluctuating	   Sino-­‐‑Japanese	   and	   Sino-­‐‑US	   relations’	   (Thies,	   2012,	   p.	  15).	  Below	  are	  some	  characteristically	  strong	  statements:	  
‘History	  is	  the	  best	  teacher.	  It	  faithfully	  records	  the	  journey	  that	  every	  country	  has	  gone	  through	  and	  offers	  guidance	  for	  its	  future	  development.	  In	  the	  over	  100	  years	  since	   the	   Opium	  War	   in	   1840	   prior	   to	   the	   founding	   of	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   of	  
	   276	  
China	  in	  1949,	  China	  was	  ravaged	  by	  wars,	  turmoil	  and	  foreign	  aggression.	  To	  the	  average	  Chinese,	  it	  was	  a	  period	  of	  ordeal	  too	  bitter	  to	  recall.	  The	  war	  of	  aggression	  against	  China	  committed	  by	  Japanese	  militarism	  alone	  resulted	  in	  over	  35	  million	  Chinese	   military	   and	   civilian	   casualties.	   These	   atrocities	   are	   still	   fresh	   in	   our	  memory.’	  
—Xi	  Jinping	  (2014C)	  
‘Both	  China	   and	  Europe	  experienced	   the	   suffering	  of	  World	  War	   II.	  Both	  Chinese	  and	   European	   people	   were	   the	   victims	   of	   war.	   No	   one	   knows	   hard-­‐‑won	   peace	  better	  than	  us,	  and	  no	  one	  cherishes	  today’s	  peaceful	  environment	  more	  than	  us…	  In	  Japan,	  some	  politicians	  still	  perversely	  visit	  Yasukuni	  shrine	  which	  honors	  war	  criminals	  in	  World	   War	  II,	   openly	   deny	   war	   crimes,	   attempt	   to	   falsify	   history,	  challenge	   the	   post-­‐‑war	   order,	   and	   undermine	   regional	   peace	   and	   stability.	   These	  actions	   should	   raise	   an	   alarm	   for	   all	   the	   peace-­‐‑loving	   countries	   and	   people.	  Safeguarding	   the	  victory	  of	  World	  War	   II	   and	   the	  post-­‐‑war	   international	  order	   is	  still	  Asia’s	  reality	  and	  also	  should	  be	  the	  common	  task	  of	   the	  entire	   international	  society.’	  
—Vice	  Foreign	  Minister	  Song	  Tao	  (2014)	  
For	  some	  observers,	  China	  carries	  the	  heavy	  burden	  of	  aggrievement.	  Kalvalski	  (2013,	  p.	  257)	  believes	  that	  contemporary	  Chinese	  diplomacy	  can	  be	  considered	  an	  attempt	  to	  rectify	  its	  past	  national	  humiliation	  by	  projecting	  an	  international	  identity	  aimed	  to	  dispel	  the	  spectre	  of	  the	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past.	  This	  argument	  is	  not	  entirely	  correct	  as,	  through	  this	  study,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  the	  Chinese	  authorities	  in	  fact	  deliberately	  maintain	  their	  identity	  of	  being	  historical	  victims.	  In	  fact,	  there	  is	  no	  real	  unpleasantness	  or	  spirit	  of	  revenge	  in	  China’s	  official	  discourse;	  the	  affective	  burden	  of	   historical	   humiliation	   has	   become	   a	   hermeneutic	   device	   for	   China	   to	   seek	   international	  recognition,	  including	  those	  about	  its	  peaceful	  development,	  special	  political	  regime	  and	  even	  its	  position	  in	  international	  conflicts.	  This	  also	  illustrates	  that,	  for	  China,	  wanting	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  weak	  and	  struggling	  for	  recognition	  by	  major	  powers	  can	  coexist	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  
	  
5.3.4	  Praising	  the	  EU.	  
In	   Chinese	   facework,	   self-­‐‑effacement	   and	   other-­‐‑enhancement	   always	   appear	   simultaneously	  (see	  more	  in	  Section	  3.5.4).	  It	  is	  emphatically	  cultural	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  when	  China	  relentlessly	  highlights	   its	  weaknesses,	   it	   often	   lavishes	   praise	   on	   the	   EU	   at	   the	   same	   time.	   According	   to	  Chinese	  cultural	  logic,	  compliments	  to	  the	  EU,	  even	  those	  that	  are	  not	  completely	  in	  line	  with	  reality	  or	  China’s	  true	  feelings,	  are	  very	  necessary	  to	  show	  China’s	  modesty	  and	  friendliness	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  recognition	  from	  the	  EU.	  
The	  most	   common	  manifestation	   is	   to	   accord	  great	   recognition	   to	   the	   international	   status	  of	  the	   EU.	   A	   generally	   recognised	   fact	   is	   that	   ‘the	   EU	   still	   remains	   a	   partial	   and	   inconsistent	  international	   actor	   even	   though	   the	   Lisbon	   Treaty	   had	   marked	   a	   new	   era	   in	   its	   diplomacy’	  (Toje,	   2008,	   p.	   122).	   Furthermore,	   in	   practice,	   ‘China	   prefers	   to	   deal	   with	   national	   capitals	  rather	   than	   the	   EU	   as	   a	  whole,	   provoking	   and	   encouraging	   political	   divisions	   in	   Europe	   and	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openly	  pursuing	  a	  divide-­‐‑and-­‐‑rule	  strategy.	  In	  many	  ways,	  China	  reveals	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  strategic	  actor	  in	  world	  politics’	  (Maher,	  2016,	  p.	  976).	  
However,	   in	  China’s	  euphoric	  discourse,	   the	  EU	   is	  depicted	  as	  a	  complete	  and	  capable	  power,	  and	   there	   is	   never	   any	   hint	   at	   questioning	   its	   ability	   or	   prospects.	   Even	   the	  Europeans	   have	  sensed	  this:	  ‘For	  some	  years,	  China	  has	  appeared	  to	  believe	  more	  strongly	  in	  Europe’s	  role	  as	  a	  serious	  player	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  than	  we	  do	  ourselves’	  (Zhang,	  2016,	  p.	  475).	  Below	  are	  some	  of	  the	  typical	  arguments	  of	  Chinese	  officials	  regarding	  the	  EU:	  
‘The	  Europe	  has	  led	  the	  trends	  of	  economic	  development	  and	  social	  reform	  since	  a	  long	   time,	  occupying	  an	   important	  position	   in	   the	  history	  of	  mankind.	  No	  matter	  how	   time	   changes,	   the	   EU	   can	   always	   take	   timely	   actions	   to	   adapt	   to	   changing	  situations	  and	  play	  a	  leading	  role.’	  	  
—Former	  Vice	  Foreign	  Minister	  Fuying	  
(as	  cited	  in	  Chinese	  Embassy	  to	  Germany,	  2010)	  
‘China	   always	   conceives	   of	   the	   EU	   as	   an	   important	   and	   positive	   force	   in	   the	  international	  arena,	  playing	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  maintaining	  world	  peace,	  promoting	  common	   development,	   dealing	   with	   global	   challenges,	   solving	   regional	   conflicts	  and	   hot-­‐‑spot	   issues,	   building	   a	   fair	   and	   rational	   new	   international	   political	   and	  economic	  order.’	  
—Former	  Chinese	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  Song	  Zhe	  (2011)	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‘[The]	   European	   Parliament	   plays	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   the	   EU’s	   foreign	   relations.	  China	   always	   attaches	   great	   importance	   to	   cooperation	   and	   exchange	   with	   the	  European	   Parliament,	   and	   believes	   that	   it	   is	   a	   significant	   stakeholder	   in	   the	  development	  of	  China-­‐‑EU	  relations.’	  
—Chinese	  Prime	  Minister	  Li	  Keqiang	  	  
(as	  cited	  in	  Xinhua	  News	  Agency,	  2015)	  
As	  Chinese	  scholar	  Wang	  Yiwei	  (2012,	  p.	  8)	  notes,	  ‘China	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  supportive	  “great	  power”	  to	  European	  integration.’	  Even	  against	  the	  background	  of	  the	  European	  debt	  crisis,	  the	  Chinese	  political	  elite	  still	  expressed	  its	  unwavering	  confidence	  in	  the	  EU’s	  ability	  to	  resolve	  the	  crisis:	  
‘In	  the	  past	  sixty-­‐‑plus	  years,	  the	  Europe	  integration	  process	  has,	  as	  a	  whole,	  moved	  ahead…	  Although	   the	  Europe	   integration	  and	   the	  EU	  organizations	  often	  provoke	  criticism,	  we	  still	  have	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  EU	  can	  overcome	  difficulties	  and	  continue	  to	  develop.’	  	  
—China’s	  ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  Yang	  Yanyi	  
(As	  cited	  in	  Mission	  of	  China	  to	  the	  EU,	  2015)	  
‘Europe’s	  many	  advantages	  have	  not	  been	  erased	  by	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis.	  On	  the	   contrary,	   in	   the	   course	   of	   combating	   the	   crisis,	   the	   European	   integration	  process	  has	  shown	  vitality,	  which	  gives	  people	  confidence	  that	  Europe	  will	  emerge	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from	   the	   temporary	   difficulties	   stronger	   than	   before.	   China	   supports	   the	   EU’s	  efforts	  to	  counter	  the	  crisis	  and	  further	  the	  integration	  process.	  We	  are	  convinced	  that	   European	   countries	   will	   find	   a	   solution	   to	   the	   problems	   and	   overcome	   the	  challenges	  that	  they	  face.’	  	  
—Former	  Foreign	  Minister	  Yang	  Jiechi	  (2011)	  
Recent	   speeches	   by	   President	   Xi	   Jinping	   always	   elaborate	   how	   this	   powerful	   man	   was	  influenced	  by	  European	  civilisation.	  His	  message	  to	  Western	  audiences	  is	  that	  just	  as	  European	  cultural	  achievements	  have	  always	  deeply	  attracted	  and	  influenced	  him,	  they	  will	  also	  similarly	  have	   an	   instructive	   impact	   on	   China.	   This	   is	   also	   a	   way	   of	   giving	   face—active	   other-­‐‑enhancement.	  Let’s	  have	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  how	  many	  books	  President	  Xi	  has	  read	  and	  how	  well	  he	  really	  knows	  Europe:	  
‘To	  be,	  or	  not	   to	  be,	   that	   is	   the	  question.’	  This	   line	   from	  Hamlet	  has	   left	   a	   lasting	  impression	  on	  me.	  When	  I	  was	  barely	  16	  years	  old,	  I	  left	  Beijing	  for	  a	  small	  village	  in	   northern	   Shaanxi	   Province	   to	   be	   a	   farmer	   and	   spent	   seven	   years	   of	  my	   youth	  there.	   Back	   in	   those	   days,	   I	   tried	   every	   means	   to	   lay	   my	   hands	   on	   William	  Shakespeare's	   works,	   reading	   A	   Midsummer	   Night's	   Dream,	   The	   Merchant	   of	  Venice,	   The	   Twelfth	   Night,	   Romeo	   and	   Juliet,	   Hamlet,	   Othello,	   King	   Lear	   and	  Macbeth.	  I	  was	  captivated	  by	  their	  dramatic	  plots,	  vivid	  characters	  and	  emotional	  intensity.	   Standing	   on	   the	   barren	   loessland	   of	   Shaanxi	   as	   a	   young	   man,	   I	   often	  pondered	  the	  question,	  to	  be	  or	  not	  to	  be.	  Eventually	  I	  made	  up	  my	  mind	  that	  I	  shall	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dedicate	  myself	  to	  serving	  my	  country	  and	  my	  people.	  I	  am	  sure	  that	  Shakespeare	  not	  only	  appeals	  to	  readers	  with	  his	  literary	  talents,	  but	  also	  inspires	  people's	  lives	  in	  profound	  ways.	  
—President	  Xi	  Jinping	  (2015B),	  at	  a	  dinner	  hosted	  by	  The	  Lord	  Mayor	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London	  
I	   developed	   a	   keen	   interest	   in	   French	   culture	   and	   particularly	   French	   history,	  philosophy,	  literature	  and	  art	  when	  I	  was	  a	  young	  man.	  By	  reading	  modern	  French	  history,	   especially	   writings	   on	   the	   French	   Revolution,	   I	   have	   gained	   a	   better	  perspective	  of	   the	   laws	  governing	   the	  political	  and	  social	  evolution	  of	   the	  human	  society.	  By	  reading	  Montesquieu,	  Voltaire,	  Rousseau,	  Diderot,	  Saint-­‐‑Simon,	  Fourier	  and	  Sartre,	  I	  have	  deepened	  my	  understanding	  of	  how	  progress	  of	  the	  mind	  propels	  progress	   in	  society.	  By	  reading	  Montaigne,	  La	  Fontaine,	  Molière,	  Stendhal,	  Balzac,	  Hugo,	   Alexandre	   Dumas,	   George	   Sand,	   Flaubert,	   Alexandre	   Dumas,	   Fils,	  Maupassant	  and	  Romain	  Rolland,	  I	  have	  better	  appreciated	  life	  with	  all	  its	  joys	  and	  sorrows.	   I	   still	   recall	   vividly	   literary	   characters	   such	   as	   Jean	   Valjean,	   Quasimodo	  and	  Boule	  de	  Suif.	  By	  watching	  the	  works	  of	  Millet,	  Manet,	  Degas,	  Cézanne,	  Monet	  and	  Rodin	  and	  the	  paintings	  of	  Zao	  Wou-­‐‑ki,	  which	  integrate	  elements	  of	  both	  East	  and	  West,	  I	  have	  refined	  my	  artistic	  taste.	  And	  by	  reading	  science	  fiction	  written	  by	  Jules	  Verne,	  I	  have	  discovered	  a	  new	  world	  where	  imagination	  knows	  no	  boundary.	  
—President	  Xi	  Jinping	  (2014D),	  At	  the	  Meeting	  Commemorating	  the	  50th	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Anniversary	  of	  the	  Establishment	  of	  China-­‐‑France	  Diplomatic	  Relations	  
Germany	   not	   only	   world-­‐‑famous	   for	   its	   advanced	   science	   and	   technology	   and	  modern	   manufacturing,	   but	   also	   for	   its	   philosophy,	   literature,	   music	   and	   other	  areas	  of	  the	  birth	  of	  many	  world-­‐‑renowned	  giants,	  many	  of	  their	  works	  have	  long	  been	   known	   to	   the	   Chinese	   people.	   These	  works—Goethe,	   Schiller,	   Heine	   et	   al.’s	  literary	  masterpiece	  and	  immortal	  poem,	  there	  is	  Leibniz,	  Kant,	  Hegel,	  Feuerbach,	  Marx,	   Heidegger,	   Marcuse	   and	   others’	   philosophical	   debates,	   there	   are	   Bach,	  Beethoven,	  Schumann,	  Brahms	  and	  others’	  beautiful	  melodies.	  Including	  myself,	  a	  lot	  of	  Chinese	  readers	  have	  gained	  pleasure	  from	  their	  work;	  to	  feel	  the	  power	  of	  ideas,	  deepen	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  and	  life.	  
—President	  Xi	  Jinping	  (2014C),	  In	  a	  speech	  at	  Germany’s	  Colbert	  Foundation	  
	  
5.4	  The	  Counterpart	  	  
In	  a	  seminar	  on	  the	  China-­‐‑EU	  partnership	  organised	  by	  Egmont	  in	  2011,	  the	  then	  Asia	  director	  of	  the	  EU’s	  External	  Action	  Service,	  James	  Moran	  (2011,	  p.	  2),	  said,	   ‘It	  is	  true	  that	  Europe	  and	  China	  may	  disagree	  and	  have	  different	  views	  on	   some	   issues.	  Good	   friendships	  are	  based	  on	  
openness	  and	  honesty’.	  However,	  good	  friendships	  for	  the	  Chinese	  are	  based	  more	  on	  restrained	  openness	  and	  behind-­‐‑the-­‐‑scenes	  honesty.	  
As	   revealed	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   in	   Chinese	   social	   life,	   any	   public	   disclosure	   of	   differences	   or	   open	  criticism	   can	   threaten	   the	   harmony	   of	   interpersonal	   relationships;	   meanwhile,	   any	   point	   of	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commonality	   (even	   something	   verisimilar)	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   the	   basis	   of	   fostering	  recognition.	   The	   third	   assumption	   of	   this	   study	   is	   that	   following	   the	   role	   conception	   of	   a	  counterpart,	  China	  is	  intent	  to	  depict	  itself	  as	  a	  homogeneous	  international	  actor	  much	  like	  the	  EU.	   This	   assumption	   seems	   to	   challenge	   the	   opinion	   of	  many	   theorists:	   national	   identity,	   by	  nature,	  is	  intrinsically	  oriented	  towards	  reproducing	  and	  magnifying	  differences	  between	  itself	  and	  the	  other	  (Hopf,	  2002;	  Shih,	  2012,	  p.	  71).	  It	  also	  somewhat	  problematises	  the	  idea	  that	  ‘the	  Chinese	   leadership	   has	   always	   tried	   to	   enhance	   China’s	   international	   standing	   while	  maintaining	  a	  distinctive	  international	  identity	  separate	  from	  that	  of	  the	  West’	  (Deng,	  2008,	  pp.	  66-­‐‑67).	   This	   section	  will	   illustrate	   how	  China	   presents	   itself	   as	   the	   EU’s	   counterpart	   to	   gain	  recognition.	  	  
	  
5.4.1	  Distinctiveness	  of	  a	  counterpart.	  
This	  study	  places	  discourse	  on	  China’s	  role	  conception	  as	  a	  counterpart	  into	  three	  categories:	  the	  same	  systematic	  characteristics,	  the	  same	  power	  status	  and	  the	  same	  values.	  After	  coding	  all	   the	   related	   discourses	   from	  my	   research	  material,	   we	   can	   conclude	   that	   the	   assumption	  based	  on	   face	   culture	   is	   true,	  namely,	  when	   facing	   the	  EU—the	  perceived	   superior—China	   is	  more	   inclined	   to	   present	   their	   common	   features;	   however,	   when	   facing	   the	   ASEAN	   and	   AU,	  China	  does	  not	  show	  this	  behavioural	  trend.	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Figure	  5.12.	  Frequency	  of	  mentions	  of	  counterpart	  in	  China’s	  diplomatic	  discourse.	  
	  
The	  differences	  seen	  in	  Figure	  5.12	  are	  consistently	  in	  the	  direction	  assumed,	  and	  all	  of	  them	  are	  statistically	  remarkable.	  Before	  the	  ASEAN	  or	  AU,	  China	  mentions	  similarities	  merely	   in	  a	  few	  ambiguous	  words:	  at	   the	  systematic	   level,	  both	  are	   facing	   the	  world	   full	  of	  opportunities	  and	   challenges;	   at	   the	   actor	   level,	   China	   highlights	   its	   identity	   as	   a	   developing	   country	   and	  emphasises	   that	   ‘both	   sides	   consider	   improving	   the	  economy	  and	  people’s	   livelihoods	  as	   the	  most	  crucial	  and	  pressing	  tasks’	  (Li,	  2015B);	  on	  diplomatic	  values,	  Beijing	  confidently	  believes	  that	   China,	   the	   ASEAN	   and	   AU	   share	   many	   opinions	   on	   international	   affairs,	   especially	   the	  values	   of	   treating	   everyone	   equally,	   non-­‐‑interference	   in	   internal	   affairs,	   promoting	   a	   new	  international	  political	  and	  economic	  order	  etc.	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naturally	  close	   to	  each	  other.	  Certainly,	  one	  point	  we	  should	  be	  careful	  of	   is	   that	  some	  of	   the	  similarities	   China	   mentions	   are	   not	   de	   facto	   but	   are	   unilaterally	   perceived	   or	   deliberately	  constructed.	  The	   following	  sections	  will	  analyse	  China’s	  discursive	  construction	  of	   the	  role	  of	  counterpart.	  
	  
5.4.2	  The	  same	  systematic	  characteristics.	  
In	   speeches,	  Chinese	   leaders	  often	  dwell	   lengthily	  on	  how	  both	   the	   sides	   are	   together	   in	   the	  same	   international	   environment,	   facing	   consistently	   congruent	   opportunities	   and	   challenges	  and	   hence	   should	   behave	   in	   the	   same	   or	   similar	   ways.	   More	   often,	   China	   presents	   its	   own	  judgment	  of	  the	  world	  as	  axiomatic	  fact	  or	  consensus.	  The	  following	  excerpt	  is	  from	  a	  speech	  by	   former	   Foreign	   Minister	   Yang	   Jiechi	   (2011)	   presented	   at	   the	   Danish	   Institute	   for	  International	  Studies:	  
The	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  the	  world	  is	  moving	  towards	  more	  equilibrium.	  This	  is	  a	  boost	  to	  multilateralism	  and	  greater	  democracy	  in	  international	  relations,	  and	  will	  have	  positive,	  far-­‐‑reaching	  impact	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  international	  order.	  With	  growing	   interdependence,	   countries	   across	   the	   globe	   hope	   to	   see	   peace,	  development	  and	  cooperation	  and	  appreciate	  the	  importance	  of	  standing	  together	  in	  times	  of	  adversity	  and	  pursing	  mutual	  benefit.	  They	  are	  working	  hard	  to	  adjust	  their	   economic	   structures,	   shift	   their	   models	   of	   growth	   and	   reform	   the	  international	  economic	  and	  financial	  system.	  Indeed,	  change	  represents	  the	  trend	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of	  our	  time	  and	  the	  aspiration	  of	  the	  people.	  
Yang’s	   speech	   presents	   a	   world	   full	   of	   vitality	   and	   hope,	   the	   decentralisation	   of	   power	   and	  echoes	  of	  people’s	  aspirations.	  His	  speech	  indicates	  a	  series	  of	  positive	  systematic	  changes	  that	  coincide	   with	   both	   sides’	   strategic	   goals	   and	   can	   contribute	   to	   the	   growth	   of	   their	   bilateral	  relations.	   As	   Chinese	   Foreign	   Minister	  Wang	   Yi	   says	   (as	   cited	   in	  Mission	  of	  China	   to	   the	  EU,	  2014B),	   ‘Against	   a	   background	   of	   world-­‐‑multi-­‐‑polarization,	   economic	   globalization,	   cultural	  diversification	  and	  democratization	  of	   international	  relations,	  China-­‐‑EU	  cooperation	  has	  been	  more	  global,	  strategic	  and	  exemplary,	  which	  can	  play	  a	  greater	  role	   in	  pushing	  the	  balance	  of	  international	  power	  and	  promoting	  world	  peace	  and	  development’.	  	  
For	  a	   long	   time,	  China	  has	  persistently	  called	   for	   the	  reform	  and	  reordering	  of	   the	  prevailing	  unequal	  international	  system	  (Yilmaz,	  2015,	  pp.	  1-­‐‑14).	  Correspondingly,	  the	  EU	  and	  European	  states	  are	  viewed	  as	  vested	  interest	  groups	  of	  this	  unfair	  global	  system.	  However,	  only	  with	  the	  EU,	   China	   seems	   to	   temporarily	   hide	   the	   emancipatory	   features	   of	   its	   diplomacy,	   tending	   to	  emphasise	  their	  common	  future	  prospects.	  	  
Certainly,	   China	   also	   mentions	   their	   shared	   challenges	   from	   a	   global	   and	   macroscopic	  perspective,	  suggesting	  that	  both	  sides	  should	  acknowledge	  each	  other’s	  strategic	  significance	  and	  cope	  with	  challenges	  together.	  In	  an	  essay,	  Ambassador	  Yang	  Yanyi	  writes	  (2014):	  	  
Uncertainties	   and	   destabilizing	   factors	   affecting	   the	   global	   and	   regional	  environment	  are	  increasing.	  Hotspot	  issues	  emerge	  from	  time	  to	  time.	  The	  world	  is	  moving	   towards	  multi-­‐‑polarity	   amidst	   twists	   and	   turns.	   The	   global	   recovery	   has	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been	   a	   slow	   and	   difficult	   process	   and	   growth	   remains	   lackluster.	   Many	   global	  problems,	   such	   as	   environmental	   pollution	   and	   climate	   change,	   pose	   a	   serious	  challenge	   to	   human	   survival	   and	   development.	   These	   new	   changes	   require	   both	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  to	  perceive	  each	  other	  from	  a	  new	  strategic	  perspective,	  to	  enrich	  the	  connotation	  of	  a	  China-­‐‑EU	  comprehensive	  strategic	  partnership.	  
For	  the	  past	  few	  years,	  on	  various	  occasions,	  Beijing	  has	  frequently	  mentioned	  that	  ‘China	  and	  the	   EU	   are	   amongst	   those	  who	   built	   and	  maintained	   the	   post-­‐‑World	  War	   II	  world”	   (Chinese	  Foreign	   Ministry,	   2015).	   Obviously,	   such	   attempts	   to	   reinforce	   this	   common	   systematic	  characteristic	  is	  aimed	  at	  reminding	  the	  Europeans	  to	  side	  with	  China	  in	  the	  Sino-­‐‑Japan	  conflict	  on	  the	  disputed	  islands	  as	  well	  as	  their	  other	  historical	  conflicts.	  
	  
5.4.3	  The	  same	  power	  status	  
At	  the	  individual	  level,	  the	  prevailing	  discourse	  tries	  to	  testify	  that	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  share	  the	  same	  power	  status	  in	  the	  international	  sphere.	  For	  a	  long	  time,	  China	  has	  viewed	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  complete	  pole	  in	  the	  post-­‐‑Cold	  War	  world,	  much	  like	  itself.	  China’s	  former	  EU	  ambassador	  Song	  Zhe	  (as	  cited	  in	  Mission	  of	  China	  to	  the	  EU,	  2008)	  said:	  	  
As	   two	   rising	   powers	   in	   the	  world,	   China	   and	   the	   EU	  must	   play	   an	   increasingly	  influential	  role	  in	  international	  affairs.	  We	  could	  say	  that	  no	  global	  problem	  can	  be	  solved	  without	  the	  cooperation	  and	  participation	  of	  China	  and	  the	  EU.	  	  
In	  recent	  years,	  the	  term	  ‘Two	  Powers,	  Markets	  and	  Civilizations’	  has	  been	  used	  as	  shorthand	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to	  refer	  to	  the	  common	  power	  status	  of	  China	  and	  the	  EU.	  On	  20	  November	  2013,	  President	  Xi	  Jinping	  (as	  cited	  in	  Xinhua	  News	  Agency,	  2013)	  proposed	  this	  new	  strategic	  positioning	  during	  his	  meeting	  with	  former	  EU	  leaders	  Herman	  Van	  Rompuy	  and	  Jose	  Barroso:	  
As	   the	   largest	   developing	   country	   and	   the	   largest	  group	  of	  developed	  countries,	  China	   and	   the	   EU	   are	   ‘two	   powers’	   for	   upholding	   world	   peace;	   as	   two	   major	  economies	  in	  the	  world,	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  are	  ‘two	  markets’	  that	  promote	  common	  development;	  as	  two	  great	  birthplaces	  of	  Eastern	  and	  Western	  cultures,	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  are	  ‘two	  civilizations’	  that	  promote	  human	  progress.	  
China’s	   strategic	   purpose	   has	   been	   very	   explicit:	   a	   China-­‐‑EU	   partnership	   should	   involve	   a	  recognition	  of	  each	  other’s	  status	  as	  a	  pole	  in	  the	  newly	  multipolar	  order.	  	  
According	   to	   the	   traditional	   realist	   viewpoint,	   ‘status	   is	   a	   positional	   good,	  meaning	   that	   one	  group’s	  status	  can	  improve	  only	  if	  another’s	  declines’	  (Swaine	  &	  Tellis,	  2000,	  pp.	  98-­‐‑99).	  On	  the	  contrary,	  China	  demonstrates	  a	  kind	  of	  social	  creative	  strategy	  as	  Mummendey	  and	  Schreiber	  (1984,	  pp.	  363-­‐‑368)	  argue	  i.e.	  two	  social	  groups	  may	  be	  able	  to	  attain	  a	  positive	  status	  at	  the	  same	   time	   as	   long	   as	   a	   lot	   of	   emphasis	   is	   placed	   on	  multiple	   criteria	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	  coexistence.	  	  	  
	  
5.4.4	  The	  same	  values	  
It	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   China	   often	   refers	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   shares	   the	   same	   international	  environment	   and	   status	   as	   the	   EU.	   This	   proves	   that	   ‘for	   better	   or	   worse,	   relative	   power	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sensitivities	  and	  concrete	  material	   interests	  still	  dominate	  EU-­‐‑China	  relations’	  (Mattlin,	  2012,	  p.	  182).	  Meanwhile,	  the	  author	  believes	  that	  the	  most	  embodying	  feature	  of	  the	  role	  conception	  of	   ‘counterpart’	   is	   the	  habitual	  assurance	   that	  China’s	  political	  values	  are	  congruent	  with	   the	  EU’s.	  	  
In	   fact,	   almost	  all	   scholars	  agree	   that	  China	  and	   the	  EU	  are	   two	  distinct	   international	  actors,	  especially	   in	   terms	   of	   values	   and	   ideologies.	   ‘The	   EU	   and	   China	   offer	   some	   of	   the	   most	  conspicuous	   indications	   of	   the	   different	   types	   of	   normative	   power	   in	   global	   life’	   (Kavalsiki,	  2013,	  p.	  249).	  Pan	  Zhongqi	  (2013,	  p.	  1)	  points	  out	  that	  ‘even	  though	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  often	  use	  the	  same	  political	  concepts	  in	  their	  respective	  political	  discourses,	  it	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  they	  still	  have	   little	   in	   common	   in	   [terms	   of]	   political	   values’.	   For	   example,	   whereas	   the	   Chinese	   and	  Europeans	   may	   agree	   on	   democracy	   and	   human	   rights	   as	   necessary	   political	   goals,	   their	  understanding	  of	  these	  concepts	  still	  differ	  substantially.	  However,	  in	  the	  Chinese	  leaders’	  and	  diplomats’	   discourse,	   the	   illusion	   that	   China	   and	   the	   EU	   are	   in	   fact	   an	   ideological	   alliance	   is	  created	  purposefully	  and	  vividly.	  
	  
Multipolarity	  
In	  China’s	  eyes,	  both	  sides	  regard	  multipolarity	  as	  a	   legitimate	  goal	   in	   the	  current	  and	   future	  world	   order.	   After	   the	   Cold	  War,	   both	   Europeans	   and	   the	   Chinese	   focused	   on	   the	   emerging	  process	  of	  multipolarisation,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  multipolarity	  automatically	  becomes	  a	  shared	  strategic	  pursuit	  for	  these	  two	  sides.	  The	  Chinese	  view	  multipolarity	  as	  the	  ‘result	  of	  a	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shift	   in	  global	  power’	   (Renard,	  2011,	  p.	  24)—a	  world	   that	   is	  more	   likely	   to	  be	  dominated	  by	  cooperation	   than	  competition.	  An	   ideal	   international	  order	   ‘would	  be	  a	  multi-­‐‑polar	  world,	   in	  which	   it	   is	  one	  pole	  among	  others,	   rather	   than	  a	  world	  order	  dominated	  by	   the	  U.S.’	   (Zhang,	  2016,	  p.	  469).	  	  
Inside	  the	  EU,	  there	  are	  always	  conflicting	  opinions	  about	  this.	  For	  example,	  French	  leaders	  are	  often	  keen	  to	  advocate	  a	  multipolar	  world,	  while	  some	  other	  European	  leaders	  are	  reluctant	  to	  embrace	   it	   (Scott,	   2013,	   p.	   232).	   Former	   British	   Prime	   Minister	   Tony	   Blair	   (2003)	   openly	  expressed	  his	  worries	  about	  a	  possibly	  multipolar	  world:	  ‘There	  is	  no	  more	  dangerous	  theory	  in	   international	   politics	   than	   that	   we	   need	   to	   balance	   the	   power	   of	   America	   with	   other	  competitive	   powers;	   different	   poles	   around	  which	   nations	   gather’.	   At	   the	   EU	   level,	   although	  multi-­‐‑polarity	   is	   a	   term	   frequently	   appearing	   in	   diplomatic	   language,	   it	   serves	   more	   as	   a	  neutrally	  descriptive	  word	  rather	  than	  a	  fully	  identified	  objective.	  Jose	  Barroso	  (2010,	  pp.	  7-­‐‑8)	  made	   the	   following	   balanced	   comment	   on	   multipolarity,	   which	   reflects	   the	   Europeans’	  ambivalent	  ideas:	  ‘There	  are,	  clearly,	  some	  virtues	  in	  a	  multipolar	  international	  society.	  It	  limits	  “hegemonic	  power”,	  which	  can	  often	  be	  a	  source	  of	  instability…	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  unwise	  to	  overlook	   the	   risks	   associated	   with	   multipolarity.	   A	   quick	   glance	   at	   European	   history	   also	  provides	  ample	  evidence	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  an	  understanding	  of	  multipolar	  strategies	  in	  terms	  of	  expansion	  and	  competition	  for	  predominance’.	  	  
In	  fact,	  Chinese	  officials	  must	  have	  realised	  that	  there	  are	  various	  or	  ambiguous	  opinions	  about	  multipolarity	   in	   the	   EU;100	  however,	   China’s	   individual	   preference	   is	   still	   exhibited	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  There	  have	  been	  a	  number	  of	  academic	  articles	  and	  news	  reports	  in	  China	  about	  the	  considerably	  divergent	  views	  on	  multi-­‐‑
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reinforced	   as	   a	   shared	   goal	   for	   both	   sides.	   In	   2009,	   Li	   Ke	  Qiang	   (2009)	   claimed	   clearly	   that	  ‘China	  and	  the	  EU	  are	  the	  leading	  promoters	  of	  multipolarity’.	  Below	  is	  another	  representative	  argument	  from	  the	  Deputy	  Foreign	  Minister	  Song	  Tao	  (2014):	  
Promoting	  multipolarity	  is	  the	  strategic	  foundation	  of	  China-­‐‑EU	  relations.	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  are	   two	  major	  powers	   in	   [the]	  global	  order.	  Both	  sides	  have	  no	  conflict	  of	  fundamental	  interest,	  support	  multipolarity	  and	  oppose	  unilateralism…	  Due	  to	  the	  common	  values	  of	  multipolarity	  and	  multilateralism,	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  can	  conduct	  mutually	   beneficial	   cooperation	   on	   the	   road	   to	   their	   respective	   development,	  demonstrating	   that	   the	   bilateral	   relation	   is	   really	   strategic,	   stable	   and	  comprehensive.	  
It	  has	  been	  a	  commonly	  held	  view	  that	  ‘Beijing	  now	  identifies	  with	  Europe	  as	  fellow	  travelers	  on	   the	   road	   to	   [the]	   containment	   of	   American	   power...	   a	  multi-­‐‑polar	  world	  with	   Beijing	   and	  Brussels	   looking	   to	   check	   American	   power’	   (Watts,	   2006;	   see	   also,	   Womack,	   2008,	   p.	   6;	  Cameron,	  2009,	  p.	  30;	  Huang,	  2016,	  p.	  47).	  If	  only	  literally,	  this	  conclusion	  is	  correct.	  However,	  the	  author	  believes	   that	  Beijing	   is	  not	   that	  naıv̈e	   and	  does	  not	  view	   the	  EU	   (and	   its	  member	  states)	  from	  such	  an	  idealistic	  perspective.	  China’s	  first	  motive	  to	  claim	  the	  EU	  as	  its	  partner	  to	  ‘support	  multipolarity	   and	   oppose	   unilateralism’	   is	   to	   highlight	   their	   possible	   shared	   values	  and	  to	  gain	  a	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  their	  status	  as	  multipolar	  powers.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  polarity	  within	  the	  EU	  (e.g.	  Chen,	  2010,	  pp.	  1-­‐‑16;	  Ren	  &	  Xu,	  2015,	  pp.	  6-­‐‑7).	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Multilateralism	  
China	  confirmedly	  emphasises	  that	  both	  sides	  have	  a	  natural	  convergence	  of	  principles	  when	  dealing	  with	   international	   affairs	   and	   conflicts.	  Wen	   Jiabao	   (as	   cited	   in	  Xinhua	  News	  Agency,	  2012A)	  has	  summarised	  some	  of	  these	  points	  as	  follows:	  	  
Both	   China	   and	   the	   EU	   are	   committed	   to	   multilateralism,	   greater	   democracy	   in	  international	  relations	  and	  world	  peace	  and	  stability.	  We	  both	  follow	  free	  and	  open	  economic	   and	   trade	   policies,	   reject	   trade	   protectionism	   and	   work	   to	   advance	  economic	  globalization.	  We	  both	  advocate	   [the]	  protection	  of	  diverse	  civilizations	  and	  inter-­‐‑civilization	  dialogue	  and	  exchanges.	  	  
‘Multilateralism’	   is	   the	  most	   mentioned	   foreign	   policy	   value	   in	   China’s	   and	   the	   EU’s	   foreign	  policy	  discourse.	  As	  an	  idea	  recipient,	  China	  is	  continuing	  to	  penetrate	  and	  demystify	  this	  EU-­‐‑dominated	   concept.	   Alder	   and	   Crawford	   (2004,	   p.	   8)	   argue	   that	   the	   values	   placed	   on	  multilateralism	  by	  the	  EU	  create	  a	  different	  paradigm	  for	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  (multipolarity)	  framework;	  however,	  for	  China,	  the	  disposition	  of	  multilateralism	  markedly	  serves	  to	  establish	  a	   multipolarity	   framework.	   In	   addition,	   with	   regard	   to	   concrete	   practices,	   the	   EU	   always	  attaches	  importance	  to	  the	  authoritative	  role	  of	  international	  law	  and	  institutions,	  while	  China	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  maintaining	  the	  dominant	  position	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  the	  autonomy	  of	  state	  behaviour.101	  Ample	  evidence	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  no	  indication	  of	  such	  divergences	  in	  China’s	  diplomatic	  discourse.	  Multilateralism	  seems	   like	  a	   self-­‐‑evident	   strategic	   convergence	  existing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  In	   recent	   years,	   China	   has	   started	   to	   adopt	   a	   less	   rigid	   line	   on	   the	   principles	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   non-­‐‑interference	   in	   its	  external	  relations	  (Helimann	  &	  Schmidt,	  2014).	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on	   both	   sides’	   interactions,	   without	   the	   necessity	   to	   explore	   its	   specific	   meanings	   and	  implications.	  On	   some	  occasions,	   China	   even	   clearly	   expresses	   its	   support	   for	   the	  EU’s	   ideas	  about	  multilateralism:	  
The	  EU	  advocates	  ‘effective	  multilateralism’,	  stands	  for	  a	  primary	  role	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	   in	   global	   governance,	   and	   believes	   that	   the	   G20	   regime	   is	   an	   important	  platform	   for	  countries	   to	   strengthen	  policy	  coordination.	  These	  are	  all	   consistent	  with	  China’s	  positions.	  
—Yang	  Yanyi	  (2014)	  	  
Obviously,	  China	  never	  accepts	  all	  the	  ideas	  of	  effective	  multilateralism	  proposed	  by	  the	  EU.102	  However,	   in	   its	  diplomatic	  discourse,	  Beijing	   ignores	   the	   existing	  differences	   and	  displays	   an	  ambiguous	  preference.	  It	  is	  often	  assumed	  in	  a	  lot	  of	  European	  literature	  that	  the	  EU’s	  efforts	  to	  promote	   effective	   multilateralism	   will	   socialise	   China	   into	   accepting	   its	   norms	   and	   values	  (Scott,	   2013,	   p.	   238).	   From	   China’s	   practices,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   it	   is	   at	   least	   very	   adept	   at	  borrowing	   the	   European	   language	   or	   words	   to	   package	   itself,	   conceal	   its	   differences	   and	  highlight	  its	  role	  conception	  as	  a	  counterpart.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Europeans	   generally	   advocate	   ‘effective	  multilateralism’	   in	   reference	   to	   rule-­‐‑based	  multilateralism,	   whereas	   the	   Chinese	  tend	  to	   interpret	   this	   term	  as	   ‘multilateralism	  that	  works’	  (Renard,	  2011,	  p.	  25).	   In	  addition,	  Chinese	  officials	  do	  not	  use	  the	  term	   effective	   multilateralism	   in	   formal	   documents,	   and	   many	   Chinese	   scholars	   believe	   that	   the	   effectiveness	   that	   the	   EU	  pursues	  is	  more/just	  for	  its	  own	  favourable	  position	  or	  normative	  hegemony	  in	  the	  current	  global	  governance	  (Cui,	  2007,	  p.	  60;	  Yang,	  2012;	  Zhang,	  2012,	  pp.	  29-­‐‑30).	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Democracy	  and	  human	  rights.	  
If	  only	  from	  the	  Western	  perspective,	   ‘the	  rising	  China	  is	  not	  enjoying	  the	  full	  membership	  of	  the	  international	  society,	  or	  it	  does	  not	  qualify	  for	  rightful	  membership	  because	  it	  is	  surely	  far	  from	  being	  recognized	  as	  a	  human	  rights	  norms	  abider	  or	  democratic	  country’	  (Zhang,	  2011,	  p.	  243).	  However,	   in	   its	  official	  discourse,	  China	  also	  underlines	   that	  both	  sides	  are	   like-­‐‑minded	  actors	  in	  their	  dealings	  with	  domestic	  politics,	  exhibiting	  the	  possibility	  that	  it	  may	  follow	  the	  Western	  model.	  	  	  
To	  the	  Europeans,	  the	  Chinese	  political	  elite	  struggles	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  they	  are	  not	  aliens.	  In	  October	  2015,	  in	  the	  UK	  Parliament,	  President	  Xi	  (2015)	  talked	  about	  his	  idea	  about	  the	  rule	  of	  law:	  
Being	  here,	   in	   this	  old	  parliament	  building,	  gives	  one	   the	   feeling	  of	  going	  back	   in	  time.	   Britain	   was	   the	   first	   country	   to	   establish	   the	   system	   of	   representative	  government.	  The	  British	  Parliament,	  which	  came	  into	  being	  in	  the	  13th	  century,	  is	  the	  oldest	  parliament	  in	  the	  world.	  In	  China,	  the	  concept	  of	  putting	  people	  first	  and	  following	   the	   rule	  of	   law	  emerged	  about	  4,000	  years	  ago,	  during	   the	   reign	  of	  Yu,	  The	  Great.	   In	   the	  Xia	  Dynasty,	   there	  was	  already	  a	   saying	   that	   the	  people	  are	   the	  foundation	   of	   a	   country,	   and	   only	   with	   a	   stable	   foundation	   can	   a	   country	   enjoy	  peace...  Today,	  as	  Chinese	  people	  are	  advancing	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  an	  all-­‐‑round	  way,	  they	  draw	  inspiration	  from	  not	  only	  China’s	  own	  legal	  traditions,	  but	  also	  the	  best	  practices	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  of	  other	  countries.	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In	  September	  2012,	  the	  former	  Chinese	  EU	  ambassador	  Wu	  Hailong	  (2012)	  claimed	  that	  China	  and	  the	  Europe	  share	  common	  views	  about	  safeguarding	  citizens’	  human	  rights:	  	  
Despite	   the	   differences	   in	  many	   aspects,	   there	   is	   one	   thing	   in	   common	   between	  China	   and	   Europe—both	   sides	   value	   the	   importance	   of	   smooth	   communication	  between	   the	  government	  and	   the	  people,	   and	  both	  sides	   regard	   the	  need	   to	   fully	  protect	   the	   rights	   and	   interests	   of	   the	   people	   to	   express	   and	   appeal	   in	   policy	  making	   as	   a	   must	   of	   modern	   democracy	   and	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   the	   efforts	   to	  protect	  and	  promote	  human	  rights.	  
Here,	   Ambassador	  Wu	   is	   trying	   to	   persuade	   his	   European	   readers	   to	   recognise	   China	   as	   the	  same	  kind	  of	  democratic	  and	  modern	  state	  as	  the	  European	  ones.	  From	  the	  liberal	  perspective	  alone,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  difference	  between	  how	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  understand	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights.	  
Similarly,	   in	   2009,	  Wen	   Jiabao	   (as	   cited	   in	  Financial	  Times	  website,	   2009)	   introduced	   China’s	  political	  reforms	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  Financial	  Times:	  ‘In	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  West,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  Chinese	  are	  afraid	  of	  democracy	  or	  elections.	  Actually,	  this	  is	  not	  true…	  Now	  we	  have	  direct	  elections	  at	  the	  village	  level	  and	  also	  direct	  elections	  of	  People’s	  Deputies	  at	  the	  township	  level’.	  In	  front	  of	  Westerners,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  Wen	  tactfully	  used	  the	  term	  ‘election’—the	  word	  that	  best	  represents	  the	  spirit	  of	  democracy—to	  prove	  that	  competitive	  democracy	  as	  a	  value	  is	  also	  applicable	  in	  China.	  	  
The	   cultural	   research	   presented	   in	   Chapter	   3	   has	   revealed	   that	   Chinese	   conformity	   is	   often	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nothing	   more	   than	   surface	   conformity,	   that	   is,	   compliance	   without	   internalisation.	   As	   such,	  many	  cited	  arguments	  are	  instrumental	  and	  paradoxical,	  displaying	  an	  ostensible	  obedience	  to	  the	   normative	   demands	   of	   the	   EU.	   The	   model	   of	   the	   nation-­‐‑state	   represented	   by	   the	   EU	  provides	  a	  clue	  to	  China	  about	  how	  to	  incorporate	  heterogeneous	  factors	  into	  its	  discourse	  and	  present	  itself	  as	  a	  ‘normal’	  state.	  
	  
5.4.5	  Obscuring	  differences	  
On	   account	   of	   face	   culture,	   Chinese	   people	   tend	   to	   hide	   their	   true	   personalities	   and	   not	  highlight	  individual	  differences.	  As	  such,	  following	  the	  culturally	  prescribed	  role	  conception	  of	  counterpart,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  China	  not	  only	  casts	  itself	  as	  a	  similar	  international	  actor	  as	  the	  EU	   but	   also	   endeavours	   to	   overcome	   binary	   thinking	   and	   obscure	   the	   inevitable	   differences	  between	  them.	  	  
First	   of	   all,	   in	   open	   diplomatic	   discourse,	   China	   always	   glosses	   over	   differences	   using	   some	  conventional	  phrases.	  An	  example	  of	  some	  typically	  used	  words	  is	  as	  follows:	  ‘China	  and	  the	  EU	  differ	  in	  social	  system,	  cultural	  background	  and	  development	  stage.	  We	  face	  different	  problems	  and	  difficulties.	  It	  is	  natural	  that	  we	  hold	  different	  views	  on	  some	  issues’	  Wen	  Jiabao	  (2012).	  
These	  kinds	  of	  statements	  can	  be	  found	  in	  most	  official	  discourse	  material	  addressed	  to	  the	  EU.	  More	  often,	  China	  would	  like	  to	  admit	  that	  it	  holds	  different	  views	  on	  some	  issues,	  but	  it	  does	  not	   specify	  which	   issues	   those	   are.	   The	   core	   idea	   is	   that	   as	   the	   existence	   of	   differences	   is	   a	  normal	  phenomenon	  engendered	  from	  some	  intrinsic	  factors	  (i.e.	  the	  above-­‐‑mentioned	  ‘social	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system,	   cultural	   background,	   and	  development	   stage’),	   and	   there	   is	   no	   necessity	   of	   pursuing	  uniformity	  or	  following	  the	  other	  side.	  	  
Generally,	   China	   avoids	   discussing	   differences	   openly.	   In	   an	   interview,	   the	   former	   State	  Councillor	  Dai	  Bingguo	  describes	  China’s	  diplomatic	  style	  as	  follows:	  ‘To	  defend	  your	  principles	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  intimidating	  or	  unfriendly.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  say	  serious	  words	  in	  a	  low	  voice’	  (The	  Beijing	  News,	   2016).	   This	   is	   a	   typical	   pattern	   of	   Chinese	   facework,	   which	   aims	   to	   not	  offend	  the	  face	  of	  the	  other	  side	  even	  in	  conflict	  situations.103	  
Second,	  China	  attributes	  most	  differences	  to	  communication	  problems	  between	  China	  and	  the	  EU.	   It	   is	   believed	   that	   many	   such	   ‘differences’	   are	   a	   result	   of	   the	   lack	   of	   bilateral	  communication,	  which	  further	  leads	  to	  the	  Europeans’	  prejudice	  and	  misunderstanding	  about	  China.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   incommensurable	   conflicts	   of	   values	   are	   interpreted	   as	   solvable	  technical	   matters.	   Logically,	   one	   effective	   way	   of	   eliminating	   differences	   is	   to	   strengthen	  various	   forms	   of	   exchange	   so	   that	   the	   EU	   and	   Europeans	   can	   adjust	   their	   presumptuous	  perspectives.	  Below	  are	  some	  typical	  examples:	  
‘The	  EU	  still	  has	  sizeable	  prejudices	  and	  doubts	  about	  China,	  and	  often	  interferes	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Some	  of	  the	  respondents	  in	  this	  study	  also	  made	  similar	  comments:	  ‘Too	  many	  policy	  documents	  or	  leaders’	  speeches	  seem	  to	   be	   devoid	   of	   substance.	   We	   are	   still	   shy	   to	   put	   interest	   or	   conflict	   on	   the	   table	   and	   to	   discuss	   them	   straightforwardly’	  (Interview	  2).	  	  ‘When	   dissatisfied	   with	   some	   country,	   China	   normally	   refrains	   from	   a	   full	   expression	   of	   its	   real	   ideas,	   at	   least	   avoiding	  criticising	   someone	   by	   name.	   Although	   everyone	   knows	   the	   object	   of	   China’s	   dissatisfaction,	   from	   the	   Chinese	   perspective,	  careful	  speech	  can	  leave	  some	  leeway	  for	  the	  situation	  to	  possibly	  change’	  (Interview	  9).	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China’s	  internal	  affairs.’	  
—Vice	  Foreign	  Minister	  Song	  Tao	  (2014)	  	  
‘I	  am	  happy	  to	  notice	  that	  Europeans	  who	  have	  visited	  China	  are	  the	  most	  likely	  to	  like	  China,	  to	  have	  a	  relatively	  balanced	  and	  fair	  view	  towards	  China’s	  things.	  That’s	  because	   they	   have	   witnessed	   China’s	   development,	   realized	   the	   complexity	   and	  diversity	   of	   China’s	   problems.	   They	   can	   understand	   the	   necessity	   of	   China’s	   rise,	  rationality	  of	  China’s	  own	  development	  path,	  and	  importance	  of	  promoting	  China-­‐‑EU	  cooperation.’	  
—Former	  Chinese	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  Song	  Zhe	  (2009C)	  
‘The	   EU	   should	   be	   with	   the	   times,	   envisage	   the	   profound	   changes	   of	   [the]	  international	   order,	   adapt	   the	   world	   multipolarity,	   economic	   globalization,	   and	  diversified	  development	  models	  with	  a	  positive	  state	  of	  mind.’	  
—Former	  Chinese	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  Song	  Zhe	  
(as	  cited	  in	  Mission	  of	  China	  to	  the	  EU,	  2014A)	  
Third,	  regarding	  the	  settlement	  of	  differences,	  China	  conveys	  enough	  confidence	  and	  optimism.	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   ‘with	   the	   growing	   interdependence	   between	   the	   two	   sides	   and	   the	  convergence	  of	  our	  interests,	  most	  problems	  will	  be	  smoothly	  and	  naturally	  solved	  during	  the	  deepening	   process	   of	   cooperation’	   (Song,	   2010B).	   Meanwhile,	   Beijing	   believes	   that	   it	   has	  established	  effective	  methods	  and	  common	  principles	   to	  deal	  with	  problems	  and	  differences.	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Certainly,	   the	   methods	   and	   principles	   it	   mentions	   are	   still	   very	   broad	   and	   lack	   any	   true	  significance:	  
‘After	  many	  years’	  development,	  China	  and	   the	  EU	  have	  created	  a	   consensus	   that	  both	   sides	   should	   mutually	   respect,	   treat	   each	   other	   like	   equals,	   and	   maintain	  stability	  of	  China-­‐‑EU	  relations.	  We	  have	  basically	  found	  effective	  ways	  to	  properly	  handle	  differences	  by	  dialogue	  and	  consultation.’	  
—Vice	  Foreign	  Minister	  Wang	  Chao	  (2015)	  
‘Understanding	   and	   supporting	   each	   other’s	   development	   path	   has	   been	   both	  sides’	  basic	   idea…	  Inside	  the	  EU,	  there	  are	  more	  and	  more	  demands	  to	  require	  to	  adapt	  to	  China’s	  development	  and	  change	  the	  ways	  of	  dealing	  with	  China.	  More	  and	  more	  Europeans	  have	  started	  to	  see	  China	  from	  a	  strategic	  perspective,	  and	  believe	  that	  the	  development	  path	  chosen	  by	  Chinese	  people	  should	  be	  respected.’	  
—Former	  Chinese	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  Song	  Zhe	  (2011D)	  
Meanwhile,	   in	   a	   large	   number	   of	   speeches,	   China	   also	   advocates	   exchanging	   mutual	  recognition.	  Such	  a	  suggestion	  is	  in	  line	  with	  Chinese	  facework,	  which	  emphasises	  the	  principle	  of	  reciprocity,	  namely,	  if	  I	  have	  given	  you	  face,	  you	  should	  actively	  give	  me	  face	  in	  return,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  In	  this	  sense,	  international	  recognition	  can	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  state	  quality	  or	  adherence	   to	   values	   and	   in	   fact	   becomes	   a	   lucrative	   investment	   to	   get	   something	   in	   return.	  Below	  are	  some	  typical	  discourses	  along	  these	  lines:	  
‘Our	  policy	  to	  support	  EU	  integration	  will	  not	  be	  changed;	  our	  position	  to	  welcome	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the	  EU	  to	  play	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  the	  world	  will	  not	  be	  changed.	  China	  also	  hopes	  the	  EU	  can	  respect	  China’s	  core	  interests	  and	  concerns	  with	  the	  same	  spirit.’	  
—Former	  Chinese	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  Wu	  Hailong	  (2013)	  	  
‘China	  will	   continue	   to	  view	  Europe	  as	  a	   strategic	  partner	  and	  support	  European	  integration.	   We	   believe	   that	   the	   European	   people	   will	   also	   support	   the	   Chinese	  people	  in	  pursuing	  a	  development	  model	  suited	  to	  China’s	  national	  conditions.’	  
—President	  Xi	  Jinping	  (2014C)	  
‘The	   EU	   promises	   to	   respect	   China’s	   sovereignty	   and	   territorial	   integrity;	   China	  firmly	  supports	  European	  integration.’	  
—Chinese	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  Yang	  Yanyi	  
(as	  cited	  in	  Mission	  of	  China	  to	  the	  EU,	  2015)	  
China’s	  logic	  takes	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘transactional’	  approach:	  ‘Just	  as	  we	  Chinese	  recognise	  your	  status	  and	  achievements,	  it	  is	  appropriate	  for	  you	  Europeans	  to	  in	  return	  give	  recognition	  to	  what	  we	  care	   about’.	   Some	  observers	  have	  been	   confused	  about	  China’s	   real	   views,	   for	   example,	   does	  China	  really	  support	  the	  EU’s	   integration	  or	  does	   it	   just	  want	  some	  reciprocal	  recognition?104	  Certainly,	   something	   like	   this	   would	   be	   ridiculous	   for	   many	   Europeans,	   as	   the	   European	  recognition	  of	  China’s	  sovereignty,	  interests	  and	  development	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  whether	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Regarding	   China’s	   attitudes	   about	   European	   integration,	   it	   is	   fairly	   plausible	   that	   Beijing	   philosophically	   supports	   it	   but	  practically	  may	  not	  wish	  to	  see	  it	  happen.	  Indeed,	  in	  many	  practices,	  ‘Beijing	  shrewdly	  exploits	  divergences	  of	  position	  within	  the	  EU,	  playing	  the	  EU	  countries	  off	  against	  each	  other’	  (Mattlin,	  2012,	  p.	  193;	  see	  also	  Fox	  &	  Godement,	  2009).	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China	  supports	  the	  EU’s	  integration.	  	  
	  
5.5	  Conclusion	  
5.5.1	  Preliminary	  conclusion	  
The	   empirical	   findings	   of	   this	   research	   have	   shown	   that	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   the	   EU’s	  recognition	   is	   guided	   by	   face	   culture,	   which	   has	   manifested	   as	   three	   complementary	   role	  conceptions—the	   partner,	   weak	   and	   counterpart.	   Chinese	   official	   discourse	   steeped	   in	   face	  culture	  has	  become	  the	  context	  within	  which	  China’s	  diplomacy	  can	  be	  explained	  and	  justified.	  These	  conclusions	  are	  supported	  by	  comparisons	  of	  China’s	  discourse	  addressed	  to	  the	  ASEAN	  and	  AU	  and	  have	   also	  been	  proven	  by	   a	   range	  of	   discursive	   strategies,	  which	   are	  marked	  by	  culturally	   particular	   and	   peculiar	   ways	   of	   presenting	   itself	   as	   a	   partner,	   weak	   and	   a	  counterpart.	  
‘Rarely	   does	   a	   foreign	   policy	   action	   serve	   one	   goal’	   (Larson,	   2015,	   p.	   332).	   Theoretically,	  international	  recognition	  is	  fungible,	  as	  recognition	  gained	  in	  one	  place	  can	  be	  transplanted	  to	  other	   place	   (Tang,	   2005,	   p.	   41),	   very	   often	   constituting	   ‘an	   emotional	   belief	   concerning	   the	  overall	   nature	   of	   a	   social	   relationship’	   (Mercer,	   2005,	   pp.	   95-­‐‑97).	   As	   revealed	   in	   the	   study,	  China’s	   purpose	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   being	   recognised	   as	   a	   partner,	   a	   developing	   country,	   a	  historical	   victim	   and	   a	   counterpart,	   but	   also	   about	   making	   an	   aggregate	   impression	  advantageous	  to	  China	  itself.	  All	  of	  these	  constructed	  fractions	  of	  China	  perform	  the	  ‘epistemic	  function	  of	  validating	  particular	  truth	  claims’	  (Haccke,	  2005,	  p.	  191)	  in	  the	  process	  of	  mutual	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interaction	  and	  are	  aimed	  at	  attaining	  an	  overall	  recognition:	  to	  be	  recognised	  as	  a	  capable	  
and	  favourable	  actor	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  Europeans.	  	  
Struggle	  for	  international	  recognition	  is	  never	  a	  purely	  normative	  phenomenon.	  In	  the	  analysis	  of	  this	  research,	  it	  can	  be	  observed	  that	  many	  realistic	  considerations	  or	  expectations	  are	  also	  included	  in	  China’s	  struggle	  for	  the	  EU’s	  recognition.	  For	  China’s	  rulers,	  the	  most	  aspired	  kind	  of	  recognition	  from	  the	  EU	  is	  orientated	  towards	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  China’s	  ruling	  authority	  and	  its	  role	  as	  a	  reliable	  business	  and	  political	  partner.	  In	  other	  words,	  regime	  security,	  economic	  
interests	   and	   strategic	   coordination	   are	   the	   key	   goals	   behind	   China’s	   entire	   search	   for	  recognition.	  
	  
China’s	  concerns	   China’s	  efforts	  in	  its	  struggle	  for	  the	  EU’s	  recognition	  
Regime	  security	   Ø   Political	   and	   security	   partner:	   exclude	   some	   issues	   on	   account	   of	   its	  cooperation	   agenda;	   promote	   China’s	   principles	   on	   the	   centralism	   of	  sovereignty.	  
Ø   Cultural	  partner:	  persuade	  Europeans	  to	  accept	  China’s	  particularities	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  cultural	  relativism.	  
Ø   Human	  rights	  partner:	  make	  human	  rights	  issues	  non-­‐‑issues.	  
Ø   Developing	  country:	  give	  prominence	  to	  the	  CCP’s	  legitimacy.	  
Ø   Historical	  victim:	  explain	  why	  China	  chooses	  a	  different	  political	  path	  compared	  to	  the	  EU.	  
Ø   The	  counterpart:	  show	  China	  as	  adopting	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  Western	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model;	  neutralise	  some	  differences	  as	  normal	  phenomena.	  
Economic	  interests	   Ø   Economic	   partner:	   highlight	   the	   scope	   and	   prospects	   of	   cooperation;	  depict	  China	  as	  a	  reliable	  partner	  to	  the	  EU.	  
Ø   Developing	   country	   and	   historical	   victim:	   gain	   the	   EU’s	   sympathy;	  enlist	  more	  economical	  and	  technological	  support	  from	  the	  EU.	  
Strategic	  coordination	   Ø   Political	   and	   security	   partner:	   strengthen	   cooperation	   in	   multiple	  spheres	  and	  at	  the	  global	  level.	  
Ø   Historical	   victim:	   suggest	   that	   both	   sides	   should	   adopt	   the	   same	  attitude	  towards	  the	  recently	  aggressive	  Japan.	  
Ø   The	   counterpart:	   prove	   that	   China	   and	   the	   EU	   are	   natural	   strategic	  partners	   in	   transforming	   the	   global	   system	   and	   upgrading	   their	  respective	  international	  standing.	  
Figure	  5.13.	  China’s	  actual	  concerns	  behind	  its	  struggle	  for	  recognition	  from	  the	  EU.	  
	  







Bringing	  in	  moral	  norms	  
Seeking	  a	  holistic	  recognition	  of	  China	  
	   304	  
Figure	  5.14.	  Behavioural	  model	  of	  China’s	  struggle	  for	  the	  EU’s	  recognition.	  
	  
5.5.2	  Relational	  orientation	  
What	  is	  characteristic	  of	  Chinese	  face	  culture	  is	  not	  a	  claim	  to	  individual	  freedom	  of	  action	  but	  a	  distinctive	   and	   perennial	   emphasis	   on	   interpersonal	   relationships	   (Mao,	   1992,	   p.	   467).	   The	  basic	  assumption	  of	  this	  entire	  study	  is	  that	  China’s	  struggle	  for	  the	  EU’s	  recognition	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  self-­‐‑presentation	   in	   the	   relationship.	   It	   means	   that	   China’s	   presentation	   to	   a	   large	   extent	  originates	   from	   the	   properties,	   conditions	   and	   states	   evinced	   in	   the	   China-­‐‑EU	   relationship.	  Evidently,	   the	   empirical	   study	   proves	   such	   assumptions,	   and	   we	   can	   see	   that	   clarifying	   the	  nature	   of	   the	   relationship	   constitutes	   the	   first	   step	   of	   China’s	   rationalisation	   of	   its	   role	  demands.	  	  
	  
Relational	  ontology.	  
China’s	   role	   performances	   seem	   to	   fit	   Chinese	   face	   culture	   first	   because	   they	   embody	   the	  approach	  of	  ontological	  position	  that	   is	   ingrained	  in	  face	  culture.	  This	  approach	  focuses	  on	   ‘a	  processual	  ontology	   that	   shifted	  analytical	   attention	  away	   from	  entities	   (the	   substance)	  with	  static	  and	  given	  properties,	  be	  they	  persons	  or	  states,	  to	  relations	  under	  constant	  construction	  among	  those	  entities’	   (Bousquet	  &	  Curtis,	  2011,	  p.	  49).	   In	   line	  with	  China’s	  discourses	   to	   the	  EU,	  ontologically,	  it	  can	  be	  found	  that	  China	  constantly	  strives	  to	  locate	  itself	  through	  relational	  judgment	   and	   comparison	   and,	   further,	   to	   enforce	   its	   perceived	   roles	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   EU.	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Specifically,	  when	  China	  presents	  itself	  as	  a	  partner	  of	  the	  EU,	  the	  EU	  is	  formulated	  as	  a	  partner	  of	  China,	  and	   is	  also	  suggested	   to	  continually	  prioritise	   the	  maintenance	  and	  development	  of	  the	  relationship.	  When	  China	  prioritises	  its	  roles	  as	  a	  developing	  country	  and	  historical	  victim,	  it	   implies	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  a	  group	  of	  developed	  countries	  who	  are	  also	  past	  aggressors	  and	  are	  responsible	   for	   granting	   China	   support	   and	   acknowledgement.	   When	   China	   enumerates	   its	  similarities	  with	   the	  EU,	  both	  China	  and	   the	  EU	  are	   characterised	  as	   actors	   sharing	   common	  features	  from	  the	  actor-­‐‑level	  and	  system-­‐‑level	  perspectives.	  In	  this	  case,	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  are	  positioned	  in	  wider	  but	  not	  necessarily	  homogeneous	  collectives.	  Just	  like	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship	  in	  social	  life,	  what	  is	  being	  recognised	  here	  ‘is	  not	  the	  identity	  of	  an	  individual	  but	  instead	  the	  position	  a	  person	  occupied	  in	  a	  particular	  relationship’	  (Ringmar,	  2015,	  pp.	  51-­‐‑52).	  All	   of	   this	   entirely	   confirms	  Womack’s	   viewpoint	   (2008,	  p.	   265)	   about	  China’s	  diplomacy	   i.e.	  ‘from	   the	   Chinese	   perspective,	   international	   relations	   are	   not	   an	   area	   for	   the	   application	   of	  abstract	  norms	  to	  cases,	  but	  rather	  a	  set	  of	  particular	  international	  relationships,	  with	  concrete	  obligations	  within	  the	  context	  of	  each	  relationship’.	  
In	   addition,	   China	   passionately	   formulates	   or	   consolidates	   the	   relational	   symmetry	   in	   some	  roles	   (i.e.	   as	   the	   partner	   and	   counterpart),	  while	  maintaining	   the	   undisguised	   asymmetry	   of	  status	   in	  some	  roles	   (i.e.	  weak).	   Its	  position	  remains	  dynamic	  and	  changeable	  with	  regard	   to	  the	   EU,	   sometimes	   as	   an	   ambitious	   order	   maker,	   sometimes	   an	   equal	   interlocutor	   and	  sometimes	  as	   a	  modest	   seeker	  of	  help.	   It	   is	   striking	   that	  Chinese	   self-­‐‑piety	   and	   self-­‐‑boasting	  coexist	  simultaneously	  in	  its	  struggle	  for	  recognition.	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Process	  oriented	  
One	   of	   the	   core	   Chinese	   philosophical	   views	   is	   that	   the	   universe	   is	   a	   dynamic	   system	   that	  changes	   constantly	   (Farras,	   2016,	   p.	   286).	   It	   is	   noteworthy	   that	   the	   Chinese	   pursuit	   of	  relationality	   is	   process	   orientated.	   ‘Process’	   here	   refers	   to	   ‘on-­‐‑going	   interactive	   relations,	  embedded	  in	  social	  practice	  and	  producing	  social	  meaning’	  (Qin,	  2009,	  p.	  14).	  Henry	  Kissinger	  (2014,	   p.	   226)	   has	   also	   noted	   this:	   ‘Americans	   seek	   an	   outcome	   responding	   to	   immediate	  circumstances;	  Chinese	  concentrate	  on	  evolutionary	  change’.	  The	  ontological	  effect	  of	  such	  an	  orientation	   is	   that	   ‘we	  should	  not	  conceptualize	  social	  actors	  as	  a	  complete	  and	  distinct	  unit,	  but	  as	   flexible	  entities	   that	  are	   in	   the	  process	  of	  continuously	  becoming’	   (Schneider,	  2014,	  p.	  693).	   In	   the	   sense	   of	  methodology,	   such	   a	   thinking	   pattern	   is	   embodied	   as	   an	   introspective	  method	   based	   on	   the	   process	   of	   interaction	   rather	   than	   explicit	   norms	   of	   appropriateness	  (Kavalski,	   2014,	   p.	   13).	   A	   kind	   of	   ungrounded	   optimism	   exists	   in	   this	   logic:	   ‘As	   long	   as	   the	  process	  of	  constructing	  relations	  can	  be	  maintained,	  relations	  will	  at	  least	  not	  deteriorate	  to	  an	  irreversible	  point	  beyond	  redemption’	  (Qin,	  2011,	  p.	  138).	  	  
In	   the	   same	   sense,	   Chinese	   officials,	   unlike	   their	   European	   counterparts	   or	   scholars,	   rarely	  express	   any	   dissatisfaction	   or	   confusion	   about	   the	   ambiguous	   nature	   of	   the	   China-­‐‑EU	  partnership.	   For	   the	   Chinese,	   sustained	   interactions	   in	   the	   name	   of	   a	   China-­‐‑EU	   partnership,	  even	   if	   some	  of	   them	   lack	   substantial	   content	  or	   shared	  value,	  have	  already	  materialised	   the	  essence	  of	  the	  term	  partnership	  i.e.	  maintaining	  relational	  stability	  and	  predictability.	  Likewise,	  China’s	  attitude	  towards	  the	  differences	  show	  the	  same	  logic	  process:	  ‘The	  problems	  we	  have	  in	  front	   of	   us	   are	   not	   lasting	   but	   temporary	   ones,	  which	   are	   just	   passing	   swirls	   in	   the	   river	   of	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China-­‐‑EU	  relations’	  (Song,	  2010B).	  Another	  case	  is	  that	  Beijing	  always	  reiterates	  that	  there	  are	  growing	  common	  interests	  and	  values	  between	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  when	  shaping	  its	  role	  as	  the	  EU’s	   counterpart.	   Obviously,	   China’s	   ‘counterpart’	   is	   not	   an	   established	   entity	   with	   certain	  immanent	  characteristics	  but	  still	  an	  on-­‐‑going	  process,	  which	  is	  supposed	  to	  have	  a	  generative	  nature	  of	  creating	  similarities	  and	  accumulating	  inter-­‐‑subjective	  recognition.	  	  
	  
5.5.3	  Neutralising	  differences.	  
When	   relations	   and	   related	   roles	   are	   made	   certain,	   China’s	   role	   performance	   is	   further	  characterised	  by	  actions	  intended	  to	  obscure	  any	  differences	  between	  itself	  and	  the	  EU.	  
As	   theorised	   by	   Derrida,	   the	   Western	   philosophical	   tradition	   rests	   on	   binary	   opposites—unity/diversity,	   presence/absence,	   universality/specificity,	   democracy/dictatorship,	  civilised/uncivilised	   etc.	   (Critchley,	   2005,	   p.	   265).	   Following	   this	   logic,	   much	   of	   the	   EU’s	  diplomatic	  discourse	  manifests	  as	  oppositional	  differentiation.	  For	  example,	  regarding	  political	  value,	   there	   must	   be	   ‘a	   morally	   superior	   identity	   of	   democratic	   juxtaposed	   to	   the	   inferior	  identity	   of	   non-­‐‑democratic’	   (Rumelili,	   2004,	   p.	   31).	   The	   EU	   always	   positions	   itself	   as	   a	  normative	   superior,	   and	   the	   ‘other’	   as	   the	   inferior	   object	   that	   ‘needs	   to	   be	  intervened/missionized/enlightened/saved/democratized’	   (Musliu	  &	  Orbie,	  2014,	  p.	  417;	  see	  also	   Gong,	   1984,	   p.	   22;	   Scheipers	  &	   Sicurelli,	   2008).	   According	   to	   Chinese	   philosopher	   Zhao	  Dingyang	   (2006,	   p.	   38),	   ‘such	   a	   pattern	   may	   enhance	   the	   integration	   of	   the	   EU	   itself	   but	  deepens	  the	  EU’s	  separation	  from	  the	  world’.	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On	  the	  contrary,	  ‘the	  Chinese	  mindset	  cannot	  be	  understood	  without	  supplanting	  the	  either/or	  mindset	   with	   a	   paradoxical	   integration	   (i.e.	   both/and)	   framework,	   in	   which	   opposites	   are	  interdependent	  rather	  than	  mutually	  exclusive’	  (Chen,	  2002,	  p.	  189).	  Seeking	  almost	  instinctive	  similarities,	  different	  and	  even	  opposite	  elements	  in	  a	  synthetic	  whole	  is	  always	  a	  characteristic	  of	  the	  Chinese	  mind	  (Solé-­‐‑Farràs,	  2016,	  p.	  5).	  This	  research	  has	  proven	  this	  cultural	  preference:	  China’s	   struggle	   for	   the	   EU’s	   recognition	   always	   avoids	   absolute	   alterity.	   From	   China’s	   role	  performances,	  all	  of	   its	   three	  roles	  are	  perceivably	  aimed	  at	   jumping	  out	  of	   such	  a	  European	  dichotomy	  and	  dismantling	  the	  antithetical	  positions	  constructed	  by	  the	  Europeans.	  	  
In	   social	   life,	   Chinese	   people	   seek	   face	   by	   avoiding	   the	   public	   disclosure	   of	   interpersonal	  differences	   and	   reducing	   any	   harmony-­‐‑threatening	   activities.	   Similarly,	   there	   is	   a	   consistent	  principle	   underpinning	   China’s	   search	   for	   recognition	   from	   the	   EU:	   ‘Do	   not	   let	   difference	  become	  the	  resistance	  of	  development	  of	  China-­‐‑EU	  relations.105	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  China	  admits	  the	  existence	  of	   some	  differences	  between	   itself	   and	   the	  EU	   in	   its	   implicit	  way.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   more	   noticeably,	   the	   Chinese	   spare	   no	   effort	   to	   mask	   many	   differences	   that	   may	  embarrass	  them,	  to	  advocate	  that	  both	  sides	  should	  transcend106	  their	  differences	  to	  maintain	  a	  ‘harmonious’	  relationship,	  to	  neutralise	  differences	  as	  a	  ‘normal’	  phenomenon	  arising	  from	  the	  process	  of	  international	  interactions	  and	  to	  balance	  the	  existing	  normative	  asymmetries	  of	  the	  EU-­‐‑China	  relationship.	  For	  example,	  partner/partnership,	  suggested	  by	  China,	  has	  proved	  to	  be	  a	   discourse	   instrument	   that	   ‘challenges	   the	   references	   to	   incompatibilities	   and	   to	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  This	  saying	  appears	  repeatedly	  in	  China’s	  official	  discourse	  with	  the	  EU.	  
106	  ‘Transcend’	  here	  for	  the	  Chinese	  refers	  to	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  behavioural	  strategies,	  including	  turning	  a	  blind	  eye,	  pursuing	  mutual	  tolerance,	  avoiding	  open	  debate	  or	  criticism	  or	  seeking	  solutions	  to	  reconcile	  differences.	  
	   309	  
rivalry/friendship	  dichotomy’	  (Feng	  &	  Huang,	  2014,	  p.	  47).	  In	  the	  overarching	  framework	  of	  a	  partnership,	  China	  expects	   to	   ‘set	   an	  example	   (with	   the	  EU)	  of	  different	   civilizations	   seeking	  harmony	  without	  uniformity,	  promoting	  diversity,	   learning	  from	  each	  other’	  (Chinese	  Foreign	  Ministry,	   2014A).	   As	   such,	   when	   China	   promotes	   its	   role	   as	   a	   developing	   country	   and	   a	  historical	   victim,	   it	   euphemistically	   reminds	   the	   EU	   of	   the	   ‘fact’	   that	   some	   differences	   are	  endogenous	   to	   the	   objective	   material	   conditions	   or	   even	   historical	   mistakes	   made	   by	  Europeans.	   The	   implication	   is	   that	   the	   EU	   has	   no	   normative	   privilege	   to	   conceptualise	   the	  differences	  by	  their	  own	  logic	  or	  to	  require	  China	  to	  make	  changes	  it	  proposes.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  Chinese	  face	  culture	  is	  self-­‐‑restraint	  or	  not	  showing	  off.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  ‘[Chinese]	  active	  pursuit	  of	  face	  is	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  each	  individual’s	  uniqueness’	  (Chang,	  2001,	  p.	  158).	   Correspondingly,	   besides	   conceptualising	   differences	   in	   its	   harmonising	  way,	   research	  shows	   that	   China	   also	   depersonalises	   itself	   to	   be	   a	   typically	   ordinary	   international	   actor,	   a	  plausibly	   favourable	   counterpart,	   part	   of	   a	  wider	   collective	  with	   the	  EU.	  All	   these	   roles—the	  partner,	   weak	   and	   counterpart—have	   the	   effect	   of	   shifting	   the	   audience’s	   attention	   to	   some	  prototypical	  properties	  shared	  by	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  or	  by	  most	  countries.	  Logically,	  as	  China’s	  unique	   features	   are	   obscured,	   the	   differences	   between	   China	   and	   the	   EU	   are	   accordingly	  obscured.	   Viewed	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   China’s	   discourses	   to	   the	   EU,	   there	   is	   almost	   no	  prominence	   given	   to	   China’s	   unique	   features	   (e.g.	   its	   socialist	   system,	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	  Communist	   Party	   etc.);	   ‘no	   messianism	   of	   exporting	   one	   ultimate	   value	   or	   system’	   (Zhang,	  2011,	   p.	   15);	   no	   challenge	   to	   the	   liberal	   principles	   the	   current	   international	   order	   rests	   on.	  These	  characteristics,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Shambaugh	  (2013,	  p.	  525),	  are	  intended	  to	  pander	  to	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the	  lowest	  common	  denominator,	  ‘usually	  adopting	  the	  safest	  and	  least	  controversial	  position’.	  	  
Moreover,	  what	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  China’s	  role	  performance	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  accommodationalism	  i.e.	  China	  adjusts	   itself	   to	  present	   a	   favourable	  appearance	   that	   incorporates	  and	  exemplifies	  the	  EU’s	  values	  and	   to	  use	  vague	  and	  general	  expressions	  suggestive	  of	   the	  existing/possible	  common	   ground	   between	   both	   sides.	   Certainly,	  many	   times,	   China’s	   accommodations	   are	   an	  overt	   form	   of	   superficial	   conformity;	   however,	   one	   culturally	   particular	   point	   is	   that	   the	  Chinese	  are	  not	   subject	   to	   the	  same	  pressure	   for	  consistency	  between	   inner	  belief	  and	  outer	  behaviour	  as	  are	  Westerners	  (Hiniker,	  1969,	  pp.	  157-­‐‑176).	  	  
When	   most	   scholars	   (including	   Chinese	   scholars)	   discuss	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   international	  recognition,	   they	   habitually	   focus	   on	   the	   emphasis	   on	   alterity	   or	   possible	   challenges	   to	   the	  existing	  system	  of	  order.	  Consequently,	  China’s	  search	  must	  ‘sow	  the	  seeds	  of	  a	  tragic	  sequence	  of	   identity-­‐‑based	   conflict’	   (Greenhill,	   2008,	   p.	   355).	   However,	   one	   main	   contribution	   of	   this	  study	  is	  to	  show	  an	  inclination	  rooted	  in	  China’s	  mind-­‐‑set	  and	  behaviours—China	  would	  like	  to	  minimise	   the	   negative	   influence	   of	   differences	   and	   to	   raise	   the	   possibility	   (or	   create	   an	  acceptable	   illusion)	   of	   coexistence	   and	   mutual	   tolerance.	   What	   Beijing	   is	   never	   tired	   of	  emphasising	   is	  that	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  are	  not	  diametrically	  opposed	  and	  homologous	  but	  are	  interdependent	  building	  blocks	  that	  come	  together	  to	  comprise	  a	  great	  whole.	  
	  
5.5.4	  Moral	  norms	  
‘Being	  innocent,	  impotent	  but	  moral	  is	  better	  received	  than	  being	  strong	  and	  outspoken	  in	  the	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Chinese	   society’	   (Lee,	   2013,	   p.	   520).	   The	   other	  main	   approach	   that	   emerges	   in	   China’s	   role	  performance	  for	  gaining	  recognition	  is	  the	  introduction	  of	  its	  own	  self-­‐‑righteous	  moral	  norms	  in	  the	  struggle	  of	  recognition.	  Certainly,	  moral	  judgment	  and	  ethical	  persuasion	  are	  absolutely	  generalised	  behaviours	  in	  international	  relations.	  As	  Han	  Mogenthau	  (1967,	  p.	  10)	  has	  noted,	  ‘all	  nations	  are	   tempted…	  to	  clothe	   their	  own	  particular	  aspirations	  and	  actions	   in	   the	  moral	  purposes	  of	  the	  universe’.	  	  
Morality,	  especially	   the	  rule	  of	  renqing	  that	  emphasises	  empathy	  and	  reciprocity	   (see	  Section	  3.5.3),	  is	  the	  guiding	  principle	  behind	  Chinese	  facework	  (Qin,	  2011,	  p.	  134).	  The	  Chinese	  always	  mobilise	  morality	  to	  mediate,	  coordinate	  and	  harmonise	  relationships	  and	  then	  to	  seek	  social	  recognition.	   As	   such,	   it	   can	   be	   observed	   that	   China’s	   face	   diplomacy	   is	   not	   about	   applying	  abstract	  or	  universal	  norms	  to	  cases	  but	  about	  espousing	  a	  set	  of	  moral	  rules	  defined	  within	  the	   context	  of	   a	  particular	   relationship.	  In	  other	  words,	   the	   core	  belief	   can	  be	   interpreted	  as	  follows:	   ‘one’s	   rights	  and	  obligations	   toward	  another	  person	  depend	   in	   the	   first	  place	  on	   the	  kind	  of	  relationship	  one	  has	  with	  that	  person’	  (Zhang,	  2015,	  p.	  19).	  
Role	   assignments	   between	  China	   and	   the	   EU	  play	   serve	   to	   amplify	   the	  moral	   justification	   of	  China’s	  aspiration	  for	  the	  EU’s	  recognition	  (Liao,	  2013,	  p.	  156).	  Specifically,	  as	  both	  China	  and	  the	   EU	   have	   been	   ‘partners’,	   the	   EU	   should	   reduce	   its	   epistemological	   claims	   for	   theorising	  China’s	  individual	  qualities	  (especially	  special	  ones	  compared	  with	  the	  EU)	  and	  focus	  more	  on	  the	  stability	  and	  development	  of	  the	  relationship;	  as	  China	  has	  been	  and	  will	  be	  largely	  weaker	  than	   the	   EU,	   the	   EU	   should	   adopt	   a	   more	   sympathetic	   attitude	   towards	   China	   and	   respect	  China’s	   choices	  no	  matter	  how	   they	  seem	  to	  deviate	   from	   its	  expectations;	  as	  China	  shares	  a	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myriad	  of	   individual	  and	  systematic	  attributes	  with	   the	  EU,	   there	   is	  no	  reason	  not	   to	  profess	  mutual	   respect	   and	   tolerance	   towards	   each	   other.	   As	   per	   this	   logic,	   China’s	   diplomatic	  discourse,	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  appears	  not	  only	  to	  be	  rational	  and	  persuasive	  but,	  above	  all,	  morally	  right	  and,	  sometimes,	  emotional,	  according	  to	  the	  cultural-­‐‑political	  framework	  of	  face	  culture.	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Chapter	  6	  
Conclusion	  





‘Napoleon	  said	  that	  China	  was	  a	  sleeping	  lion	  and	  when	  this	  lion	  awoke,	  
it	  would	  shake	  the	  world.	  




As	   a	   long-­‐‑time	   observer,	   I	   have	   witnessed	   a	   lot	   of	   China’s	   continuous	   fascination	   with	  international	  recognition	  and	  its	  frequent	  frustration	  with	  still	  being	  viewed	  as	  a	  marginalised	  other.	  In	  recent	  years,	  as	  China	  has	  taken	  more	  initiatives	  to	  promote	  its	  soft	  power	  by	  hosting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  This	  passage	  has	  been	  cited	  from	  Xi’s	  speech	  at	  the	  Meeting	  Commemorating	  the	  50th	  Anniversary	  of	  the	  Establishment	  of	  China-­‐‑France	  Diplomatic	  Relations.	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grand	   international	  gatherings	  one	  after	  another,	   the	   foreign	  media	  have	  been	  keen	  to	  report	  on	  how	  China	  is	  obsessed	  with	  its	  face	  diplomacy;	  however,	  the	  official	  Chinese	  media	  tends	  to	  emphasise	  that	  today’s	  China	  is	  more	  pragmatic	  and	  is	  bidding	  goodbye	  to	  face	  diplomacy.	  No	  matter	  from	  which	  perspective	  you	  analyse	  it,	  one	  thing	  seems	  to	  be	  certain	  for	  everyone:	  face	  culture,	   as	   China’s	   traditional	   and	   mass	   culture,	   is	   still	   ‘one	   crucial	   element	   influencing	   the	  manner	  in	  which	  China	  relates	  with	  other	  nations’	  (Ho,	  2015,	  p.	  3).	  
Before	   this	   research,	   like	   many	   other	   observers,	   I	   regarded	   face	   culture	   as	   an	   inherent	  weakness	  of	  the	  Chinese	  nation.	  It	  seems	  only	  to	  lead	  to	  ‘a	  vain	  China’,	  which	  either	  squanders	  large	  quantities	  of	  resources	  to	  present	  an	  ‘ideal’	  image	  or	  adopts	  all	  possible	  means	  to	  conceal	  or	  undo	  foreign	  criticism.	  However,	  after	  this	  study,	  I	  realise	  that	  most	  people	  in	  fact	  lack	  a	  clear	  and	   complete	   knowledge	   about	   face	   culture,	   and,	   consequently,	   the	   role	   of	   face	   culture	   in	  China’s	  diplomacy	  is	  commonly	  misunderstood	  and	  then	  stereotyped.	  	  
The	   final	   chapter	   of	   this	   thesis	   has	   a	   two-­‐‑fold	   aim.	   First,	   I	   intend	   to	   summarise	   the	   main	  findings	  of	  this	  thesis;	  second,	  I	  transcend	  the	  general	  conclusions	  and	  address	  some	  profound	  and	   elaborate	   insights	   into	   some	   research	   questions	   about	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   international	  recognition.	  
	  
6.1	  Main	  Findings	  	  
Chinese	  face	  culture	  Just	   like	  a	   spider	  web,	   a	  person’s	  behaviors	  may	  seem	   infinitely	   complicated,	  but	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they	   always	   have	   a	   common	   clue	   and	   clear	   designs.	   After	   understanding	   their	  designs,	  we	  will	  discover	  that	  various	  different	  factors	  are	  in	  fact	  connected	  by	  an	  undoubted	  web,	  and	  many	  seemingly	  contradictory	  activities	  stem	  from	  the	  same	  substructure.	  (Zheng,	  2012,	  p.	  93)	  
The	  core	  question	  of	  this	  research	  is,	  how	  does	  Chinese	  face	  culture	  influence	  China’s	  struggle	  for	  international	  recognition?	  Just	  as	  the	  passage	  cited	  above	  notes,	  the	  research	  assumes	  face	  culture	   is	   a	  web	   of	  meanings	   ingrained	   in	   the	   Chinese	  mind	   and	   plays	   a	   remarkable	   role	   in	  shaping	  China’s	  seemingly	  contradictory	  identities	  and	  behaviours.	  	  
Chapter	  3	  elaborates	  on	  the	  conceptual	  richness	  and	  methodological	  diversity	  of	  face	  culture	  in	  Chinese	  society.	  Face	  has	  been	  defined	  in	  a	  universal	  sense	  i.e.	  face	  is	  the	  public	  image	  that	  a	  
person	  claims	   for	  him/herself	  and	   is	  also	  recognised	  by	  others.	  The	   fundamental	   aim	  of	  face	   concern	   is	   being	   recognised	   by	   others	   i.e.	   social	   recognition.	   Because	   of	   face	   concern,	  people	   in	  general	  have	  two	  behavioural	  objectives:	   to	  seek	   face	  and	  to	  save	   face	  when	  face	   is	  lost.	  As	   theorised	  by	  social	  psychology,	   facework	   is	  a	   typical	  kind	  of	   self-­‐‑presentation,	  which	  intrinsically	  consists	  of	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  others	  and	  to	  relationship.	  
Through	   a	   detailed	   cultural	   analysis,	   this	   paper	   further	   suggests	   that	   Chinese	   face	   culture	  
emphasises	   the	   role	   of	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	   relationship	   in	   its	   struggle	   for	   social	  
recognition.	  Specifically,	  the	  core	  cultural	  norm	  of	  Chinese	  facework	  is	   ‘to	  achieve	  and	  foster	  harmonious	   interdependence	  with	  your	  audiences’	   (Kim	  &	  Nam,	  1998,	  p.	  526).	  Ontologically,	  what	   is	   ultimately	   recognised	   ‘is	   not	   the	   identity	   of	   an	   individual	   but	   instead	   the	   position	   a	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person	  occupies	  in	  a	  particular	  relationship’	  (Ringmar,	  2015,	  pp.	  51-­‐‑52)	  
Regarding	  China’s	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship,	  two	  behavioural	  patterns	  of	  its	  face	  culture	  are	  proposed	  as	  below:	  	  
Ø   Behavioural	   pattern	   I:	   Chinese	   face	   culture	   encourages	   people	   to	   show	  superiority	  when	  seeking	  recognition.	  
Ø   Behavioural	  pattern	   II:	  When	  one	  perceives	  oneself	   at	   the	   same	  or	   at	   an	  inferior	  status	  in	  an	  interaction,	  one	  tends	  to	  present	  oneself	  as	  an	  acquaintance,	  as	  a	  weak	  and	  as	  a	  counterpart	  in	  order	  to	  seek	  recognition.	  	  
These	  arguments	  can	  be	  depicted	  as	  a	  flow	  chart	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  6.1.	  
	  
Figure	  6.1.	  Behavioural	  patterns	  of	  Chinese	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship.	  
	  
Regarding	  the	  behaviour	  patterns	  of	  face	  culture	  and	  role	  theory,	  the	  thesis	  puts	  forward	  two	  assumptions	  about	  China’s	  diplomatic	  behaviours	  in	  seeking	  international	  recognition:	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Ø   Behavioural	   pattern	   I:	   China	   tends	   to	   perform	   the	   role	   conception	   of	   a	  major	  power	  in	  order	  to	  seek	  international	  recognition.	  
Ø   Behavioural	  pattern	  II:	  When	  China	  perceives	  itself	  at	  the	  same	  or	  inferior	  status	  in	  an	  interaction,	  it	  tends	  to	  present	  itself	  as	  an	  acquaintance,	  weak	  and	  as	  a	  counterpart	  in	  order	  to	  seek	  international	  recognition.	  	  
Wolf	  (2014,	  p.	  470)	  contends,	  ‘often	  we	  [Westerners]	  have	  some	  broad	  ideas	  about	  foreigners’	  symbolic	   needs	   but	   are	   unaware	   of	   specific	   qualities	   or	   achievements	   they	  may	  want	   to	   see	  appreciated’.	   This	   research	   aims	   to	   detect	   the	   ‘specific	   qualities	   or	   achievements’	   that	   China	  pursues	  and	  shows	  in	  practice.	  Generally,	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5	  have	  fully	  confirmed	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  above	  hypotheses,	  and	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  face	  culture	  is	  an	  explicit	  behavioural	  rule	  guiding	  China’s	  struggle	  for	  international	  recognition.	  
	  
Benign	  major	  power	  
Face	   is	   a	   Chinese	   social	   ideology	   that	   legitimatises	   pre-­‐‑existing	   hierarchical	   rectitude.	   In	  Chinese	  society,	  in	  which	  Confucian	  hierarchy	  and	  decorum	  are	  still	  highly	  valued	  and	  strictly	  followed,	  people	  sincerely	  believe	  that	  social	  recognition,	  in	  many	  cases,	  is	  the	  pure	  obedience	  of	   social	   hierarchy	   and	   the	   acknowledgement	   of	   relational	   asymmetry.	   As	   a	   social	   rule,	  superiors	   are	   endowed	   with	   legitimacy	   to	   gain	   face	   from	   subordinates,	   and	   subordinates	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  their	  duty	  as	  well	  as	  virtue	  to	  actively	  give	  face	  to	  superiors.	  According	  to	  this	  Chinese	   logic,	   no	   matter	   what	   position	   (superior	   or	   inferior)	   a	   person	   occupies	   in	   an	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interaction,	   it	   is	   reasonable	   for	   him	   or	   her	   to	   highlight	   and	   even	   exaggerate	   his	   or	   her	  superiority.	  It	  is	  expected	  that	  through	  such	  behaviours,	  the	  asymmetry	  of	  the	  relationship	  can	  be	  confirmed,	  magnified	  or	  balanced,	  and	  then	  social	  recognition	  can	  be	  gained/saved.	  
It	   is	   evidenced	   that	   face	   culture	   has	   been	   institutionalised	   as	   constitutive	   and	   regulative	  elements	  of	  China’s	   role	   conception	  of	   a	   ‘benign	  major	  power’.	  According	   to	   the	  paradigm	  of	  face	   culture,	   seeking	   international	   recognition	   as	   a	  major	   power	   is	   an	   overriding	   diplomatic	  objective	  for	  the	  Chinese.	  In	  the	  Chinese	  mind,	  only	  when	  it	  is	  admitted	  and	  treated	  as	  a	  major	  power	   by	   other	   countries	   is	   China	   authentically	   accorded	   its	   due	   respect	   and	   sufficient	  ontological	  security.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  minimum	  international	  recognition	  aims	  at	  no	  loss	  in	  its	  perceived	  status	  as	  a	  major	  power,	  and	  the	  thin	  recognition	  it	  pursues	  is	  essentially	  a	  kind	  of	  equality	  among	  major	  powers	  instead	  of	  among	  all	  the	  international	  actors.	  
Following	   the	   relational	   thinking	   and	   hierarchical	   view	   embedded	   in	   face	   culture,	   China’s	  
conceptualisation	  as	  a	  major	  power	  is	  essentially	  a	  sense	  of	  centrality.	  For	  China,	  the	  ideal	  international	  recognition	  as	  a	  major	  power	  would	  not	  only	  be	  a	  confirmation	  of	  its	  power	  but	  more	  an	  automatic	  tendency	  of	  movement	  towards	  the	  symbolic	  centre	  of	  international	  society.	  A	   predilection	   to	   formalism	   is	   a	   key	   characteristic	   of	   China’s	   identity	   constructions	   and	   role	  performances.	   Coherently,	   China’s	   search	   for	   identification	   often	   ends	   with	   ostensible	  recognition	   or	   temporary	   praise,	   instead	   of	   sincere	   and	   consistent	   acknowledgement.	   It	   is	  acceptable	  for	  China	  that	  ‘there	  is	  a	  discrepancy	  between	  diplomacy	  rhetoric	  and	  diplomacy	  in	  its	  practical	  form	  of	  policies	  and	  actions’	  (Scott,	  2015,	  p.	  261).	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As	   revealed	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   Chinese	   face	   culture	   maintains	   the	   consciousness	   of	   moral	  boundaries,	  expresses	  the	  rule	  of	  renqing	  and	  puts	  forth	  a	  behavioural	  code	  for	  those	  who	  are	  superior.	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   recognition	   does	   involve	   some	   righteous	   and	   credible	  
aspects:	  First,	  the	  pursuit	  of	  superiority	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  not	  a	  battle	  for	  the	  zero-­‐‑sum	  resource	  of	  social	  status	  but	  more	  as	  cooperation	  for	  achieving	  harmony	  in	  relationships.	  The	  dynamics	  of	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   international	   recognition	   are	   positively	   reciprocal	   with	   all	   the	   actors	  engaged	   in	   a	   common	   orientation	   to	   raise	   and	   attend	   to	   each	   other’s	   face.	   Second,	   avoiding	  public	  confrontation	  among	  countries	  is	  a	  compelling	  principle	  for	  China	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  both	   its	   and	  other’s	   face.	   Third,	   closely	   related	   to	   the	   reciprocal	   principle,	   China	   seeks	   to	   be	  recognised	  as	  a	  major	  power	  worthy	  of	  enduring	  trust	  and	  cooperation.	  
The	   author	   particularly	   notes	   that	   under	   the	   influence	   of	   face	   culture,	  China	   is	   unlikely	   to	  
become	  an	  altruist	   or	  moral	  perfectionist.	   To	   begin	  with,	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   recognition	  still	   safeguards	   a	   strictly	   hierarchical	   and	   explicitly	   inegalitarian	  world.	   Second,	   beneath	   the	  veneer	  of	  harmony	  and	  politeness,	  China’s	  struggle	  for	  the	  status	  of	  major	  power	  is	  displayed	  and	   conducted	   in	   a	   distinctly	   transactional	   way.	   Many	   behaviours	   eventually	   become	   the	  exchange	   of	   interests.	   Besides,	   the	   avoidance	   of	   public	   criticism	   and	   conflict	   deafens	   the	  Chinese	  government	  and	  public	  to	  what	  others	  really	  perceive	  and	  think	  about	  them.	  
China’s	   role	   performance	   as	   a	   benign	   major	   power	   can	   be	   observed	   saliently	   in	   many	  diplomatic	   activities	   involving	   a	   show	   of	   its	   hospitality	   and	   generosity	   e.g.	   large-­‐‑scale	  international	   gatherings,	   diplomatic	   visits,	   diplomatic	   discourse,	   economic	   diplomacy	   and	  external	   assistance	   and	   its	   response	   to	   foreign	   criticism	   or	   crises.	   China	   tends	   to	   highlight	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achievements	  and	  cooperation	  regardless	  of	  the	  cost	  and	  to	  solve	  conflicts	  or	  react	  to	  criticism	  in	   a	   tacit	   manner.	   Compared	   with	   many	   other	   countries,	   China	   focuses	   much	   more	   on	   the	  symbols	   rather	   than	   the	   substance	   of	   diplomacy.	   Most	   of	   the	   time,	   China	   is	   fond	   of	   using	  economical	  means	  and	  financial	  assets	  to	  purchase	  recognition.	  
	  
A	  multifaceted	  China.	  
The	   core	   value	   of	   this	   research	   is	   the	   finding	   that	   China’s	   hybrid	   identities	   are	   partly	  endogenous,	   and	   face	   culture	   is	   an	   enduring	   dynamic	   of	   creating	   multiple	   and	   ambivalent	  national	  identities.	  
In	   Chinese	   facework,	  when	   one	   is	   at	   the	   same	   or	   at	   an	   inferior	   status	   compared	  with	   one’s	  audience,	  one	  has	  the	  tendency	  to	  display	  one’s	  qualities	  in	  order	  to	  construct/reconstruct	  the	  relationship	   so	   as	   to	   gain	   social	   recognition.	   The	   author	   further	   suggests	   that	   that	   there	   are	  three	   relational	   identities	   embedded	   in	   this	   behavioural	   pattern:	   the	   acquaintance,	   the	  weak	  and	  the	  counterpart.	  Chinese	  people	  believe	  that	  social	  images	  and	  behaviours	  rooted	  in	  these	  three	  identities	  can	  effectively	  close	  the	  gap	  between	  themselves	  and	  others	  who	  are	  superior	  to	  them,	  cultivate	  good	  relationships	  and,	  finally,	  bring	  about	  the	  expected	  gain	  of	  face.	  
This	   research	   illustrates	   that	   Chinese	   decision-­‐‑makers,	   scholars	   and	   the	   public	   commonly	  regard	  the	  EU	  as	  an	  undoubted	  major	  power,	  which	  has	  a	  higher	  or	  equal	  international	  status	  compared	  with	  China.	  Additionally,	  facts	  have	  proved	  that	  China	  always	  has	  extensive	  demands	  and	   continuously	   strives	   to	   seek	   recognition	   from	   the	   EU,	   because	   of	   which	   this	   study	   has	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sufficient	  empirical	  proof.	  	  
This	   empirical	   study	   has	   demonstrated	   that	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   the	   EU’s	   recognition	   is	  
guided	   by	   face	   culture,	   which	   has	   manifested	   as	   three	   complementary	   role	  
conceptions—the	   partner,	   the	   weak	   and	   the	   counterpart.	   This	   conclusion	   is	   proven	  through	   comparisons	   between	   China’s	   official	   discourse	   addressed	   to	   the	   EU	   versus	   those	  addressed	  to	  the	  ASEAN	  and	  AU.	  It	  has	  also	  been	  proven	  by	  a	  spectrum	  of	  discursive	  strategies,	  which	  are	  marked	  by	  culturally	  particular	  and	  peculiar	  ways	  of	  presenting	  itself	  as	  a	  partner,	  a	  developing	  country,	  a	  historical	  victim	  and	  a	  counterpart,	  like	  the	  EU.	  Obviously,	  China’s	  goal	  is	  not	   limited	   to	   being	   recognised	   as	   fulfilling	   these	   roles	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   EU.	   All	   of	   these	  constructed	   roles	   are	   aimed	   at	   attaining	   overall	   recognition	   for	   the	   nature	   of	   their	  relationship—to	   be	   recognised	   as	   a	   capable	   and	   favourable	   actor	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	  
Europeans.	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   the	   EU’s	   recognition	   also	   includes	   many	   realistic	  considerations	  or	  expectations.	  Regime	  security,	  economic	  interests	  and	  strategic	  coordination	  are	  the	  most	  pressing	  objectives	  behind	  China’s	  search	  for	  recognition	  from	  the	  EU.	  
This	   struggle	   for	   the	   EU’s	   acknowledgement	   also	   reveals	   a	   kind	   of	   relational	   ontology.	   It	   is	  revealed	   that	  China,	  according	   to	   its	  cultural	   logic,	   tries	   to	   locate	   itself	  and	   the	  EU	   in	  various	  constructed	  relationships	  and	  shifts	  the	  EU’s	  attention	  away	  from	  China’s	  individual	  properties	  to	  the	  established	  or	  the	  potential	  nature	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐‑EU	  relationship.	  Specifically,	  when	  China	  presents	   itself	  as	  a	  partner	  of	   the	  EU,	   the	  EU	  is	  also	   formulated	  as	  a	  partner	  of	  China,	  who	  is	  suggested	  to	  continue	  prioritising	  the	  maintenance	  and	  development	  of	  the	  relationship.	  When	  China	  prioritises	  its	  role	  as	  a	  developing	  country	  and	  historical	  victim,	  it	  implies	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  a	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group	   of	   developed	   countries	   and	   past	   aggressors	   who	   are	   responsible	   for	   granting	   China	  support	  and	  acknowledgement.	  When	  China	  enumerates	  its	  similarities	  with	  the	  EU,	  it	  actually	  characterises	  both	  China	  and	   the	  EU	  as	  actors	   sharing	  common	   features	   from	   the	  actor-­‐‑level	  and	  system-­‐‑level	  perspectives.	   In	  this	  case,	  China	  and	  the	  EU	  are	  positioned	   in	  wider	  but	  not	  necessarily	   homogeneous	   collectives.	   What	   Beijing	   wants	   to	   achieve	   is	   to	   shape	   the	   EU’s	  recognition	  of	  various	  collectives	  and	  then	  attain	  recognition	  towards	  itself.	  All	  of	  this	  entirely	  confirms	  Womack’s	   viewpoint	   (2008,	   p.	   265)	   about	   China’s	   diplomacy	   i.e.	   ‘from	   the	   Chinese	  perspective,	   international	   relations	   are	   not	   an	   area	   for	   the	   application	   of	   abstract	   norms	   to	  cases,	  but	  rather	  a	  set	  of	  particular	  international	  relationships,	  with	  concrete	  obligations	  within	  the	  context	  of	  each	  relationship’.	  
In	   order	   to	   substantiate	   the	   content	   of	   the	   relationship,	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   the	   EU’s	  recognition	   mainly	   manifests	   in	   two	   behaviours.	   The	   first	   behaviour	   is	   neutralising	   the	  
differences	  between	  the	  two	  parties.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  at	   least	  in	  terms	  of	  discourse,	  China	  tries	   to	   escape	   the	   oppositional	   differentiation	   constructed	   by	   the	   EU	   and	   to	   neutralise	   any	  differences—especially	  conceptual	  differences—between	  the	  two	  sides	  and	  present	  them	  as	  a	  normal	   phenomenon	   arising	   from	   the	   process	   of	   bilateral	   interactions.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  China	  has	  an	  inclination	  to	  depersonalise	  itself	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  ordinary	  international	  actor	  in	  the	  Western	  sense,	  and	  then	  to	  obscure	  its	  uniqueness	  and	  differences	  compared	  with	  the	  EU.	  The	   other	   behaviour	   is	   introducing	   its	   self-­‐‑righteous	   moral	   norms	   in	   relational	  
management.	  The	  rule	  of	  renqing,	  which	  emphasises	  empathy	  and	  reciprocity,	   is	   the	  guiding	  principle	   that	   China	   continuously	   proclaims	   and	   references.	   It	   is	   not	   about	   the	   utilisation	   of	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abstract	  or	  universal	  norms	  to	  cases,	  but	  about	  espousing	  a	  set	  of	  moral	  rules	  defined	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  particular	  relationship.	  
As	  a	  whole,	  by	  being	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  China’s	  worldview,	  face	  culture	  provides	  behavioural	  models	   for	   studying	   how	   cultural	   factors	   contribute	   to	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   international	  recognition.	  The	  core	  argument	   is	   that,	   for	  the	  Chinese,	   international	  recognition	  is	   integrally	  related	  to	  the	  understanding	  and	  construction	  of	  a	  relationship.	  	  
	  
6.2	  China’s	  Subjectivity:	  Being	  Outwardly	  Flexible	  but	  Inwardly	  Determinate	  	  
This	  research	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  a	  fundamental	  question	  regarding	  China’s	  diplomacy	  i.e.	  how	  does	  China	  regard	  itself	  and	  engage	  with	  others?	  One	  dominant	  academic	  view	  of	  this	  question	  is	   that	  China	   lacks	  sufficient	  subjectivity	  and	  seems	   to	  be	  a	   ‘fledging	  normative	  power’	  when	  defining	  and	  expressing	  itself	  (Kavalski,	  2013,	  p.	  253).	  
The	   theoretical	   understanding	   of	   state	   subjectivity	   is	   mainly	   drawn	   from	   the	   social	   and	  theoretical	  tradition	  of	  individuals,	  according	  to	  which	  subjectivity	  is	  ‘a	  function	  of	  narratives,	  of	  stories	  that	  constitute	  our	  diverse	  experiences	  as	  those	  of	  a	  coherent	  Self’	  (Ringmar,	  1996,	  p.	  450).	   According	   to	   Wendt,	   states	   are	   also	   made	   up	   of	   ‘us’	   narratives	   as	   opposed	   to	   ‘them’	  narratives,	  which	  can	  constitute	  collective	  consciousness	  and	  memories	  (Wendt,	  2004,	  p.	  313).	  	  
Subjectivity,	   in	   the	  eyes	  of	  many	  scholars,	   is	  a	   rare	  commodity	   for	   today’s	  China.	  Shambaugh	  (2013,	  p.	  316)	  maintains	  that	   ‘China	  is	  a	  confused	  and	  conflicted	  rising	  power	  undergoing	  an	  identity	   crisis	   of	   significant	   proportions’.	   Geeraerts	   (2013,	   p.	   61)	   argues	   that	   China	   ‘is	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constantly	  involved	  in	  a	  tug-­‐‑of-­‐‑war	  between	  its	  weak	  power	  identity	  [developing	  country]	  and	  strong	  power	  identity	  [great	  power]’.	  Scholars	  often	  attribute	  a	  ‘lack	  of	  subjectivity’	  to	  identity	  disorder	   or	   incomplete	   identity	   construction.	   Ren	   Jiantao	   (2016,	   p.	   2)	   believes	   that	   ‘China’s	  identification	  as	  an	  international	  identity	  suffers	  from	  a	  persistent	  disorder,	  oscillating	  between	  self-­‐‑conceit	   and	   self-­‐‑abasement’.	  Qin	  Yaqing	   (2011,	   p.	   137)	   claims	   that	   China	  has	   an	   identity	  crisis	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  its	  diplomacy	  and,	  on	  many	  occasions,	  it	  cannot	  clarify	  its	  national	  role	  and	  position.	  	  
However,	   from	   a	   theoretical	   perspective,	   the	   author	   contends	   that	   a	   state’s	   struggle	   for	  international	   recognition	   originates	   mainly	   because	   the	   state	   is	   quite	   certain	   about	   what	   it	  wants	  to	  be	  and	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  can	  justify	  being	  treated	  with	  more	  consideration	  (Wolf,	  2011,	   p.	   109).	   As	   Williams	   (1997,	   p.	   349)	   argues,	   ‘when	   states	   enter	   into	   the	   process	   of	  recognition,	  what	  they	  seek	  is	  recognition	  of	  their	  independence	  as	  an	  end	  in	  itself ’.	  In	  addition,	  many	  observers	  are	  ‘standing	  in	  the	  shoes	  of	  others,	  looking	  at	  China’	  (Kavalski,	  2013,	  p.	  257),	  ignoring	   the	   changing	  and	   fluid	  nature	  of	  Chinese	  behaviour.	  Unsurprisingly,	   they	  draw	   their	  conclusions	   ‘without	   much	   appreciation	   of	   the	   deeper	   identity-­‐‑structural	   disposition	   of	   the	  “Chinese”	  self ’	  (Forsby,	  2011,	  p.	  8).	  	  
Face	   culture	  provides	  us	  with	   insights	   into	  China’s	   subjectivity	   in	   international	   relations	  and	  also	  problematises	  the	  previous	  arguments	  of	  scholars.	  One	  central	  argument	  of	  this	  research	  is	   that	   China	   has	   an	   unyielding	   sense	   of	   subjectivity	   in	   its	   diplomacy.	   In	   the	   process	   of	  seeking	   international	   recognition,	   China	   is	   very	   clear	   about	  what	   it	  wants	   to	   be	   and	  what	   it	  must	  defend,	  and	   it	  can	  represent	  different	  and	  even	  self-­‐‑contradictory	   identities	   to	  different	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nations,	   often	   at	   the	   same	   time.	   ‘Being	   flexible	   on	   the	   outside	   but	   determinate	   inside’	   is	   a	  classical	  Confucian	  creed,	  which	  is	  also	  appropriate	  to	  describe	  China’s	  subjectivity.	  In	  terms	  of	  China’s	   diplomatic	   language,	   which	   is	   often	   mentioned,	   China	   sticks	   to	   ‘the	   combination	   of	  consistency	  in	  principle	  and	  flexibility	  in	  tactic’	  [Chinese:	  将原则的坚定性与策略的灵活性相结
合].	  
According	   to	   the	   research	   findings,	   China’s	   role	   conceptions	   and	   performances	   are	   indeed	  relationship-­‐‑centred	   and	   ‘the	   other’	   based;	   nevertheless,	   at	   a	   deeper	   level,	   they	   are	   still	  subject/self-­‐‑centric	  and	  oriented	  towards	  perceived	  values.	  Kavalski	  (2013,	  p.	  258)	  argues	  that	  ‘it	  is	  a	  routinized	  practice	  that	  international	  actors	  attempt	  to	  take	  control	  over	  the	  process	  of	  meaning-­‐‑creation	   by	   anchoring	   their	   identity	   to	   explicit	  material	   practices’.	   Such	   a	   situation	  also	  exists	  in	  the	  China-­‐‑EU	  interactions:	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  EU	  brands	  itself	  as	  a	  normative	  power,	  promoting	  the	  diffusion	  of	  a	  set	  of	  norms	  relating	  to	  democracy,	  human	  rights,	  market	  economy	  and	   so	  on	   in	   its	   relations	  with	  China.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   despite	   avoiding	   an	  open	  ideological	  competition	  or	  confrontation,	  China	  still	  persists	  in	  using	  its	  own	  cultural	  instincts	  to	   establish	   manifold	   standards	   about	   what	   is	   considered	   ‘normal’108 	  in	   international	  community,	   and	   to	   ‘silently’	   countervail	   part	   of	   the	   EU’s	   socialising	   influences	   by	   obscuring	  differences	   or	   by	   introducing	   its	   own	   favoured	   moral	   norms.	   Many	   aspects	   of	   China’s	   role	  performances	   are	   indeed	   intended	   ‘to	   deconstruct	   Western	   knowledge	   of	   China	   and	   at	   the	  same	   time	   to	   explore	   various	   possibilities	   to	   reconstruct	   China’s	   own	   cultural	   identity	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  This	   is	   inspired	  by	  Manner’s	  arguments	  (2002,	  p.	  239;	  2008,	  p.	  65)	   i.e.	   the	  core	  of	  a	  normative	  power	   lies	   in	   its	  ability	  to	  shape	  conceptions	  of	  what	  is	  normal	  in	  international	  relations.	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national	  subjectivity’	  (Guo,	  1999,	  p.	  214).	  	  
There	  are	  many	  platitudes	  about	  how	  China	  has	  paid	   little	  heed	  to	  European	  values	  and	  how	  Beijing	   regularly	   contravenes	   or	   even	   undermines	   them	   (Fox	   &	   Godement,	   2009,	   p.	   16).	  Nevertheless,	  from	  China’s	  perspective,	  the	  EU	  model	  still	  ‘has	  a	  lot	  of	  value	  for	  China	  in	  order	  to	   get	   its	   people	   rich	   after	   getting	   its	   nation	   strong’,	   and	   is	   still	   ‘an	   important	   source	   of	  inspiration	   for	   China	   regarding	   its	   peaceful	   rise	   and	   the	   building	   of	   a	   harmonious	   world’	  (Wang,	  2011,	  p.	  43).	  According	   to	   the	   research	  results,	   a	  more	  accurate	  argument	   is	   that	   the	  resilient	   China	   always	   pays	   a	   lot	   of	   heed	   to	   European	   values	   for	   seeking	   recognition,	   and	  meanwhile,	   Beijing	   artfully	   and	   implicitly	   contravenes	   or	   even	   undermines	   some	   of	   them.	  Nowadays,	   it	   is	  not	  China	   that	   faces	   the	   identity	  dilemma	  but	   the	  EU,	  whose	   commitment	   to	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  very	  often	  has	  to	  make	  room	  for	  giving	  face	  to	  one	  of	  its	  ‘strategic	  partners’	  like	  China	  or	  Russia.	  As	  noted	  by	  Renard	  and	  Biscop	  (2010,	  p.	  1),	  ‘seemingly	  evident,	  it	   is	   actually	   not	   that	   clear	  which	   values	   and	   interests	   the	  EU	   seeks	   to	   safeguard,	   and	  which	  kind	  of	  international	  actor	  it	  wants	  to	  be’.	  	  
Such	  subjectivity	  is	  also	  helpful	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  China’s	  multifaceted	  nature.	  An	  analysis	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  face	  culture	  helps	  bring	  to	  light	  insights	  that	  may	  be	  less	  visible	  when	  viewed	  from	   other	   analytical	   perspectives	   i.e.	   how	   China	   consciously	   constructs	   its	   competing	   or	  contested	  roles	  and	   images	   in	   the	  sphere	  of	   international	   relations.	   In	  order	   to	  gain	   face,	   the	  Chinese	  commonly	  find	  it	  reasonable	  to	  maintain	  many	  different	  social	  selves	  and	  present	  the	  appropriate	  one	  according	  to	  the	  relational	  context.	  By	  this	  logic,	  the	  juxtapositions	  of	  China’s	  diversified	  and	  even	  paradoxical	  national	  roles	  are	  also	  viewed	  as	  a	  normal	  phenomenon	  by	  the	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Chinese.	  As	  seen	  in	  this	  study,	  China	  intentionally	  takes	  on	  different	  roles	  in	  front	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  its	   perceived	   inferiors,	   the	   ASEAN	   and	  AU.	   Even	  with	   the	   EU,	   China	   is	   able	   to	   inhabit	   a	   role	  somewhere	   between	   a	   confident	   major	   power	   and	   a	   modest	   weak	   state.	   Such	   behavioural	  trends,	   in	   most	   cases,	   have	   been	   proven	   to	   be	   not	   a	   result	   of	   identity	   disorder	   but	   a	  consequence	  of	  conscious	  manipulation	  led	  by	  clear	  subjectivity.	  
To	   sum	   up,	   China	   maintains	   paradoxical	   identities	   and	   remains	   ambivalent	   about	   its	  
relations	   with	   the	   world,	   which	   is	   a	   reflection	   of	   subjectivity.	   Face	   culture	   not	   only	  provides	   rhetorical	   devices	   or	  discourse	   frameworks	   to	   sugar-­‐‑coat	  China	  but	   also	   serves	   the	  profoundly	  intellectual	  purpose	  to	  construct	  the	  content	  and	  orientation	  of	  its	  existence.	  	  
	  
6.3	  Intricate	  Dilemmas	  for	  China	  
Former	  Chinese	  Vice	  Foreign	  Minister	  Fu	  Yin	  (2008)	  once	  said,	  ‘the	  wall	  that	  stands	  in	  China’s	  way	   to	   the	   world	   is	   so	   thick’.	   In	   recent	   years,	   the	   Chinese	   government	   has	   invested	   huge	  resources	  into	  multidimensional	  and	  multinational	  efforts	  to	  boost	  the	  country’s	  international	  recognition.	  Yet,	  to	  date,	  these	  efforts	  have	  had	  little	  payoff	  (Shambaugh,	  2013,	  p.	  310).109	  Even	  much	  of	  the	  recognition	  China	  has	  gained	  is	  unstable	  and	  falsehearted.	  An	  ironic	  fact	  is	  that	  ‘the	  strong	  desire	  for	  international	  affirmation	  often	  leads	  China’s	  elites	  to	  present	  a	  very	  bad	  face	  to	  the	  world’	  (Gries,	  1999,	  pp.	  68-­‐‑69).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  Chinese	   scholars	   basically	   refuse	   to	   admit	   this	   dilemma.	   Many	   of	   them	   argue	   that	   China	   just	   lacks	   effective	   means	   of	  communication	  or	   the	  power	  of	   international	  discourse,	  and	  Westerners	  will	  give	  China	   the	  recognition	   it	  desires	  as	   long	  as	  China	  uses	  the	  ‘correct’	  language	  or	  enters	  into	  a	  ‘shared’	  discourse	  space.	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In	  Chapter	  3,	  the	  author	  divides	  facework	  into	  two	  categories—self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  others	  and	  self-­‐‑presentation	   to	   relationship.	  The	   former	   involves	  seeking	   recognition	  by	  meeting	  others’	  expectations,	   while	   the	   latter	   involves	   seeking	   recognition	   by	   creating	   and	   manipulating	   an	  existing	  relationship.	  Applying	  this	  to	  China’s	  practices,	  we	  can	  ascertain	  that	  China	  confronts	  three	  intricate	  dilemmas	  when	  seeking	  international	  recognition	  from	  Western	  powers:	  
The	   first	   dilemma	   is	   that	   due	   to	   huge	   differences	   in	   political	   regimes	   and	   the	   intractable	  conflict	  of	  values	  between	  China	  and	  the	  West,	  the	  PRC	  is	  by	  no	  means	  at	  a	  point	  where	  it	  
can	   meet	   European	   and	   American	   expectations	   (Geeraerts,	   2013,	   p.	   64).	   In	   more	   blunt	  terms,	   as	   long	   as	   the	  CCP	  maintains	   its	   rule	   in	   China,	   it	  will	   be	   impossible	   for	   China	   to	   gain	  complete	  international	  recognition	  from	  the	  Western	  powers—both	  sides	  are	  very	  clear	  about	  this.	   In	   some	   situations,	   China	  has	  been	  numb	   to	   the	   endless	   stream	  of	  Western	   criticism	  or	  complaints,	  as	  it	  knows	  that	  nothing	  it	  does	  will	  change	  this	  legitimacy	  deficit.	  
This	   dilemma	   further	   results	   in	   a	   potentially	   aggressive	   China.	   The	   Chinese	   word	   ‘撕破脸’	  [English:	  cast	  aside	  all	  considerations	  of	  face]	   is	  used	  to	  describe	  an	  emotional	  reaction	  to	  an	  extremely	   hostile	   situation	   in	   social	   life.	   When	   Chinese	   people	   have	   to	  撕破脸	   and	   feel	   no	  necessity	   of	   preserving	   their	   face,	   they	   will	   forget	   even	   basic	   politeness	   in	   a	   flash,	   allow	  themselves	   to	   act	   like	   a	   shrew	   and	  make	   no	   effort	   to	   conceal	   their	   fierce	   and	   arrogant	   side	  (Chen,	  2004,	  p.	  221).	  Sinologist	  Holcombe	  (2001(1895),	  p.	  190)	  exposed	  China’s	  true	  colours	  in	  his	  book	  Real	  Chinaman.	  
This	  habit	  of	  repression	  and	  the	  misrepresentation	  of	  feelings	  has	  given	  the	  outside	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world	  the	  idea	  that,	  as	  a	  nation,	  the	  Chinese	  are	  stolid,	  indifferent	  and	  lack	  nerves.	  Such	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  The	  Chinese	  are	  in	  fact	  keenly	  sensitive,	  proud	  and	  passionate.	  As	  might	   be	   expected,	   when	   provoked	   beyond	   endurance,	   they	   give	   free	   rein	   to	  their	   feelings,	  and	  the	  result,	  be	   it	  grief	  or	  anger,	   is	  as	  extreme	  and	  unreasonable,	  from	   our	   (Westerners’)	   standpoint,	   as	   their	   ordinary	   suppression	   of	   emotion	   is	  absurd	  and	  unnecessary.	  
In	  much	  the	  same	  way,	  when	  China	  feels	  there	  is	  no	  hope	  of	  gaining	  recognition,	  it	  will	  perform	  more	   aggressively	   than	   foreigners	   can	   imagine.	   There	   is	   a	   compelling	   need	   to	  wipe	   out	   and	  reverse	   the	   consequence	  of	   losing	   face,	   and	   the	  Chinese	   tend	   to	   swing	  abruptly	  between	   the	  two	   extremes	   of	   ‘disciplined	   order	   and	   explosive	   outbursts’	   (Lee,	   2013,	   p.	   520).	   China’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  2010	  Nobel	  Peace	  Prize	  is	  a	  very	  typical	  case.	  Awarding	  this	  world-­‐‑class	  prize	  to	  Liu	  Xiaobo,	  a	  human	  rights	  activist	  as	  well	  as	  criminal	  serving	  a	  sentence	  in	  a	  Chinese	  prison,	  was	  expectedly	   regarded	  by	  Beijing	  as	  an	  open	  and	   intentional	   insult	   to	  China’s	  political	  and	  legal	  system.	  As	  reported	  by	  The	  Telegraph,	  ‘China	  responded	  like	  a	  scolded	  child,	  determined	  to	   spoil	   the	   party,	   doing	   everything	   in	   its	   power	   to	   undermine	   the	   Nobel	   ceremony’	   (Peter,	  2010).	  In	  Swaine’s	  words	  (2010,	  p.	  1),	  China	  is	  finally	  ‘revealing	  its	  true	  colors’.	  
One	   can	   feel	   confused	   about	   such	   contradictory	   behaviour—‘if	   China	   does	   care	   about	   its	  international	   image,	  why	  would	  it	  behave	  in	  a	  way	  that	  hurts	   its	  own	  national	   image?’	  (Chen,	  2014).	  This	   research	  hopes	   to	  provide	  a	  plausible	  explanation:	   face	  culture	  represses	  China’s	  aggressive	   side	   and	   also	   easily	   triggers	   its	   truculent	   side.	   It	   is	   not	   that	   China	   is	   an	   actor	  ‘basically	  lowest	  and	  provocative	  possible	  and	  defensive	  in	  nature’	  (Zhang,	  2010,	  p.	  281).	  What	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this	  research	  repeatedly	  demonstrates	  is	  that,	  as	  argued	  by	  Sole-­‐‑Farra	  (2016,	  p.	  12),	  ‘absolute	  distinctions	   such	   as	   those	   indicated	   by	   the	   “either-­‐‑or”	   point	   of	   view	   do	   not	   meet	   with	   the	  approval	  of	  the	  Chinese	  mind;	  accordingly,	  the	  Chinese	  can	  be	  at	  one	  and	  the	  same	  time	  both	  extremely	  idealistic	  and	  extremely	  realistic.’	  
The	   other	   dilemma	   is	   that	   China’s	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	   relationship,	   intended	   to	   gain	  
international	   recognition,	   can	   easily	   lead	   to	   even	   more	   misunderstandings	   and	  
bewilderment,	   eliciting	   quite	   the	   opposite	   effect.	   The	   cultural	   analysis	   presented	   in	   this	  paper	   shows	   that	   self-­‐‑presentation	   to	   others	   is	   conditioned	   by	   external	   inter-­‐‑subjective	  expectations,	  but	  self-­‐‑presentation	  to	  relationship	  is	  more	  internally	  conditioned	  and	  governed.	  Under	   the	   influence	   of	   face	   culture,	   China’s	   struggle	   for	   international	   recognition	   reflects	   a	  dominance	  of	  ego	  expectation	  and	  self-­‐‑righteous	  moral	  appeal,	  while	  any	  different	  expectations	  from	   the	   West	   become	   subordinated.	   This	   leads	   to	   one	   of	   the	   most	   common	   mistakes	   in	  intercultural	   communication	   i.e.	   ‘others	   want	   the	   kind	   of	   things	   that	   are	   treasured	   in	   our	  society’	  (Kopra,	  2012,	  p.	  52).	  	  
China	   wishes	   to	   be	   recognised	   as	   a	   ‘benign	  major	   power’;	   however,	   most	   foreign	   audiences	  cannot	  see	  its	  benignity	  and	  remain	  vigilant	  regarding	  its	  hubris	  and	  unforeseeable	  influence.	  On	  many	  occasions,	  here	  is	  simply	  a	  lack	  of	  basic	  trust	  between	  China	  and	  others.	   ‘The	  larger	  and	  more	  powerful	  China	  appears	  to	  be,	  the	  harder	  it	  is	  to	  develop	  and	  maintain	  strategic	  trust’	  (Cook,	   2015,	   p.	   130).	   Worse	   still,	   ‘the	   “ethical	   argument”110	  frequently	   cited	   by	   the	   Chinese	  state	  to	  justify	  its	  entitlement	  to	  legitimate	  power	  status	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  does	  not	  effectively	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  The	  ‘ethical	  argument’	  here	  refers	  to	  many	  arguments	  about	  China’s	  national	  particularity.	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persuade	  the	  international	  audience,	  especially	  Western	  powers’	  (Liao,	  2013,	  p.	  552).	  
Many	   experts	   claim	   that	   since	   2008,	   Beijing	   has	   manifested	   an	   explicitly	   assertive	   attitude	  towards	   the	   outside	   world.	   One	   argument	   even	   claims	   that	   in	   2009	   and	   2010,	   China’s	  assertiveness	  resulted	  in	  it	  losing	  many	  benefits	  it	  had	  gained	  from	  two	  decades	  of	  friendship	  diplomacy	  (Overholt,	  2012,	  p.	  129).	  When	  China	  shows	  off	  its	  power,	  generosity	  and	  hospitality,	  it	   is	  usually	   followed	  by	  doubt	  and	  suspicion	   instead	  of	   the	  recognition	  and	  praise	   it	  expects.	  Does	  China	  then	  become	  even	  more	  aggressive?	  Does	  it	  begin	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  international	  order	  as	  per	   its	  own	  desires?	  Does	  China	  begin	   to	   incessantly	   challenge	   the	  powers	   that	  be?	  Does	   it	   persist	   in	   following	   its	   own	   way	   no	  matter	   what	   others	   say?	   In	   recent	   years,	   these	  questions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  China’s	  diplomacy	  have	  become	  focal	  points	  in	  the	  Western	  media	  and	  the	  international	  political	  community.	  Both	  Americans	  and	  Europeans	  have	  a	  shared	  worry	  that	  is	  difficult	  to	  eliminate—the	  worry	  is	  the	  suddenness	  with	  which	  the	  entire	  perspective	  of	  the	  political	  world	  will	  be	  or	  has	  been	  changed	  by	  China	  (Lindemann,	  2013,	  p.	  131).	  
In	  addition,	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  China’s	  discourse	  often	  further	  obfuscates	  what	  foreigners	  know	  about	  the	   ‘real’	  China.	  What	  China	  pursues	  is	  this:	   ‘It	  could	  either	  painstakingly	  yield	  without	  clearly	  yielding	  or	  confront	  without	  clearly	  confronting’	  (Shih	  &	  Yin,	  2013,	  p.	  74),	   in	  order	  to	  preserve	  face	  on	  all	  sides	  and	  still	  maintain	  its	  freedom	  to	  manoeuvre.	  However,	  things	  often	  go	  athwart,	  and	  Chinese	  wisdom	  cannot	  be	  appreciated	  by	  Westerners	  on	  every	  such	  occasion.	  
In	  both	  its	  role	  presentations,	  many	  facts	  and	  values	  China	  claims	  are	   in	   fact	  devoid	  of	  
empirical	  context	  and	  concrete	  behaviours.	  ‘Chinese	  politics	  often	  dictates	  that	  “surface	  and	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reality	  differ”’	  (Gries,	  2004,	  p.	  9).	  For	  the	  Chinese,	  social	  recognition	  never	  has	  to	  do	  with	  facts	  but	   form.	   This	   research	   also	   shows	   that	   China	   easily	   turns	   its	   struggle	   for	   international	  recognition	  into	  a	  remarkably	  theatrical	  process	  or	  a	  meticulous	  construction	  of	  formalism.	  As	  a	   result,	   the	   image	   and	   the	   behaviour	   can	   be	   de-­‐‑coupled	   and	   have	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   one	  another.	   There	   is	   very	   often	   a	   huge	   gap	  between	  China’s	   claimed	   identity	   and	   its	   diplomatic	  behaviour.	  For	  China,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  serious	  problem.	  Chan	  (1999,	  p.	  59)	  summarises	  this	  well:	  
If	  China	  is	  blamed	  for	  inconsistencies	  in	  its	  behavior	  because	  its	  tactics	  contradict	  its	  principles,	   the	  Chinese	  would	  brush	  aside	   these	  criticisms	  without	   feeling	  any	  sense	  of	   guilt.	  Rather,	   they	   regard	   such	  practices	   as	   an	  acceptable	   and	   legitimate	  way	  of	  tackling	  problems.	  
However,	  such	  inconsistency	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  outsiders	  is	  hypocritical.	  Consequently,	  much	  of	  the	  international	  recognition	  China	  has	  gained	  is	  still	  tentative	  and	  indeterminate.111	  The	  Western	  powers	  sometimes	  offer	  China	  their	  possibly	  real	  or	  possibly	  falsehearted	  recognition,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  are	  always	  willing	  to	  hide	  their	  true	  feelings	  or	  act	  according	  to	  China’s	  script.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  From	  China’s	  perspective,	  this	  kind	  of	  recognition	  is	  also	  acceptable,	  because	  ‘others’	  recognition	  always	  brings	  us	  [Chinese]	  pleasure,	  even	  hypocritical	  recognition;	  nevertheless,	  others’	  derecognition	  always	  annoys	  us,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  sincere	  or	  authentic’	  (Tang	  &	  Qi,	  2008,	  p.	  65).	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6.4	  Not	  Easy	  to	  Say	  Goodbye	  to	  Face	  Diplomacy	  
Chapter	  4	  has	  noted	  that	  one	  prevailing	  view	  in	  Chinese	  society	  is	  that	  it	  is	  time	  to	  say	  goodbye	  to	   face	  diplomacy.	  China’s	  official	  media	  does	  preach	   that	  China	   today	   focuses	  on	   its	  national	  interests	   and	   its	   people’s	   well-­‐‑being	   rather	   than	   the	   country’s	   or	   its	   senior	   leaders’	   face.	  However,	  the	  reality	  is	  that	  face	  culture	  still	  persists	  in	  China’s	  diplomatic	  practices,	  and	  many	  of	   its	   endeavours	   pertaining	   to	   the	   struggle	   for	   international	   recognition	   are	   still	   imprinted	  with	  the	  characteristics	  of	  face	  culture.	  	  
Generally,	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  for	  China	  to	  say	  goodbye	  to	  face	  diplomacy.	  The	  fundamental	  reason	  for	  this	   is	   that	   face	   culture	   as	   a	   universal	   tenet	   in	   Chinese	   society	   is	   a	   dominant	   factor	   that	  profoundly	   influences	  Chinese	  behaviour	  and	  characteristics.	   ‘Six	  decades	  of	  Communist	   rule	  has	  not	  changed	  the	  Chinese	  soul,	  which	  developed	  over	  thousands	  of	  years’	  (Mahbubani,	  2008,	  p.	  149).	  At	  least	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  future,	  we	  cannot	  see	  this	  culture	  irreversibly	  weakening	  or	  perishing.	  
From	   a	   more	   realistic	   perspective,	   another	   major	   reason	   is	   that	   face	   culture	   is	   a	   national	  treasure	  for	  Chinese	  authorities	  on	  which	  they	  build	  national	  sentiment	  and	  solidarity.	  Chapter	  3	  has	  clearly	  illustrated	  that	  ‘Chinese	  people	  are	  concerned	  not	  only	  about	  enhancing	  or	  losing	  face	  of	  one’s	  “small	  self”,	  but	  also	  about	  enhancing	  or	  losing	  face	  of	  one’s	  “big	  self”	  arising	  from	  significant	  moral	  or	  social	  episodes’	  (Hwang	  &	  Han,	  2012,	  p.	  479).	  Today’s	  Chinese	  rulers	  take	  advantage	   of	   face	   culture	   to	   manipulate	   public	   ideas	   and	   behaviours	   in	   the	   context	   of	  international	   politics.	   Anything	   that	   goes	   against	   the	   Chinese	   government	   or	   leaders	   can	   be	  
	   334	  
portrayed	  as	  a	   loss	  of	  face	  for	  the	  whole	  country;	  any	  endeavour	  to	  present	  China	  as	  an	  ideal	  country	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   the	   unshakable	   obligation	   of	   every	   citizen.	   Even	   if	   a	   Chinese	  citizen	  wants	  to	  criticise	  his	  or	  her	  government	  publicly	  or	  in	  a	  foreign	  country,	  he	  or	  she	  will	  be	  criticised	  for	  damaging	  the	  face	  of	  not	  only	  the	  ‘big	  self ’	  of	  China	  but	  also	  the	  ‘small	  self ’	  of	  the	   person	   themselves.	   In	   this	   sense,	   face	   culture,	   patriotism	   and	   nationalism	   have	  mingled,	  and	  thin	  recognition	  of	  the	  state’s	  equality	  and	  thick	  recognition	  of	  the	  state’s	  uniqueness	  have	  also	  been	  confused.	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